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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 ANNA ESPERANZA TERRONES, Case No. 2:25-cv-09937-JC 11 Plaintiff, 12 ORDER SUBMITTING, VACATING v. HEARING ON, AND DENYING 13 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND 14 GENERAL MOTORS LLC, [DOCKET NO. 13] 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 I. SUMMARY 19 On May 9, 2025, Plaintiff Anna Esperanza Terrones (“Plaintiff”), filed a 20 Complaint against Defendant General Motors LLC (“Defendant”), in Los Angeles 21 County Superior Case No. 25STCV13589 (“State Action”), asserting claims under 22 the California Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act for breach of express 23 warranty, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and violation of 24 California Civil Code sections 1793.2(a)(3), (b) & (d). (Docket No. 1-1, at 1-16 25 (“Complaint” or “Comp.”)). On May 13, 2025, Plaintiff served the Summons and 26 Complaint on Defendant. (Docket No. 13-1, at 5-6). On July 22, 2025, Defendant 27 filed an Answer to the Complaint. (Docket No. 1-2 at 2-7). On October 15, 2025, 28 Defendant removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction (28 1 | U.S.C. § 1332. (Docket No. 1 (“Notice of Removal’) at 2-6). The matter was thus 2 || removed to the United States District Court for the Central District of California 3 || and was subsequently assigned to this Court as to whom the parties have been 4 || deemed to consent. (See Docket Nos. 1, 2, 6, 7). 5 On October 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand (“Motion”), a 6 || supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities (“Motion Memo”), and a 7 || declaration of counsel (“Yang Decl.) with an exhibit. (Docket No. 13). Plaintiff 8 || contends that remand is warranted because Defendant’s removal of the case to this 9 || Court: (1) was untimely; and (2) fails to establish that the case satisfies the 10 | amount-in-controversy requirement.’ (See Motion Memo at 4-10). On 11 |) November 4, 2025, Defendant filed an Opposition to the Motion (“Opposition”) 12 || and a supporting declaration of counsel (“Fitch Decl.”) with exhibits (“Fitch Ex.”). 13 | (Docket No. 16). Plaintiff did not file a reply. 14 Pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 15 || 7-15, the Court finds the Motion appropriate for decision without oral argument. 16 || The hearing calendared for November 25, 2025 at 9:30 a.m. is hereby vacated and 17 || the Motion is taken off calendar and is submitted for decision. 18 For the reasons discussed below, the Motion is denied. In reaching this 19 || conclusion, the Court has considered every argument made by the parties and 20 || discusses the main contentions herein. 21 22 'The Motion is premised, in part, on Plaintiff's erroneous assertion that the Complaint 23 || contains claims under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seg., which may be filed in (or removed to) federal district court if the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000, 24 see 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(B). However, the Complaint contains no mention of the Magnuson- 25 || Moss Warranty Act or any other federal basis for relief that would confer federal-question Jurisdiction here. Thus, notwithstanding the Motion’s erroneous references to the Magnusen- 26 || Moss Warranty Act and its requisite $50,000 amount-in-controversy threshold (see Motion 07 Memo at 2, 8-10), the Court construes the Motion as a challenge to whether removal was timely and whether the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 as required for diversity jurisdiction. 28

1] Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW 2 Removal of a case from state court to federal court is governed by 28 U.S.C. 3 || § 1441, which provides in relevant part that “any civil action brought in a State 4 || court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, 5 || may be removed . . . to the district court of the United States for the district and 6 || division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 7 || Federal courts have original subject matter jurisdiction where an action presents 8 || either a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or diversity of citizenship under 9 || 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Generally, a court has diversity jurisdiction only when there is 10 || complete diversity of citizenship among adverse parties and the amount in 11 |) controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Remand to state court may 12 || be ordered for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or any defect in the removal 13 || procedure. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 14 To protect the jurisdiction of state courts, removal jurisdiction is strictly 15 || construed in favor of remand. See Harris v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 16 || 689, 698 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 17 || 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006) (“It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside the limited 18 || jurisdiction of the federal courts and the burden of establishing the contrary rests 19 || upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks and brackets 20 || omitted)). If there is any doubt as to whether removal is proper, remand must be 21 || ordered. Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 1988). 22 || “The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.” 23 || Id. 24] 1. DISCUSSION 25 As indicated above, Plaintiff's Motion contends that remand is warranted 26 || because Defendant’s removal: (1) was untimely; and (2) fails to satisfy the amount- 27 || in-controversy requirement. (See Motion Memo at 4-10). For the reasons 28 || explained below, the Motion is denied.

