1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 MARCUS HILL-COLBERT, JENNIFER No. 2:22-cv-1651 WBS DB TIMMONS, HERMINIO LeBRON, DANIEL 13 REED, VINCENT BARNAO, ERIN McMARLIN, and JAMES THOMPSON, on 14 behalf of themselves and a class MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: of similarly situated persons, PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR FINAL 15 APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION AND Plaintiffs, MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES 16 AND COSTS v. 17

CITY OF ROSEVILLE, ROSEVILLE

18 POLICE DEPARTMENT, TYLER CANTLEY, and DOES 1-20, 19 Defendants. 20

21 ----oo0oo---- 22 23 Plaintiffs Marcus Hill-Colbert, Jennifer Timmons, 24 Herminio LeBron, Daniel Reed, Vincent Barnao, Erin McMarlin, and 25 James Thompson (collectively, “plaintiffs”), individually and on 26 behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, brought this 27 putative class action against municipal government defendants 28 City of Roseville (“the City” or “Roseville”), the Roseville 1 Police Department, Roseville Officer Tyler Cantley, and twenty 2 fictitiously named “Does” (collectively, “defendants”) alleging 3 various torts and constitutional rights violations. (See First 4 Am. Compl. (“FAC”) (Docket No. 17).) This court granted 5 plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval of a class action 6 settlement. (Order Granting Prelim. Approval.) Plaintiffs now 7 move for final approval. (See Docket No. 45.) 8 The Ninth Circuit has declared a strong judicial policy 9 favoring settlement of class actions. Class Plaintiffs v. City 10 of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992); see also 11 Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 965 (9th Cir. 2009) 12 (“We put a good deal of stock in the product of an arms-length, 13 non-collusive, negotiated resolution[.]”) (citation omitted). 14 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides that “[t]he 15 claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled 16 . . . only with the court’s approval.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). 17 “Approval under 23(e) involves a two-step process in 18 which the Court first determines whether a proposed class action 19 settlement deserves preliminary approval and then, after notice 20 is given to class members, whether final approval is warranted.” 21 Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 22 525 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (citing Manual for Complex Litig. (Third), 23 § 30.41 (1995)). This court satisfied step one by granting 24 plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for preliminary approval of class 25 action settlement on April 15, 2025. (Docket No. 42.) Now, 26 following notice to the class members, the court will consider 27 whether final approval is merited by evaluating: (1) the 28 treatment of this litigation as a class action and (2) the terms 1 of the settlement. See Diaz v. Tr. Territory of Pac. Islands, 2 876 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir. 1989). 3 I. Class Certification 4 The putative class consists of “all homeless persons 5 who were excluded from a City of Roseville park facility pursuant 6 to Roseville Municipal code section 8.02.316, but not arrested at 7 the time, within two years before September 20, 2022.” (Docket 8 No. 40-2 Ex. C ¶ 12.) Class counsel received 48 claim forms 9 after the Notice of Settlement was distributed. (Docket No. 45-1 10 at 3.) 11 To be certified, the putative class must satisfy the 12 requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b). 13 Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 512 (9th Cir. 2013). 14 A. Rule 23(a) 15 Rule 23(a) restricts class actions to cases where: “(1) 16 the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 17 impracticable [numerosity]; (2) there are questions of law or 18 fact common to the class [commonality]; (3) the claims or 19 defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims 20 or defenses of the class [typicality]; and (4) the representative 21 parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 22 class [adequacy of representation].” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). 23 In the court’s order granting preliminary approval of 24 the settlement, the court found that the putative class satisfied 25 the Rule 23(a) requirements. (See Order Granting Prelim. 