NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 18 2025

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MILADYS LVETH MONTOYA- No. 21-1425 CAMPOS,* Agency No.

A206-808-410

Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM**

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted November 12, 2025***

Before: SCHROEDER, RAWLINSON, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

Miladys Lveth Montoya-Campos, a native and citizen of El Salvador,

petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order

* The clerk will amend the docket to reflect petitioner’s name as Miladys Lveth Montoya-Campos, consistent with the final removal order in the certified administrative record. ** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. *** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying her

applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.

We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Arrey v. Barr,

916 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir. 2019). We review de novo questions of law and

constitutional claims. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir.

2005). We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Montoya-

Campos failed to show she was or would be persecuted on account of a protected

ground. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (an applicant’s

“desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random

violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground”). We reject as

unsupported by the record Montoya-Campos’s contention that the agency

improperly imposed a blanket rule that harm from gangs cannot be a valid basis for

asylum.

Because Montoya-Campos failed to show any nexus to a protected ground,

she also failed to satisfy the standard for withholding of removal. See Barajas-

Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 359-60 (9th Cir. 2017).

Thus, Montoya-Campos’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail.

We need not reach Montoya-Campos’s remaining contentions regarding the

2 21-1425 merits of these claims because lack of nexus is dispositive. See Simeonov v.

Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (courts and agencies are not required

to decide issues unnecessary to the results they reach).

Montoya-Campos does not challenge the BIA’s determination that she

waived review of the IJ’s denial of CAT protection, so we do not address it. See

Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2013).

To the extent Montoya-Campos claims ineffective assistance of counsel, this

contention is not properly before the court because she did not raise it before the

BIA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (administrative remedies must be exhausted); see

also Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 417-19 (2023) (section 1252(d)(1)

is not jurisdictional); Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815-16 (9th Cir. 2007)

(ineffective assistance of counsel claims must be raised in a motion to reopen

before the BIA).

We do not consider the materials Montoya-Campos references in the

opening brief that are not part of the administrative record. See Fisher v. INS, 79

F.3d 955, 963-64 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

3 21-1425