INTRODUCTION

21 On February 13, 2025, Plaintiffs Haydee Reynoso and Jesus Gallegos 22 (together, “Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint (the “Complaint”) alleging violations of 23 California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and the federal Magnuson-Moss 24 Warranty Act in the Los Angeles County Superior Court against Defendants 25 General Motors LLC, Montebello Auto Group LLC, and DOES 1 through 10. (Dkt. 26 1-1.) On February 21, 2025, Plaintiffs effectuated service of the Complaint on 27 Defendant General Motors LLC (“Defendant”). (Dkt. 13 at 2.) On March 28, 2025, 28 1 Does 1 through 10 as defendants. (Dkt. 1-2.) On July 3, 2025, Defendant filed an 2 Answer in the Los Angeles County Superior Court. (Dkt. 1-3.) On September 5, 3 2025, Defendant filed a Notice of Removal of the action to the U.S. District Court 4 for the Central District of California (the “Notice of Removal”). (Dkt. 1.) 5 On October 3, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Remand (the “Motion to 6 Remand”) this action to the Los Angeles County Superior Court. (Dkt. 13.) On 7 October 15, 2025, Defendant filed an Opposition to the Motion to Remand (the 8 “Opposition”). (Dkt. 14.) Plaintiffs had until October 22, 2025 to file an optional 9 reply, but declined to do so. 10 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned U.S. 11 Magistrate Judge. (Dkt. 8.) For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES 12 Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand. (Dkt. 15.) Because the Court has determined that the 13 14 Motion to Remand must be denied, the Court will also issue a separate scheduling 15 order. 16 17 II. 18 LEGAL STANDARD 19 Removal of a case from state court to federal court is governed by 28 U.S.C. 20 § 1441, which provides in relevant part that “any civil action brought in a State court 21 of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be 22 removed . . . to the district court of the United States for the district and division 23 embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal 24 courts have original subject matter jurisdiction where an action presents either a 25 federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. 26 § 1332. Generally, a court has diversity jurisdiction only when there is complete 27 diversity of citizenship among adverse parties and the amount in controversy 28 exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Remand to state court may be ordered 1 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 2 To protect the jurisdiction of state courts, removal jurisdiction is strictly 3 construed in favor of remand. See Harris v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 4 689, 698 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 5 684 (9th Cir. 2006) (“It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside the limited 6 jurisdiction of the federal courts and the burden of establishing the contrary rests 7 upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks and brackets 8 omitted)). If there is any doubt as to whether removal is proper, remand must be 9 ordered. Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 1988). 10 “The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.” 11 Id. 12

13 14 III. 15 RELEVANT ALLEGATIONS IN THE PLEADINGS 16 Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges four causes of action under the Song-Beverly 17 Consumer Warranty Act, California Civil Code §§ 1791, et seq.,1 and one cause of 18 action under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12, 19 arising out of their September 3, 2022 purchase of a 2022 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 20 (the “Subject Vehicle”). (Dkt. 1-1 at 12-17.) Plaintiffs allege that they are 21 residents of the State of California. (Id. at 12.) Plaintiffs further allege that 22 Defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware and registered to 23 conduct business in California. (Id.) 24 Plaintiffs allege that during their ownership, “the Subject Vehicle manifested 25 defects covered by Defendant’s express written warranties” including, but not 26

