1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 15 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 16 17 VOLTSTAR TECHNOLOGIES, Case No. 25-cv-01861-BAS-KSC 18 Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

19 v. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 20 MOTEK TEAM, INC., d/b/a Prodigee, ALTERNATIVE SERVICE OF

PROCESS BY CALIFORNIA

21 Defendant. SECRETARY OF STATE AND BY 22 EMAIL (ECF No. 4)

23 24 For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff Voltstar 25 Technologies, Inc.’s motion for alternative service of process by the California Secretary 26 of State and by email. (ECF No. 4.) The Court further GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for 27 an extension of time under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). Service upon Defendant 28 must be completed no later than . 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 On July 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant Motek Team alleging 3 a cause of action for patent infringement for its charger plug. (ECF No. 2.) A summons 4 was issued on the same day. (ECF No. 3.) 5 Plaintiff hired a process server to attempt to serve Defendant at the address for 6 registered agent Alexandra Ariel Shalom listed with the California Secretary of State. 7 (ECF No. 4 at 4:27–28.) The process server made five failed service attempts at the 8 registered agent’s address on July 28, August 6, August 9, August 12, and August 16, 2025. 9 (Id. at 4:24–5:3.) The process server then made one failed attempt on August 20, 2025, to 10 serve Defendant at 7343 Ronson Rd, Suite M, San Diego, CA 92111 which was listed as 11 Motek’s principal place of business on its website. (Id. at 5:7–8; ECF No. 4-1 ¶ 10.) On 12 August 22, 2025, the process server made one attempt to serve Defendant at another 13 address listed on its website as part of its contact information, at 7292 Opportunity Rd, 14 Suite E, San Diego, CA 92111. (ECF No. 4-1 ¶ 12.) On August 25, 2025, Plaintiff 15 attempted to serve Defendant via email address at sales@iamprodigee.com, which were 16 allegedly successfully delivered but never opened. (ECF Nos. 4 at 5:25–28, 4-1 ¶ 14.) 17 On October 20, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for alternate service of process and 18 additional time to serve summons and complaint. (ECF No. 4.) No opposition or reply 19 has been filed. The Court now considers the requests made in that motion. 20 II. LEGAL STANDARD 21 “Before a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the 22 procedural requirement of service of summons must be satisfied.” Omni Capital Int'l v. 23 Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987). Under Rule 4, individuals and corporations 24 may be served in a manner that follows “state law for serving a summons in an action 25 brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or 26 where service is made.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1), 4(h)(1)(A). Rule 4 is intended “to 27 provide maximum freedom and flexibility in the procedures for giving all defendants ... 28 notice of commencement of the action and to eliminate unnecessary technicality in 1 connection with service of process.” See Elec. Specialty Co. v. Rd. & Ranch Supply, Inc., 2 967 F.2d 309, 314 (9th Cir. 1992). As this Court is located in California, it may authorize 3 service of process in conformity with California law. 4 III. ANALYSIS 5 A. California Secretary of State 6 California Corporations Code §§ 1702 and 17701.16 provide that the Court may 7 order service to be made upon a corporation by hand delivery to the Secretary of State, if 8 an affidavit shows that “the designated agent cannot with reasonable diligence be found at 9 the address designated for personal delivery of the process” in the manner provided in 10 California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 415.10, 415.20(a) or 415.30(a). See Cal. Corp. Code 11 §§ 17701.16(c), 1702(a). 12 To determine whether a plaintiff has attempted service with reasonable diligence, 13 the Court must ask “whether the plaintiff took the steps a reasonable person who truly 14 desired to give notice of the action would have taken under the circumstances.” Rios v. 15 Singh, 65 Cal. App. 5th 871, 880-81, 280 Cal. Rptr. 3d 404 (2021) (citing Donel, Inc. v. 16 Badalian, 87 Cal. App. 3d 327, 332, 150 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1978)). “Reasonable diligence is 17 determined by the circumstances; there is ‘no single formula’ that constitutes diligence.” 18 Gnathonic LLC v. Dingman, CV 19-01502-VAP (SSx), 2019 WL 13166751, at *3 (C.D. 19 Cal. Oct. 2, 2019) (quoting Donel, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 333); see also Watts v. Crawford, 10 20 Cal. 4th 743, 749 n.5, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81, 896 P.2d 807 (1995) (“The term ‘reasonable 21 diligence’ ... denotes a thorough, systematic investigation and inquiry conducted in good 22 faith by the party or his agent or attorney.”) (internal quotations omitted). 23 First, Cal. Proc. Code § 415.10(a) allows service by “personal delivery ... to the 24 person to be served”, and section 416.10(a) allows service on a corporation through its 25 agent. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 415.10(a), 416.10(a). Ordinarily, “two or three attempts at 26 personal service at a proper place should fully satisfy the requirement of reasonable 27 diligence and allow substituted service to be made.” Trackman v. Kenney, 187 Cal. App. 28 4th 175, 185, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 619 (2010) (quoting Espindola v. Nunez, 199 Cal. App. 3d 1 1389, 1392 (1988)). Here, Plaintiff has alleged five failed service attempts to Defendant’s 2 agent. (ECF No. 4 at 4:24–5:3.) Accordingly, the Court concludes Plaintiff have 3 demonstrated that process cannot be accomplished with reasonable diligence by personal 4 delivery to the designated agent, at the principal or mailing address of Defendant. 5 Second, Cal. Proc. Code § 415.20(a) allows substitute service by leaving a copy of 6 the complaint and summons at the office or home address of the person to be served “with 7 the person who is apparently in charge thereof” and subsequently mailing the documents 8 to the person to be served at the same address where the documents were left. Cal. Civ. 9 Proc. Code § 415.20(a). As detailed above (supra § I), Plaintiff attempted service on 10 multiple occasions at the principal address for Defendant registered with the California 11 secretary of state, and other addresses listed as contact information on the U.S. Patent and 12 Trade Office’s and Defendant’s website. (ECF Nos. 4 at 5:7–8, 4-1 ¶¶ 10, 12.) The 13 addresses appeared to be “closed up,” “locked and closed,” “vacant,” or to be housing 14 another business altogether. (ECF No. 4-1 ¶¶ 8, 11–12.) The Court is therefore satisfied 15 that service under California Procedure Code § 415.20(a) could not be accomplished 16 through reasonable diligence in light of Plaintiff’s failure to locate “a person who is 17 apparently in charge” at the entities' principal or mailing address. 18 Third, Cal. Proc. Code § 415.30(a) allows service by mail with a return envelope, 19 postage prepaid. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.30(a). Here, it does not appear that Plaintiff 20 attempted service by mail. However, through Plaintiff’s personal service attempts, it is 21 clear that Defendant is not active at any of the addresses Plaintiff has identified—so 22 sending mail to those addresses would be futile. Thus, the Court is similarly satisfied that 23 service under § 415.30(a) could not be accomplished with reasonable diligence. See e.g., 24 Richter v. KRG Trading, Inc., No. CV 24-03622-MWF (SKX), 2025 WL 819041, at *4 25 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2025) (finding reasonable diligence where “the principal address 26 associated with [defendants] is same as the listed mailing address” and plaintiff had 27 attempted personal service). 28 1 For the reasons above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has exhibited “reasonable 2 diligence” in its past attempts to serve Defendant to warrant hand delivery to the Secretary 3 of State under Cal. Corp. Code § 17701.16(c) and Cal. Corp. Code § 1702(a). The Court 4 thus, GRANTS alternative service of process via hand delivery to the Secretary of State. 5 B. Electronic Service via Email 6 California Code of Civil Procedure § 413.30, as recently amended, states: 7 (a)(1) If no provision is made in this chapter or other law for the service of summons, or if a plaintiff, despite exercising reasonable diligence, has been 8 unable to effect service of the summons by any of the methods authorized 9 under this chapter, the court in which the action is pending may, upon motion, direct that summons be served in a manner that is reasonably calculated to 10 give actual notice to the party to be served, including by electronic mail or 11 other electronic technology, and that proof of such service be made as prescribed by the court. 12 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 413.30. 13 “Methods authorized” under Chapter 4 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, as 14 referenced in Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 413.30, include the same ones discussed above. See 15 Cal. Civ. Code §§ 415.10(a), 415.20(a), and 415.30(a). Though Plaintiff has “exercise[ed] 16 reasonable diligence” to serve Defendant as discussed above, it is unclear that service via 17 electronic mail will be “reasonably calculated to give actual notice to the party to be 18 served.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 413.30. Other district courts in California have held that 19 Section 413.30 comports with due process, which similarly requires that notice be 20 “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 21 pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” 22 LawRank LLC v. LawRankSEO.com, No. 21-CV-04515-HSG, 2021 WL 4461592, at *1 23 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2021) (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 24 306, 314 (1950) and Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th 25 Cir. 2002)). 26 Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is associated with the email address 27 sales@iamprodigee.com, and that Defendant’s last known trademark counsel can be 28 1 reached at processing@icaplaw.com, vlin@icaplaw.com and kmeier@icaplaw.com. (ECF 2 No. 4 at 5:26, 6:23–7:11). Notably, Plaintiff does not specify the method through which 3 Plaintiff located the aforementioned email addresses. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that its 4 emails enclosing copies of the summons, complaint, notice, and waiver of summons to the 5 aforementioned emails addresses were “delivered successfully” on August 25, 2025. (ECF 6 No. 4 ¶¶ 8–9.) 7 Though Plaintiff has not received any “bounce back” emails, Plaintiff has not 8 received any confirmation that Defendant has received their emails either. See Creative 9 Intellects v. Haygood, No. 221CV02670RGKAFM, 2021 WL 3568237, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 10 July 23, 2021) (finding email service reasonably calculated where the plaintiff did not 11 receive any bounce-back email and where the defendant admitted to receiving the email 12 over a phone call with the plaintiff’s counsel); see also LawRank LLC v. 13 LawRankSEO.com, No. 21-CV-04515-HSG, 2021 WL 4461592, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 14 2021) (Denying service by email where the plaintiff did not receive any response, including 15 a bounce-back email). Proof that emails were merely delivered successfully does not also 16 mean the email addresses Plaintiff identified are still active, that they are associated with 17 Defendant, or that Defendant has access to the email messages Plaintiff sent. See Sec. & 18 Exch. Comm'n v. CoinW6, No. 2:24-CV-07924-ODW (ASX), 2025 WL 1191570, at *6 19 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2025) (“Even if RPost confirms that the email was successfully 20 delivered to the [defendant’s] email addresses, RPost does not verify whether [the 21 defendant] continues to maintain and access the email addresses”). 22 Further, Plaintiff has not verified that the email addresses it listed in its motion are 23 active, or explained how it located those email addresses. Courts within this district have 24 previously held that email addresses of former attorneys obtained from a prior certificate 25 of service in the same action and email addresses from the contact page on defendants’ 26 websites are “reasonably calculated” to give plaintiff notice. See e.g., Sihler v. Fulfillment 27 Lab, Inc., No. 20CV1528-LL-MSB, 2022 WL 20286296, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 18, 2022) 28 (finding email service reasonably calculated where “Plaintiff obtained Mr. James's email 1 address from a certificate of service filed in March 2022 by his former attorney in this 2 action”); Beqa Lagoon Support Servs. v. Hasselman, No. 20-CV-968 JLS (AHG), 2020 3 WL 6271032, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2020) (finding email service reasonably calculated 4 where “[t]he email address, imse1@aol.com, is listed on IMSE's website under ‘Contact 5 Us’ ”). 6 The Court understands Plaintiff’s concern that Defendant may be evading service, 7 and that Defendant may have “improper and inaccurate business registration” with the 8 Secretary of State (ECF No. 4 at 7:1), but Plaintiff has not yet attempted to serve Defendant 9 through hand delivery to the Secretary of State and has not proven that the email addresses 10 it listed are “reasonably calculated” to provide Defendant notice of this action comporting 11 with due process requirements. Accordingly, the Court DENIES WITHOUT 12 PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s request for alternative service of process through email. 13 B. Additional Time to Serve under Rule 4(m) 14 Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the defendant is 15 not served within ninety days after the complaint is filed, the court must dismiss the action 16 against the defendant or order that service be made within a specific time. In the present 17 action, Plaintiff needed to have served Defendant by October 20, 2025. However, given 18 Plaintiff’s diligent attempts to serve Defendant, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for 19 an extension of time. Service upon Defendant must be completed no later than November 20 28, 2025. 21 IV. CONCLUSION 22 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff’s motion for 23 alternative service of process (ECF No. 4). The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to 24 serve Defendant through hand delivery to the California Secretary of State. However, the 25 Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s motion for alternative service 26 through email at this time. If after a good faith effort Plaintiff remains unable to serve 27 Defendant through hand delivery to the Secretary of State or through traditional means of 28 service, Plaintiff may refile its motion to serve Defendant by an alternative method. 1 The Court further GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for an extension of time. Service 2 ||upon Defendant must be completed no later than November 28, 2025. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED.

5 DATED: November 7, 2025 Hon. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge 6 United States District Court 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9]