1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SAENGPHET Case No.: 3:25-cv-2909-JES-BLM (a.k.a., Saengphet No Last Name, 12 Saengphet NLN) ORDER: 13 Petitioner, (1) GRANTING CLAIM ONE OF 14 v. THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF 15 HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S. 28 U.S.C. § 2241; 16 Department of Homeland Security;

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General of 17 (2) DENYING CLAIM TWO OF THE the United States, TODD M. LYONS,

PETITION AND MOTION FOR

18 Acting Director, Immigration and

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

Customs Enforcement, JESUS ROCHA, 19 ORDER AS MOOT; and Acting Field Office Directo1 San Diego

20 Field Office, and CHRISTOPHER J. (3) DENYING CLAIM THREE OF LAROSE, Senior Warden, Otay Mesa 21 THE PETITION FOR LACK OF Detention Center

STANDING AND MOOTNESS

22 Respondents. 23 [ECF Nos. 1, 3] 24 25 26 27 28 1 Before the Court is Petitioner Saengphet’s (“Petitioner” or “Saengphet”) Petition for 2 Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and Motion for a Temporary 3 Restraining Order. ECF No. 1, (“Pet.”); ECF No. 3, (“TRO”). The Petition and TRO were 4 filed on October 28, 2025. Id. On that same day, Petitioner also filed a Motion for 5 Appointment of Counsel pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2). ECF No. 2. On October 29, 6 2025, the Court granted the Motion for Appointment of Counsel and set the briefing 7 schedule for the Petition and TRO. ECF No. 4. Respondents filed their Response on 8 November 3, 2025. ECF No. 7, (“Res.”). Petitioner filed his Traverse on November 4, 9 2025. ECF No. 9, (“Trav.”). And on November 5, 2025, the Court held a hearing on the 10 Petition and TRO. ECF No. 10. 11 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Claim One of the Petition for 12 Writ of Habeas Corpus, DENIES AS MOOT Claim Two of the Petition and Motion for 13 Temporary Restraining Order, and DENIES Claim Three of the Petition for lack of 14 standing and mootness. 15 I. BACKGROUND 16 Petitioner was born in a Vietnamese refugee camp to Laotian parents and is currently 17 detained in Otay Mesa Detention Center. Pet. Ex. A (“Pet. Dec.”) ¶ 1. In 1989, Petitioner 18 came to the United States and, soon after, became a lawful permanent resident. Id. In 2001, 19 Petitioner was convicted of assault. Id. ¶ 2. This resulted in the initiation of removal 20 proceedings against Petitioner and an immigration judge ordering him removed on June 21 27, 2002. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. After Respondents were unsuccessful in obtaining a travel document 22 to Laos, for months, Petitioner was released from immigration custody on an order of 23 supervision on October 24, 2002, pending removal to Laos Id. ¶ 3; ECF No. 7-2 (“Res. 24 Dec.”) ¶ 5. Between his release from immigration custody on October 24, 2002 and when 25 ICE revoked Petitioner’s release on May 28, 2017, Petitioner had numerous contacts with 26 San Diego Police leading to multiple arrests, and even a conviction for possession of a 27 firearm—for which he was sentenced to a 180-day term and three years’ probation. Res. 28 Dec. ¶¶ 6-7. However, after each contact with state and/or local law enforcement, Petitioner 1 was re-detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) but was 2 ultimately released on an order of supervision. Id. ¶ 6. Petitioner remained in immigration 3 custody from May 28, 2017 until he was released on an order of supervision because of 4 ICE’s unsuccessful attempts to obtain a travel document from Laos. Id. 5 On October 15, 2025, ICE issued an administrative warrant for Petitioner and 6 executed it upon his arrival to the ICE office for his annual check in. Id. ¶ 8; see ECF No 7 7-2 at 6-7, 12-13; Pet. Dec. ¶ 6. On the same day of his arrest, ICE provided Petitioner with 8 a Notice of Revocation of Release (“Notice 1”). Res. Dec. ¶ 10; see ECF No 7-2 at 9-10. 9 Then on October 29, 2025, Respondents provided Petitioner with an amended Notice of 10 Revocation of Release (“Notice 2”). Res. Dec. ¶ 14; see ECF No 7-2 at 20-21. And later 11 that same day, Respondents provided Petitioner with an informal interview pursuant to 8 12 C.F.R. §§ 241.4 & 241.13. Res. Dec. ¶ 15; ECF No 7-2 at 23-24; see 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l) 13 & 241.13(i). 