26 Approval at 6-12.) As to numerosity, typicality, and 27 commonality, the court is unaware of any changes that would 28 affect its conclusion that the putative class satisfies the Rule 1 23(a) requirements, and the parties have not indicated that they 2 are aware of any such developments. 3 As to adequacy of representation, the court previously 4 found no conflicts of interest, as the named plaintiffs’ 5 interests are generally aligned with those of the putative class 6 members, who suffered injuries similar to those suffered by the 7 named plaintiffs. (Order Granting Prelim. Approval at 8.) 8 However, plaintiffs were asked to “present further evidence of 9 named plaintiffs’ efforts toward receiving incentive awards at 10 final approval.” (Id. at 9.) As discussed in greater detail 11 below, the court finds the incentive awards are reasonable and do 12 not render the class representatives inadequate. 13 Accordingly, the court finds that the class definition 14 proposed by plaintiffs meets the requirements of Rule 23(a). 15 B. Rule 23(b) 16 After fulfilling the threshold requirements of Rule 17 23(a), the proposed class must satisfy the requirements of one of 18 the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b). Leyva, 716 F.3d at 512. 19 Plaintiffs seek certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which provides 20 that a class action may be maintained only if (1) “the court 21 finds that questions of law or fact common to class members 22 predominate over questions affecting only individual members” and 23 (2) “that a class action is superior to other available methods 24 for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. 25 R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 26 In its order granting preliminary approval of the 27 settlement, the court found that both the predominance and 28 superiority prerequisites of Rule 23(b)(3) were satisfied. 1 (Order Granting Prelim. Approval at 11-12.) The court is unaware 2 of any changes that would affect its conclusion that Rule 3 23(b)(3) is satisfied. Because the settlement class satisfies 4 both Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3), the court will grant final class 5 certification of this action. 6 C. Rule 23(c)(2) Notice Requirements 7 If the court certifies a class under Rule 23(b)(3), it 8 “must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable 9 under the circumstances, including individual notice to all 10 members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” Fed. 11 R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). Rule 23(c)(2) governs both the form and 12 content of a proposed notice. See Ravens v. Iftikar, 174 F.R.D. 13 651, 658 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 14 417 U.S. 156, 172–77 (1974)). Although that notice must be 15 “reasonably certain to inform the absent members of the plaintiff 16 class,” actual notice is not required. Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 17 1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). 18 The notice explains the proceedings, defines the scope 19 of the class, and explains what the settlement provides and how 20 much each class member can expect to receive in compensation. 21 (See Docket No. 45-3 Ex. B.) The notice further explains the 22 opt-out procedure, the procedure for objecting to the settlement, 23 and the date and location of the final approval hearing. (See 24 id.) The content of the notice therefore satisfies Rule 25 23(c)(2)(B). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B); Churchill Vill., 26 L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Notice 27 is satisfactory if it ‘generally describes the terms of the 28 settlement in sufficient detail to alert those with adverse 1 viewpoints to investigate and to come forward and be heard.’”) 2 (quoting Mendoza v. Tucson Sch. Dist. No. 1, 623 F.2d 1338, 1352 3 (9th Cir. 1980)). 4 In its preliminary approval order, this court cautioned 5 that “because plaintiffs are homeless . . . a notice sent via 6 conventional means, such as mail, is unlikely to suffice.” (See 7 Order Granting Prelim. Approval at 14 (citing Roes 1-2 v. SFBSC 8 Mgmt., LLC, 944 F.3d 1035, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 2019).) Counsel was 9 thus advised to undertake additional measures to apprise all 10 class members of the proposed settlement. (See id.) 11 Counsel attempted to notify class members in a variety 12 of ways. (See Docket No. 46 at 4.) Counsel posted notices in 13 front of their office and at places frequented by the homeless; 14 they placed a table outside their office with supplies for 15 completing class participation forms; they contacted many 16 homeless people face-to-face in parks, churches, pantry 17 locations, and any other areas they reasoned the homeless would 18 likely be found; and they hired homeless individuals to 19 distribute informational flyers. (See id. at 4-5.) 