1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 R.M., Case No.: 25-cv-3186-AGS-DEB 4 Petitioner, ORDER REQUIRING RESPONSE

AND GRANTING MOTION TO

5 v.

PROCEED PSEUDONYMOUSLY

6 Christopher J. LAROSE, et al., (ECF 2) 7 Respondents. 8 9 Petitioner challenges his immigration detention. He seeks a writ of habeas corpus 10 under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 as well as leave to proceed under the pseudonym “R.M.” 11 EX PARTE MOTION TO USE PSEUDONYM 12 “The normal presumption in litigation is that parties must use their real names.” Doe 13 v. Kamehameha Schs./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Est., 596 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010). 14 But when the claims involve “sensitive and highly personal issues,” a party may proceed 15 pseudonymously if the “need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and 16 the public’s interest in knowing the party’s identity.” Does I thru XXII v. Advanced Textile 17 Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1067–68 (9th Cir. 2000). When “pseudonyms are used to shield the 18 anonymous party from retaliation,” as alleged here, courts must consider: “(1) the severity 19 of the threatened harm, (2) the reasonableness of the anonymous party’s fears,” “(3) the 20 anonymous party’s vulnerability to such retaliation,” (4) “the precise prejudice . . . to the 21 opposing party” at “each stage of the proceedings,” and (5) “whether the public’s interest 22 in the case would be best served by requiring that the litigants reveal their identities.” Id. 23 at 1068 (citations omitted). 24 Petitioner alleges that he “is an Azerbaijani man” and that he is currently “applying 25 for asylum in the United States based on his fear of persecution in his home country.” 26 (ECF 2, at 2–3.) If he used his real name here, “Azerbaijani authorities” could learn that 27 “he sought asylum,” which would “amplif[y]” his “safety concerns.” (Id. at 3.) He also 28 points to a “related class action complaint” in which he is a likely proposed class member. 1 (Id. at 2, 4.) In that case, the named plaintiffs, who are “facing deportation to countries 2 where they have faced persecution and torture,” were granted anonymity based on the 3 court’s analysis of the five required factors. A.M. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 4 No. 25-cv-2308-JO-AHG, ECF 7 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025). Petitioner claims that he 5 “faces the same circumstances.” (ECF 2, at 4.) 6 At this stage, the Court grants the motion to proceed pseudonymously and adopts 7 the A.M. court’s reasoning on a similar record. See A.M., No. 25-cv-2308-JO-AHG, ECF 1, 8 4, 7. Also, two additional considerations are worth mentioning regarding the five-factor 9 analysis. First, there appears to be little prejudice to the respondents here. “Petitioner, 10 through counsel, provided the U.S. Attorney’s office with his legal name and A-Number.” 11 (ECF 2, at 4.) The “knowledge defendants have of plaintiffs’ identities . . . lessens” any 12 “prejudice[] by the use of pseudonyms.” Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d at 1069 n.11. 13 Second, the public-interest factor seems to favor anonymity. After all, R.M. has 14 applied for asylum. “Asylum seekers have the right to keep confidential any information 15 contained in or pertaining to an asylum application that allows a third party to link” their 16 identities to, among other things, facts giving “rise to a reasonable inference that the 17 applicant has applied for asylum.” A.B.T. v. United States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 18 No. 2:11-cv-02108 RAJ, 2012 WL 2995064, at *5 (W.D. Wash. July 20, 2012) (expressing 19 “grave concerns” about “essentially requiring the parties to violate” these confidentiality 20 regulations by not granting pseudonymity and citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.6, 1208.6); see also 21 Doe v. Bernacke, No. 2:23-cv-01453-RFB-VCF, 2023 WL 6311458, at *2 (D. Nev. 22 Sept. 27, 2023) (granting pseudonymity and citing “policies that generally protect the 23 confidentiality of information related to asylum applications”). 24 The public also has an interest in avoiding the chilling of lawsuits brought to enforce 25 public rights. In cases against government entities, “personal anonymity is more readily 26 granted” because “there is arguably a public interest in a vindication of [an individual’s] 27 rights,” and personal characteristics are generally not at issue. EW v. New York Blood Ctr., 28 213 F.R.D. 108, 111 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Publius v. Boyer-Vine, 321 F.R.D. 358, 366 1 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (granting pseudonymity to blogger who published home addresses of 2 California legislators who had voted in favor of gun-control measures because “the fact 3 that Defendant is a government entity tips the balance”); cf. Advanced Textile Corp., 4 214 F.3d at 1072–73 (finding public interest weighed in favor of allowing pseudonymity 5 in Fair Labor Standards Act matter and “fail[ing] to see[] how disguising plaintiffs’ 6 identities will obstruct public scrutiny of the important issues in this case”). 