14 Petitioner seeks habeas and injunctive relief from the Court by asserting the 15 following claims: (1) In revoking Petitioner’s release, Respondents have failed to comply 16 with their own regulations, which violates the APA and the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 17 Constitution; (2) Petitioner’s re-detention violates Zadvydas v. Davis because for the last 18 14 years, the Government has been unable to remove him and cannot show that there is a 19 "significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future." 533 U.S. 678, 701 20 (2001); and (3) Respondents’ practice of removing noncitizens, such as Petitioner, to a third 21 country without providing an opportunity to assert fear of persecution or torture before an 22 immigration judge also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Pet. at 2- 23 3. 24 II. LEGAL STANDARD 25 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United 26 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). 27 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that 28 custody, and ... the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 1 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus 2 to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal 3 law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means 4 of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections 5 have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, challenges 6 to immigration-related detention are within the purview of a district court's habeas 7 jurisdiction. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687; see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). 8 Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law 9 ... affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or 10 confinement.” Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963). “The application for the writ usurps 11 the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives 12 prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” Yong v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 13 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 14 III. DISCUSSION 15 A. Jurisdiction 16 The Court has jurisdiction to hear Claims One and Two of the Petition but lacks 17 jurisdiction over Claim Three. The Court begins its discussion with Claim Three. 18 1. Claim Three 19 Petitioner’s third claim, in which he seeks injunctive relief, is based on an allegation 20 of Respondents’ intent to deport him to a third country. Pet. at 4-5, 9-12. In its Response, 21 the Government makes clear that, at this time, it does not seek to take such action with 22 respect to Petitioner. Res. at 4; Res. Dec ¶ 16. 23 Federal judicial power is limited by the Constitution, which permits courts to only 24 hear matters that present “cases” and/or “controversies.” U.S. Const., art. III, § 2; SEC v. 25 Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 407 (1972). The Supreme Court has 26 established that “in a lawsuit brought to force compliance, it is the plaintiff's burden to 27 establish standing by demonstrating that, if unchecked by the litigation, the defendant's 28 allegedly wrongful behavior will likely occur or continue, and that the threatened injury is 1 certainly impending.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 2 U.S. 167, 190 (2000) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus, a case or controversy 3 does not exist—and a party seeking injunctive relief lacks Article III standing—if they 4 cannot show a real and immediate threat of future injury. Id. 5 Federal courts do not have jurisdiction “to give opinions upon moot questions or 6 abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter 7 in issue in the case before it.” Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 8 (1992) (citations omitted). “A claim is moot if it has lost its character as a present, live 9 controversy.” Am. Rivers v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 126 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 10 1997) (citation omitted). Thus, a claim is moot, and therefore must be dismissed, if an event 11 occurs that prevents a court from granting effective relief. GTE California, Inc. v. FCC, 39 12 F.3d 940, 945 (9th Cir. 1994). 13 The Government’s position, that it does not plan to send Saengphet to a country 14 other than Laos, eviscerates any possibility of him showing the existence of a live 15 controversy or an imminent threat of injury. This restricts the Court’s ability to grant 16 effective relief to Petitioner from being deported to a third country. Therefore, the Court 17 finds that Claim Three is nonjusticiable for lack of standing and mootness. Thus, the Court 18 dismisses Claim Three of the Petition. 