NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 25 2025

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MASSIEL EUGENIO CONTRERAS- No. 24-4729 QUINTERO, Agency No.

A208-197-916

Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted November 21, 2025** Phoenix, Arizona

Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and HAWKINS and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Massiel Eugenio Contreras-Quintero seeks review of a Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) decision affirming the order of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). denying his application for cancellation of removal. He also raises for the first time

a claim that his removal order was invalid because he did not concede removability.

We review the agency’s determination regarding exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship for substantial evidence. Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996,

1003 (9th Cir. 2025). To qualify for cancellation, an applicant must establish that

removal will result in hardship that is substantially beyond the hardship ordinarily

associated with removal from the United States. Id. at 1005–06. “It must deviate,

in the extreme, from the norm.” Id. at 1006. The agency must consider the

cumulative hardships, taking into consideration the age, health and circumstances of

the qualifying family members. Id. (citing Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I & N

Dec. 56, 63 (BIA 2001)). It should also consider family and social support, whether

the respondent is the sole means of support for the qualifying relative, and the future

prospects for lawful immigration. Matter of Recinas, 23 I & N Dec. 467, 470–71

(BIA 2002).

Contreras-Quintero sought relief based on hardship to his father but

introduced no evidence other than the emotional and psychological hardship from

separation that is attendant with any removal. The IJ and BIA adequately analyzed

the sparse record established by Contreras-Quintero and concluded he had failed to

satisfy the standard for relief; the record does not compel a contrary finding. See

Gonzalez-Juarez, 137 F.4th at 1005–08.

2 24-4729 For the first time before this Court, Contreras-Quintero contends his removal

order was improper because he did not concede removability. Under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(d)(1), we cannot review a final order of removal unless a petitioner has

“exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.” Although

the Supreme Court has held that this exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, it

is a claim-processing rule that must be enforced if a party properly raises it. Santos-

Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 423 (2023); Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th

544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023). Because the government has raised absence of exhaustion,

we decline to address removability.

PETITION DENIED.

3 24-4729