I. INTRODUCTION

18 Plaintiff Venture Strategy Holdings, LLC (“Venture”) brings this action against 19 Defendant Pe’er Peter Bursuker for breach of contract and breach of guaranty. (Compl. 20 ¶¶ 65–116, Dkt. No. 1.) Venture seeks to recover all outstanding obligations owing 21 under four separate loans, interest and late fees, attorneys’ fees and costs, and pre- and 22 post-judgment interest. (Id., Prayer.) Bursuker failed to appear and defend, and Venture 23 now moves for entry of default judgment. (Mot. Default J. (“Motion” or “Mot.”), Dkt. 24 No. 20.) For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Venture’s Motion.1 25 26 27

28 1 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 Bursuker and Jeremy M. Russo, as joint and several borrowers (collectively, 3 “Borrowers”), executed Promissory Notes 1 through 4 (“Note” or “Notes”) with several 4 lenders. (Compl. ¶¶ 9, 13, 17, 21.) The Notes were subsequently sold and assigned to 5 Venture, who became the owner and holder of the Notes. (Id. ¶¶ 29, 40, 50, 60.) 6 The first of these occurred on August 21, 2017, when Brandon Ross loaned 7 Borrowers $60,000.00 at twenty-percent interest (“Loan 1”). (Id. ¶ 9.) Borrowers 8 signed Note 1 to evidence the loan. (Id. ¶ 10; see Decl. Jeremy Russo ISO Mot. (“Russo 9 Decl.”) ¶ 6, Dkt. No. 20; see also Russo Decl. Ex. 1.) Note 1 requires Borrowers to pay 10 a 1.5% monthly late fee on any remaining balance after payment becomes due. (Id. 11 ¶ 31.) On April 1, 2018, the loan matured but Bursuker failed to make any payments. 12 (Id. ¶¶ 25–26.) Ross subsequently sold and assigned Note 1 to Venture. (Id. ¶¶ 27–28.) 13 On April 26, 2018, Ross loaned Borrowers another $60,000.00 at twenty-percent 14 interest (“Loan 2”). (Id. ¶¶ 13–14.) Borrowers signed Note 2 to evidence the loan, 15 which included the same 1.5% monthly late-fee provision. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 41; see Russo 16 Decl. Ex. 2.) On December 31, 2018, the loan matured but Bursuker failed to make any 17 payments. (Compl. ¶¶ 35–36.) Ross subsequently sold and assigned Note 2 to Venture. 18 (Id. ¶¶ 38–39.) 19 On July 17, 2018, Glenn Clemmons loaned Borrowers $100,000.00, plus 20 twenty-percent interest (“Loan 3”). (Id. ¶¶ 17–18.) Borrowers signed Note 3 to 21 evidence the loan, which also requires them to pay a 1.5% monthly late fee on any 22 unpaid balance. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 51; see Russo Decl. Ex. 3.) On July 17, 2019, the loan 23 matured but Bursuker failed to make any payments. (Compl. ¶¶ 45–46.) Clemmons 24 subsequently sold and assigned Note 3 to Venture. (Id. ¶¶ 48–49.) 25 In 2018, Stephen Cuccia made two loans (collectively, “Loan 4”) to Borrowers— 26 one for $300,000.00 and another for $100,000.00—each bearing twenty-percent 27 interest. (Id. ¶¶ 21–22.) The document reflecting Note 4 is now lost but Russo 28 “personally reviewed” Note 4 before it was lost and states that it was executed “on the 1 same form[]” as the earlier Notes.2 (Russo Decl. ¶ 42.) Cuccia also declares that he 2 “looked for a copy” of Note 4 but was unable to locate it. (Decl. Stephen Cuccia ISO 3 Mot. (“Cuccia Decl.), Dkt. No. 20.) Note 4 requires Borrowers to pay a 1.5% monthly 4 late fee on any remaining balance owed after payment becomes due. (Compl. ¶ 41.) In 5 March 2019, the loan matured and became due. (Id. ¶ 55.) Cuccia received full 6 payment on the $100,000.00 note and partial payment on the $300,000.00 note, but the 7 latter “was not paid off in full.” (See Cuccia Decl.) A balance of $116,000.00 remains 8 outstanding. (Compl. ¶ 55.) Cuccia subsequently sold and assigned Note 4 to Venture. 9 (Id. ¶¶ 58–59.) 10 On December 24, 2024, Venture brought this action against Bursuker to recover 11 the outstanding principal, interest, and late fees under Loans 1 through 4 (the 12 “Obligations”), as well as attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in collecting the 13 Obligations. (Id., Prayer ¶¶ A–F.) Venture asserts two causes of action: (1) breach of 14 contract, and (2) breach of guaranty. (Id. ¶¶ 65–116.) 