19 2. Claims One and Two 20 Respondents assert that the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear Claims One and 21 Two of the Petition because they stem from the Attorney General’s decision to execute a 22 removal order against Saengphet. Res. at 5-6. However, Petitioner does not seek relief from 23 this Court from a decision to execute a removal order. Rather, he challenges the propriety 24 of his detention as governed by Respondents’ regulations and Zadvydas. Pet. at 8-17. 25 Therefore, this argument has no bearing on this Petition. 26 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s holding in Zadvydas directly contradicts 27 Respondents’ argument. 533 U.S. at 687-88; see Res. at 7. There, the Supreme Court 28 rejected the application of 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to limit judicial review of post-removal-period 1 detentions under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687-88 (holding “that § 2241 2 habeas corpus proceedings remain available as a forum for statutory and constitutional 3 challenges to post-removal-period detention.”). Thus, just as other courts in this district 4 have found in similar matters, this Court finds that it has jurisdiction to hear Petitioner’s 5 claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Alegria Palma v. LaRose, 25-cv-1942-BJC-MMP, ECF 6 No. 14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2025); Mendez Los Santos v. LaRose, 25-cv-2216-TWR-MSB, 7 ECF No. 14 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2025) (granting petition by minute order); Rokhifirooz v. 8 LaRose, No. 25-cv-2053-RSH-VET, 2025 WL 2646165 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2025). 9 B. Respondents’ Regulatory Noncompliance Violates Due Process 10 The Court finds that the Government has failed to comply with its regulations that 11 govern the re-detention of noncitizens. Specifically, when it provided Petitioner with 12 inadequate notice of its justification for revoking his leave, which was also given on the 13 same day that it conducted his informal interview. As a result, Petitioner was substantially 14 prejudiced when challenging his detention, as set forth in the regulatory scheme. See 8 15 C.F.R. §§ 241.13(i)(2)-(3). This is a clear violation of Petitioner’s due process rights. 16 Accordingly, the Court grants Claim One of the Petition. 17 “The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Government from 18 depriving individuals of their life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 19 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). “[T]he Due Process Clause 20 applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence is 21 lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 679. “Freedom from 22 imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint— 23 lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Id. at 690. A person at risk of a suffering 24 a serious loss being given notice and an opportunity to be heard, in a meaningful manner 25 and at a meaningful time, is the essence of procedural due process. Mathews v. Eldridge, 26 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 27 The detention and release of noncitizens that are subject to a final order of removal 28 (“Relevant Noncitizens”), like Petitioner, is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. This statute 1 provides that “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the 2 alien from the United States within a period of 90 days.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). “If the 3 alien does not leave or is not removed within the removal period, the alien, pending 4 removal, shall be subject to supervision under regulations prescribed by the Attorney 5 General.” Id. § 1231(a)(3). 6 The revocation of Relevant Noncitizens’ supervised release is governed by 8 C.F.R. 7 §§ 241.4 & 241.13. Between the two regulations, there are four bases under which ICE 8 may take such action: (1) when the noncitizen fails to comply with the conditions of their 9 release. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1); id. § 241.13(i); (2) when authorized by a revoking official, 10 either the Executive Associate Commissioner or a district director. Id. § 241.4(l)(2); (3) 11 when “in the opinion of a revoking official: (i) The purposes of release have been served; 12 (ii) The alien violates any condition of release; (iii) It is appropriate to enforce a removal 13 order or to commence removal proceedings against an alien; or (iv) The conduct of the 14 alien, or any other circumstance, indicates that release would no longer be appropriate.” 