1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 KURRABA GROUP EXPOSED, Case No. 25-cv-09271-JSC

8 Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR

9 v. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

10 KURRABA GROUP PTY LTD, et al., Defendants. 11

12 13 Plaintiff, Kurraba Group Exposed (KGE), filed this action seeking to enjoin Defendants 14 Kurraba Group Pty Ltd. and Nicholas Mark Smith from enforcing an Australian court order 15 regarding KGE’s website. The Complaint was accompanied by a motion for a temporary 16 restraining order (TRO). (Dkt. No. 2.1) The Court struck the TRO and related filings because 17 Plaintiff’s counsel was not admitted to practice in this Court and the filings failed to comply with 18 the Local Rules. Plaintiff has now filed a second motion for a TRO seeking an order enjoining 19 Defendants from enforcing the Australia’s court’s order in the United States and enjoining 20 Defendants from pursuing further legal action in Australia. (Dkt. No. 11.) Having reviewed the 21 filings and relevant legal authority, the Court concludes oral argument is unnecessary, see Civ. 22 L.R. 7-1(b), and DENIES the TRO. As there is no legal basis for Plaintiff’s demanded injunctive 23 relief, it has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits or a serious legal issue. 24 BACKGROUND 25 Plaintiff is an unincorporated association that operates an interactive online platform where 26 community activist members “post investigative content, factual reports, and commentary 27 1 regarding Defendant Kurraba Group and its Executive Director, Nicholas ‘Nick’ Mark Smith, and 2 their real estate development projects and business practices, particularly the controversial 3 proposed development at 100 Botany Road in Sydney, Australia.” (Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 3.) Plaintiff’s 4 “technical infrastructure” is maintained through servers located in the United States with 5 “administrative operations” based in San Francisco, California. (Id.) Defendant Kurraba Group is 6 an Australian company and Defendant Smith an Australian resident. (Id. at ¶¶ 5-6.) 7 One of Plaintiff’s members, “Australian community advocate, Michael Williams, has been 8 publicly associated with opposing Kurraba’s project.” (Id. at ¶ 3.) On October 2, 2025, 9 Defendants filed a lawsuit against Williams in the New South Wales District Court bringing 10 defamation claims regarding publications on Plaintiff’s website and claims for invasion of privacy 11 and intimidation. (Id. at ¶ 15.) The Australia court issued an order enjoining “Williams from 12 ‘publishing any documents … by way of posting articles on the Internet … referring to Mr[.] 13 Smith and Kurraba,’ and further required Williams ‘within two days’ to ‘take all steps to remove 14 from the Internet … any website, article, advertisement or document referring to or identifying 15 Mr[.] Smith and Kurraba.’” (Id.) Williams was also “barred [] from ‘repeating or continuing to 16 publish’ any such materials and from ‘inciting or encouraging any person’ to engage in the 17 same.’” (Id.) Defendants presented the Australian court order to Google and Google “geo- 18 blocked” access to Plaintiff’s website in Australia and “de-indexed” the website globally so the 19 website does not appear in a Google search using “key search terms.” (Id. at ¶ 18.) 20 Plaintiff thereafter filed this action under Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and 21 the SPEECH Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-4104. (Dkt. No. 1.) In its TRO request, Plaintiff asks this 22 California federal court to:

23 1. Enjoin[] Enforcement of the Australian Order in the U.S.: Defendants and anyone in active concert with them, shall be 24 restrained and enjoined from enforcing, attempting to enforce, or otherwise giving any effect to the orders of the New South Wales, 25 Australia court [] in any court or jurisdiction of the United States[;] 26 2. Enjoin[] Further Censorship Actions Abroad that Impact U.S. 27 Speech: Defendants are further enjoined from taking any action in of content in the United States. In particular, Defendants shall not 1 pursue contempt proceedings, penalties, or new injunctions in the Australian courts against Google (or other U.S. entities) for failure 2 to comply with the Australian removal order, insofar as such non- compliance occurs in accordance with U.S. law and this Court’s 3 orders.