15 On January 23, 2025, Venture served Bursuker. (Proof Service Compl., Dkt. 16 No. 10.) Bursuker did not appear or defend the case. Accordingly, upon Venture’s 17 request, on February 21, 2025, the Clerk of Court entered Bursuker’s default. (Default, 18 Dkt. No. 15.) On May 19, 2025, Venture filed this Motion against Bursuker. (Mot.) 19 III. LEGAL STANDARD 20 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 55(b) authorizes a district court to grant 21 a default judgment after the Clerk enters default under Rule 55(a). However, before a 22 court can enter a default judgment against a defendant, the plaintiff must satisfy the 23 procedural requirements in Rules 54(c) and 55, and Central District Civil Local 24 Rules 55-1 and 55-2. Even if these procedural requirements are satisfied, “[a] 25 2 The Court accepts as true Venture’s well-pleaded factual allegations upon entry of default. Cripps 26 v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992). The Court finds that the sworn statements and the evidence submitted in support of this Motion are sufficient to “prove-up” Venture’s 27 damages. Orange Cnty. Elec. Indus. Health & Welfare Tr. Fund v. Moore Elec. Contracting, Inc., 28 No. 11-cv-00942-LHK, 2012 WL 4120348, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2012). The sworn testimony and exhibits are evidence that could be admitted at trial and are thus appropriate for consideration. Id. 1 defendant’s default does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to a court-ordered 2 judgment.” PepsiCo, Inc., v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 3 2002) (citing Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924–25 (9th Cir. 1986)). Instead, “[t]he 4 district court’s decision whether to enter a default judgment is a discretionary one.” 5 Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (collecting cases). 6 Generally, after the Clerk enters a default, the defendant’s liability is conclusively 7 established, and the well-pleaded factual allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint “will 8 be taken as true,” except those pertaining to the amount of damages. TeleVideo Sys., 9 Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917–18 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting Geddes 10 v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977)). The court need not make 11 detailed findings of fact when entering default judgment, except as to damages. See 12 Adriana Int’l Corp. v. Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1414 (9th Cir. 1990). 13 IV. DISCUSSION 14 Venture satisfies the procedural requirements for default judgment, establishes 15 that entry of default judgment against Bursuker is substantively appropriate, and 16 demonstrates that the requested relief is warranted. 17 A. Procedural Requirements 18 Local Rule 55-1 requires that the movant establish: (1) when and against which 19 party default was entered; (2) the pleading on which default was entered; (3) whether 20 the defaulting party is a minor or incompetent person; (4) that the Servicemembers Civil 21 Relief Act does not apply; and (5) that the defaulting party was properly served with 22 notice, if required under Rule 55(b)(2). In turn, Rule 55(b)(2) requires written notice 23 on the defaulting party if that party “has appeared personally or by a representative.” 24 Venture meets these requirements. On February 21, 2025, the Clerk entered 25 default against Bursuker as to Venture’s Complaint. (See Default.) Venture’s counsel 26 submits declaration testimony that Bursuker is not a minor or incompetent person and 27 that the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act does not apply. (Decl. Isaac M. Gabriel ISO 28 Mot. (“Gabriel Decl.”) ¶¶ 11–14, Dkt. No. 25.) Finally, although service of the Motion 1 is not required because Bursuker has not appeared, Venture nonetheless served Bursuker 2 with the Motion. (Proof Service Mot., Dkt. No. 20.) 3 Thus, Venture satisfies the procedural requirements for entry of default judgment. 4 B. Eitel Factors 5 In assessing whether entry of default judgment is warranted, courts consider the 6 “Eitel factors”: “(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff”; “(2) the merits of 7 plaintiff’s substantive claim”; “(3) the sufficiency of the complaint”; “(4) the sum of 8 money at stake”; (5) the possibility of a material factual dispute; “(6) whether the 9 default was due to excusable neglect”; and (7) the strong policy favoring decisions on 10 the merits. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). “Of all the Eitel 11 factors, courts often consider the second and third factors to be the most important.” 12 Viet. Reform Party v. Viet Tan-Viet. Reform Party, 416 F. Supp. 3d 948, 962 (N.D. Cal. 13 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Court considers these factors first. 14 1. Second & Third Eitel Factors 15 The second and third Eitel factors require a plaintiff to “state a claim on which 16 the [plaintiff] may recover.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1175 (alteration in original). 17 Although well-pleaded allegations are taken as true, “claims which are legally 18 insufficient[] are not established by default.” Cripps, 980 F.2d at 1267. 