15 Id.; and (4) finally, when due to changed circumstances, ICE determines that there is a 16 significant likelihood that the noncitizen may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable 17 future. Id. § 241.13(i)(2). 18 Petitioner raises two arguments in support of his claim that Respondents violated 8 19 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). First, ICE lacked the authority to revoke Petitioner’s detention because 20 since 2002, Petitioner has not violated the conditions of his release. Pet. at 7. Also, the 21 Government has failed to obtain a travel document from Laos for more than the last twenty 22 years. Id. Therefore, its sentiment that it is more likely to obtain one now does not constitute 23 sufficient changed circumstances to justify his re-detention. Id. at 7-8. Second, Petitioner 24 contends that the regulatory requirements, set forth by 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i), are 25 prerequisites to ICE revoking a Relevant Noncitizen’s release. Id. Here, Petitioner did not 26 receive advance notice from ICE of their plans to detain him. Id. Thus, Petitioner’s 27 detention is in violation of the Government’s regulations. Id. 28 // 1 The Government contends it has complied with its regulations when it revoked 2 Petitioner’s release because the regulations do not require the provision of advance notice 3 to a noncitizen, nor must it prove—prior to revoking one’s release—and to the petitioner’s 4 satisfaction, that changed circumstances are present. Res. at 12. The Government, however, 5 avers that changed circumstances, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i), are present with 6 respect to Petitioner’s removal because of ICE’s recent ability to obtain travel documents 7 from the Laotian government and schedule routine removal flights to Laos. Id.; Res. Dec. 8 ¶¶ 20–21. 9 The Court begins its analysis with Petitioner’s second argument. On this point, it 10 agrees with the Government. 11 Here, the regulation’s plain language, specifically the words “[u]pon revocation” 12 and “after his or her return to Service custody,”1 makes clear that the Government is not 13 required to provide a detainee advance notice of the bases for it revoking their release, or 14 an informal interview, before doing so. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1); id. § 241.13(i)(3). Thus, the 15 Court finds that Respondents did not violate their regulations by not providing Petitioner 16 with advance notice of the reasons for revoking his release. 17 The Court now turns to Petitioner’s first argument, that the Government lacked 18 regulatory authority to revoke his release. Petitioner maintains that he did not violate the 19 conditions of his release. But Respondents do not allege that Petitioner did. Thus, the first 20 subpart of Petitioner’s first argument is irrelevant to the Court’s inquiry. 21 To determine whether Respondents had authority to revoke Petitioner’s release, the 22 Court must analyze their proffered justifications for doing so. After being re-detained, the 23 Government provided Petitioner with two Notice of Revocation of Release forms, which 24 state the Government’s basis for revoking his release. ECF No. 7-2 at 9; Id. at 20. The first 25 Notice of Revocation of Release (“Notice 1”) was issued on October 15, 2025. See id. at 26 27

28 1 9. The second Notice of Revocation of Release (“Notice 2”) was issued on October 29, 2 2025. See id. at 20. 3 1. Notice 1 4 Notice 1 was issued to Petitioner on October 15, 2025, the same day he was arrested 5 by ICE. Id. at 9. Notice 1 states that “pursuant to 8 C.F.R § 241.4 / 8 C.F.R § 241.13, you 6 are to remain in ICE custody at this time … [t]his decision has been made based on a review 7 of your official alien file and a determination that there are changed circumstances in your 8 case.” Id. Both of the regulations the Notice cites to require Petitioner to be notified of the 9 reasons for revocation of their release, “upon revocation”. 8 C.F.R § 241.4(l)(1); id. § 10 241.13(i)(3). While the Court acknowledges that Respondents provide timely notice to 11 Petitioner, it also finds that Notice 1 is defective for three reasons. 12 First, Respondents seemingly cite to 8 C.F.R § 241.4 in error. This is because Notice 13 1 states that “changed circumstances” formed the basis for ICE’s determination to re-detain 14 Petitioner. See ECF No. 7-2 at 2. But the revocation of a noncitizen’s release on such a 15 ground is not authorized by that regulation. See 8 C.F.R § 241.4(l). It is, however, 16 authorized by 8 C.F.R § 241.13(i). Id. § 241.13(i)(3). 