20 The court appreciates the thorough efforts taken by the 21 parties to effectuate notice and is satisfied that the notice 22 procedure was “reasonably calculated, under all the 23 circumstances,” to apprise all class members of the proposed 24 settlement. See Roes, 944 F.3d at 1045–46. 25 II. Final Settlement Approval 26 Having determined that class treatment is warranted, 27 the court must now address whether the terms of the parties’ 28 settlement appear fair, adequate, and reasonable. See Fed. R. 1 Civ. P. 23(e)(2). To determine the fairness, adequacy, and 2 reasonableness of the agreement, Rule 23(e) requires the court to 3 consider four factors: “(1) the class representatives and class 4 counsel have adequately represented the class; (2) the proposal 5 was negotiated at arm’s length; (3) the relief provided for the 6 class is adequate; and (4) the proposal treats class members 7 equitably relative to each other.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has 8 also identified eight additional factors the court may consider, 9 many of which overlap substantially with Rule 23(e)’s four 10 factors: 11 The strength of the plaintiff’s case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of 12 further litigation; the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; the amount 13 offered in settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; the 14 experience and views of counsel; the presence of a governmental participant; and the reaction of 15 the class members to the proposed settlement. 16 Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). 17 A. Adequate Representation 18 The court must first consider whether “the class 19 representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the 20 class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(A). This analysis is 21 “redundant of the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) . . . .” Hudson 22 v. Libre Tech., Inc., No. 3:18-cv-1371 GPC KSC, 2020 WL 2467060, 23 at *5 (S.D. Cal. May 13, 2020) (quoting 4 Newberg on Class 24 Actions § 13:48 (5th ed.)); see also In re GSE Bonds Antitr. 25 Litig., 414 F. Supp. 3d 686, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (noting 26 similarity of inquiries under Rule 23(a)(4) and Rule 27 23(e)(2)(A)). 28 Because the Court has found that the proposed class 1 satisfies Rule 23(a)(4) for purposes of class certification, the 2 adequacy factor under Rule 23(e)(2)(A) is also met. See Hudson, 3 2020 WL 2467060, at *5. 4 B. Negotiation of the Settlement Agreement 5 On September 20, 2022, plaintiffs initiated this action 6 and moved for a preliminary injunction. (See Docket Nos. 1, 4.) 7 On November 1, 2022, the court denied plaintiffs’ motion for a 8 preliminary injunction. (Docket No. 16.) Plaintiffs amended the 9 complaint the next day. (Docket No. 17.) On July 20, 2023, the 10 parties stipulated to a settlement conference, which the court 11 approved within a day. (See Docket Nos. 24-25.) Counsel 12 represents that the parties thereafter engaged in months of 13 settlement discussions as well as “extensive investigation and 14 discovery” from August 29, 2023 to January 6, 2025. (See Docket 15 No. 40-2 at ¶¶ 5-8; see also Docket No. 40-1 at 6.) Counsel 16 further represents that the parties engaged in thorough informal 17 discovery and discussion during and prior to settlement 18 negotiations, which were adversarial and conducted at arms- 19 length. (See Docket No. 40-1 at 6.) 20 Given the parties’ representation that the settlement 21 reached was the product of arms-length bargaining following 22 thorough informal discovery, the court does not question that the 23 proposed settlement is the result of informed and non-collusive 24 negotiations between the parties. See La Fleur v. Med. Mgmt. 25 Int’l, Inc., No. 13-cv-00398, 2014 WL 2967475, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. 26 June 25, 2014). 27 C. Adequate Relief 28 In determining whether a settlement agreement provides 1 adequate relief for the class, the court must “take into account 2 (i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal; (ii) the 3 effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to 4 the class, including the method of processing class-member 5 claims; (iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees, 6 including timing of payment; and (iv) any [other] agreement[s]” 7 made in connection with the proposal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 23(e)(2)(C); Baker v. SeaWorld Entm’t, Inc., No. 14-cv-02129-MMA- 9 AGS, 2020 WL 4260712, at *6-8 (S.D. Cal. Jul. 24, 2020). 