1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TUAN QVOC BUI, Case No.: 25-cv-2111-JES-DEB

12 Petitioner,

ORDER GRANTING PETITION

13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241

14 WARDEN OF THE OTAY MESA

DETENTION FACILITY, et al., 15 [ECF No. 1, 12] Respondents. 16 17 Before the Court is Petitioner Tuan Qvoc Bui’s (“Petitioner” or “Bui”) Petition for 18 Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. Pursuant to the Court’s 19 briefing schedule (ECF No. 5), Respondents filed a return to the petition and Petitioner 20 filed a traverse based on the original petition. ECF Nos. 10, 11. Petitioner then filed an 21 Amended Petition, and the parties agreed upon a further briefing schedule. ECF No. 12. 22 Respondents filed a return on the Amended Petition and Petitioner filed a traverse. ECF 23 Nos. 14, 15. Finding the matter appropriate for resolution on the papers, for the reasons set 24 forth below, the Court GRANTS the Writ of Habeas Corpus. 25 I. BACKGROUND 26 A. Amended Petition 27 Petitioner alleges the following factual background in his Amended Petition. He is a 28 native of Vietnam who moved to the United States with his mother in 1975 after she 1 married a U.S. serviceman. ECF No. 12 at 3. In 2015, Petitioner was convicted of 2 possession for sale of MDMA. Id. Based on this conviction, in May 2018, he was 3 subsequently ordered removed. Id. At that time, Immigration and Customs Enforcement 4 (“ICE”) held him for over 4 months but was unable to obtain travel documents and remove 5 him. Id. Thus, Petitioner was released on an order of supervision. Id. 6 After release, Petitioner lived in the United States for the next seven years. Id. He 7 alleges that he never missed a check-in with ICE, had no further convictions, and held a 8 steady job as a finance manager with Long Beach Honda. Id. On May 7, 2025, Petitioner 9 was detained at his regular check-in with ICE. Id. Petitioner has since been held in 10 detention at the Otay Mesa Detention Center. Id. 11 In his Amended Petition, Petitioner asserts two claims: (1) Respondents are 12 detaining him without a significant likelihood of removing him to Vietnam, in violation of 13 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), and the Due Process 14 Clause; and (2) ICE failed to comply with its own procedures to re-detain him, in violation 15 of the Fifth Amendment and the Administrative Procedures Act. Id. at 5-10. 16 B. ICE’s Actions Post-Detainment 17 In support of its return, Respondents offer a declaration from ICE Deportation 18 Officer Daniel Negrin (“Officer Negrin”) regarding actions taken following Petitioner’s re- 19 detainment. ECF No. 14-1. He alleges that a week after re-detainment, on May 14, 2025, 20 San Diego’s Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”), started the process of 21 obtaining Petitioner’s foreign identify documents. Id. ¶ 7. On June 25, 2025, he alleges that 22 ERO submitted these documents for English translation, which was returned on June 30, 23 2025. Id. ¶ 8. On August 29, 2025, he alleges that ERO submitted additional documents 24 for translation, which was returned on September 5, 2025. Id. ¶ 9. Finally, on September 25 17, 2025, ERO submitted a request for travel documents to Vietnam for Petitioner. Id. ¶ 26 10. Based on his experience, Officer Negrin states that he “expects to receive Petitioners 27 [Travel Document] by the end of this month, October 2025” and that Petitioner’s removal 28 to be effectuated on or before December 1, 2025. Id. ¶¶ 13-21. 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 3 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). 4 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 5 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 6 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of 7 habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the 8 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas 9 corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in 10 that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 11 (2001). Accordingly, challenges to immigration-related detention are within the purview 12 of a district court’s habeas jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see 13 also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 14 III. DISCUSSION 15 As stated above, Petitioner brings two claims to argue that he should be released 16 from detention: (1) Respondents are detaining him without a significant likelihood of 17 removing him to Vietnam, in violation of Zadvydas, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), and the Due 18 Process Clause; and (2) ICE failed to comply with its own procedures to re-detain him, in 19 violation of the Fifth Amendment and the Administrative Procedures Act. Because the 20 Court finds below that Claim 2 is meritorious and justifies Petitioner’s release, the Court 21 will only address this claim in this Order. 22 “The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Government from 23 depriving individuals of their life, liberty, or property, without due process of 24 law.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). “[T]he Due Process Clause 25 applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence is 26 lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 679. “Freedom from 27 imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint— 28 lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Id. at 690. A person at risk of a suffering 1 a serious loss being given notice and an opportunity to be heard, in a meaningful manner 2 and at a meaningful time, is the essence of procedural due process. Mathews v. Eldridge, 3 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 4 The detention and release of noncitizens that are subject to a final order of removal 5 is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. This statute provides that “when an alien is ordered 6 removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a 7 period of 90 days.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). “If the alien does not leave or is not removed 8 within the removal period, the alien, pending removal, shall be subject to supervision under 9 regulations prescribed by the Attorney General.” Id. § 1231(a)(3). 10 Supervised release and any revocation of such release thereafter is governed by 11 either 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 or 8 C.F.R. § 241.13. Diaz v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01079 JLT 12 EPG, 2025 WL 2581575, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2025). Here, in Petitioner’s case, the 13 Notice of Revocation of Release cites to 241.4 as the basis for his revocation. ECF No. 14- 14 2 at 14; see ECF No. 14 at 7-8. Revocation under § 241.4(l) provides two ways for 15 supervised release to be revoked: 16 (1) Violation of conditions of release. Any alien described in paragraph (a) or (b)(1) of this section who has been released under an order of supervision or 17 other conditions of release who violates the conditions of release may be 18 returned to custody. Any such alien who violates the conditions of an order of supervision is subject to the penalties described in section 243(b) of the Act. 19 Upon revocation, the alien will be notified of the reasons for revocation of his 20 or her release or parole. The alien will be afforded an initial informal interview promptly after his or her return to Service custody to afford the alien an 21 opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification. 22 (2) Determination by the Service. The Executive Associate Commissioner 23 shall have authority, in the exercise of discretion, to revoke release and return 24 to Service custody an alien previously approved for release under the procedures in this section. A district director may also revoke release of an 25 alien when, in the district director's opinion, revocation is in the public interest 26 and circumstances do not reasonably permit referral of the case to the Executive Associate Commissioner. Release may be revoked in the exercise 27 of discretion when, in the opinion of the revoking official: 28 1 (i) The purposes of release have been served;

2 (ii) The alien violates any condition of release; 3 (iii) It is appropriate to enforce a removal order or to commence 4 removal proceedings against an alien; or 5 (iv) The conduct of the alien, or any other circumstance, indicates that 6 release would no longer be appropriate. 7 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l). Respondents do not appear to suggest that Petitioner violated the terms 8 of his supervised release (see generally ECF No. 14), ruling out § 241.4(1)(1) as a source 9 of his revocation. Rather, they appear to rely on § 241.4(l)(2). 10 Section 241.4(l)(1) explicitly requires that “Upon revocation, the alien will be 11 notified of the reasons for revocation of his or her release or parole. The alien will be 12 afforded an initial informal interview promptly after his or her return to Service custody to 13 afford the alien an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the 14 notification.” These requirements for notice and for an initial information interview are not 15 explicitly required in § 241.4(l)(2), but courts have held that the same requirements 16 constrain revocation of release under this second provision as well. See Diaz, 2025 WL 17 2581575 (citing various district court cases that have rejected the government’s arguments 18 that these provisions do not apply to § 241.4(l)(2)); Constantinovici v. Bondi, No. 3:25- 19 CV-02405-RBM-AHG, 2025 WL 2898985, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025) (“District 20 courts have consistently rejected this argument and held that § 241.4(l)(1)’s procedural 21 requirements apply equally to revocation of a noncitizen’s release pursuant to § 22 241.4(l)(2).”). Thus, as applicable to this provision, the Court will address the issues of 23 notice and informal interview below. 24 However, as an initial matter, the Court first addresses Respondents’ argument that 25 these regulations governing revocation of supervised release do not provide any substantive 26 rights that override their statutory detention authority, seeming to suggest that a due process 27 violation therefore cannot be sustained. ECF No. 14 at 8. While Respondents cite to one 28 1 recent district court case within the Ninth Circuit to support its position (id.), the Court 2 finds that the weight of the authority among other district courts within this circuit takes 3 the opposition position. See Diaz, 2025 WL 2581575, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2025) 4 (“DHS’s failure to follow its own procedural regulations may constitute a due process 5 violation.”); M.S.L. v. Bostock, No. 6:25-CV-01204-AA, 2025 WL 2430267, at *8 (D. Or. 6 Aug. 21, 2025) (“Although ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen 7 pending removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody, they have a 8 protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.”); Constantinovici, 2025 WL 9 2898985, at *5 (“Both 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 and 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 were intended to ‘provide 10 due process protections to [noncitizens] following the removal period as they are 11 considered for continued detention, release, and then possible revocation of release . . . .’”) 12 (citation omitted); Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-05436-RFL, 2025 WL 1983677, 13 at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2025) (“The fact that Petitioner is subject to discretionary 14 conditions of release likewise does not mean he lacks a protectable liberty interest and can 15 be re-detained without process.”). Thus, the Court finds that failure by Respondents to 16 follow their own regulations, if found, may constitute a due process violation. 17 A. Initial Information Interview 18 First, Petitioner argues that Respondents conceded in their return to his Amended 19 Petition that he never received an initial interview. ECF No. 15 at 4. The Court agrees. In 20 the return, Respondents state that “[t]here is no record that Petitioner was provided with an 21 informal interview during which he could respond to the reasons stated for revocation.” 22 ECF No. 14 at 8. This is confirmed based on a review of the documents submitted by 23 Respondents. See generally ECF No. 14-2. The only record of an interview in 24 Respondents’ documents are for an interview that was conducted around September 5, 25 2025 (see ECF No. 14-2 at 19-22), but this was pursuant to the regulations that require a 26 review after the initial period of 90 days and not the initial informal interview required 27 under § 241.4(l). This does not suffice to meet the requirement for a “prompt” informal 28 interview required under Respondents’ own regulations and does not work to cure this 1 violation. See, e.g., M.S.L., 2025 WL 2430267, at *11 (holding that informal interview was 2 not sufficiently “prompt” where it took place twenty-seven days after revocation). 