17 Second, even when analyzing the Government’s justifications for revocation, solely 18 under 8 C.F.R § 241.13, Notice 1 is overly vague. See ECF No. 7-2 at 2. While Notice 1 19 advises Petitioner that he will remain in custody, it fails to specify why the Government 20 has made this decision. See id. Notice 1 does not cite to a specific subsection that applies 21 to Petitioner and thus authorizes his re-detention. See id. It does not state any facts or 22 allegations that Petitioner violated a condition of his release. Id. Nor does it indicate which 23 criteria under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(f) that is implicated and supports revocation of Petitioner’s 24 release. See id. 25 And while Notice 1 states that ICE’s review of Petitioner’s alien file and “changed 26 circumstances” justify his re-detention. Id. The Court finds that these statements are wholly 27 conclusory. This is because Respondents fail to indicate which facts contained within 28 Petitioner’s alien file—or what specific circumstances, that are relevant to Petitioner, have 1 changed and therefore—justify the revocation of Petitioner’s release. To successfully 2 contest his detention, Petitioner must adequately “respond to the reasons for revocation 3 stated in the notification.” 8 C.F.R § 241.13(3). And here, the Government’s provision of 4 such conclusory “reasons,” is highly likely to result in Petitioner losing his challenge before 5 it even begins. 6 Finally, the stated justifications in Notice 1 fail to appropriately invoke revocation 7 authority under 8 C.F.R § 241.13(2). Id. This is because ICE can only revoke a Relevant 8 Noncitizen’s release, under the regulatory the basis of changed circumstances, when ICE 9 “determines that there is a significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in the 10 reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. Notice 1 references the existence of some unspecified 11 changed circumstances in Petitioner’s case. See ECF No. 7-2 at 9. However, it fails to 12 explain how these circumstances are relevant to, and more importantly justify, ICE’s 13 determination “that there is a significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in the 14 reasonably foreseeable future.” See id.; 8 C.F.R § 241.13(2). Therefore, the Court finds 15 that the proffered justifications stated in Notice 1, fail to satisfy the regulatory criteria, as 16 set forth in 8 C.F.R § 241.13(2), which authorizes the revocation of Relevant Noncitizens, 17 such as Petitioner. 18 Accordingly, the Court concludes that, pursuant to Notice 1, the Government lacked 19 regulatory authority to re-detain Petitioner. 20 2. Notice 2 21 The Court finds that Notice 2 is defective because it provides inadequate notice as 22 to why Petitioner’s release was revoked. It finds further that another defect arises from 23 when the Notice was issued, in relation to when ICE conducted the informal interview. 24 This is because doing so when ICE did, resulted in Petitioner being substantially prejudiced 25 when he was to contest the revocation of his release later that same day. 26 The Court analyzes the propriety of Notice 2 by first assessing: (1) whether it 27 provided sufficient notice to Petitioner, then (2) the timing of when it was issued. 28 // 1 a. Sufficiency of Notice 2 ICE provided Petitioner with Notice 2 on October 29, 2025, two weeks after his 3 arrest. ECF No. 7-2 at 20. Notice 2 is similar to Notice 1, in that, it advises Petitioner that 4 ICE’s review of his alien file and its determination that changed circumstances justify him 5 remaining in custody. See id. Notice 2 does, however, attempt to distinguish itself from its 6 predecessor which is evidenced by four of its components. (1) It alludes that the 7 Government was authorized to revoke Petitioner’s release, under 8 C.F.R § 241.13(2), 8 because of ICE’s determination that he can be removed to Laos “expeditiously”. See 8 9 C.F.R § 241.13(2); ECF No. 7-2 at 20. (2) The Notice highlights a specific fact from 10 Petitioner’s alien file that supports ICE’s determination (i.e., that he was ordered removed 11 to Laos on June 27, 2022). Id. (3) It states that the Government is in the process of obtaining 12 a travel document from, and finding a removal flight to, Laos. Meaning that it is actively 13 taking steps to effectuates Petitioner’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Id.; 14 see 8 C.F.R § 241.13(2). (4) Lastly, Notice 2 outlines the regulatory scheme for a noncitizen 15 to challenge the revocation of their release. ECF No. 7-2 at 20. 