1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 INFINITY MANAGEMENT & INVESTMENT, ) Case No.: 1:25-cv-01180 JLT SKO LLC, et al., ) 12 ) Plaintiff, ) 13 ) ORDER SUA SPONTE REMANDING CASE v. ) TO MERCED COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT 14 )

BRUCE AUSTIN, )

15 ) Defendant. ) 16 )

17 On June 9, 2025, Infinity Management & Investment, LLC initiated a complaint for unlawful 18 detainer in Merced County Superior Court, Case No. 25CV-03099, against Bruce Austin. (Doc. 1 at 19 27–28 (“Unlawful Detainer Action”).) On September 11, 2025, Mr. Austin filed a “Complaint”1 in this 20 Court, to which he has attached the Unlawful Detainer Action as well as numerous filings from that 21 Action. (See generally Doc. 1.) Mr. Austin’s filings reveal that Infinity Management has obtained a 22 writ of possession for the property at issue in the Unlawful Detainer Action and “are proceeding with 23 Plaintiff’s eviction.” (Doc. 1 at 9.) Mr. Austin requests, among other things, emergency injunctive 24 relief against Infinity Management and their agents, precluding enforcement of the writ of possession 25 and/or any other action to evict Mr. Austin. (Id. at 12.) Construing Mr. Austin’s pro se filing liberally, 26 the Court treats it as a Notice of Removal. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that it lacks 27 28 1 1 subject matter jurisdiction over the action and therefore REMANDS the matter to Merced County 2 Superior Court. 3 I. Removal Jurisdiction 4 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a defendant has the right to remove a matter to federal court 5 where the district court would have original jurisdiction. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 286, 6 392 (1987). Specifically, 7 Except otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, 8 may be removed by the defendant or defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending. 9

10 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). District courts have “original jurisdiction [over] all civil actions arising under the 11 Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Id. at § 1331. 12 A party seeking removal must file a notice of removal of a civil action within thirty days of 13 receipt of a copy of the initial pleading. Id. at § 1446(b). Removal statutes are to be strictly construed, 14 and any doubts are to be resolved in favor of state court jurisdiction and remand. See Gaus v. Miles, 15 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). The party seeking removal bears the burden of proving its propriety. 16 Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996); Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 683– 17 85 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Calif. ex. rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 2274 F.3d 831, 838 (“the burden of 18 establishing federal jurisdiction falls to the party invoking the statute”). If there is any doubt as to the 19 right of removal, “federal jurisdiction must be rejected.” Duncan, 76 F.3d at 1485. 20 The Court has “a duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction over [a] removed action sua 21 sponte, whether the parties raised the issue or not.” United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed, 22 Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Kelton Arms Condo. Homeowners Ass’n v. Homestead 23 Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192–93 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting a distinction between procedural and 24 jurisdictional defects and holding a “district court must remand if it lacks jurisdiction”). Thus, a court 25 “can, in fact must, dismiss a case when it determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, whether or 26 not a party has a filed a motion.” Page v. City of Southfield, 45 F.3d 128, 133 (6th Cir. 1995). 27 II. Discussion and Analysis 28 The determination of subject matter jurisdiction “is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint 1 rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the 2 face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392; see also California v. 3 United States, 215 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000). “It does not suffice to show that a federal question 4 lurks somewhere inside the parties’ controversy, or that a defense or counterclaim would arise under 5 federal law.” Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 70 (2009). Instead, the complaint must establish 6 “either that [1] federal law creates the cause of action or that [2] the plaintiff’s right to relief 7 necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Williston Basin Interstate 8 Pipeline Co. v. An Exclusive Gas Storage Leasehold & Easement, 524 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008) 9 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1983)). 10 The only cause of action identified by Infinity Management in the removed complaint is 11 unlawful detainer. (See Doc. 1 at 27.) An unlawful detainer action arises under state law, not federal 12 law. See Wells Fargo Bank v. Sherzad, 2022 WL 913251, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2022) (a complaint 13 for unlawful detainer “relies solely on California state law and does not state any claims under federal 14 law”); Fannie Mae v. Suarez, 2011 WL 13359134, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 27, 2011) (“Unlawful detainer 15 actions are strictly within the province of state court”). Thus, Infinity Management did not raise a 16 claim that invokes federal subject matter jurisdiction. 17 To the extent the “Complaint” filed here could be construed as a stand-alone lawsuit and not as 18 a notice of removal, it would be barred entirely by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which precludes 19 district courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over cases that are de facto appeals from 20 state court judgments. See Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals 21 v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 (1983). A federal action is a “de facto appeal” of a state court decision 22 when the plaintiff “complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court and seeks relief 23 from the judgment of that court.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003). Lower federal 24 courts cannot adjudicate actions brought by “state-court losers” seeking relief from “state-court 25 judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 26 460 (2006) (quoting Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). 27 District courts must also refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is “inextricably intertwined” 28 with the state court proceedings. Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158 (citing Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 543 1 (10th Cir. 1991), as an example of a federal case being intertwined with a state case because the 2 federal plaintiff sought to “vacate and set aside” a previously entered state court judgment). 3 As mentioned, in this lawsuit, Mr. Austin requests injunctive relief against execution of the 4 state court judgment. (Doc. 1 at 12.) Rooker-Feldman bars this court from entertaining that request. 5 The remaining claims are inextricably intertwined with the state court proceeding. For example, Mr. 6 Austin’s third cause of action attempts to advance a claim for retaliation in violation of the Fair 7 Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3617. (Doc. 1 at 10–11.) Therein, he alleges that he exercised his 8 FHA rights by defending himself against an earlier “discriminatory and fraudulent eviction action,” 9 and that in direct retaliation, Infinity Management initiated “a second fraudulent eviction action, 10 locked him out of the recertification process, demanded a fraudulent amount of rent, and procured a 11 wrongful judgment against him.” (Id.) This claim is barred as inextricably intertwined because 12 affording “the relief requested in the federal action would effectively reverse the state court decision 13 or void its ruling.” Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal citation omitted). The 14 same result pertains to Mr. Austin’s due process claim, which alleges the state court proceedings were 15 “corrupted by extrinsic fraud, including perjury” and thereby “deprived the state court process of its 16 legitimacy”; to his FHA discrimination claim, which alleges, among other things, that Infinity 17 Management initiated fraudulent evictions against him; and to the intentional infliction of emotional 18 distress claim, which alleges that Infinity Management engaged in “outrageous conduct” by, among 19 other things, engaging in “the prosecution of two fraudulent eviction lawsuits based on lies and 20 perjured testimony.” (Doc. 1 at 9–11); Cooper, 704 F.3d at 779. Thus, even if Mr. Austin did not 21 intent for his Complaint to operate as a notice of removal, the Court has no jurisdiction over this case. 22 III. Conclusion and Order 23 Because there is no federal question appearing in the complaint, the Court cannot exercise 24 jurisdiction and the action must be remanded to the state court.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any 25 time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case 26 shall be remanded”). Accordingly, the Court ORDERS: 27

28 2 Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action, the Court lacks jurisdiction to address Mr. Austin’s 1 1. The matter is REMANDED to the Superior Court for the County of Merced due to 2 lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 3 2. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate all pending motions. 4 3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this matter. 5 6 || IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 Dated: _ September 17, 2025 ( Lint pA | . | Wy h \ 8 TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28