4 3. [Provide] Declaratory Relief: … declar[ing] that Plaintiff’s publications at issue do not violate U.S. defamation law and are 5 protected speech under the First Amendment, and that the Australian injunction and any resulting judgment are repugnant to 6 the public policy of the United States and unenforceable domestically pursuant to the SPEECH Act, 28 U.S.C. § 4102, 7 Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230, and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 8 (Dkt. No. 11-1 at 28-29.) 9 Plaintiff provided notice of the Complaint and TRO by email on October 30, 2025. (Dkt. 10 No. 11-2, Khanna Decl. at ¶¶ 3-4.) 11

DISCUSSION

12 The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is identical to the standard for 13 issuing a preliminary injunction. See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1159 n.3 (9th Cir. 14 2017) (“[T]he legal standards applicable to TROs and preliminary injunctions are substantially 15 identical.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A court considers four factors before 16 granting preliminary relief: (1) whether the applicant is likely to succeed on the merits of the 17 action; (2) whether the applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary 18 relief; (3) whether the balance of the equities tip in the applicant’s favor; and (4) that an injunction 19 is in the public interest. Doe v. Reed, 586 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter v. 20 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). An injunction is a matter of equitable 21 discretion and is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that 22 the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. 23 Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success or even serious questions going to the 24 merits that would support its proposed injunctive relief. First, Plaintiff contends the SPEECH Act, 25 28 U.S.C. § 4102, “categorically prohibits U.S. courts from recognizing or enforcing foreign 26 defamation judgments that fail to meet First Amendment standards.” (Dkt. No. 11-1 at 15.) 27 Agreed. See Trout Point Lodge, Ltd. v. Handshoe, 729 F.3d 481 (5th Cir. 2013) (affirming federal 1 district court’s refusal to enforce a defamation-based default judgment obtained against a blogger 2 in Canada). But no entity or individual, let alone Defendants, have sought to have this Court 3 recognize a foreign defamation judgment. So, the Act, on its face, does not authorize this Court to 4 issue the injunctive relief sought by Plaintiff. 5 At most, Plaintiff can seek a declaration that the Australian order is repugnant to the laws 6 of the United States. See Electronic Frontier Foundation v. Global Equity Management (SA) Pty 7 Ltd., 290 F.Supp.3d 923 (N.D. Cal. 2017). But Plaintiff has not made the requisite showing for 8 this relief under the SPEECH Act, and, in particular, that the injunction it seeks to declare 9 “repugnant” is a final judgment. Id. at 941-42 (“The Australian injunction is a qualifying order 10 under the SPEECH Act because it is a final judgment on a defamation claim”). Indeed, Plaintiff 11 itself characterizes the Australian injunction as “interim.” (Dkt. No. 11-1 at 8.) Further, the Court 12 is not aware of any authority, and Plaintiff has not cited any authority, permitting a tro of a mere 13 declaration as a declaration is not a restraining order. Finally, unsurprisingly, the SPEECH Act 14 does not regulate the enforcement of foreign judgments in foreign countries; yet, that is primarily 15 the injunctive relief Plaintiff seeks. 16 Second, Plaintiff contends “the Australian order cannot be enforced because it violates 17 fundamental First Amendment principles that no foreign judgment can override.” (Dkt. No. 11-1 18 at 18.) But, again, no one has asked this federal district court to enforce a judgment. Plaintiff 19 cites Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 745 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc), and characterizes it as 20 “dissolving injunction on online video, emphasizing First Amendment limits on prior restraints in 21 digital media.” (Dkt. No. 11-1 at 18.) The case says nothing about permitting a federal district 22 court to impose the remarkable and unprecedented relief sought here. 23 Third, Plaintiff contends the Australian judgment “was obtained in violation of basic due 24 process principles.” (Id. at 20.) But, again, given no party has asked this federal court to enforce 25 the judgment, that the Australian judgment did not satisfy the due process clause of the United 26 States Constitution does not support entry of the relief sought. 27 Plaintiff has thus failed to establish a likelihood of success or a serious legal question and 1 1040 (9th Cir. 2023) (“a ‘court need not consider the other factors’ if a movant fails to show a 2 || likelihood of success on the merits.”) (citation omitted); Smith v. Helzer, 95 F.4th 1207, 1215 (9th 3 |} Cir. 2024) (affirming denial of a preliminary injunction after finding no likelihood of success and 4 || without discussing any other preliminary injunction factor). 5 CONCLUSION 6 For the reasons stated above, the request for a TRO is DENIED. 7 This Order disposes of Docket No. 11. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 Dated: October 31, 2025 10 ’ ne 11

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORL

12 United States District Judge

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