1 A. Defendant’s Removal Was Timely 2 1. Pertinent Law 3 The Ninth Circuit has explained that there are three pathways for removal of 4 || an action from state court based on diversity jurisdiction. See Roth v. CHA 5 || Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P., 720 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 2013). The first two 6 || pathways are contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) and impose thirty-day deadlines for 7 || removal. See Dietrich v. Boeing Co., 14 F.4th 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2021). The 8 | third pathway is based on reading 28 U.S.C. § 1446 together with 28 U.S.C. § 1441 9 || and permits removal up to one year from the filing of the complaint, but this 10 || pathway only applies if the first two do not. See Roth, 720 F.3d at 1125-26. 11 The first pathway is set forth by Section 1446(b)(1) and states that “[t]he 12 || notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after 13 || the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial 14 || pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is 15 || based, or within 30 days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such 16 || initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on the 17 || defendant, whichever period is shorter.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). Section 18 || 1446(b)(1) “only applies if the case stated by the initial pleading is removable on 19 || its face,” as determined “through examination of the four corners of the applicable 20 || pleadings, not through subjective knowledge or a duty to make further inquiry.” 21 || Harris, 425 F.3d at 694. 22 The second pathway is set forth by Section 1446(b)(3) and states in relevant 23 || part that “if the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of 24 || removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant, through service 25 || or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from 26 || which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become 27 || removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). Section 1446(b)(3) is triggered only where 28 | ///

1 || “an amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper . . . [makes] a ground for 2 || removal unequivocally clear and certain.” Dietrich, 14 F.4th at 1095. 3 The third pathway is based on the interaction of Section 1446 with Section 4 || 1441. See Roth, 720 F.3d at 1125. Section 1441(a) states that “[e]xcept as 5 || otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a 6 || State court of which the district courts of the United States have original 7 || jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district 8 || court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where 9 || such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The Ninth Circuit has explained 10 | “that §§ 1441 and 1446, read together, permit a defendant to remove outside the 11 || two thirty-day periods on the basis of its own information, provided that it has not 12 | run afoul of either of the thirty-day deadlines.” Roth, 720 F.3d at 1125. Thus, “a 13 || defendant who has not lost the right to remove because of a failure to timely file a 14 || notice of removal under § 1446(b)(1) or (b)(3) may remove to federal court when it 15 || discovers, based on its own investigation, that a case is removable.” Id. at 1123. 16 || The only time limit on removal under this third pathway is that a defendant must 17 || file the notice of removal within one year of the filing of the complaint. Id. at 1126 18 |] (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1) for the one-year time limit). 19 2. Analysis 20 It is undisputed that Defendant removed this case to this Court more than 21 | thirty days after service of the Complaint; indeed, removal occurred about five 22 || months after service, long after Defendant already had answered the Complaint. 23 || (See Yang Decl. 5, 8). Defendant asserts that the thirty-day deadlines of Section 24 || 1446(b)(1) and Section 1446(b)(3) do not apply here because Plaintiff's Complaint 25 || is ambiguous as to Plaintiff's state of citizenship and the amount in controversy. 26 || (See Notice of Removal at 2; Opposition at 16-20). Particularly as to the latter, as 27 | /// 28 | ///

1 || Defendant points out, the Complaint fails to provide any of the values needed to 2 || calculate the amount of damages sought.’ 3 Plaintiff contends that a thirty-day deadline applied because the face of the 4 || Complaint provided sufficient information for Defendant plausibly to allege that 5 || the amount in controversy requirement was satisfied. (See Motion Memo at 2, 6 | 5-7). As indicated above, the Complaint asserts breach-of-warranty claims under 7 || the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act arising out of Plaintiff's purchase of a 8 || 2023 Chevrolet Traverse on December 10, 2022. (See Comp. {[{| 6-33). As relief, 9 || the Complaint seeks a rescission of the purchase contract and restitution of all 10 || monies expended on the subject vehicle, general, special, incidental, and 11 || consequential damages, as well as a civil penalty of up to two times the amount of 12 || actual damages, along with attorneys’ fees and costs. (See Comp. at 5 (Prayer)). 13 || Not only is the amount of damages unspecified, but so too are the purchase price, 14 || the mileage, and any other facts related to the subject vehicle aside from the make, 15 || model, year, and Vehicle Identification Number (“VIN”). Yet, Plaintiff asserts that 16 | this information alone sufficed for Defendant to estimate the vehicle’s market value 17 || and thereby calculate the total damages sought, given that Defendant has 18 || “sophisticated knowledge of the motor vehicle industry” and was the vehicle’s 19 || “manufacturer and distributor.” (Motion Memo at 6-7). 20 It is true that defendants are required to “apply a reasonable amount of 21 || intelligence in ascertaining removability,” and “[m|]ultiplying figures clearly stated 22 || in a complaint is an aspect of that duty.” Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 23 | 707 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2013). However, when no such figures are provided, 24 25 *The Complaint also fails to specify Plaintiff's state of citizenship, as Defendant points 26 || out. (See Opposition at 16-17). Instead, it alleges only that Plaintiff “is and at all times relevant herein was, a resident of San Jacinto, California” (Comp. §] 2 (emphasis added)), which does not 27 || suffice. See, e.g., Huerta Chavarin v. General Motors LLC, 2025 WL 3030875, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 28 Oct. 29, 2025) [T]he bare allegation of Plaintiff's California residency was not enough to allege domicile or citizenship for diversity purposes.”).

1 || “defendants need not make extrapolations or engage in guesswork,” id., nor are 2 || they expected to rely on their “subjective knowledge” or “pre-complaint documents 3 || to ascertain whether a case stated by an indeterminate initial pleading is actually 4 || removable,” Carvalho v. Equifax Inf. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 885-86 (9th Cir. 5 || 2010). To the contrary, as indicated above, the thirty-day deadline under Section 6 || 1441(b)(1) applies only if the basis for removal may be determined by examining 7 || “the four corners” of the Complaint itself, “not through subjective knowledge or a 8 || duty to make further inquiry.” Harris, 425 F.3d at 694. 9 Thus, absent any specific allegations of the dollar value of the claims, bare 10 | allegations of the make and model of the vehicle and claims for broad categories of 11 || damages are insufficient to trigger the removal deadline. See, e.g., 12 || Alvarez-Munguia v. Ford Motor Co., 2024 WL 69076, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 13 || 2024) (complaint did not trigger thirty-day removal deadline because it alleged 14 || only categories of relief and did not identify any “specific measure of damages, nor 15 || [did] it allege the amount of attorneys’ fees and costs incurred”); Pastrana v. Nissan 16 || N. Am., Inc., 2024 WL 2817533, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 2024) (thirty-day 17 || deadline was not triggered where the complaint did not “list a dollar amount 18 || corresponding to the damages’); Moran v. Ford Motor Co., 2023 WL 4532755, at 19 | *3 (S.D. Cal. July 13, 2023) (“[W]hile Defendant could have made a plausible 20 || guess that the amount in controversy in this case exceeded $75,000, Defendant was 21 || under no obligation to do so.’’). 22 As Plaintiff's Complaint does not expressly disclose the amounts in issue, 23 || Section 1441(b)(1) does not apply. See Harris, 425 F.3d at 694. There were also 24 || no subsequent pleadings, motions, orders, or other papers that made the basis for 25 || removal “unequivocally clear and certain.” See Dietrich, 14 F.4th at 1095. 26 || Accordingly, as Defendant did not run afoul of the deadlines in Section 1441(b)(1) 27 || or Section 1441(b)(3), Defendant was entitled to remove the case to this Court 28 || “when it discover[ed], based on its own investigation,” that the case was

1 || removable. Roth, 720 F.3d at 1123; see also Gonzalez v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 2 || 2024 WL 2782102, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2024) (“This is simply the kind of 3 || case where defendant removed the case based on its knowledge ‘beyond the 4 || pleadings,’ a removal that defendant was not ‘obligated’ to file pursuant to one of 5 || the two 28 U.S.C. § 1446 deadlines, but a removal that defendant nonetheless 6 || ‘could’ file.” (quoting Kuxhausen, 707 F.3d at 1141 n.3)). Removal was therefore 7 || timely. 8 B. Defendant Satisfies the Amount-in-Controversy Requirement for 9 Diversity Jurisdiction 10 1. Applicable Law 11 A removing defendant bears the burden to show that “it is more likely than 12 || not that the amount in controversy exceeds” the jurisdictional threshold. Sanchez 13 || v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation 14 || marks and citation omitted). “A defendant may rely on reasonable assumptions to 15 || prove that it has met the statutory threshold.” Harris v. KM Indus., Inc., 980 F.3d 16 || 694, 701 (9th Cir. 2020). The parties also may submit evidence, “including 17 || affidavits or declarations, or other summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to the 18 || amount in controversy at the time of removal.” Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 19 | F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 20 “The amount in controversy is simply an estimate of the total amount in 21 || dispute, not a prospective assessment of defendant’s liability.” Lewis v. Verizon 22 || Commce’ns, Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 400 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). “In that 23 || sense, the amount in controversy reflects the maximum recovery the plaintiff could 24 || reasonably recover.” Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott, 936 F.3d 920, 927 (9th 25 || Cir. 2019) (citing Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 417 (9th Cir. 26 || 2018)) (emphasis in original). Thus, the amount in controversy is the amount “at 27 || stake” in the litigation at the time of removal, “whatever the likelihood that [the 28 || plaintiff] will actually recover them.” Chavez, 888 F.3d at 417.

1 “[T]he amount in controversy includes damages (compensatory, punitive, or 2 otherwise), the costs of complying with an injunction, and attorneys’ fees awarded 3 under fee-shifting statutes or contract.” Fritsch v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, 4 899 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2018). 5 Under the Song-Beverly Act, the purchaser of a vehicle may obtain 6 restitution equal to “the purchase price paid by the buyer, less that amount directly 7 attributable to use by the buyer.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(1). The usage offset 8 (or “mileage offset”) is calculated by multiplying the purchase price by a fraction 9 with a denominator of 120,000 and a numerator of “the number of miles traveled 10 by the new motor vehicle prior to the time the buyer first delivered the vehicle to 11 the manufacturer.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(C). In addition, under newly 12 enacted California law, defendants in actions seeking restitution for motor vehicles 13 are entitled to offset from the purchase price any negative equity, manufacturer’s 14 rebate, third-party sold optional equipment, and unpaid financing. Cal. Code Civ. 15 Proc. § 871.27(b), (c), (d), (f).3 The Ninth Circuit has explained that, because “an 16 estimate of the amount in controversy must be reduced if ‘a specific rule of law or 17 measure of damages limits the amount of damages recoverable,’” consideration of 18 the Song-Beverly Act’s offsets in calculating the amount in controversy is 19 “appropriate.” Schneider v. Ford Motor Co., 756 F. App’x 699, 701 n.3 (9th Cir. 20 2018) (quoting Morris v. Hotel Riviera, Inc., 704 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1983)). 21 2. Analysis 22 Plaintiff argues that Defendant has failed to meet its burden to show by a 23 preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the 24 /// 25 /// 26 27 3Section 871.27 was enacted as part of California Assembly Bill 1755 and went into effect on January 1, 2025. See A.B. 1755, 2023-24 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2024). Because this 28 action was initiated after January 1, 2025, these requirements apply here. 9 1 || jurisdictional threshold.* (Motion Memo at 8-10). However, as set forth below, 2 || Defendant has provided ample evidence to support its amount-in-controversy 3 || allegations, including the Retail Installment Sale Contract (“RISC”), Repair 4 || History, and Payment History for the subject vehicle. 5 On December 10, 2022, Plaintiff purchased a 2023 Chevrolet Traverse with 6 || 56 miles on the odometer for $77,434.04. (See Fitch Ex. A (RISC)). On May 22, 7 || 2023, with 8,887 miles on the odometer, Plaintiff presented the vehicle to a 8 || dealership for repair of the defect claim she appears to be pursuing here. (See Fitch 9 || Decl. 4] 3; Fitch Ex. B (Repair History Summary)). Plaintiff's use of the vehicle 10 || prior to the discovery of this alleged nonconformity was 8,831 miles (8,887—56). 11 || As Defendant points out, dividing this number by 120,000 and multiplying this by 12 || the cash price of the vehicle — which is $47,187.58 (see Fitch Ex. A at 2) — results 13 || in an estimated mileage offset of $3,472.61. See Cal. Civil Code § 14 || 1793.2(d)(2)(C). Additionally, Defendant has identified $8,790.00 in other offsets 15 || for optional third-party contracts. (See Fitch Ex. A); Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 16 || 871.27. Deducting these offsets of $8,790.00 and the usage/mileage offset of 17 || $3,472.61 from the total purchase price of $77,434.04 results in $65,171.43. 18 The amount of unpaid financing also must be deducted.” As of August 2025, 19 20 “Plaintiff's Motion specifically argues that Defendant fails to establish that the amount in 21 || controversy exceeds $50,000, which is the threshold to bring a Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim in federal court. (See Motion Memo at 8-10). But as the Complaint does not assert such 22 || claim, and Defendant’s removal of the case is instead predicated on diversity jurisdiction, 73 Plaintiffs argument is construed as a challenge to whether Defendant meets the amount-in- controversy threshold for diversity jurisdiction, which is $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 24 || Plaintiff does not dispute that there is complete diversity between the parties, and Defendant’s 5 allegations appear sufficient on that issue. (See Notice of Removal at 3). 6 “While ‘[c]ourts routinely find that an undisputed [RISC] can establish actual damages[,]’ this should account for actual payments made. Where the Court is unable to 27 || determine the specific amount paid towards an installment contract, however, district courts find 28 the ‘total cash price’ within such contract appropriate as a substitute.” Gonzales v. Ford Motor (continued...) 10

| | Plaintiff had $37,983.33 remaining in unpaid financing. (Fitch Ex. C (Loan Payoff 2 || History)). As Defendant notes, “[g]iven that this matter is unlikely to resolve early, 3 || 1t would be reasonable to estimate at least 12 additional monthly payments of 4 || $862.31 prior to resolution of trial and any appeal, leaving an estimated $27,635.61 5 | in unpaid financing.” (Opposition at 21; see Fitch Ex. A at 1). By then subtracting 6 || that amount from $65,171.43, Defendant posits that the amount of “actual” 7 || damages at issue here is $37,535.82. Plaintiff has offered no basis to dispute this 8 || estimate.° See also, e.g., Carillo v. FCA USA, LLC, 546 F. Supp. 3d 995, 1001-04 9 || (C.D. Cal. 2021) (finding defendant satisfied the amount in controversy 10 || requirement by a preponderance of the evidence based on RISC and repair order). 11 In addition to actual damages, the Complaint seeks a civil penalty of up to 12 || two times the amount of actual damages (see Comp. at 5 (Prayer)), as permitted for 13 || willful violations of the Song-Beverly Act, see Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(c). “Courts 14 || treat the Song-Beverly Act’s civil penalties akin to punitive damages,” Carillo, 546 15 16 °(...continued) 17 || Co., 2025 WL 1166056, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2025) (quoting Luna v. FCA US LLC, 2021 18 WL 4893567, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2021)). Here, under the latter approach, if the Court were to use the vehicle’s “total cash price” of $47,187.58 as a substitute for the total amount paid, 19 || from which the Court would then subtract the usage/mileage offset ($3,472.61) and the offsets for third-party contract amounts ($8,790.00), the estimated actual damages would be $34,924.97, 20 which is similar to Defendant’s estimate of $37,535.43 in actual damages set forth below (a 21 || difference of $2,610.85) and, with the civil penalty added, would similarly result in an amount that satisfies the amount in controversy. 22 3 *Plaintiff’s Motion disputes the estimate of $65,171.43 in actual damages that Defendant alleged in the Notice of Removal, which did not sufficiently account for offsets and deductions. 24 || (See Motion Memo at 8-9; Notice of Removal at 5). At this stage, however, upon Plaintiff's challenge to removal, Defendant was entitled to refine its previous estimate of damages with 25 || additional evidence. Cf. Schneider v. Ford Motor Co., 756 F. App’x 699, 700-01 (9th Cir. 2018) 6 (“The Supreme Court has held that a notice of removal must include only ‘a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.’ The preponderance of the 27 || evidence standard applies only after ‘the plaintiff contests, or the court questions, the defendant’s 28 allegation’ and ‘both sides submit proof.’” (quoting Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 88-89 (2014))). 11

