1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOSE CRUZ CORONA RIOS, Case No.: 3:25-cv-01796-JES-DEB

12 Petitioner,

ORDER:

13 v. (1) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 14

OF HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT

15 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241; AND

SECURITY, KRISTI NOEM, PAMELA

16 BONDI, TODD M. LYONS, and (2) DENYING MOTION FOR 17 CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

ORDER AS MOOT

18 Respondents.

19 [ECF Nos. 1, 2] 20 21 Before the Court is Petitioner Jose Cruz Corona Rios’ (“Petitioner”) petition for writ 22 of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 against the U.S. Department of Homeland 23 Security, Kristi Noem, Pamela Bondi, Todd M. Lyons, and Christopher LaRose 24 (“Respondents”). ECF No. 1. Petitioner seeks relief from his detention of over a year at 25 Otay Mesa Detention Center. Id. ¶¶ 1, 9. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is 26 DENIED. 27 /// 28 /// 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico who is currently detained at Otay Mesa Detention 3 Center. ECF No. 1 ¶ 1. He previously lived in the United States illegally from around 2006 4 to 2012, and left voluntarily after being detained by ICE in 2012. Id. ¶ 11. Petitioner is 5 married to a DACA recipient, and has a daughter who is a 15-year-old U.S. citizen. Id. ¶ 6 10. 7 Petitioner reentered the country on September 13, 2024, under the CBP One 8 program. Id. ¶ 9. On January 11, 2025, Petitioner applied for asylum, withholding, and 9 relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Id. ¶ 12. On April 18, 2025, an 10 immigration court held a merit hearing on Petitioner’s case, and on April 21, 2025, an 11 immigration judge (“IJ”) granted Petitioner’s application for withholding of removal to 12 Mexico under the CAT. Id. ¶ 13. After the IJ granted his withholding application to Mexico, 13 Petitioner states that he was told he was being held awaiting removal to a third county. Id. 14 ¶ 15. 15 On June 25, 2025, Petitioner moved to reopen his removal order and filed an 16 emergency motion to stay removal following a Supreme Court decision that made it more 17 likely he would be removed to a third country. ECF Nos. 1 ¶ 16; 13 at 2. Those motions 18 were granted by an IJ on June 25, 2025. Id. Petitioner had subsequent hearings in his 19 immigration case on July 9, 2025, August 8, 2025, and October 7, 2025. ECF Nos. 1 ¶ 17; 20 15 at 2. 21 On October 8, 2025, the IJ issued a written decision reissuing an order of removal 22 to Mexico in Petitioner’s case and granting Petitioner’s application for withholding of 23 removal under the CAT. ECF No. 15 at 6. The IJ noted that the Department of Homeland 24 Security has asserted since the case was reopened that it has not yet been able to find a 25 third country willing to accept Petitioner. Id. at 5. 26 II. LEGAL STANDARD 27 “Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, 28 the district courts, and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 1 U.S.C. § 2241(a). A prisoner prevails in her petition for writ of habeas corpus if she shows 2 that “[she] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 3 States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual 4 detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). 5 III. DISCUSSION 6 A. Jurisdiction 7 Respondents argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this 8 petition under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g) and (b)(9). ECF No. 12 at 3-7. For the reasons outlined 9 below, the Court finds that those statutes do not bar jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claims. 10 The Court’s jurisdiction to hear writs of habeas corpus from immigration detainees 11 depends on the type of claims at issue. Congress has granted the Attorney General the 12 power to “commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, and execute removal orders” against 13 aliens, and forbidden judicial review of “any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien 14 arising from” such decisions. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). District courts also may not review on 15 habeas “questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional 16 and statutory decisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an 17 alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). In interpreting “arising under” in both statutes, the Supreme 18 Court has cautioned against “expansive interpretations” that would cause “staggering 19 results” like rendering prolonged detention claims unreviewable. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 20 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018); Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 21 U.S. 471, 482-483 (1999). 