1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MICHAEL M. WARD, No. 2:25-cv-00919-TLN-DMC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 CITY OF REDDING POLICE DEPT., et al., 15 Defendants. 16

17 18 Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil action. Pending before the 19 Court is Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, ECF No. 7, and Plaintiff’s motion to compel, ECF 20 No. 3. 21 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by litigants who, as here, have 22 been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Under this 23 screening provision, the Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 24 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 25 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(A), (B). 26 Moreover, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), this Court must dismiss an 27 action if the Court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3), 28 the Court will also consider as a threshold matter whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction. 1 Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a 2 “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 3 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See 4 McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). 5 These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim 6 and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). 7 Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific 8 defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this 9 standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law 10 when the allegations are vague and conclusory. 11 12 I. BACKGROUND 13 Plaintiff filed the original complaint, a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and a 14 motion to compel on March 24, 2025. See ECF Nos. 1, 2 and 3. Plaintiff’s complaint was 15 dismissed with leave to amend because it was not clear if the state proceedings that Plaintiff’s 16 allegations arise from had concluded and if they had not, this Court found that Younger 17 abstention may be appropriate. See ECF No. 6. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on June 18, 18 2025. See ECF No. 7. 19 A. Plaintiff’s Allegations 20 Plaintiff contends that on November 4, 2023, “officers” violated Plaintiff’s Fourth 21 Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. ECF No. 7, pg. 3-4. Plaintiff 22 asserts that, based on whether they were located, officers could not have noticed that Plaintiff did 23 not have a front license plate but officers claimed that was the reason for stopping Plaintiff. See 24 id. at 4. According to Plaintiff, he did have a front license plate on his car at the time. See id. 25 Further, Plaintiff asserts that his GPS contradicts the officer’s statements about where Plaintiff 26 was at the time. See id. at 7. Plaintiff contends this stop resulted in a “fishing expedition,” while 27 Plaintiff “was being detained unlawfully without legitimate legal basis or probable cause.” Id. at 28 4. Plaintiff asserts that he has no criminal record, is a retired Army Veteran, and posed no threat 1 to the safety of the officers or others. Id. According to Plaintiff, when he asked if he was free to 2 go, officers “shift[ed]” their stated reason for the stop as being the tint of Plaintiff’s windows and 3 then began “using the ‘He Fits The Description’ tactic.” Id. Plaintiff asserts that refusing to let 4 Plaintiff leave violated Plaintiff’s right to due process. Id. at 9. 5 Plaintiff characterizes this stop as racial profiling and asserts officers 6 “unconstitutionally arrest[ed] the plaintiff for the sole purpose of taking the plaintiff to their 7 jailhouse.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff asserts that the arresting officers obstructed justice by bringing a 8 false criminal matter in court, in an effort to silence Plaintiff. Id. According to Plaintiff, officers 9 falsified reports that were then used in court to initiate a criminal matter against Plaintiff. Id. at 7. 10 Plaintiff provides what he alleges is Officer Dahnke and Officer Upshaw’s false report. See id. 11 Plaintiff asserts that this was done in retaliation, as “a means to interfere with the legal process of 12 a federal lawsuit filed against their department.” Id. Plaintiff contends that this instance is one 13 within a “Pattern-Of-Practice of Civil Rights Violations” by Redding Police Department. Id. at 8. 14 Plaintiff asserts that the officers’ actions “may be considered criminal.” Id. at 14. 15 Plaintiff next describes actions he has taken in state court to make “‘Pitchess 16 motions’” for impeachment material, but Plaintiff asserts that such motions have been denied. Id. 17 Plaintiff contends that the arresting officers “are in fact on the ‘Brady List.’” Id. Plaintiff contends 18 that the officers “have a substantial history of false arrests, illegal traffic stops, and falsified report 19 writing, excessive use of force.” Id. at 15. Plaintiff explains that “this is why the Plaintiff 20 requested the impeachment records of both defendants Dahnk and Upshaw.1” Id. Plaintiff asserts 21 that the City District Attorney’s failure to provide Plaintiff these documents violates Plaintiff’s 22 Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and equal protection under Brady v. Maryland, 373 23 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). See id. 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 1 Arresting Officers Dahnk and Upshaw are not named Defendants in this action. the Court 27 takes judicial notice of Plaintiff’s other case filed in this district, arising from the same November 4, 2023, arrest of Plaintiff, which does name Dahnk and Upshaw as Defendants. See 2:24-cv- 28 00978-TLN-AC. 1 Plaintiff asserts that “the Prosecutor knows the charges are false, or should have 2 known the charge was falsified.” Id. at 14. Plaintiff contends that the state criminal court 3 “provided no avenue or venue for Plaintiff to fight for his constitutional rights” and “has 4 continuously stripped the Plaintiff of Due Process protections to ensure a conviction under the 5 false charge.” Id. Plaintiff asserts that the state criminal court “is acting in a ‘Lawless Manner’. 6 And when this happens Federal Courts have Jurisdiction to Intervene . . . as it is an exeption (sic) 7 under the Younger Abstention Doctrine.” Id. Plaintiff further states that the state criminal court 8 “clearly demonstrated they do not have the moral, or ethical capability of providing proceedings, 9 and following the Law, and Constitution by protecting those rights . . .” Id. at 15. Plaintiff 10 contends that this presents “extraordinary circumstances that would make abstention 11 inappropriate.” Id. 12 B. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel 13 Plaintiff filed a motion to compel what Plaintiff characterizes as “Brady and 14 impeachment material.” See ECF No. 3. Plaintiff asserts that he brings the motion under “the 15 Public Records Request Act, Brady Rule, and Giglio Rule.” Id.at 2. Plaintiff contends that he has 16 sought this information throughout the court proceeding in Shasta County Superior Court but 17 there was “zero to little interest in enforcing the Plaintiff’s Constitutional Rights to these 18 Records.” Id. Much of Plaintiff’s motion to compel summarizes the allegations within Plaintiff’s 19 complaint and requests the same relief Plaintiff seeks in his complaint. See id. generally. 20 21 II. DISCUSSION 22 A. Younger Abstention 23 When state court proceedings are ongoing, federal action may be barred under the 24 doctrine announced in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Younger abstention is concerned 25 with overlapping principles of equity, comity, and federalism and directs federal courts to abstain 26 from granting injunctive or declaratory relief that would interfere with pending state or local court 27 proceedings in certain situations. See Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2018); 28 Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 973 (9th Cir. 2004). Younger established that federal courts 1 must refrain from enjoining or interfering with a parallel, pending criminal proceeding in state 2 court. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 49-53. 3 Younger abstention applies differently to claims for monetary damages and claims 4 for injunctive and declaratory relief. Where injunctive and declaratory relief is sought, a dismissal 5 of those claims is appropriate. Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 981. But where monetary damages are 6 sought, the federal court should stay, rather than dismiss those claims, until after the state court 7 proceedings are no longer pending. Id. at 981-82. 8 Plaintiff was provided leave to amend because the Court could not determine if 9 there were ongoing state criminal proceedings which would necessitate Younger abstention. See 10 ECF No. 6. In this amended complaint, Plaintiff does not clarify whether the proceedings are 11 ongoing but instead argues that Younger abstention is not appropriate given the egregious 12 constitutional violations Plaintiff is suffering. The information Plaintiff provides indicates state 13 criminal proceedings are ongoing. Plaintiff requests injunctive relief to dismiss the criminal 14 charges against him, a declaration stating that his arrest was unlawful, and a declaration ordering 15 Shasta County District Attorney “to cease engaging in further misconduct, and civil rights 16 violations. To end all harassment of the Plaintiff including “Unlawful Prosecution.” ECF No. 7, 17 pg. 16. Additionally, Plaintiff seeks “monetary relief.” Id. 18 To the extent that state criminal proceedings are ongoing, and Plaintiff seeks 19 declaratory and injunctive relief, Younger abstention is appropriate. Plaintiff argues that the state 20 court is “acting in a ‘Lawless Manner,’” and such actions present “extraordinary circumstances 21 that would make abstention inappropriate.” Id. at 14-15. Plaintiff is correct that even if the 22 requirements of Younger abstention are met, abstention is not appropriate in the situation of “bad 23 faith prosecution or harassment” nor if “a statute is flagrantly and patently violative of 24 constitutional prohibitions.” World Famous Drinking Emporium, Inc. v. Tempe, 820 F.2d 1079, 25 1082 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 47-54 (1971). 26 Here, Plaintiff does not allege his charge was the result of a patently 27 unconstitutional statute. Additionally, as currently pled, Plaintiff’s allegations do not rise to the 28 level of bad faith prosecution nor harassment. Plaintiff does not explicitly state what charges were 1 asserted against him. For example, the complaint cites a number of criminal laws and makes 2 statements such as “improper use of 148. (a) (1) p.c. charges to silence the victim of excessive use 3 of force.” See ECF No. 7, pg. 6. However, the complaint does not state that Plaintiff was charged 4 with a violation of Cal. Penal Code 148. 5 Additionally, Plaintiff contends that “the Prosecutor knows the charges are false, 6 or should have known the charge was falsified.” ECF No. 7, pg. 14. However, Plaintiff does not 7 explain how “the Prosecutor” should have had such knowledge, beyond making the claim that the 8 officers who arrested Plaintiff are on “the Brady list” and “have a substantial history of false 9 arrests, illegal traffic stops, and falsified report writing.” Id. at 15. A conviction can be set aside 10 when a prosector presents knowingly false testimony but here, Plaintiff does not allege that the 11 prosecutor knew the testimony presented was false. See United States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 12 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1993). 13 Indeed, as discussed below, Plaintiff’s original complaint named Stephanie 14 Bridgette, Shasta County District Attorney, as a Defendant but in the first amended complaint, it 15 is not clear if Bridgette was the prosecutor on Plaintiff’s case or if Plaintiff is asserting 16 supervisory liability. Additionally, the Court notes that much of Plaintiff’s complaint alleges 17 violations of Brady, but Brady obligations merely require the prosecution to turn over exculpatory 18 evidence, including impeachment evidence, before a trial, and it is not clear from the complaint 19 that Plaintiff has had a trial yet. Thus, Plaintiff does not provide sufficient facts for this Court to 20 find Younger abstention is inappropriate. 21 However, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, Plaintiff may be 22 entitled to a stay as to those claims until after the state court proceeding is no longer pending. See 23 Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 981-982. Given the other deficiencies with Plaintiff’s complaint, 24 discussed in the following sections, Plaintiff will be provided leave to amend, and the Court will 25 consider a stay at the time that the complaint presents cognizable claims. 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 B. Rooker-Feldman Abstention 2 Under the Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine, federal courts lack jurisdiction to 3 hear matters already decided in state court. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 4 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The doctrine 5 applies in cases “brought by state court losers complaining of injuries caused by state court 6 judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court 7 review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 8 544 U.S. 280 (2005). For jurisdiction to be barred under Rooker-Feldman abstention, the plaintiff 9 must be both seeking relief from state court judgment and “allege[] a legal error by the state 10 court.” Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Kougasian v. TMSL, 11 Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Rooker-Feldman thus applies only when the federal 12 plaintiff both asserts as her legal error or errors by the state court and seeks as her remedy relief 13 from the state court judgment.”). 14 To determine if a claim for damages arising from a state ruling is barred by 15 Rooker-Feldman, the court must consider whether the alleged damages “flow[] from the 16 judgment.” See Blakeley v. Gunderson, No. 23-35061, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 1389, at *3-4 (9th 17 Cir. Jan. 22, 2024) (Rooker-Feldman only bars suits for damages “flowing from the judgment” of 18 the state-court); McCoy v. Uale, No. 21-16877, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 28912, at *2 (9th Cir. 19 Oct. 18, 2022) (“since McCoy alleges injuries from the state court's decision, Rooker-Feldman 20 bars his claims) (emphasis added); see also Hook v. Winmill, No. 22-36065, 2023 U.S. App. 21 LEXIS 33473, at *2 (9th Cir. Dec. 18, 2023) (suits against Judges and the Court are ‘de facto’ 22 appeals barred by Rooker-Feldman and judicial immunity). 23 As previously stated, it is not clear whether Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings have 24 concluded. However, it appears that Plaintiff is seeking relief from a state court judgment. 25 Plaintiff is advised that relief may not be available if it constitutes a de facto appeal under 26 Rooker-Feldman. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 C. Causal Link 2 Plaintiff was previously advised that:

3 the complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is involved and must set forth some affirmative link or connection between each defendant’s 4 actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 5 ECF No. 6, pg. 3. 6 The first amended complaint does not provide sufficient facts to link Defendant 7 Stephanie Bridgett to Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff’s allegations do not make clear if Defendant 8 Bridgett is the prosecutor who brought the charges against Plaintiff, because he refers to that 9 individual as “the Prosecutor,” rather than their name. Plaintiff will be provided leave to amend to 10 clarify Defendant Bridgett’s involvement. 11 D. Motion to Compel 12 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to compel may be filed “if a 13 party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a).” Fed. Rul. Civ. Pro. 37(3)(A). Parties can 14 also seek to compel a discovery response or information related to a deposition. Fed. Rul. Civ. 15 Pro. 37(3)(B) and (C). At this stage of litigation, before the action has even been served on 16 parties, a motion to compel is premature. Accordingly, the undersigned will deny Plaintiff’s 17 motion without prejudice to refile in the future. 18

19

III. CONCLUSION

20 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 21 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire 22 action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is 23 informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See 24 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to 25 amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended 26 complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if 27 Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make 28 1 || Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be 2 || complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 3 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the 4 || conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See 5 || Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 6 || each named defendant is involved and must set forth some affirmative link or connection between 7 || each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 8 | (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 9 Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the 10 || time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 11 | 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply 12 || with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 13 || See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 14 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 15 1. Plaintiff's first amended complaint, ECF No. 7, is dismissed with leave to 16 || amend; 17 2. Plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint within 30 days of the date 18 | of service of this order; and 19 3. Plaintiff's motion to compel, ECF No. 3, is denied without prejudice. 20 21 || Dated: September 22, 2025 Co 22 DENNIS M. COTA 3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28