1 || F. Supp. 3d at 1003 (citing Suman vy. Superior Court, 39 Cal. App. 4th 1309, 1317 2 || (1995)), and “[i]t 1s well established that punitive damages are part of the amount 3 || in controversy in a civil action,” Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 945 (9th 4 | Cir. 2001) (citing Bell v. Preferred Life Assur. Society, 320 U.S. 238, 240 (1943)), 5 || cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1104 (2002). 6 Plaintiff contends that Defendant cannot “[m]erely assum[e] the existence of 7 || a civil penalty award,” and must instead “offer evidence of willfulness that much 8 || support such an award.” (Motion Memo at 10). Here, however, the Complaint 9 || expressly alleges that Defendant’s conduct was willful (see Comp. 17, 24, 28) 10 || and seeks “a civil penalty in the amount of two times Plaintiffs actual damages 11 || pursuant to [California] Civil Code section 1794(c)” (Comp. at 5). In such 12 || circumstances, several courts have appropriately found that maximum civil 13 || penalties may be included in calculating the amount in controversy. See Amavizca 14 || v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 2023 WL 3020489, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2023) (“Many 15 || courts have included the maximum civil penalty available under the Song-Beverly 16 || Act as part of the amount in controversy, at least when the plaintiff alleges that the 17 || defendant acted willfully and requests the full penalty in the complaint.” (collecting 18 || cases)); Canesco v. Ford Motor Co., 570 F. Supp. 3d 872, 902 (S.D. Cal. 2021) 19 | (‘[T]his Court sides with the majority of courts and more recent cases, which find 20 || civil penalties appropriate for inclusion in the calculation of the amount in 21 || controversy without the defendant needing to ‘prove a case against itself with 22 || respect to liability for civil penalties.”); Perez v. Gen. Motors LLC, 2025 WL 23 || 2985229, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2025) (“[S]everal courts have found that 24 || maximum civil penalties may be included in calculating the amount in controversy. 25 || This is especially true where, as here, there are ‘allegations in the [Complaint] that 26 || Defendant’s conduct was willful.’ “Moreover, Defendant 1s not required to prove 27 || the case against itself.’” (citations omitted)). 28 | /// 12

1 Applying this maximum (two-times) civil penalty here ($37,535.82*2), as 2 Defendant points out, brings the total amount to $112,607.46 ($37,535.82 + 3 ($37,535.82*2)), which well exceeds $75,000. See also Carillo, 546 F. Supp. 3d at 4 1003 (denying a motion to remand after finding the amount in controversy satisfied 5 based on “the amount of actual damages available as restitution” of $25,018.70, 6 which when adding the civil penalty of twice the amount ($50,037.40), amounted 7 to a total of $75,056.10 in controversy); Perez, 2025 WL 2985229, at *4 (same, for 8 $36,071.22 in damages plus a two-times civil penalty, for a total of $108,213.66). 9 Accordingly, Defendant has demonstrated that it is more likely than not that the 10 amount in controversy exceeds the threshold for diversity jurisdiction. 11 IV. ORDERS 12 IT THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion is denied. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 DATED: November 20, 2025 15 16 ______________/s/_____________________ 17 Honorable Jacqueline Chooljian

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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