27 1 Specifically, Plaintiffs allege causes of action for violations of California Civil Code §§ 1793.2(d), 1793.2(b), 1793.2(a)(3), 1791.1, and 1794. (Dkt. 1-1 at 13-16.) 28 1 that they “delivered Subject Vehicle to Defendant and/or its authorized service and 2 repair facilities for diagnosis and repair of the defects.” (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that 3 “Defendant and/or its authorized service and repair facilities failed to service or 4 repair the Subject Vehicle to conform with the applicable express warranties after a 5 reasonable number of opportunities to do so.” (Id. at 14.) 6 Plaintiffs seek actual, equitable, statutory, incidental, and consequential 7 damages. (Id. at 17-18.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s conduct was willful and 8 therefore seek civil penalties of up to two times the amount of actual damages. (Id. 9 at 14-15, 17.) Finally, Plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees and costs, prejudgment 10 interest, and other relief as the Court may deem proper. (Id. at 18.) 11 Plaintiffs’ FAC is nearly identical to the Complaint in all relevant aspects, but 12 drops Montebello Auto Group LLC as a defendant and adds two causes of action. 13 14 Specifically, the FAC alleges four causes of action under the Song-Beverly 15 Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1791, et seq.,2 a cause of action under 16 the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12, a cause of action 17 under the Uniform Commercial Code, and a cause of action under the California 18 Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750, et seq., arising out of their 19 purchase of the Subject Vehicle. (Dkt. 1-2 at 3-11.) Plaintiffs again allege that they 20 are residents of the State of California. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiffs again allege that 21 Defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware and registered to 22 conduct business in California. (Id.) 23 Plaintiffs again allege that during their ownership, “the Subject Vehicle 24 manifested defects covered by Defendant’s express written warranties” including, 25 but not limited to, “infotainment and structural defects.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiffs again 26

27 2 Specifically, Plaintiffs allege causes of action for violations of California Civil Code §§ 1793.2(d), 1793.2(b), 1793.2(a)(3), 1791.1, and 1794. (Dkt. 1-2 at 3-6.) 28 1 and repair facilities for diagnosis and repair of the defects.” (Id.) Plaintiffs again 2 allege that “Defendant and/or its authorized service and repair facilities failed to 3 service or repair Subject Vehicle to conform with the applicable express warranties 4 after a reasonable number of opportunities to do so.” (Id.) 5 Plaintiffs again seek actual, equitable, statutory, incidental, and consequential 6 damages. (Id. at 11-12.) Plaintiffs again allege that Defendant’s conduct was 7 willful and therefore seek civil penalties of up to two times the amount of actual 8 damages. (Id. at 4-6, 12.) Finally, Plaintiffs again seek attorneys’ fees and costs, 9 prejudgment interest, and other relief as the Court may deem proper. (Id. at 12.) 10

11

IV.

12

DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF REMOVAL

13 14 Defendant removed the action based on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 15 § 1332 and 1446. (Dkt. 1 at 1.) Defendant points to the allegation in the FAC that 16 Plaintiffs are residents of California. (Id. at 3.) Defendant then states that its 17 “preliminary investigation also concluded that Plaintiffs resided in California when 18 they purchased the [S]ubject [V]ehicle, and on other occasions, establishing a 19 plausible basis for intent to remain in California thus providing a plausible basis for 20 citizenship.” (Id.) Defendant states that it is a Delaware corporation with its 21 principal place of business in Michigan, and therefore is a citizen of both Delaware 22 and Michigan for purposes of jurisdiction. (Id. at 3-4.) 23 With regard to the amount in controversy, Defendant points to the language in 24 the FAC seeking rescission of the contract, damages under the California 25 Commercial Code, civil penalties in the amount of two times Plaintiffs’ actual 26 damages, consequential and incidental damages, attorneys’ fees, prejudgment 27 interest, and other relief as the Court may deem proper. (Id. at 4.) Defendant 28 explains that under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, a plaintiff’s actual 1 payable by the buyer less applicable offsets. (Id. (citing Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2 1793.2(d)(2)(B), 1794(b)).) Defendant estimates the purchase price for the Subject 3 Vehicle to be $76,678.52.3 (Id. at 5.) Defendant further estimates $53,356.77 in 4 total deductions including estimates of mileage offset, third-party service contracts, 5 manufacturer’s rebate, and negative equity. (Id.) Thus, Defendant states that its 6 preliminary investigation “yield[ed] a plausible estimate of actual damages of 7 $23,321.75.” (Id.) 8 Defendant states that its “preliminary investigation into the vehicle repair 9 history and related case history revealed that Plaintiffs are more likely than not to 10 actually seek civil penalties in this matter, and it would thus be reasonable to include 11 a meaningful amount for civil penalties, tied to the actual damages calculated.” (Id.) 12 Defendant further states that based on its “prior experience in similar matters, a 13 14 reasonable estimate of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees accumulated up to this point in 15 litigation is $5,000.” (Id. at 6.) Additionally, Defendant’s “assessment is that this 16 case is not likely to resolve and conservatively including fees from work up for even 17 just 6 months post-removal, the amount in controversy more than exceeds the 18 jurisdictional threshold.” (Id.) “Considering the combination of actual damages, 19 civil penalties, past, and conservatively calculated future attorney fees,” Defendant 20 contends that “the amount in controversy meaningfully exceeds $75,000.” (Id.) 21 22 \\ 23 \\ 24

25 3 The Complaint and FAC state that the Subject Vehicle is a 2022 Chevrolet Silverado 1500. (Dkt. 1-1 at 1; Dkt. 1-2 at 1.) However, Defendant’s Notice of 26 Removal states that the Subject Vehicle is a 2022 Chevrolet Equinox. (Dkt. 1 at 5.) 27 Because Defendant’s Opposition identifies that the Subject Vehicle is a 2022 Chevrolet Silverado, the Court assumes the reference to a Chevrolet Equinox in the 28 Notice of Removal was a clerical error. (Dkt. 14 at 12.) 1 DISCUSSION 2 Plaintiffs contend that Defendant’s Notice of Removal was untimely because 3 the basis for removal was apparent on the face of the Complaint. (Dkt. 13 at 6-7.) 4 Additionally, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant failed to carry its burden on removal 5 of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. (Id. at 14-18.) By contrast, Defendant 6 contends that neither diversity of citizenship nor the amount in controversy were 7 sufficiently clear from the face of the Complaint and therefore Defendant had no 8 duty to remove the action. (Dkt. 14 at 10-14.) Thus, the resolution of Plaintiffs’ 9 Motion to Remand turns on whether the grounds for removal were sufficiently clear 10 from the face of the Complaint, and if not, whether Defendant carried its burden on 11 removal to establish subject matter jurisdiction. 12 For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that the grounds for 13 14 removal were not sufficiently clear from the face of the Complaint and the Notice of 15 Removal was therefore timely. The Court also concludes that Defendant met its 16 burden on removal of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ 17 Motion to Remand is DENIED. 18 A. The Grounds For Removal Were Not “Set Forth” On The Face Of 19 Plaintiffs’ Complaint. 20 The Ninth Circuit has explained that there are three pathways for removal of 21 an action from state court. See Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P., 720 F.3d 22 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 2013). The first two pathways are contained in 28 U.S.C. § 23 1446(b) and impose 30-day deadlines for removal. See Dietrich v. Boeing Co., 14 24 F.4th 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2021). The third pathway is based on reading 28 U.S.C. 25 § 1446 together with 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and permits removal up to one year from the 26 filing of the complaint, but this pathway only applies if the first two do not. See 27 Roth, 720 F.3d at 1125-26. 28 The first pathway is set forth by Section 1446(b)(1) and states that “[t]he 1 the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial 2 pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is 3 based, or within 30 days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such 4 initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on the 5 defendant, whichever period is shorter.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) (emphasis added). 6 The second pathway is set forth by Section 1446(b)(3) and states in relevant part 7 that “if the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal 8 may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or 9 otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from 10 which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become 11 removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) (emphasis added). 12 The third pathway is based on the interaction of Section 1446 with Section 13 14 1441. See Roth, 720 F.3d at 1125. Section 1441(a) states that “[e]xcept as 15 otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State 16 court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may 17 be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United 18 States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is 19 pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The Ninth Circuit has explained “that §§ 1441 and 20 1446, read together, permit a defendant to remove outside the two thirty-day periods 21 on the basis of its own information, provided that it has not run afoul of either of the 22 thirty-day deadlines.” Roth, 720 F.3d at 1125. Thus, “a defendant who has not lost 23 the right to remove because of a failure to timely file a notice of removal under § 24 1446(b)(1) or (b)(3) may remove to federal court when it discovers, based on its 25 own investigation, that a case is removable.” Id. at 1123. The only time limit on 26 removal under this third pathway is that a defendant must file the notice of removal 27 within one year of the filing of the complaint. Id. at 1126 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 28 1446(c)(1) for the one-year time limit). 1 above after conducting “a preliminary investigation [which] determined that 2 Plaintiffs’ citizenship and the reasonable, non-speculative estimation of the amount 3 in controversy placed at issue through Plaintiffs’ allegations plausibly g[a]ve rise to 4 subject matter jurisdiction.” (Dkt. 1 at 2.) Defendant contends that it timely 5 removed the action because neither of the 30-day deadlines for removal were 6 triggered and it ultimately removed the action less than one year after the filing of 7 the Complaint. (Id. at 10.) By contrast, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant’s removal 8 was untimely because service of the Complaint on February 21, 2025 triggered the 9 30-day deadline to remove the action under the first pathway, 28 U.S.C. § 10 1446(b)(1). (Dkt. 13 at 6-7.) Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that the 30-day deadline 11 to remove was triggered under Section 1446(b)(1) because the Complaint alleges a 12 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim, providing the Court federal question 13 14 jurisdiction, and because the threshold requirements for diversity jurisdiction were 15 ascertainable from the face of the Complaint. (Id. at 10-16.) As explained below, 16 the Court concludes that the grounds for removal were not set forth on the face of 17 the Complaint. 18 1. Plaintiffs’ Magnuson-Moss Warranty Claim Did Not 19 Independently Establish Federal Question Jurisdiction. 20 First, Plaintiffs contend that the grounds for removal were set forth on the 21 face of the Complaint because it alleges an “independent claim under the Federal 22 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, [which] formed the bases of federal question 23 jurisdiction when initially filed on February 13, 2025.” (Id. at 10.) However, the 24 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act states that “[n]o claim shall be cognizable . . . if the 25 amount in controversy is less than the sum or value of $50,000 (exclusive of 26 interests and costs) computed on the basis of all claims to be determined in this 27 suit.” 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(B). Thus, “[i]n order [to] file a claim in district court 28 under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, the amount in controversy must be at least 1 Cal. June 20, 2023). “There is nothing in the text of the Magnuson-Moss Act that 2 would indicate that the amount in controversy for that statute is assessed any 3 differently than the diversity jurisdiction requirement found in 28 U.S.C. § 1332.” 4 Romo v. FFG Ins. Co., 397 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1240 (C.D. Cal. 2005). Therefore, 5 Plaintiffs’ Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim did not independently provide 6 grounds for removal based on federal question jurisdiction because the Complaint 7 still needed to sufficiently allege an amount in controversy of $50,000. As 8 explained below, the Complaint is indeterminate as to the amount in controversy. 9 2. Plaintiffs’ Complaint Is Indeterminate As To The Amount In 10 Controversy. 11 As set forth above, the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act requires an 12 amount in controversy of at least $50,000. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(B). And of 13 14 course, diversity jurisdiction requires an amount in controversy that exceeds 15 $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Plaintiffs contend that even though the 16 Complaint does not allege an amount in controversy, Defendant should have been 17 able to determine the amount in controversy from the face of the Complaint because 18 “the make, model, year, and VIN[] were included within the factual bases alleged 19 within the Complaint.” (Dkt. 13 at 12.) 20 However, in Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., the plaintiff argued that the 21 defendant “should have looked in its files within the first thirty days” to discover 22 that a named defendant whose presence in the suit frustrated complete diversity of 23 citizenship had died, and therefore should have recognized that the case was 24 immediately removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Harris, 425 F.3d at 696. The 25 Ninth Circuit rejected this argument in favor of “a bright-line approach” that relies 26 on “objective analysis of the pleadings” instead of asking “whether [a] defendant 27 had subjective knowledge, or whether [a] defendant conducted [a] sufficient 28 inquiry.” Id. at 697. Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that materials outside the 1 remove under the first pathway (28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1)). See id. 2 The Ninth Circuit reinforced the holding and rationale from Harris in 3 Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136 (2013). In Kuxhausen, the 4 Ninth Circuit held that the amount in controversy for removal under the Class 5 Action Fairness Act was not sufficiently clear from the face of the complaint 6 because the complaint did not allege, “even as an approximation,” the value of the 7 other class members’ vehicle financing contracts, and instead, alleged only the value 8 of the named class representative’s vehicle financing contract. See Kuxhausen, 707 9 F.3d at 1140-41. The Ninth Circuit relied on Harris to specifically reject the 10 argument “that BMW should have consulted its business records to identify a 11 representative valuation.” Id. at 1141. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit explained “that 12 BMW was not obligated to supply information which Kuxhausen had omitted.” Id. 13 14 Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that because the complaint did not allege the 15 amount demanded by each of the putative class members, “it fell short of triggering 16 the removal clock under Section 1446(b).” Id. 17 The Court concludes that Harris and Kuxhausen are controlling here. 18 Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not allege the amount in controversy, even by 19 approximation. (Dkt. 1-1 at 12.) Instead, the Complaint simply identifies the make, 20 model, year, and VIN of the Subject Vehicle. (Id.) The Ninth Circuit has clearly 21 and repeatedly held that this is insufficient to start the removal clock under Section 22 1446(b) and that Defendant was not required to research its internal files to 23 determine the value of the vehicle contract at issue. See Harris, 425 F.3d at 696-97; 24 Kuxhausen, 707 F.3d at 1140-41; Crystal Fortune v. Gen. Motors, LLC, et al., 2025 25 WL 2866659, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2025) (“In this case, Plaintiff’s Complaint 26 does not allege a specific amount in controversy, nor does it allege specific facts that 27 would allow Defendant to make simple calculations to ascertain the amount in 28 controversy issue (like the purchase price of the Vehicle). Under such 1 court opinions within the Ninth Circuit), the Court concludes that service of the 2 summons and complaint did not trigger Defendant’s 30-day time period for 3 removal.”). 4 Plaintiffs contend that the Complaint actually does allege the amount in 5 controversy because “both the caption page and accompanying Civil Case Cover 6 Sheet expressly indicated that the claim was being brought under the state court’s 7 unlimited jurisdiction (seeking damages above $35,000.00).” (Dkt. 13 at 8.) 8 However, the caption page and Civil Case Cover Sheet merely indicate that the 9 “Amount demanded exceeds $35,000.” (Dkt. 1-1 at 4.) There is no indication of 10 whether the amount demanded is the total amount in controversy, in which case the 11 amount would be too low, or whether this is the amount demanded for actual 12 damages. See Longoria v. Ford Motor Co., 2022 WL 16961482, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 13 14 Nov. 16, 2022) (“Yet the Civil Cover Sheet for Plaintiff’s Complaint did not assert 15 that his ‘damages’ exceed $25,000: it stated only that the ‘amount demanded 16 exceeds $25,000,’ and did not specify what this amount includes.”). Thus, the Court 17 concludes that the caption page and Civil Case Cover Sheet were insufficient to 18 trigger Defendant’s 30-day deadline for removal.4 See, e.g., id.; accord Cuevas v. 19 Ford Motor Co., 2022 WL 1487178, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 2022); Carillo v. FCA 20 USA, LLC, 546 F. Supp. 3d 995, 1000–01 (C.D. Cal. 2021). Accordingly, the 21 Court concludes that Defendant’s Notice of Removal was timely. 22 23 24 4 To trigger the 30-day deadline, all that Plaintiffs needed to do was allege the 25 approximate value of the sales contract and facts necessary to calculate the statutory use offset. See, e.g., Larios v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 2025 WL 2402250, at *4-6 26 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2025) (holding that plaintiff sufficiently alleged the amount in 27 controversy to trigger the 30-day deadline for removal because the complaint alleged the approximate value of the sales contract and facts necessary to calculate 28 the statutory use offset). 1 Even if the Complaint had sufficiently alleged the amount in controversy, 2 which it did not, the Court would still conclude that Defendant’s 30-day deadline for 3 removal was not triggered under the first pathway because the Complaint is also 4 indeterminate as to Plaintiffs’ citizenship. As set forth above, Plaintiffs’ Complaint 5 only alleges that “Plaintiffs are, and at all times relevant herein [were], [] resident[s] 6 of Whittier, CA.” (Dkt. 1-1 at 12.) However, “the diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 7 U.S.C. § 1332, speaks of citizenship, not residency.” Kanter v. Warner-Lambert 8 Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, a “natural person’s state 9 citizenship is . . . determined by [their] state of domicile, not [their] state of 10 residence.” Id. A person is domiciled in a state where they live and intend to 11 remain permanently. See id. “A person residing in a given state is not necessarily 12 domiciled there, and thus is not necessarily a citizen of that state.” Id.; see also 13 14 Weible v. United States, 244 F.2d 158, 163 (9th Cir.1957) (“Residence is physical, 15 whereas domicile is generally a compound of physical presence plus an intention to 16 make a certain definite place one’s permanent abode, though, to be sure, domicile 17 often hangs on the slender thread of intent alone, as for instance where one is a 18 wanderer over the earth. Residence is not an immutable condition of domicile.”). 19 Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ bare allegation of residency 20 was insufficient to trigger Defendant’s 30-day deadline for removal on the basis of 21 complete diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.5 See, e.g., Crisp-Stoot v. Wal-Mart 22 Stores, Inc., 2019 WL 1307735, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2019) (“[A]n allegation 23 that an individual is a resident of a state is not enough to show that she is a citizen of 24 that state. And because the thirty-day removal clock does not start running until the 25 defendant receives a pleading or other paper that affirmatively reveals that the case 26

27 5 Of course, Plaintiffs could have easily put Defendant on notice of the existence 28 of complete diversity by simply alleging their citizenship. 1 that information in pleadings or other papers about residence alone is not enough to 2 start the clock.” (citations omitted)); accord Brady v. Kohl’s, Inc., 2022 WL 3 4104627, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2022); Cioffi v. Solomon, 2014 WL 6679555, 4 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2014); Tandoc v. U.S. Renal Care, Inc., 2025 WL 5 1397193, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2025); Brinkley v. Monterey Fin. Servs., Inc., 6 2016 WL 4886934, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2016). 7 In sum, the Court concludes that Defendant’s 30-day deadline for removal 8 was not triggered under the first pathway because the Complaint is indeterminate as 9 to both the amount in controversy and Plaintiffs’ citizenship.6 Thus, the Court 10 concludes that Defendant’s Notice of Removal was timely. Accordingly, the Court 11 now turns to the question of whether Defendant has met its burden on removal to 12 establish subject matter jurisdiction. 13 14 B. Defendant Has Met Its Burden Of Establishing That The Amount In 15 Controversy Exceeds $50,000. 16 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), a defendant’s notice of removal must be signed 17 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and include “a short and plain 18 statement of the grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, 19 and orders served upon such defendant.” The Supreme Court has explained that 20 where removal is based on diversity jurisdiction, “a defendant’s notice of removal 21 22 6 Plaintiffs do not contend that Defendant’s 30-day deadline for removal was 23 triggered under the second pathway by service of an amended pleading, motion, 24 order, or other paper. (Dkt. 13 at 14.) Therefore, the Court need not address the second pathway. However, the Court notes that the FAC could not have triggered 25 the second pathway because the jurisdictional allegations in the FAC were identical to those in the Complaint. (Compare Dkt. 1-1 at 12-14, with Dkt. 1-2 at 3-5); see 26 Harris, 425 F.3d at 694 (explaining that the second pathway “applies when the case 27 stated by the initial pleading is not removable,” but is later “rendered removable by virtue of a change in the parties or other circumstance revealed in a newly-filed 28 paper” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 1 jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC, v. Owens, 574 2 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). “Evidence establishing the amount is controversy is required by 3 §1446(c)(2)(B) only when the plaintiff contests, or the court questions, the 4 defendant’s allegation.” Id. 5 Plaintiffs argue in their Motion to Remand that Defendant has failed to meet 6 its “heavy burden” of establishing that the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000. 7 (Dkt. 13 at 14.) Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant merely estimated the 8 Subject Vehicle’s value to yield estimated actual damages of $23,321.75 instead of 9 producing any evidence to show that Plaintiffs’ actual damages approach or exceed 10 $50,000. (Id. at 14-15.) Plaintiffs also contend that Defendant ignored the statutory 11 mileage offset. (Id. at 15.) Because Plaintiffs contend that Defendant failed to 12 provide competent evidence of actual damages, Plaintiffs assert that any projection 13 14 of civil penalties is likewise conjectural. (Id.) 15 As an initial matter, the Court concludes that Defendant’s Notice of Removal 16 plausibly alleges that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. 17 Specifically, the Notice of Removal states that Defendant has estimated the purchase 18 price for the Subject Vehicle to be $76,678.52. (Dkt. 1 at 5.) The Notice of 19 Removal further states that Defendant’s “preliminary investigation also estimated 20 $53,356.77 in total deductions including estimates of statutorily required deductions 21 for mileage offset, third-party service contracts, manufacturer’s rebate, and negative 22 equity.” (Id.) Thus, the Notice of Removal states that Defendant’s preliminary 23 investigation “yields a plausible estimate of actual damages of $23,321.75.” (Id.) 24 The Notice of Removal further states that it would be “reasonable to include a 25 meaningful amount for civil penalties, tied to the actual damages calculated.” (Id.) 26 The Notice of Removal states that based on Defendant’s “prior experience in similar 27 matters, a reasonable estimate of Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees accumulated up to this 28 point in litigation is $5,000.” (Id. at 6.) Finally, the Notice of Removal states that 1 conservatively calculated future attorney’s fees, the amount in controversy 2 meaningfully exceeds $75,000.” (Id.) 3 Plaintiffs offer no reason to doubt Defendant’s estimates in the Notice of 4 Removal, but simply contends that the allegations are conclusory and speculative. 5 (Dkt. 13 at 15.) However, Defendant’s estimates are neither conclusory, nor 6 speculative. To the contrary, the Notice of Removal states that Defendant has 7 conducted a preliminary investigation and begins with an estimate of the purchase 8 price, then provides an estimate of the statutory mileage offset, and then provides an 9 estimate of actual damages. (Dkt. 1 at 5.) The Notice of Removal explains the basis 10 of these estimates and the math is apparent for how Defendant reached the actual 11 damages calculation. (Id.) Plaintiffs’ only other argument is that Defendant’s 12 estimate of actual damages “ignores the statutory mileage offset.” (Dkt. 13 at 15.) 13 14 But this contention is simply incorrect because Defendant expressly estimated total 15 deductions of $53,356.77, which included an estimate of the statutory mileage 16 offset. (Dkt. 1 at 5.) Therefore, the allegations in the Notice of Removal plausibly 17 allege that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.7 See, 18 e.g., Schneider v. Ford Motor Co., 756 F. App’x 699, 700 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding 19 that the notice of removal must include only a plausible allegation that the amount in 20 controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold). 21 Although Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand does not contest Defendant’s 22 allegations of citizenship, the Court also concludes that the Notice of Removal 23 plausibly alleges diversity of citizenship. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 24 500, 514 (2006) (noting that courts “have an independent obligation to determine 25

26 7 Indeed, Plaintiffs affirmatively argue that the amount in controversy exceeded the jurisdictional threshold and was apparent from the face of the Complaint. (Dkt. 27 13 at 11 (“[I]t is impossible to believe that Defendant could not ascertain the amount in controversy exceeded $50,000.00 based on the face of the complaint alone.”).) 28 1 any party”). In the Notice of Removal, Defendant points to Plaintiffs’ allegations in 2 their Complaint that they are residents of California. (Dkt. 1 at 3.) Defendant also 3 alleges that its preliminary investigation concluded that Plaintiffs resided in 4 California when they purchased the Subject Vehicle, and on other occasions, 5 establishing a plausible basis for intent to remain in California and thus providing a 6 plausible basis for citizenship. (Id.) Defendant further alleges that it is a citizen of 7 Delaware and Michigan for purposes of jurisdiction. (Id. at 3-4.) Accordingly, the 8 Notice of Removal plausibly alleges complete diversity.8 9 Finally, the Court also concludes that Defendant has presented sufficient 10 evidence with its Opposition to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 11 amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. Specifically, Defendant 12 included with its Opposition the declaration of Karyn L. Ihara (the “Ihara 13 14 Declaration”). (Dkt. 14-1.) The Ihara Declaration includes the purchase agreement, 15 the Subject Vehicle repair history, and Plaintiffs’ loan payoff history. (Id. at 2; 16 Dkts. 14-2, 14-3, 14-4.) The Ihara Declaration explains that based on a review of 17 Defendant’s records, the Subject Vehicle was presented for repair at least 11 times 18 and November 22, 2023, appears to be the first potentially relevant presentation, 19 when the Subject Vehicle had 15,067 miles on the odometer. (Dkt. 14-1 at 2.) 20 Defendant’s Opposition explains the calculation for the statutory mileage offset 21 based on the evidence contained within the Ihara Declaration and estimates actual 22 damages of $32,312.58. (Dkt. 14 at 25.) Defendant’s Opposition further explains 23 that once actual damages are determined, it is appropriate to calculate civil penalties 24

25 8 Indeed, Plaintiffs affirmatively argue that complete diversity exists and was apparent from the face of the Complaint. (Dkt. 15 at 5 (“Defendant incorrectly 26 contends that removal was not triggered by the Complaint because it purportedly 27 fails to establish the amount in controversy and Plaintiffs’ state of citizenship. The Court should not be misled by Defendant’s arguments, which are on their face 28 misleading and unpersuasive.” (citation omitted)).) 1 $96,937.74. (Id. at 26.) Finally, Defendant’s Opposition explains that Defendant 2 expects Plaintiffs’ counsel to demand at least $15,000 in attorneys’ fees based on 3 settlement negotiations to date and prior experience with counsel, as well as 4 knowledge of counsel’s billing rate. (Id.) 5 Plaintiffs contend that “[b]ecause Defendant has provided no competent 6 evidence of actual damages, any projection of civil penalties is likewise 7 conjectural.” (Dkt. 13 at 15.) However, as set forth above, Defendant did provide 8 competent evidence of actual damages with its Opposition. (Dkts. 14-1, 14-2, 14-3, 9 14-4.) Plaintiffs had the opportunity to file a reply in response to the Opposition, 10 but declined to do so. Because Defendant did provide competent evidence of actual 11 damages, it is appropriate to “consider[] civil penalties when deciding whether the 12 amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Wang v. FCA US LLC, 13 14 2025 WL 1218745, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2025). It is also appropriate to 15 consider Plaintiffs’ demand for attorneys’ fees given that Defendant has provided 16 specific facts to support the estimate.9 See id. Thus, the Court concludes that 17 Defendant has carried its burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence 18 that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. Indeed, 19 Plaintiffs declined to provide any contrary evidence or dispute Defendant’s 20 evidence. 21 In sum, Defendant has met its burden of establishing that the amount in 22 controversy exceeds $50,000. First, the Notice of Removal plausibly alleges that 23 the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold and that there is 24 complete diversity amongst the parties. Second, in response to Plaintiffs’ challenge 25

26 9 Plaintiffs contend that Defendant’s allegation of likely attorneys’ fees in the Notice of Removal is speculative and lacking evidentiary support. (Dkt. 13 at 16.) 27 However, Defendant has now provided evidence to support its estimate of likely attorneys’ fees in the Opposition. (Dkt. 14 at 26.) 28 1 || Defendant’s allegations related to the amount in controversy, Defendant has 3 || presented sufficient evidence to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 3 || the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. 4 5 VI. 6 ORDER 7 Consistent with the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand is DENIED. g || (Dkt. 13.) The Court will also issue a separate scheduling order. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 11 || DATED: November 5, 2025 \ou LL. 12 HOW. A. JOEL RICHLID

UNITED “TATES MAG“ * TE JUDGE

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