16 The Court notes that, in their brief, Respondents, provide additional details and facts 17 that support its contention that change circumstances, related to Saengphet’s removal, may 18 be present. (Res. Dec. ¶18-23.) (explaining that the Government has established routine 19 flights to Laos over the last several months, completed removal flights as recently as 20 October 22, 2025, and has removed 177 Laotian citizens to Laos over the last year). 21 However, these changed circumstances are generally applicable to Relevant Noncitizens 22 that are pending removal to Laos. As discussed in Section III-C below, none of the 23 circumstances that the Government claims to have changed are specifically relevant to 24 Petitioner, whose Laotian citizenship is unclear and has a sizeable criminal history. 25 Moreover, what controls, here, are the contents of Notice 2, not those in 26 Government’s Response. And most relevant to the Court’s inquiry is Notice 2’s first 27 component. Where ICE states that it “has determined that you can be expeditiously 28 removed from the United States pursuant to an outstanding order of removal against you.” 1 ECF No. 7-2 at 20. As discussed above, Respondents attempt to invoke regulatory authority 2 but fail to do so because this statement is conclusory. See Sarail A. v. Bondi, ---F. Supp. 3d 3 ---, 2025 WL 2533673, at *10 (D. Minn. 2025) (“Simply to say that circumstances had 4 changed or there was a significant likelihood of removal in the foreseeable future is not 5 enough. Petitioner must be told what circumstances had changed or why there was now a 6 significant likelihood of removal in order to meaningfully respond to the reasons and 7 submit evidence in opposition.”). 8 The Court acknowledges that Notice 2 provides more information to the Petitioner 9 than Notice 1. However, the Government’s provision of such notice still falls short of what 10 is required under its regulation and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 11 Accordingly, the Court finds that Notice 2 does not provide adequate notice to 12 Petitioner as required under 8 C.F.R § 241.13(3). 13 b. Timing of Notice 14 The timing of Respondents’ provision of Notice 2 to Petitioner seriously troubles the 15 Court. On the one hand, Respondents provided Petitioner Notice 1, albeit defective, the 16 very same day he was arrested. See ECF No. 7-2 at 9. And on the other, it took Respondents 17 an additional two weeks to provide Petitioner with the amended notice that contained the 18 newly proffered reasoning for revoking his release. See id. at 20. 19 The Court struggles to find that a two-week delay clearly complies with the 20 regulation’s “upon revocation” notice requirement. See 8 C.F.R § 241.13(3). And while 21 such a period may not be objectively egregious enough for a court to make a finding in the 22 alternative, two other issues with Notice 2 bring the Court far more concern. 23 The first of which is that Petitioner filed this action on October 28, 2025, and ICE 24 issued Notice 2 the very next day. See Pet.; Res. Dec. ¶14; ECF No. 7-2 at 20. Respondents 25 do not indicate in their brief what prompted ICE to issue an amended notice to Petitioner. 26 See generally Res. And although there is insufficient evidence for the Court to conclude 27 so, it certainly hopes that Saengphet filing this Petition was not the catalyst to the 28 Government’s after-the-fact attempt to comply with its own regulations. 1 The second troubling issue is that Notice 2 was provided on October 29, 2025—the 2 same day that ICE conducted Petitioner’s informal interview. See id.; see also Pet.; Res. 3 Dec. ¶15; ECF No. 7-2 at 23. 8 C.F.R § 241.13’s regulatory scheme requires the 4 Government to provide a noncitizen with notice of the reasons for revocation of their leave. 5 See 8 C.F.R § 241.13(i)(3). Then when ICE conducts their informal interview, the 6 noncitizen has an opportunity to contest their detention by adequately responding to, and 7 overcoming, the stated reasons in the notice. Id. 8 When a petitioner is provided notice on the same day that their informal interview 9 is conducted, they are substantially prejudiced in preparing competent arguments and/or 10 gathering any supporting documents to regain their freedom. What results from such a 11 situation is a deprivation of any “meaningful opportunity” for a petitioner to be heard on 12 the incredibly important issue of re-obtaining their freedom. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 13 And that is exactly what happened here. 14 Government agencies are required to follow their own regulations. United States ex 15 rel Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. 16 Norton, 340 F.3d 835, 852 (9th Cir. 2003). Courts have found that when ICE fails to follow 17 its own regulations in revoking release, the detention is unlawful, and the petitioner's 18 release must be ordered. See Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 169-170 19 (W.D.N.Y. 2025); Rombot v. Souza, 296 F. Supp.3d 383, 387 (D. Mass. 2017); M.S.L. v. 20 Bostock, No. 6:25-CV-01204-AA, 2025 WL 2430267, at *11 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 2025); 21 Truong v. Noem et al., No. 25-cv-2597-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2988357, at *6 (S.D. Cal. 22 Oct. 22, 2025). 23 After-the-fact determinations in an attempt to justify a noncitizen’s re-detention 24 cannot cure the Government’s blatant procedural errors. Especially when notice is provided 25 in such an egregious manner that it substantially prejudiced Petitioner, essentially 26 compelling him to contest his re-detention blindly. The Court, therefore, finds that the 27 Government failed to satisfy the notice requirement provided by its regulation. 8 C.F.R § 28 241.13(i)(3). As a result, Saengphet’s Constitutional due process rights were violated. 1 Accordingly, the Court will grant Count One of the Petition and will order his 2 release. 3 3. The Informal Interview 4 “Promptly” after re-detaining a noncitizen on supervised release, ICE must notify 5 them of the basis for the revocation of their release and conduct an informal interview. Id. 6 The informal interview “afford[s] the [noncitizen] an opportunity to respond to the reasons 7 for revocation stated in the notification.” Id. 8 Petitioner argues that the Government failed to comply with its own regulations 9 because ICE failed to conduct an informal interview prior to re-detaining him and on the 10 day that he was arrested. Pet. at 3; TRO at 9. Respondents contend to have complied with 11 their regulations because Petitioner’s informal interview was conducted on October 29, 12 2025. Res. Dec. ¶ 15; Res. at 3. This was two weeks after Petitioner’s arrest and conforms 13 with the regulatory time requirement. Res. at 12. 14 As the Court found earlier, 8 C.F.R § 241.13(3) does not create prerequisites that the 15 Government must meet prior to revoking a noncitizen’s release. Rather, they establish 16 procedural safeguards the Government must comply with to avoid offending the Fifth 17 Amendment. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Government did not violate its 18 regulation by not conducting a pre-arrest informal interview of Petitioner. 19 The regulation calls for the informal interview to take place “promptly” after a 20 noncitizen is re-detained. 8 C.F.R § 241.13(3). “Promptly” is defined by Black’s Law 21 Dictionary as, quickly; without delay; or as soon as practicable. Id.; PROMPTLY, Black's 22 Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Here, Respondents conducted Petitioner’s informal 23 interview on Turning to the October 29, 2025, fourteen days after he was detained. 24 The Court finds difficulty in construing such a period of time as “promptly.” See 8 25 C.F.R § 241.13(3). However, considering the defective qualities Court identified, in its 26 discussion above, with Notice 2, the Court declines to rule on whether the Government’s 27 two-week delay in conducting Petitioner’s informal interview violated its regulations. 28 // 1 C. Petitioner’s Zadvydas Claim 2 In Claim Two of the Petition, Saengphet asserts that his re-detention violates 3 Zadvydas because his six-month grace period has already expired. Pet. at 13. Petitioner 4 argues that since his final order of removal was entered in June 2002, his aggregated time 5 in ICE custody, all prior detentions and his current month-long detention, exceeds the 6 presumptively reasonable six-month period rovided under Zadvydas. Id.; 533 U.S. at 701. 7 Saengphet argues further that he has provided good reason to believe that there is no 8 significant likelihood of removal because over the last decade, the Government has been 9 unsuccessful in their attempts to remove him to Laos. Id. at 14; see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 10 701. Thus, the Court should grant him habeas relief. 