22 Here, Petitioner seeks only review of the legality of his detention (ECF No. 13 at 6- 23 7), which does not require judicial intervention into the Attorney General’s decisions to 24 commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, and execute removal orders. The government 25 asserts that Petitioner’s claim of unlawful detention arises from the Attorney General’s 26 decision to commence removal proceedings against him. ECF No. 12 at 7. Adopting this 27 interpretation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g) and (b)(9) would eliminate judicial review of 28 immigration detainees’ claims of unlawful detention, which the Court finds inconsistent 1 with Jennings and the history of judicial review of the detention of noncitizens under 28 2 U.S.C. § 2241. 538 U.S. at 294; see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001) 3 (finding the duration of immigration detention reviewable under § 2241); Rodriguez Diaz 4 v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1209 (9th Cir. 2022) (finding that the court would have 5 jurisdiction under § 2241 to consider errors of law in immigration detention, including due 6 process violations); Hernandez v. Session, 872 F.3d 976, 986 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding that 7 the court had jurisdiction to hear constitutional claims about immigration detention under 8 § 2241 despite the government characterizing the challenge as unreviewable). As other 9 courts in this district have found in similar matters, the Court has jurisdiction to hear 10 Petitioner’s claims that his detention is unlawful under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Alegria 11 Palma v. LaRose, 25-cv-1942-BJC-MMP, ECF No. 14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2025); Mendez 12 Los Santos v. LaRose, 25-cv-2216-TWR-MSB, ECF No. 14 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2025) 13 (granting petition by minute order); Rokhifirooz v. LaRose et al., No. 25-cv-2053-RSH- 14 VET, 2025 WL 2646165 (S.D. Cal Sept. 15, 2025). 15 B. Due Process 16 Petitioner argues that his continued detention is unlawful because he has been 17 detained for over a year during his initial asylum case, the first order of removal against 18 him, his re-opened asylum case, and now following a second order of removal. ECF No. 19 13 at 2. Petitioner’s claim arises primarily under Zadvydas, where the Supreme Court held 20 that indefinite immigration detention raises due process concerns under the Fifth 21 Amendment. 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). The Court in Zadvydas based its reasoning on the 22 government’s failure to show a reasonable likelihood of removing an immigration detainee 23 who they were legally authorized to remove. Id. at 701. Here, Petitioner’s case has gone 24 through several stages both allowing and prohibiting his removal. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 13-16. The 25 Court must therefore examine separately the legality of his detention under the law that 26 applies to the period in which his re-opened asylum claim was pending, between June 25, 27 2025, and October 8, 2025, and after his October 8, 2025, final order of removal was 28 1 entered. See id.; ECF No. 15 at 2. For reasons explained below, the Court does not reach 2 the legality of Petitioner’s detention prior to his re-opening of his asylum case in this order. 3 While Petitioner’s asylum case was re-opened, the government was barred by 4 judicial order from removing him. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 16. Applicants for asylum are detained 5 under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii), which allows for detention during the pendency of the 6 case. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 283 (explaining that the asylum statutes “mandate detention for 7 a specific period of time: until immigration officers have finished considering the asylum 8 application or until removal proceedings have concluded.”) (internal quotations and 9 citations omitted). Applicants for asylum may be paroled into the country while their 10 asylum case is pending at the discretion of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). 11 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). 12 After an immigration court enters a final order of removal, the case is no longer 13 pending and the government “shall remove the alien from the United States within a period 14 of 90 days.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)-(a)(2)(A). The government may hold the alien in 15 custody during the initial 90 day removal period by statute. Id. In Zadvydas, the Supreme 16 Court held that when the government is unable to remove an alien within 90 days, the alien 17 may seek review of the reasonableness of their continued detention under the due process 18 clause through petition for writ of habeas corpus. 