10 The court notes that, in evaluating whether the 11 settlement provides adequate relief, it must consider several of 12 the same factors outlined in Hanlon, including the strength of 13 the plaintiffs’ case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely 14 duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class 15 action status throughout the trial; and the amount offered in 16 settlement. See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026. 17 In determining whether a settlement agreement is 18 substantively fair to class members, the court must balance the 19 value of expected recovery against the value of the settlement 20 offer. See In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d 21 1078, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2007). When a settlement was reached prior 22 to class certification, it is subject to heightened scrutiny for 23 purposes of final approval. See In re Apple Inc., 50 F.4th at 24 782. The recommendations of plaintiffs’ counsel will not be 25 given a presumption of reasonableness, but rather will be subject 26 to close review. See id. at 782-83. The court will particularly 27 scrutinize “any subtle signs that class counsel have allowed 28 pursuit of their own self-interests to infect the negotiations.” 1 See id. at 782 (quoting Roes, 944 F.3d at 1043). 2 The parties proposed a settlement which includes the 3 following: (1) $250 incentive awards for the seven named 4 plaintiffs, for a total of $1,750; (2) a payment to each class 5 member depending on how long he or she was excluded from 6 Roseville parks; (3) a supplemental payment to each class member 7 who claims loss of property, depending on the lost property’s 8 value; and (4) a “reasonable amount of fees and costs incurred 9 by class counsel to handle the claims administration.” (See 10 Docket No. 40-2 Ex. C at ¶¶ 43-44.) 11 Payments to class members based on exclusion range 12 between “$50 for a one-day exclusion; $300 for a thirty-day 13 exclusion; $500 for a ninety-day exclusion; and $1,000 for a one- 14 year exclusion.” (Id. ¶ 43.) Payments to class members based on 15 lost property range between “$150 for a minimal loss for such 16 things as bedding and/or tents; $500 for a moderate loss for such 17 things as back packs, clothes, person items cooking gear [sic], 18 tarps, and incidentals; and $1,500 for a great loss such as 19 bicycles, campers, wheel chairs, cell phones, important 20 mementoes, electronics, and/or things of special value.” (Id. ¶ 21 44.) 22 The parties have agreed that class members will receive 23 a total of $34,100 for both loss of property and park exclusions. 24 (Docket No. 49 at 2.) The parties have documented all accepted 25 and partially accepted claims and have listed amounts for each. 26 (Id. Ex. A at 5-8.) 27 Plaintiffs faced numerous hurdles in the litigation, 28 including proving all elements of the claims, obtaining and 1 maintaining class certification, establishing liability, and the 2 costliness of litigation on these issues. Among other things, 3 after the Supreme Court decided City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, 4 603 U.S. 520 (2024), the strength of plaintiffs’ position came 5 into question. In Grants Pass, the Court held that a state or 6 local government may criminalize “camping . . . for the purpose 7 of maintaining a temporary place to live” without violating the 8 Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 9 punishment. 603 U.S. at 537-38, 560-61. 10 The parties appeared to read Grants Pass to have 11 weakened plaintiffs’ federal constitutional claims. Thus, 12 plaintiffs’ counsel represents that the settlement and resulting 13 distribution “potentially benefits a substantial number of 14 persons who, were it not for the settlement, would likely have 15 received no compensation whatsoever.” (See Docket No. 40-2 at 16 ¶ 8.) 17 In light of the risks associated with further 18 litigation and the relative strength of defendant’s arguments, 19 the court finds that the value of the settlement counsels in 20 favor of granting final approval. The court further finds the 21 method of processing class member claims to be adequate. Each 22 class member’s individual share of the settlement is 23 proportional to the amount of time excluded from Roseville parks 24 and property lost in connection with such exclusion. The court 25 is also satisfied that counsel’s requested fees of $162,500 are 26 reasonable and support approval of the settlement, which it will 27 address in greater detail below. 28 D. Equitable Treatment of Class Members 1 Finally, the court must consider whether the Settlement 2 Agreement “treats class members equitably relative to each 3 other.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(D). In doing so, the court 4 determines whether the settlement “improperly grant[s] 5 preferential treatment to class representatives or segments of 6 the class.” Hudson, 2020 WL 2467060, at *9 (quoting Tableware, 7 484 F. Supp. at 1079). 8 Here, the Settlement Agreement does not improperly 9 discriminate between any segments of the class, as all class 10 members are entitled to monetary relief based on the amount of 11 time excluded from Roseville parks and property lost in 12 connection with such exclusion. 13 E. Remaining Hanlon Factors 14 In addition to the factors already considered as part 15 of the court’s analysis under Rule 23(e)(A)-(D), the court must 16 also examine “the extent of the discovery completed . . ., the 17 presence of government participation, and the reaction of class 18 members to the proposed settlement.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026. 19 As explained above, counsel engaged in thorough 20 informal discovery. This factor thus weighs in favor of final 21 approval of the settlement. 22 The seventh Hanlon factor, pertaining to government 23 participation, also weighs in favor of approval. See Hanlon, 150 24 F.3d at 1026. Defendant City of Roseville is a local government 25 authority and has agreed to the terms of the Settlement 26 Agreement. See Garcia v. City of King City, No. 14-cv-01126-BLF 27 2017 WL 2017 WL 363257 at *8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2017) (finding 28 this factor satisfied because the defendant city approved the 1 settlement agreement). 2 The eighth Hanlon factor, the reaction of the class 3 members to the proposed settlement, also weighs in favor of final 4 approval, as none of the class members have objected or opted 5 out. See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026. 6 In sum, the four factors that the court must evaluate 7 under Rule 23(e) and the eight Hanlon factors, taken as a whole, 8 weigh in favor of approving the settlement. The court will 9 therefore grant final approval of the Settlement Agreement. 10 III. Attorneys’ Fees 11 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h) provides, “[i]n a 12 certified class action, the court may award reasonable attorney’s 13 fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the 14 parties’ agreement.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). If a negotiated 15 class action settlement includes an award of attorneys’ fees, 16 that fee award must be evaluated in the overall context of the 17 settlement. Knisley v. Network Assocs., 312 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th 18 Cir. 2002); Monterrubio v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 291 F.R.D. 443, 19 455 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (England, J.). The court “ha[s] an 20 independent obligation to ensure that the award, like the 21 settlement itself, is reasonable, even if the parties have 22 already agreed to an amount.” In re Bluetooth Headset Prod. 23 Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2011). 24 The court assesses whether the requested fee award is 25 reasonable under the lodestar method by multiplying a reasonable 26 hourly rate by the number of hours counsel reasonably expended. 27 See In re Bluetooth Headset, 654 F.3d at 941-42. As part of this 28 lodestar calculation, the court may consider factors such as the 1 “level of success” or “results obtained” by plaintiffs’ counsel. 2 See id. 3 To determine whether counsel has employed a “reasonable 4 hourly rate” for purposes of calculating the lodestar amount, the 5 court must look to the “prevailing market rates in the relevant 6 community.” Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1206 7 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 886, 895 (9th Cir. 8 2001)). “Generally, when determining a reasonable hourly rate, 9 the relevant community is the forum in which the district court 10 sits.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Prison 11 Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446, 454 (9th Cir.2010)). 12 Within this geographic community, the district court should 13 “tak[e] into consideration the experience, skill, and reputation 14 of the attorney [or paralegal].” Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 15 813 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). 16 Counsel represents that they have dedicated a total of 17 382.8 hours of work to this case; they have submitted billing 18 records to confirm this number. (See Docket No. 45-2 at 7; 19 Docket No. 45-3 at 6.) Counsel states their hourly rate in class 20 actions is $500 and that they have previously been awarded fees 21 at that amount in this district. (See Docket No. 45-2 at 2; 22 Docket No. 45-3 at 6.) Counsel further states they are 23 recognized as one of the most experienced and successful civil 24 rights litigators in the Sacramento area, and as possessing 25 unique qualifications to pursue cases of this kind. (See Docket 26 No. 45-2 at 2.) Counsel finally provides instances of other 27 attorneys with less experience obtaining awards in excess of a 28 $500 hourly rate in this district. (See id.) The court is 1 satisfied that counsel has offered sufficient evidence of a 2 reasonable rate. See Final Order and Judgment, Baker v. Regents 3 of the Univ. of Cal., No. 2:12-cv-00450-JAM-EFB (E.D. Cal. Jan. 4 9, 2013), ECF No. 54 (awarding a comparable hourly rate to 5 counsel). 6 Based on 382.8 hours billed at an hourly rate of $500, 7 the lodestar figure is $191,400. Counsel requests an amount 8 lower than the lodestar at $162,500, with $122,500 to be paid to 9 Mark E. Merin and $40,000 to be paid to Paul W. Comiskey. While 10 that amount remains well in excess of the settlement, the Ninth 11 Circuit has held that “it is not per se unreasonable for the 12 prevailing party in a civil rights case to be awarded an amount 13 of attorney’s fees that exceeds the amount of money recovered by 14 his or her client.” Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1200. Following the 15 lodestar calculation, the important factor in determining 16 reasonableness is “the results obtained.” Id. (citing Hensley v. 17 Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)) (internal quotation marks 18 omitted). 19 Plaintiffs have obtained considerable non-monetary 20 results for the class members in this litigation. The City’s 21 exclusion policy has been narrowed and relaxed, the policy for 22 property seizure has been modified with tag and notice 23 provisions, the City has agreed to provide due process with 24 appeals for those excluded in the future, and the City has 25 affirmed they will not enforce camping prohibitions during 26 specified daytime hours. (See Docket No. 45-1 at 11.) These 27 results align with the sorts of positive outcomes in civil rights 28 cases for “the named plaintiff and for society at large” which 1 can justify higher attorneys’ fees awards. Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 2 1210 (citing Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96 (1989)) 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 Accordingly, the court finds the requested fees to be 5 reasonable and will grant counsel’s motion for attorneys’ fees. 6 IV. Costs 7 Counsel’s litigation expenses and costs total $644.28. 8 (See Docket No. 45-2 at 6.) These expenses include a case filing 9 fee, service of process, and photocopying fees. (See id.) The 10 court finds these are reasonable litigation expenses. Therefore, 11 the court will grant class counsel’s request for costs in the 12 amount of $644.28. 13 V. Representative Service Award 14 “Incentive awards are fairly typical in class action 15 cases.” Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 958. “[They] are intended to 16 compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the 17 class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken 18 in bringing the action.” Id. at 958-59. 19 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit has cautioned that 20 “district courts must be vigilant in scrutinizing all incentive 21 awards to determine whether they destroy the adequacy of the 22 class representatives . . . .” Radcliffe v. Experian Info. 23 Solutions, Inc., 715 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2013). In 24 assessing the reasonableness of incentive payments, the court 25 should consider “the actions the plaintiff has taken to protect 26 the interests of the class, the degree to which the class has 27 benefitted from those actions” and “the amount of time and effort 28 the plaintiff expended in pursuing the litigation.” Staton, 327 1 F.3d at 977 (citation omitted). The court must balance “the 2 number of named plaintiffs receiving incentive payments, the 3 proportion of the payments relative to the settlement amount, and 4 the size of each payment.” Id. 5 In the Ninth Circuit, an incentive award of $5,000 is 6 presumptively reasonable. Davis v. Brown Shoe Co., Inc., No. 7 1:13-cv-01211 LJO BAM, 2015 WL 6697929, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 8 2015) (citing Harris v. Vector Marketing Corp., No. 08-cv-5198 9 EMC, 2012 WL 381202, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2012) (collecting 10 cases)). 11 Plaintiffs seek $250 incentive awards for the seven 12 named plaintiffs, totaling $1,750. (See Docket No. 45-1 at 10.) 13 Plaintiffs identify specific efforts undertaken by named 14 plaintiffs in this litigation, including origination of the 15 lawsuit, involvement in negotiation, communication with class 16 members, provision of declarations, and solicitation of class 17 participation. (See Docket No. 45-3 at 2-4.) This is sufficient 18 evidence of named plaintiffs’ efforts toward receiving incentive 19 awards, and thus the court finds the incentive awards do not 20 create a conflict interest. In light of plaintiffs’ efforts and 21 the risks incurred in bringing this action, the court finds the 22 requested incentive awards to be reasonable and will approve the 23 awards. 24 VI. Conclusion 25 Based on the foregoing, the court will grant final 26 certification of the settlement class and will approve the 27 settlement set forth in the Settlement Agreement as fair, 28 reasonable, and adequate. The Settlement Agreement shall be 1 binding upon all participating class members who did not exclude 2 themselves. 3 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ unopposed 4 motion for final approval of the parties’ class action settlement 5 (Docket No. 45) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT: 7 (1) Solely for the purpose of this settlement, and 8 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the court hereby 9 certifies the following class: all homeless persons who were 10 excluded from a City of Roseville park facility pursuant to 11 Roseville Municipal code section 8.02.316, but not arrested at 12 the time, within two years before September 20, 2022; 13 (2) The court appoints named plaintiffs Marcus Hill- 14 Colbert, Jennifer Timmons, Herminio LeBron, Daniel Reed, Vincent 15 Barnao, Erin McMarlin, and James Thompson as class 16 representatives and finds that they meet the requirements of Rule 17 23; 18 (3) The court appoints Mark E. Merin, Paul H. Masuhara, 19 and Paul W. Comiskey to serve as class counsel for settlement 20 purposes only; 21 (4) The settlement agreement’s plan for class notice 22 satisfies the requirements of due process and Rule 23. The plan 23 is approved and adopted. The notice to the class complies with 24 Rule 23(c)(2) and Rule 23(e) and is approved and adopted; 25 (5) The court finds that the parties and their counsel 26 took appropriate efforts to locate and inform all class members 27 of the settlement. Given that no class member filed an objection 28 to the settlement, the court finds that no additional notice to eee ee OR OS OEE INI OE OO OSE SE eee

1 the class is necessary; 2 (6) As of the date of the entry of this order, 3 plaintiffs and all class members who have not timely opted out of 4 this settlement hereby do and shall be deemed to have fully, 5 finally, and forever released, settled, compromised, 6 relinquished, and discharged defendants of and from any and all 7 settled claims, pursuant to the release provisions stated in the 8 parties’ settlement agreement; 9 (7) Plaintiffs’ counsel is entitled to fees in the 10 amount of $162,500, with $122,500 to be paid to Mark E. Merin and 11 $40,000 to be paid to Paul W. Comisky, and litigation costs in 12 | the amount of $644.28; 13 (8) Plaintiffs Marcus Hill-Colbert, Jennifer Timmons, 14 Herminio LeBron, Daniel Reed, Vincent Barnao, Eric McMarlin, and 15 James Thompson are entitled to incentive awards in the amount of 16 | $250; 17 (9) $34,100 shall be paid to participating class 18 members for loss of property and park exclusion, in accordance 19 | with the parties’ stipulated terms (Docket No. 49.) and; 20 (12) This action is dismissed with prejudice. However, 21 without affecting the finality of this Order, the court shall 22 retain continuing jurisdiction over the interpretation, 23 implementation, and enforcement of the Settlement Agreement with 24 respect to all parties to this action and their counsel of 25 record. . a bean, (hi. 26 Dated: September 15, 2025 Pi he Vi (eh 27 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28 19