11 Respondents raise four arguments to support their contention that Petitioner’s 12 removal to Laos in the foreseeable future is significantly likely. First, they do not foresee 13 any barriers to the Laotian government issuing a travel document for Petitioner. Res. Dec. 14 ¶ 23. Second, they have established routine flights to Laos over the last several months, 15 having completed removal flights as recently as October 22, 2025. Id. ¶¶ 18-23. Third, 16 from October 1, 2024 through September 8, 2025, ICE has removed 177 Laotian citizens 17 to Laos. Id. ¶ 21. And fourth, they anticipate deporting Petitioner “on or before March 1, 18 2026,” which constitutes the reasonably foreseeable future. Id. ¶ 23. 19 The Court acknowledges that the Government’s recent success in deporting Relevant 20 Noncitizens to Laos. However, it also has strong concerns regarding the propriety of 21 Saengphet’s detention under Zadvydas. Such as the collective length of Petitioner’s 22 detention has already exceeded Zadvydas’ presumptively reasonable six-month period. Pet. 23 at 13. Also, that on October 29, 2025, the Government represented that it submitted a travel 24 document request for Petitioner. Res. at 9-10. However, that was merely an internal 25 submission to the Laos Unit of ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations’ Removal and 26 International Operations. Id. Further, the Government fails to indicate when it expects to 27 submit the travel document request to the Laotian government, or how long it will 28 reasonably take to receive a response. 1 Separate and apart from the logistical challenges that the Government faces, the 2 Court foresees potential practical obstacles to Laos issuing a travel document for Petitioner, 3 which may prevent Petitioner’s removal from being characterized a significant likelihood. 4 For example, although Petitioner’s parents were Laotian, Saengphet was born in a refugee 5 camp in Vietnam. Therefore, he may not be viewed, by the Laotian government, as 6 analogous to the 177 Laotian citizens that the Government successfully deported. Also, 7 from his time in the United States, Petitioner has amassed an extensive criminal history. 8 Thus, it is possible that because of Petitioner’s Laotian citizenship status, or lack thereof, 9 and his potentially troubling criminal record, Laos very well may decline to issue him a 10 travel document. 11 At the November 5, 2025, hearing, the Court indicated that for it to rule on this claim, 12 additional briefing would likely be necessary. However, in light of the Court granting 13 Count One of the Petition, it need not issue such an order and DENIES AS MOOT Claim 14 Two of the Petition. 15 D. Temporary Restraining Order 16 Having ruled on the Petition on the merits, the Court declines to apply the Winter 17 factors to determine whether to issue a TRO. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 18 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The Court, therefore, DENIES AS MOOT the Motion for Temporary 19 Restraining Order. 20 IV. CONCLUSION 21 In sum, the Government failed to follow its own regulations when it revoked 22 Petitioner’s release because it failed to provide him with adequate notice of its reasons for 23 doing so. The Government also provided Petitioner with such notice in an untimely 24 manner, this resulted in substantial prejudice when he challenged the revocation of his 25 release. In doing so, the Government violated Petitioner's Constitutional due process rights. 26 Accordingly, Petitioner's habeas Petition is GRANTED and Petitioner is ordered 27 RELEASED. 28 // I For the reasons stated above: 2 (1) The Court GRANTS Claim One of the Petition; 3 (2) The Court DENIES Claim Three of the Petition for lack of standing and 4 mootness; 5 (3) As Petitioner’s sought after relief was granted with respect to Claim One, the 6 Court DENIES AS MOOT Claim Two of the Petition and the Motion for 7 Temporary Restraining Order; 8 (4) At the November 5, 2025, hearing, Respondents were ORDERED to 9 immediately release Petitioner from custody, under the same conditions as 10 previously imposed, and to FILE a Notice of Compliance to confirm when the 11 Petitioner has been released; 12 (5) Respondents have complied with the Court’s orders. Their November 7, 2025, 13 Notice states that Petitioner was RELEASED from custody on November 6, 14 2025 (ECF No. 11.); 15 (6) In the event Petitioner seeks further habeas relief arising from the Government’s 16 conduct related to its future execution of the removal order, Petitioner must 17 FILE a new Petition; and 18 (7) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this suit. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 || Dated: November 20, 2025 21 Sa— Sin, 22 Honorable James E. Sunmons Jr. 3 United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28