3 Courts have found a due process violation where no informal interview took place 4 after the revocation of release. Id. (collecting cases); Constantinovici, 2025 WL 2898985, 5 at *6 (due process violation where “[n]othing in the record indicates that Petitioner was 6 provided with an interview in connection with the revocation of his release or otherwise 7 afforded an opportunity to respond to the reasons for his re-detention”); Delkash v. Noem, 8 No. 5:25-CV-01675-HDV-AGR, 2025 WL 2683988, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025) 9 (same where there was “no evidence that [petitioner] has been afforded an informal or 10 formal interview”); Phan v. Noem, No. 3:25-CV-02422-RBM-MSB, 2025 WL 2898977, 11 at *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025) (finding same where no interview was conducted). 12 B. Sufficiency of the Notice 13 Second, Petitioner argues that the notice provided to him when he was re-detained 14 was not sufficient in explaining the reasoning for the revocation of his supervised release. 15 ECF No. 15 at 4-5. The notice, dated the day he was re-detained on May 7, 2025, states as 16 follows: 17 This letter is to inform you that your case has been reviewed, and it has been determined that you will be kept in the custody of U.S. Immigration and 18 Customs Enforcement (ICE) at this time. This decision has been made based 19 on a review of your immigration and criminal history. 20 Based on the above, and pursuant to 8 CFR 241.4, you are to remain in ICE 21 custody at this time. 22 ECF No. 14-2 at 14. On the same date, Petitioner was also provided with a Warrant of 23 Arrest (id. at 16) and a Notice of Custody Determination (id. at 18), but neither provide 24 any further reasoning as to the revocation of supervised release. 25 In M.S.L, the court reviewed and held deficient a notice that stated “in vague terms, 26 that the revocation decision was ‘made based on a review of your case; your existing order 27 of removal; and a determination that there is a significant likelihood of your removal in the 28 reasonably foreseeable future.’” M.S.L., 2025 WL 2430267, at *10. Similarly, in Perez- 1 Escobar v. Moniz, No. 25-CV-11781-PBS, 2025 WL 2084102, at *2 (D. Mass. July 24, 2 2025), a case cited favorably within this circuit by the Diaz district court, the court held 3 insufficient a notice that stated “generically that officials had reviewed [petitioner’s] 4 ‘official alien file’ and determined ‘there are changed circumstances in your case,’ 5 including that he was ‘subject to an administratively final order of removal’ and that DHS 6 ‘determined the purpose of your release has been served and it is appropriate to enforce the 7 removal order.’” Also, in Delkash, the court held that “the government cannot conflate the 8 reason for removal with the reason for revocation of release” when the government pointed 9 to the petitioner’s “criminal activities” for his re-detention. Delkash, 2025 WL 2683988, 10 at *5. 11 Compared to the level of details and reasoning provided in these cases, the notice 12 here fares no better. The mere statement that the re-detention decision was “based on a 13 review of your immigration and criminal history” is arguably even less detailed than the 14 statements in Perez-Escobar and M.S.L. Thus, the Court finds that the notice here is 15 insufficient and does not provide Petitioner with adequate reasons for the revocation of his 16 release. 17 * * * * * 18 In summary, the Court concludes that Respondents failed to follow their own 19 regulations in re-detaining Petitioner by failing to: (1) state an adequate basis to revoke 20 Petitioner’s release pursuant to of 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l); and (2) provide Petitioner with a 21 “prompt” informal interview so that he could contest the reasons for his revocation, as 22 required under f 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l). Like many other district courts within this circuit, the 23 Court finds that these failures constitute a violation of Petitioner’s due process rights and 24 justifies his release. Diaz, 2025 WL 2581575, at *9; M.S.L., 2025 WL 2430267, at *12; 25 Constantinovici, 2025 WL 2898985, at *7; Phan, 2025 WL 2898977, at *5; Delkash, 2025 26 WL 2683988, at *6. 27 28 1 Accordingly, Petitioner’s habeas petition is GRANTED on this ground, and 2 || Petitioner is ordered RELEASED. In light of the disposition, the Court declines to address 3 || the remaining claims in the Amended Petition. 4 IV. CONCLUSION 5 For the reasons stated above Petitioner’s Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED. 6 Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody, subject to 7 |\|his preexisting Order of Supervision. The Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status 8 ||Report no later than 5:00 p.m. on October 28, 2025, confirming that the Petitioner has 9 || been released. The Clerk of Court is ORDERED to CLOSE this case. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 || Dated: October 23, 2025 12 Vw Sin, 13 Honorable James E. Simmons Jr. 14 United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28