19 Venture asserts eight causes of action for payment of the Obligations based on 20 Bursuker’s breach of the Notes: (1) four claims for breach of contract, (Compl. ¶¶ 65– 21 92), and (2) four claims for breach of guaranty, (id. ¶¶ 93–116). As Venture sufficiently 22 states a claim for breach of contract, and that claim is inextricably intertwined with the 23 breach of guaranty, the Court needs only address the breach of contract claim. 24 To prevail on its breach of contract claim, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the 25 existence of a contract; (2) plaintiff’s performance; (3) defendant’s breach; and 26 (4) resulting damages to the plaintiff. See Landstar Ranger, Inc. v. Parth Enters., Inc., 27 725 F. Supp. 2d 916, 920 (C.D. Cal. 2010). Venture’s Complaint, taken as true, 28 adequately alleges all four elements of a claim for breach of contract. (See generally 1 Compl.); see also Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560 (“[U]pon default[,] the factual allegations of 2 the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.”). 3 Venture alleges that, pursuant to the loan agreements, Bursuker executed the 4 Notes. (Compl. ¶¶ 10, 14, 18, 22.) Venture also alleges that pursuant to the Notes, 5 Bursuker agreed to pay the Obligations due on the maturity dates. (Id.) Venture further 6 alleges that Bursuker failed to pay his Obligations once the Loans matured and became 7 due. (Id. ¶¶ 26, 26, 46, 56.) Lastly, Venture alleges that as a result of Bursuker’s breach, 8 Venture suffered damages. (Id. ¶¶ 70, 77, 84, 91.) Accordingly, Bursuker’s failure to 9 pay the required Obligations under the Notes constitutes a breach of contract. 10 Thus, Venture sufficiently pleaded meritorious breach of contract claims against 11 Bursuker to recover the owed and owing Obligations under the Notes, and therefore the 12 second and third Eitel factors favor entry of default judgment. 13 2. Remaining Eitel Factors 14 On balance, the remaining Eitel factors also weigh in favor of entering default 15 judgment against Bursuker. To begin, the first and fourth Eitel factors—possibility of 16 prejudice and sum of money at stake—favor default judgment. See Eitel, 782 F.2d 17 at 1471–72. Venture would suffer prejudice absent entry of default judgment because 18 Venture would otherwise have no recourse for Bursuker’s unpaid Obligations. Further, 19 as discussed below, the sum of money Venture seeks is directly proportionate to the 20 amount Bursuker owes and failed to pay. 21 The fifth and sixth factors—possibility of dispute and excusable neglect—also 22 weigh in favor of entering default judgment. See id. Venture’s well-pleaded factual 23 allegations are accepted as true on default, and Bursuker may not now “challenge the 24 accuracy of the allegations in the complaint.” Landstar Ranger, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 922. 25 Venture supports its claims with credible evidence demonstrating that Bursuker owes 26 Venture certain unpaid Obligations, and the Court’s review of the record reveals “no 27 factual disputes . . . that preclude the entry of default judgment.” Id. Further, nothing 28 in the record suggests that Bursuker’s failure to appear is a result of excusable neglect. 1 Finally, the seventh factor—policy favoring decisions on the merits—always 2 weighs in the defaulting defendant’s favor. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. However, 3 because Bursuker’s failure to appear in this action prevents the Court from reaching a 4 decision on the merits, this factor does not prevent the Court from entering judgment 5 by default. See Duralar Techs. LLC v. Plasma Coating Techs., Inc., 848 F. App’x 252, 6 255 (9th Cir. 2021) (affirming entry of default judgment where all factors except the 7 seventh weighed in the plaintiff’s favor). 8 In sum, the Eitel factors weigh in favor of entering default judgment against 9 Bursuker on Venture’s Complaint. 10 C. Requested Relief 11 “A default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is 12 demanded in the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c). Here, Venture seeks to recover 13 principal, interest, and late fees. (Mot. ¶¶ 14–18.) Venture requests judgment for 14 outstanding Obligations as of November 18, 2024. (Id. ¶ 14.) “Additional interest and 15 late fees have accrued since the filing of the Complaint but are not being sought as part 16 of the default judgment.” (Id. ¶ 19.) Venture “is not seeking its attorneys’ fees and costs 17 as part of the default judgment,” (Mot. ¶ 15). Thus, the relief Venture seeks is consistent 18 with and does not exceed that requested in the Complaint. (See Compl. ¶¶ 65–116, 19 Prayer ¶¶ A–F.) 20 Additionally, once liability is established through a defendant’s default, a plaintiff 21 must establish that the requested relief is appropriate. Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560. A 22 plaintiff cannot rely solely on allegations to establish damages, for “even a defaulting 23 party is entitled to have its opponent produce some evidence to support an award of 24 damages.” LG Elecs., Inc. v. Advance Creative Comput. Corp., 212 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 25 1178 (N.D. Cal. 2002). Here, Venture seeks an award of $992,828.50, consisting of 26 $336,000.00 in unpaid principal, $337,868.50 in accrued interest, and $318,690.00 in 27 accrued late fees as of November 18, 2024. (Compl. ¶¶ 32, 42, 52, 62; Mot. ¶¶ 14–18.) 28 1 1. Unpaid Principal 2 Venture seeks unpaid principal totaling $336,000.00. (Id.) In support, Venture 3 submits declaration testimony of co-borrower, Russo. (See generally Russo Decl.) 4 Russo states that “[a]s of November 18, 2024, the outstanding obligations” on the Notes 5 included $60,000.00, $60,000.00, $100,000.00, and $116,000.00 in unpaid principal. 6 (Id. ¶¶ 6, 13, 17, 24, 28, 26, 40, 49.) This figure is based on Bursuker’s failure to make 7 any principal payments due under Notes 1 through 3, (id. ¶¶ 9, 20, 31), and only partial 8 payment under Note 4, (id. ¶ 44; see generally Cuccia Decl.). Accordingly, the Court 9 finds that Venture is entitled to unpaid principal in the total amount of $336,000.00. 10 2. Accrued Interest 11 Venture also seeks interest totaling $337,868.50. (Mot. ¶¶ 14–18.) Russo 12 declares that the accrued interest at the rate of twenty-percent per annum on the four 13 loans totals $337,868.50. (Russo Decl. ¶¶ 13, 24, 36, 49.) Combining the total accrued 14 interest across all four Notes, the Court finds that as of November 18, 2024, the Court 15 finds that Venture is entitled to recover $337,868.50 in interest. 16 3. Accrued Late Fees 17 Venture also seeks accrued late fees totaling $318,960.00. (Mot. ¶¶ 14–18.) The 18 Notes require Borrowers to pay a 1.5% monthly late fee on any remaining balance after 19 payment becomes due. (Compl. ¶¶ 31, 41, 51, 61.) 20 Venture contends that under Notes 1 and 2, the late fees at 1.5% per month on 21 the unpaid balance is $72,000.00 each (consisting of $60,000.00 principal plus 22 maturity-date interest of $12,000.00). (Mot. ¶¶ 14–15.) Applying the monthly rate to 23 this balance for seventy-nine months of Bursuker’s delinquency under Note 1 yields an 24 amount of $85,320.00 in late fees as of November 18, 2024. (Id. ¶ 14.) Further, 25 applying the monthly rate for seventy-one months of Bursuker’s delinquency under 26 Note 2 yields an amount of $76,680.00 in late fees as of November 18, 2024. (Id. ¶ 15.) 27 Next, Venture contends that pursuant to Note 3, the late fees at 1.5% per month 28 on the unpaid balance on Note 3 due at maturity date is $120,000.00 (consisting of 1 || $100,000.00 principal plus maturity-date interest of $20,000.00). Ud. ¥ 16.) Applying 2 || the monthly rate to this balance for sixty-four months of Bursuker’s delinquency under 3 || Note 3 yields an amount of $115,200.00 in late fees as of November 18, 2024. (/d.) 4 Finally, Venture contends that the late fees at 1.5% per month on the unpaid 5 | balance on Note 4 due at maturity date is $116,000.00 (consisting of $116,000.00 6 || principal with no maturity-date interest). Ud. 417.) Applying the monthly rate to this balance for twenty-four months of Bursuker’s delinquency under Note 2 yields an 8 || amount of $41,760.00 in late fees as of November 18, 2024. Cd.) 9 Combining the late fees amounts across all four Notes, Venture contends that the 10 | aggregate amount in late fees is $318,960.00. (Ud. 4] 18.) Consistent with the late fee 11 || amounts outlined above, the Court finds that Venture is entitled to recover $318,960.00 12 || in accrued late fees. 13 4. Summary of Relief 14 To summarize, the Court finds that Venture is entitled to recover $336,000.00 in 15 | unpaid principal, $337,868.50 in accrued interest, and $318,960.00 in late fees. Venture 16 || is therefore entitled to recover the total sum of $992,828.50. 17 Vv. CONCLUSION 18 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Venture’s Motion for Entry 19 | of Default Judgment against Bursuker. (Dkt. No. 20.) The Court AWARDS Venture 20 || the total sum of $992,828.50 in principal, accrued interest, and late fees as of 21 || November 18, 2024. The Court will issue judgment in accordance with this order. 22 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 25 October 29, 2025 26 SE KY

38 OTIS D. II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE