NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 19 2025

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EVER RAMON VILLANUEVA-LARA; No. 24-4279 MARIA DE LOS ANGELES Agency Nos.

CABALLERO-CHINCHILLA; G.D.V.C., A220-152-324

A220-152-325

Petitioners,

A220-152-326

v.

MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted November 17, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW, BERZON, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

Ever Ramon Villanueva-Lara, Maria de Los Angeles Caballero-Chinchilla,

and their minor daughter, G.D.V.C., natives and citizens of Honduras, petition for

review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing an

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). appeal of an order of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Petitioners’ applications

for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against

Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we deny the

petition. “We review both the IJ and the BIA decisions when the BIA adopts and

affirms the IJ’s decision and provides its own analysis.” Chmukh v. Garland, 124

F.4th 670, 674 (9th Cir. 2024) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “We

review the denial of asylum, withholding of removal and CAT claims for

substantial evidence.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir.

2019). “Under this standard, we must uphold the agency determination unless the

evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Id.

1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Petitioners

did not establish that they have “suffered past persecution or ha[ve] a well-founded

fear of future persecution on account of [their] race, religion, nationality,

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Id. (citation

omitted). “Persecution is an extreme concept that does not include every sort of

treatment our society regards as offensive.” Id. (internal quotations and citation

omitted). While “credible death threats alone can constitute persecution,” they

constitute persecution “in only a small category of cases, and only when the threats

are so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm.” Id. (citation

modified). “We have been most likely to find persecution where threats are

2 24-4279 repeated, specific[,] and combined with other confrontation or mistreatment.” Id.

(internal quotations and citation omitted).

Petitioners credibly testified that they paid extortion to a criminal gang for

nearly three years while participating in a local street market in Honduras. After

the COVID-19 pandemic interrupted their business and Petitioners became unable

to make extortion payments to the gang, Petitioners began to receive death threats.

Gang members threw stones at Petitioners’ house, repeatedly threatened to kill

them, and twice followed Petitioners while they were driving. Petitioners

continued to receive threats even after fleeing to a family member’s house in

another city. Petitioners were never physically harmed. We agree with the BIA’s

conclusion that Petitioners’ experiences do not rise to the “extreme” level of

persecution. Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1028; Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th

1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2021) (listing non-exhaustive factors to consider when

evaluating whether a petitioner suffered past persecution).

2. Because Petitioners fail to establish past persecution, there is no

presumption of future persecution. Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1029. While

Petitioners’ fear of persecution is “subjectively genuine,” substantial evidence

supports the conclusion that Petitioners do not have an “objectively reasonable”

fear that they will suffer harm rising to the level of persecution. Wakkary v.

Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

3 24-4279 3. Moreover, even assuming, as the BIA did, that Petitioners established

membership in a valid particularized social group (“PSG”), and articulated an

actual or imputed political opinion, the record does not compel the conclusion that

Petitioners were persecuted on account of either their political opinion or

membership in any PSG. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that

Petitioners cannot establish that nexus because the gang members were motivated

only by financial gain. See Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 646 (9th Cir. 2021)

(“To establish past persecution, an applicant must show he was individually

targeted on account of a protected ground rather than simply the victim of

generalized violence.”); Kaur v. Wilkinson, 986 F.3d 1216, 1226 (9th Cir. 2021)

(“[W]hether a petitioner has been persecuted ‘on account of’ a protected ground” is

a function of “the persecutor’s motive, not the victim’s perspective.”).

4. Petitioners’ claim for withholding of removal also fails because

Petitioners did not establish that it is more likely than not that they will suffer

persecution if removed to Honduras, Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1029, or that

their membership in a PSG, or actual or imputed political opinion, is “a reason for

future persecution,” Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 551 (9th Cir. 2023)

(internal quotations and citation omitted).

5. Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s determination that

Petitioners are not more likely than not to be tortured with the consent or

4 24-4279 acquiescence of the Honduran government. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Because

Petitioners have not shown that they are likely to suffer harm rising to the level of

persecution, they necessarily have not shown that they are likely to suffer harm

rising to the level of torture. See Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1067 (holding that “[b]ecause

the BIA could reasonably conclude that Sharma’s past harm did not rise to the

level of persecution, it necessarily falls short of the definition of torture” and

“Sharma has not shown an objectively reasonable fear of future torture”); Duran-

Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1029–30. Nor does the record compel the conclusion that

Petitioners would be subjected to torture with the “consent or acquiescence of, a

public official acting in an official capacity or other person acting in an official

capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.1

1 Petitioners’ Motion to Stay Removal is denied as moot. See Dkt. 3. The temporary stay will dissolve when the mandate issues. See Dkt 10.

5 24-4279