533 U.S. at 687. The Court instructed 19 habeas courts to analyze whether continued detention beyond the 90 day period “exceeds 20 a period reasonably necessary to secure removal,” based on “the [removal detention] 21 statute’s basic purpose, namely, assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.” 22 Id. at 699. The Court has held that it is presumptively reasonable for the government to 23 detain an alien for a period of 6 months while it works to effectuate his removal after 24 issuing a final order of removal against him. Id. at 701. Beyond that period, “if removal is 25 not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no 26 longer authorized by statute” and grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 699- 27 700. 28 1 Here, Petitioner argues that his detention of over a year is unlawful under Zadvydas. 2 ECF No. 1 ¶ 31. However, while Petitioner’s detention has been continuous since he re- 3 entered the country, his detention between voluntarily re-opening his asylum case and the 4 IJ’s final order in that case fell under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) and is thus not subject 5 to analysis under Zadvydas. See 533 U.S. at 701. It is reasonable that the government failed 6 to remove Petitioner while his reopened case was pending because the IJ’s order reopening 7 the case also stayed his removal. See ECF No. 12 at 3. While Respondents could have 8 granted Petitioner parole while his reopened asylum case was pending, it is not within this 9 Court’s jurisdiction to require them to do so. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Petitioner does 10 not argue any procedural defect in his reopened case that would make it improper to 11 consider his reopened case pending for its duration. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii); 12 Jennings, 583 U.S. at 283. Thus, Respondents did not violate Petitioner’s due process rights 13 by detaining him while his reopened removal case was pending. 14 Petitioner’s current detention subject to a final order of removal falls under 8 U.S.C. 15 § 1231(a)(2)(A) because there is now no pending case and a final order of removal against 16 him. The IJ issued a final order of removal against Petitioner on October 8, 2025, starting 17 the 90-day removal period, which will still be in effect when this order is filed. See 8 U.S.C. 18 § 1231(a)(1)(A)-(B). The Court does not reach today the likelihood of Petitioner’s removal 19 or the effect of Petitioner’s prior detention before re-opening his case on analysis of his 20 detention under Zadvydas, because, assuming no defects in the asylum case or removal 21 order, Zadvydas due process analysis does not begin until the close of the statutory 90 day 22 removal period. See 533 U.S. at 682. Thus, Respondent have not violated Petitioner’s due 23 process rights by detaining him following the IJ’s issuance of the final order of removal 24 against him. 25 For the reasons set forth above, the petition for writ of habeas corpus on due process 26 grounds is DENIED as premature. 27 /// 28 /// 1 C. Administrative Procedure Act 2 Petitioner also argues that his detention is unlawful under the Administrative 3 || Procedure Act (“APA”) and the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). ECF No. 1 9 4 32-36. Courts may set aside unlawful, unconstitutional, or arbitrary and capricious agency 5 |actions. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Petitioner provides a list of reasons that a person may be 6 || deportable, inadmissible, and subject to mandatory detention under INA §§ 212(a)(2)-(3), 7 || 237(a)(2)-(4). ECF No. 1 4 4. Petitioner argues that because he does not fall into the 8 ||categories enumerated in those statutes, he may not be lawfully subjected to mandatory 9 || detention. /d. 4] 35. However, those statutes do not constitute an exhaustive list of reasons 10 |/that a person can be subject to immigration detention. As explained above, Petitioner was 11 || previously detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) and is currently detained under 8 12 ||}U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). Neither statute requires that a person falls into the enumerated 13 ||categories subject to mandatory detention for the government to lawfully detain them. 14 || Thus, Respondents did not violate the APA by detaining Petitioner. 15 The petition is DENIED on the basis of the alleged APA violation. 16 D. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 17 Having ruled on the Petition on the merits, the Court declines to apply the Winter 18 factors to determine whether to issue a TRO. Thus, the Court DENIES AS MOOT the 19 || Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. 20 IV. CONCLUSION 21 For the reasons set forth above, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 54 Dated: October 29, 2025 ee Sm. 25 Honorable James E. Sunmons Jr. United States District Judge 27 28