1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JOHN DOE J.D., Case No. 25-cv-06289-JSC

8 Plaintiff,

ORDER RE: AMS DEFENDANTS’

9 v. MOTION TO DISMISS AND

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

10 ARCHBISHOP TIMOTHY BROGLIO, et TRANSFER OF VENUE al., 11 Re: Dkt. No. 11, 24 Defendants.

12

13 Plaintiff sues the Archdiocese for the Military Services (“AMS”), AMS Archbishop 14 Timothy Broglio, and the Archdiocese of New York (“ADNY”) for negligence related to sexual 15 abuse while a minor. (Dkt. No. 8.)1 Now pending before the Court are AMS’s and Archbishop 16 Broglio’s (“AMS Defendants’”) motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s third amended complaint and 17 Plaintiff’s motion for transfer of venue. (Dkt. Nos. 11, 24.) Having carefully considered the 18 parties’ submissions, and with the benefit of oral argument on October 23, 2025, the Court 19 GRANTS AMS Defendants’ motion to dismiss and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for transfer of 20 venue. Plaintiff has not stated facts to plausibly allege a theory of AMS’s liability for actions 21 occurring prior to its corporate existence, and has not alleged any facts supporting claims against 22 or actions taken by AMS Archbishop Broglio. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim against 23 AMS Defendants and fails to plausibly allege personal jurisdiction. 24 \\ 25

26 27 1 BACKGROUND 2 I. COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS 3 Between 1974 and 1976, when Plaintiff was a minor and California citizen, he was 4 sexually abused by a “Father John Doe,” an “employee or agent of Defendants at a Catholic 5 Church facility on McClellan Air Force Base in Sacramento County, California.” (Dkt. No. 8 ¶ 1.) 6 Plaintiff’s family “came in contact with Father John Doe” when attending Catholic services on 7 McClellan Air Force Base. (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff “regularly attended mass and was allowed to 8 spend time alone during non-mass hours with Father John Doe,” including at youth activities at 9 the church. (Id. ¶¶ 21-22.) While “performing his duties as a priest employed by Defendants, 10 [Father John Doe] repeatedly sexually assaulted, molested and abused Plaintiff at McClellan Air 11 Force Base.” (Id. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer from severe mental and 12 emotional distress and economic injuries. (Id ¶¶ 32-33.) 13 Father John Doe was ordained as a Roman Catholic priest before 1974. (Id. ¶ 12.) From at 14 least 1974 to 1976, he was under AMS’s and ADNY’s “direct supervision, employ and control,” 15 and AMS and ADNY placed him “in positions where he had access to, and worked with, children 16 as an integral part of his work.” (Id.) Father John Doe “utilized Defendants’ facilities and 17 institutions to gain access to Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 27.) His title and attire “signified” he was “in good 18 standing with Defendants and was authorized to act as a priest and agent of the Church.” (Id.) In 19 addition, “[a] Catholic military chaplain such as Father John Doe may not engage in any public 20 ministry without the permission of the archbishop.” (Id. ¶ 35.) Father John Doe “is believed to 21 have previously sexually assaulted victims other than Plaintiff prior to the time he sexually 22 assaulted Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 13). However, “[i]n 1962, the Vatican in Rome issued a Papal 23 Instruction binding upon . . . AMS and ADNY until 2001,” which “directed that allegations and 24 reports of sexual abuse of children by priests were required to be kept secret.” (Id.) “Defendants 25 are directly and vicariously liable for the abuse committed by Father John Doe, including but not 26 limited to, through the theories of respondeat superior, ratification, and authorization.” (Id. ¶ 34) 27 Archbishop Broglio was at “all times material hereto . . . the head of a religious 1 DC,” but “was authorized to, and did, conduct business in the State of California, which includes 2 but is not limited to civil corporations, decision making entities, officials, agents and employees to 3 act on its behalf.” (Id. ¶ 2.) Archbishop Broglio “conducted substantial business in, and was 4 responsible for organizational operations in, Sacramento County on McClellan Air Force Base,” 5 was “responsible for the funding, staffing, and direction of the facilities and institutions within its 6 geographic area, which encompassed McClellan Air Force Base,” and was “the primary entit[y] 7 owning, operating, and controlling the activities and behavior of its employees and agents,” 8 including Father John Doe. (Id.) He therefore “had sole authority and responsibility to control 9 and supervise the ministry of Father John Doe from at least 1974 to 1976.” (Id.) 10 AMS is a corporation incorporated in Maryland with its principal place of business in 11 Washington D.C., but is “authorized to, and did, conduct business in” California. (Id. ¶ 3.) 12 Because the Catholic Church Plaintiff attended was on McClellan Air Force Base, it was “located 13 within” AMS. (Id. ¶ 1.) “At all times relevant to this Complaint,” AMS “conducted substantial 14 business in, and was responsible for organizational operations” on McClellan Air Force Base, was 15 “responsible for the funding, staffing, and direction of the facilities and institutions within” 16 McClellan Air Force Base, was “the primary entity owning, operating, and controlling the 17 activities and behavior of its employees and agents at Defendant,” and “had sole authority and 18 responsibility to control and supervise the ministry of Father John Doe from 1974 to 1976.” (Id. ¶ 19 3). Plaintiff also explains:

20 While the Archdiocese for The Military Services, the tax-exempt religious corporation incorporated in Maryland was created in 1986 21 by Pope John Paul II, its history dates back to World War I when an Auxilary Bishop of New York, Patrick Hayes, was appointed the first 22 leader of the military diocese for the US armed forces. Hayes was succeeded by Francis Cardinal Spellman, the Archbishop of New 23 York as head of the military disocese. Upon Spellman’s death in 1967 and was succeeded by Terence Cardinal Cooke who also replaced 24 Spellman as the Archbishop of New York. Successive episcopal appointments continued until Pope John Paul II created the 25 Archdiocese for The Military Services and moved its headquarters to Washington, DC. 26 (Id. ¶ 5.) 27 Plaintiff alleges AMS and ADNY employed Father John Doe “as an agent and had the 1 ability to control and supervise Father John Doe’s activities.” (Id. ¶ 6.) “[T]here existed a unity of 2 interest and ownership among all Defendants and each of them, such that an individuality and 3 separateness between Defendants ceased to exist.” (Id. ¶ 9.) Because Defendants “purchased, 4 controlled, dominated and operated each other without separate identity, observation of 5 formalities, or any other separateness,” Defendants were “the successors-in-interest and/or alter 6 egos of the other Defendants.” (Id.) Therefore, “[t]o continue to maintain the façade of a separate 7 and individual existence between and among Defendants . . . would serve to perpetuate a fraud and 8 injustice.” (Id.) 9 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 10 Plaintiff sued AMS, AMS Archbishop Broglio, ADNY, and ADNY Archbishop Timothy 11 Cardinal Dolan in Alameda County Superior Court alleging negligent supervision and retention of 12 an unknown Father John Doe and negligent supervision of Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 8.)2 AMS 13 Defendants removed the case to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 1.)3 AMS 14 Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them. (Dkt. No. 11.) Plaintiff opposes 15 AMS Defendants’ motion to dismiss and moves to transfer venue. (Dkt. No. 24.) Plaintiff also 16 voluntarily dismissed without prejudice his claims against ADNY Archbishop Timothy Cardinal 17 Dolan. (Dkt. No. 32.) 18 DISCUSSION 19 I. JUDICIAL NOTICE 20 “Generally, district courts may not consider material outside the pleadings when assessing 21 the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).” Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 22 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018). “There are only a few limited exceptions to this rule. A court may 23 consider: (1) documents attached to the complaint; (2) documents incorporated by reference in the 24

25 2 Under California law, “[t]here is no time limit for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault,” and a plaintiff “may recover up to treble damages against a defendant 26 who is found to have covered up the sexual assault of a minor.” Cal. Code Civ. P. § 340.1. 3 Although AMS Defendants’ removal attached Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 1- 27 1 at 2-23), this district later noted the entry as erroneous and refiled the Third Amended Complaint 1 complaint; and (3) matter that is judicially noticeable under Federal Rule of Evidence 201.” City 2 of Royal Oak Retirement Sys. v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 3 2012) (citing United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2003)). A court may take 4 judicial notice of facts “not subject to reasonable dispute” because they are “generally known 5 within the court's territorial jurisdiction” or can be “accurately and readily determined from 6 sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). This includes 7 “undisputed matters of public record.” Harris v. Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 8 2012); see also Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1064 n.7 (9th Cir. 9 2008) (granting judicial notice of publicly available financial documents). 10 AMS Defendants request—and Plaintiff does not oppose—judicial notice of the articles of 11 incorporation for the Military Archdiocese, United States of America, Inc., incorporated in 12 Washington D.C. on June 19, 1985; and the Archdiocese for the Military Services, U.S.A., 13 incorporated in Maryland on August 23, 1993. (Dkt. No. 12.) Courts have taken judicial notice of 14 articles of incorporation as undisputed matters of public record. See, e.g., Astre v. McQuaid, No. 15 3:18-cv-00138-WHO, 2018 WL 5617226, at *3 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2018) (taking judicial 16 notice of articles of incorporation filed with state of California because their accuracy “cannot 17 reasonably be questioned”); In re Yahoo! Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 153 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 18 1117 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (taking judicial notice of articles of incorporation); Singleton v. Volunteers 19 of Am., No. C 12-5399 LHK (PR), 2013 WL 5934647, at *2 & n.3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2013) 20 (taking judicial notice of articles of incorporation because “publicly recorded”). 21 So, the Court GRANTS AMS Defendants’ request for judicial notice of the articles of 22 incorporation. However, the Court’s judicial notice does not alone establish AMS, its alter ego, or 23 its predecessor did not exist in any form prior to 1985 or 1993. See eBay Inc. v. Digital Point 24 Sols., Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1164 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (taking “judicial notice of the fact that 25 the corporate entity known as Digital Point Solutions, Inc. filed articles of incorporation on that 26 date,” but noting “the existence of the articles of incorporation does not establish that DPS or any 27 alter ego to DPS did not exist in any form prior to May 14, 2007.”); Bohnert v. Roman Catholic 1 judicial notice of articles of incorporation, noting “the documents do not compel me to accept the 2 arguments for which they are provided”). 3 Plaintiff’s opposition brief also includes an exhibit with an AMS “Certificate of 4 Confirmation.” (Dkt. Nos. 24, 24-1.) Because the Certificate of Confirmation is not in the 5 complaint, incorporated by reference in the complaint, or judicially noticeable, the Court will not 6 consider it in deciding this motion. See Pickern v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 968- 7 69 (9th Cir. 2006) (refusing to consider new allegations raised in briefing and noting plaintiff 8 instead could have amended complaint to include allegations). 9 II. MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 10 Courts often address a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction 11 before a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. However, as the Court has 12 diversity subject matter jurisdiction, it may in its discretion evaluate the failure to state a claim 13 argument before the personal jurisdiction argument, and it does so here. See Wages v. IRS, 915 14 F.2d 1230, 1234-35 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining while a court without subject matter 15 jurisdiction is “foreclosed by definition from saying anything on the merits,” “[w]e have not 16 treated defects in personal jurisdiction similarly” because “[a] court that lacks personal jurisdiction 17 . . . [is] foreclosed from conducting a trial and entering a final judgment against the defendant” 18 and, if the plaintiff also fails to state a claim, neither “disposition” will “‘bind’ the defendant by 19 finding him liable”). 20 Under Federal Rule of Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must include a “short and plain 21 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 22 While the Rule 8 pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” “it demands 23 more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 24 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). On a motion to dismiss, the court “must take all of the factual 25 allegations in the complaint as true.” Id. However, this presumption does not apply to 26 “[t]hreadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements, supported by mere conclusory statements.” 27 Id. Put another way, to avoid dismissal, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter” to 1 alleged.” Id. A court also “need not accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly 2 subject to judicial notice, . . . [or] conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents 3 referred to in the complaint.” See Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood of Los Angeles, 759 F.3d 4 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). 5 A. Claims Against AMS 6 “The corporation comes into existence when its articles of incorporation are filed with the 7 Secretary of State.” Brodsky v. Seaboard Realty Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d 504, 515-16 (1962); see 8 also Cal. Corp. Code § 200(c) (“The corporate existence begins upon the filing of the articles.”); 9 People ex rel. Boardman v. Town of Linden, 107 Cal. 94, 101 (1895) (“Until [declaration of 10 incorporation] is filed there is no corporation.”). So, “[i]n general, a corporation cannot be liable 11 for actions taken prior to the date of its incorporation.” In re Townshend Patent Litig., Nos. C 02- 12 04833-JF, C 02-04836 JF, 2004 WL 1920009, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2004); see also Cappello 13 Global, LLC v. Temsa Ulaşim Araçlari Sanayì Ve Tìcaret A.S., No. 2:19-CV-10710-MEMF-KS, 14 2024 WL 5330030, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2024) (“Generally, a corporation is not liable for 15 acts undertaken prior to its organization.”); Cal. Corp. Code § 207(g) (allowing corporations to 16 “incur liabilities”). 17 AMS Defendants argue Plaintiff cannot state a claim against them because AMS did not 18 exist between 1974 and 1976. Plaintiff alleges McClellan Air Force Base was “located within” 19 AMS, and AMS “had sole authority and responsibility to control and supervise the ministry of 20 Father John Doe from 1974 to 1976.” (Dkt. No. 8 ¶¶ 1, 3.) However, Plaintiff also alleges AMS 21 was “created in 1986,” (id. ¶ 5), and does not contest AMS Defendants’ judicially noticeable 22 evidence AMS was incorporated in 1993, (Dkt. No. 12 at 11). So, Plaintiff has not plausibly 23 alleged AMS existed between 1974 and 1976. Because AMS is a corporation, it cannot incur 24 liabilities for actions taken between 1974 and 1976, prior to its existence. 25 But, Plaintiff argues AMS Defendants are nevertheless liable as alter egos or successors in 26 interest of a “military diocese for the US armed forces” or ADNY. (Dkt. No. 8 ¶ 5.) 27 1. Alter Ego Liability 1 individuality, or separateness, of the said person and corporation has ceased,’” and (2) “‘adherence 2 to the fiction of the separate existence of the corporation would. . . sanction a fraud or promote 3 injustice.’” In re Schwarzkopf, 626 F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Wood v. Elling 4 Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 353, 365 n.9 (1977)). “Conclusory allegations of ‘alter ego’ status are 5 insufficient to state a claim. Rather, a plaintiff must allege specific facts supporting both of the 6 necessary elements.” Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Ent. Inc., 116 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1136 (C.D. Cal. 7 2015); see also Slack v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 83 F. Supp. 3d 890, 901 (N.D. Cal. 8 2015) (dismissing alter ego theory based on “conclusory allegation” without “underlying factual 9 allegations to support th[e] conclusion”). 10 Plaintiff alleges “at all relevant times, there existed a unity of interest and ownership 11 among all Defendants and each of them, such that an individuality and separateness between 12 Defendants ceased to exist,” and “[t]o continue to maintain the façade of a separate and individual 13 existence between and among Defendants . . . would serve to perpetuate a fraud and injustice.” 14 (Dkt. No. 8 ¶ 9.) Plaintiff’s “formulaic recitation of the elements of [the] cause of action” is 15 insufficient to plausibly allege alter ego liability. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 16 544, 570 (2007). Plaintiff also alleges Defendants “purchased, controlled, dominated and operated 17 each other without separate identity, observation of formalities, or any other separateness,” but he 18 does not provide any specific facts supporting these allegations. (Dkt. No. 8 ¶ 9.) See In re 19 Schwarzkopf, 626 F.3d at 1038 (explaining comingling of funds, disregard of legal formalities, or 20 diversion of assets might suggest unity of interest); see also Maverick Bankcard, Inc. v. Nurture 21 Sols., LLC, No. 2:22-cv-02875-ODW (JPRx), 2023 WL 8543508, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2023) 22 (dismissing alter ego claim when allegations “consist of statements of law drawn directly from 23 case authority and culminate with the legal conclusion of alter ego liability” and “could appear in 24 any pleading alleging alter ego and are not specific to this case”). Because Plaintiff has not 25 alleged facts supporting a plausible inference AMS operates as the alter ego of the “military 26 diocese for the US armed forces” or ADNY, Plaintiff has not alleged AMS’s liability through an 27 alter ego theory. (Dkt. No. 8 ¶ 5.) 2. Successor Liability 1 “[S]uccessor liability is an equitable doctrine that applies when a purchasing corporation is 2 merely a continuation of the selling corporation or the asset sale was fraudulently entered to 3 escape debts and liabilities.” Brown Bark III, L.P. v. Haver, 219 Cal. App. 4th 809, 822 (2013). 4 “Transfer of all or substantially all a corporation’s assets is a prerequisite to a finding of successor 5 liability.” Pac. Gulf Shipping Co. v. Vigorous Shipping & Trading S.A., 992 F.3d 893, 897 (9th 6 Cir. 2021). A plaintiff must allege specific facts to support a plausible inference of successor 7 liability as a legal theory. See id. (affirming dismissal of successor liability theory when party 8 “made only a conclusory allegation” companies “‘comprise successor corporate business 9 entities’”). 10 As to successor liability, Plaintiff alleges only “Defendants were the successors-in-interest 11 . . . of the other Defendants in that they purchased, controlled, dominated and operated each 12 other.” (Dkt. No. 8 ¶ 9.) Plaintiff does not allege facts supporting his conclusory allegation AMS 13 was the successor-in-interest of other Defendants—or even factual allegations clarifying which 14 “other Defendants” AMS succeeded. Furthermore, to the extent Plaintiff alleges AMS succeeded 15 ADNY, ADNY’s continued existence weakens such allegations. See Gerritsen, 116 F. Supp. 3d at 16 1133 (“[I]mposition of successor liability under the ‘mere continuation’ doctrine requires that the 17 predecessor entity that was purportedly acquired by the successor entity no longer exist.”); see 18 also Philips v. Cooper Labs., 215 Cal. App. 3d 1648, 1660 (1989) (holding no successor liability 19 when corporation “continued as a separate corporation after its acquisition”). And although 20 Plaintiff argues “the new AMS corporation has assumed the title and responsibilities of the 21 military vicarate that pre-existed it,” (Dkt. No. 24 at 6), Plaintiff does not allege any assets were 22 transferred to AMS, which is a “prerequisite to a finding of successor liability.” Pac. Gulf 23 Shipping Co., 992 F.3d at 897. So, Plaintiff has not alleged successor liability. 24 Because Plaintiff agrees AMS had not yet been incorporated when Plaintiff’s injuries 25 occurred, and because Plaintiff fails to allege facts plausibly supporting AMS’s liability under an 26 alter ego or successor liability theory, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against AMS. 27 B. Archbishop Broglio 1 Plaintiff alleges Archbishop Broglio, as AMS Archbishop, was “responsible for the 2 funding, staffing, and direction of the . . . McClellan Air Force Base,” and, like AMS, “had sole 3 authority and responsibility to control and supervise the ministry of Father John Doe from 1974 to 4 1976.” (Dkt. No. 8 ¶ 2.) As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s allegations Archbishop Broglio had 5 certain authorities and responsibilities as AMS Archbishop between 1974 and 1976 contradict his 6 allegations AMS was “created in 1986” and judicially noticeable evidence of AMS’s 7 incorporation, and therefore need not be accepted as true. (Id. ¶ 5.) See Gonzalez, 759 F.3d at 8 1115 (noting court “need not accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to 9 judicial notice”). However, Plaintiff’s complaint also lacks sufficient factual allegations to 10 support a plausible inference Archbishop Broglio, specifically, committed the alleged torts. 11 Plaintiff does not provide any facts supporting his allegations Father John Doe’s sexual abuse 12 “was or should have been reasonably foreseeable to” Archbishop Broglio, or explaining how 13 Archbishop Broglio “failed to provide reasonable supervision of Father John Doe” or “breached 14 [his] duty” to supervise Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 8 ¶¶ 49, 52, 67.) So, Plaintiff has not alleged facts 15 sufficient to state claims against Archbishop Broglio. 16 Plaintiff’s contention Archbishop Broglio is liable as a “successive appointment from the 17 line of Archbishops who had previously served as” AMS Archbishop is unavailing. (Dkt. No. 24 18 at 4-5.) First, Plaintiff does not explain the legal standard for imposing liability on Archbishop 19 Broglio as a “successive appointment.” Second, even if Archbishop Broglio derived liability from 20 a prior AMS Archbishop, there was no AMS Archbishop between 1974 and 1976 from whom he 21 would derive liability; instead, Plaintiff alleges an individual served as “leader of the military 22 diocese” during that period. (Dkt. No. 8 ¶ 5.) 23 Plaintiff’s argument he has pled “extensive facts against AMS and Archbishop Broglio 24 demonstrating involvement in the [Catholic Church’s] cover-up” is also irrelevant. (Dkt. No. 24 at 25 7.) To support his argument, Plaintiff references the Vatican’s 1962 Papal Instruction, 26 “Defendants’ protocols,” and the “Dallas Charter.” (Dkt. No. 8 ¶¶ 13, 14, 17.) However, Plaintiff 27 does not allege any specific actions AMS or Archbishop Broglio took to help cover up Father John 1 Doe’s sexual abuse. That California’s Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.1(b) allows treble 2 damages against “a defendant who is found to have covered up the sexual assault of a minor” does 3 not excuse Plaintiff from stating facts to plausibly AMS Defendants participated in a cover up. 4 Because Plaintiff has not alleged facts plausibly supporting claims against AMS or 5 Archbishop Broglio, his claims against the AMS Defendants are dismissed. 6 III. MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 7 To exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, a court must establish the 8 defendant had “certain minimum contacts” with the forum state “such that the maintenance of the 9 suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. 10 Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (cleaned up). Personal jurisdiction can be either general or 11 specific. General personal jurisdiction exists “when a defendant is ‘essentially at home’ in the 12 State.” Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 358 (2021) (citation 13 omitted). And specific personal jurisdiction exists when a defendant takes “some act by which it 14 purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.” Id. at 15 359 (cleaned up). The plaintiff “bears the burden of establishing” personal jurisdiction. Mavrix 16 Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011). The plaintiff “need only 17 make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts,” and a court “resolve[s] factual disputes in the 18 plaintiff’s favor.” Id. 19 A. General Jurisdiction 20 General jurisdiction exists only when a defendant’s “affiliations with the State in which 21 suit is brought are so constant and pervasive as to render it essentially at home in the forum State.” 22 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014) (cleaned up). For an individual, general 23 jurisdiction exists in their domicile. See id. at 137. For a corporation, general jurisdiction exists in 24 its “place of incorporation and principal place of business.” See id. Plaintiff alleges Archbishop 25 Broglio is incorporated with a principal place of business in Washington, D.C., so his domicile is 26 Washington, D.C. (Dkt. No. 8 ¶ 2). AMS is incorporated in Maryland, with its principal place of 27 business in Washington, D.C. (Id. ¶ 3.) So, the Court does not have general personal jurisdiction B. Specific Jurisdiction 1 The Ninth Circuit “use[s] a three-prong test for analyzing claims of specific jurisdiction.” 2 Glob. Commodities Trading Grp., Inc. v. Beneficio de Arroz Choloma, S.A., 972 F.3d 1101, 1107 3 (9th Cir. 2020). “First, the non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or 4 consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he 5 purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking 6 the benefits and protections of its laws.” Id. (cleaned up). “Second, the claim must arise out of or 7 relate to the defendant's forum-related activities.” Id. “Finally, the exercise of jurisdiction must 8 be reasonable.” Id. If the plaintiff “satisf[ies] both of the first two prongs, the burden then shifts 9 to the defendant to . . . [show] the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Id. (cleaned 10 up). As to the first prong, a plaintiff must show the defendants “(1) committed an intentional act, 11 (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be 12 suffered in the forum state” Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int’l, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th 13 Cir. 2017) (citation omitted) (explaining purposeful direction test applies to tort claims). 14 To support purposeful direction, Plaintiff argues AMS Defendants “assign[ed] known 15 pedophile priests to minister to children at McClellan Air Force Base” and “cover[ed] up 16 childhood sexual abuse by priests at the McClellan Air Force Base and other military bases in 17 California.” (Dkt. No. 24 at 10.) Plaintiff’s arguments for personal jurisdiction fail for reasons 18 similar to his failure to state a claim. As explained above, Plaintiff has not alleged facts to support 19 a plausible inference AMS took any actions or incurs liability for others’ actions between 1974 20 and 1976, before AMS existed. And Plaintiff does not state any facts supporting his conclusory 21 allegations AMS Archbishop Broglio “[a]t all material times hereto, . . . conduct[ed] business in” 22 California, and was “responsible for the [] staffing” of the McClellan Air Force Base. (Dkt. No. 8 23 ¶ 2.) Because Plaintiff does not plausibly allege AMS Defendants committed any intentional acts, 24 he cannot show purposeful direction or specific personal jurisdiction. 25 So, the Court also dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against AMS Defendants because Plaintiff 26 has not shown the Court has personal jurisdiction. 27

IV. MOTION TO TRANSFER

In his brief opposing AMS Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiff also moved for transfer of venue to the Eastern District of California, the Southern District of New York, or Washington, ° D.C. (Dkt. No. 24 at 11.) In response to the Court’s order for supplemental briefing on □□□□□□□□□□□ motion for transfer of venue, AMS Defendants opposed Plaintiff's motion for transfer of venue. ° (Dkt. Nos. 30, 33.) Plaintiff then clarified he “does not object to venue in San Francisco but felt ° an obligation as an officer of the court to raise this question in his first filed pleadings in the ’ removed actions.” (Dkt. No. 34 at 2.) Plaintiff now argues AMS Defendants “have waived any ° venue objections and the action should not be transferred,” and “it is likely there is no other ° jurisdiction than California that this case could have been brought.” (/d. at 2-3.) Because neither party objects to venue, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's motion to transfer venue.

CONCLUSION

Because Plaintiff has not stated a claim against or plausibly alleged personal jurisdiction 4 over AMS Defendants, the Court GRANTS AMS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims S against them. Leave to amend would be futile as there is no legal basis for AMS Defendants’ liability. See Wheeler v. City of Santa Clara, 894 F.3d 1046, 1059 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Leave to 5 amend may be denied if the proposed amendment is futile or would be subject to dismissal.”); see = " also Yagman vy. Garcetti, 852 F.3d 859, 867 (9th Cir. 2017) (‘T]he district court need not grant 18 leave if it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” (quotation marks and citation omitted). If Plaintiff believes there are additional persons or entities over which the Court has personal jurisdiction and which may be liable for the alleged conduct, he may move for leave to amend to add new defendants if the remaining Defendant does * not stipulate to amendment. °° This Order disposes of Docket No. 11.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

* Dated: October 23, 2025 | td 26 fn 27 JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLE 28 United States District Judge