7 On the other hand, the Court is mindful that it has not yet heard the government’s 8 position on this ex parte motion. Perhaps the government has information that would alter 9 the legal analysis and lead to a different result. If so, it may so move, and the Court will 10 consider the issue anew. 11 For now, R.M. has shown that his need for anonymity outweighs any prejudice to 12 defendant or to the public’s interest. He may proceed pseudonymously. 13 HABEAS SCREENING 14 Next, the Court must screen R.M.’s habeas petition. R.M. need only make out a 15 claim that is sufficiently cognizable to warrant a response. See Rules Governing Section 16 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 4 (authorizing summary dismissal “if 17 it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not 18 entitled to relief”); id., Rule 1(b) (permitting use of those Rules to any “habeas corpus 19 petition”). In this context, the relevant federal rules permit “summary dismissal of claims 20 that are clearly not cognizable.” Neiss v. Bludworth, 114 F.4th 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2024) 21 (cleaned up). But “as long as a petition has any potential merit, it is not so frivolous or 22 incredible as to justify summary dismissal[.]” Id. 23 R.M. alleges that he was “detained in a manner arbitrary, capricious, [and] without 24 required process” in “violat[ion] of the Administrative Procedure Act” and that “his 25 detention violates his rights under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.” (ECF 1, 26 at 3.) R.M. “fears persecution” in his home country “Azerbaijan,” due to his “political 27 beliefs.” (Id. at 5.) In 2024, he “entered the United States,” was “issued a Notice to 28 Appear,” “placed in standard removal proceedings,” and “released without detention.” (Id.) 1 “Within one year,” he “applied for asylum.” (Id.) On “July 11, 2025,” R.M. “attended a 2 scheduled, mandatory hearing,” during which respondents “orally moved to dismiss R.M.’s 3 immigration case,” which was granted. (Id. at 6.) When R.M. “exit[ed] the hearing, ICE 4 immediately arrested” him in the hallway. (Id.) He has been detained ever since, and he 5 was also “placed” in “‘expedited removal’ proceedings under INA § 235 (8 U.S.C. 6 § 1225(b)).” (Id.) 7 This challenge has sufficient potential merit to warrant a response. Functionally 8 identical cases across California have been found to have a “likelihood of success on the 9 merits” or have resulted in the writ being issued. See, e.g., Noori v. Larose, No. 25-cv- 10 1824-GPC-MSB, 2025 WL 2800149, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2025) (granting habeas 11 petition for Afghan asylum-seeker after respondents “orally moved to dismiss the case” 12 before the petitioner “was detained by ICE agents” and then “placed in expedited removal 13 proceedings”); Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06924-EMC, 2025 WL 2637503, 14 at *1, *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025) (granting preliminary injunction in favor of a 15 “removable” “noncitizen” who “appeared at [immigration court] for a scheduled hearing” 16 and “was arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement [] agents and detained”); 17 Garcia v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-01006-JLT-SAB, 2025 WL 2420068, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 18 Aug. 21, 2025) (granting preliminary injunction in favor of “Nicaraguan national” who 19 “appeared for his scheduled . . . [asylum] hearing,” had his case “orally” “dismissed,” and 20 “was arrested by ICE agents” “upon exiting the courtroom”); see also Aviles-Mena v. 21 Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06783-RFL, 2025 WL 2578215, at *3–*5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2025) 22 (“[W]hen ICE affirmatively chooses to release an individual on parole, it has made the 23 determination that it no longer intends to fast-track their removal and that it will proceed 24 with the standard removal process under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.”). 25 CONCLUSION 26 By December 17, 2025, respondents must answer the petition. Any reply by 27 petitioner must be filed by January 5, 2025. The Court will hold oral arguments on the 28 petition on January 13, 2026, at 2:00 p.m. 1 || Dated: November 21, 2025

3 Hon. rew G. Schopler 4 United States District Judge

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