1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No.: 25-cv-03207-DMS-DEB

CRISTIAN ANDRADE-ANAYA,

12 O R D E R G R A N T I N G I N P A RT AND 13 Petitioner, DENYING IN PART PETITIONER’S v. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 14

CORPUS

KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as 15 Secretary of Homeland Security; 16 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, in his official capacity as Warden of Otay Mesa 17 Detention Center; GREGORY J. 18 ARCHAMBEAULT, in his official capacity as San Diego Field Office 19 Director, ICE Enforcement and Removal 20 Operations; TODD LYONS, in his official capacity as Acting Director of ICE; 21 PAMELA BONDI, U.S. Attorney 22 General; IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; and 23

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND

24 SECURITY, 25 Respondents.

26

27

28 1 Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 2 (“Petition”). (Pet., ECF No. 1). Respondents filed a return to the Petition. (Return, ECF 3 No. 5). Petitioner did not file a reply. After reviewing the briefs, the Court finds this matter 4 is suitable for decision without oral argument. S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1); Tijerina v. 5 Thornburgh, 884 F.2d 861, 866 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that an evidentiary hearing is not 6 necessary when deciding only questions of law). For the following reasons, the Court 7 grants in part and denies in part the Petition. 8 I. BACKGROUND 9 Petitioner, a Mexican national, entered the United States in 2004. (Pet. ¶ 1). On or 10 around October 10, 2025, Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents arrested 11 Petitioner. (Id. ¶ 17). Petitioner has since been detained at Otay Mesa Detention Center. 12 (Id. ¶ 18). He is charged with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (as being 13 present in the United States without being admitted or paroled) and 8 U.S.C. § 14 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (as an immigrant not in possession of valid entry documents). (Return 15 1). He is currently in removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. (Id.). 16 Respondents argued before the Immigration Court that Petitioner is being detained 17 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). (Pet. ¶ 24). Petitioner’s next master-calendar hearing 18 is scheduled for December 18, 2025 before an immigration judge (“IJ”). (Id. ¶ 19). 19 Petitioner has not yet received a bond determination hearing and has not requested a 20 custody redetermination because “the Board of Immigration (‘BIA’) decision in Matter of 21 Yajure Hurtado, 2[9] I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) has meant that all requests for custody 22 redetermination under Petitioner’s circumstances have been dismissed for lack of 23 jurisdiction.” (Id. ¶ 3). 24 The Petition asserts that Petitioner’s detention violates 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and the 25 Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. (Id. at 6–8). Respondents maintain that Petitioner 26 is being lawfully detained under § 1225(b)(2). (Return 1). Petitioner requests a writ of 27 habeas corpus ordering the immediate release of Petitioner under reasonable conditions of 28 supervision; an order enjoining Respondents from transferring Petitioner out of the 1 Southern District of California during the pendency of these proceedings and while 2 Petitioner remains in Respondents’ custody; and any other relief which this Court deems 3 “just and proper.” (Id., Prayer for Relief, ¶¶ 2–3, 6). 4 II. LEGAL STANDARD 5 “Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by . . . the district courts . . . within their 6 respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). A petitioner prevails in his petition for writ 7 of habeas corpus if he shows that his custody violates the Constitution or laws of the United 8 States. Id. § 2241(c)(3). The writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual 9 detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). 10 III. DISCUSSION 11 A. Jurisdiction 12 Respondents argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction per 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) and 13 (g). (Return 5–9). The Court has previously considered and rejected this argument. See 14 Vasquez Garcia v. Noem, --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL 2549431, at *3–4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15 3, 2025); Medina-Ortiz v. Noem, No. 25-cv-02819-DMS-MMP, ECF No. 7, at 3–4 (S.D. 16 Cal. Oct. 30, 2025). Based on the reasoning of those cases, the Court again rejects this 17 argument. 18 B. Exhaustion 19 In a footnote, Respondents argue that the Court should “ensure Petitioner properly 20 exhausts administrative remedies.” (Return 9 n.1). Petitioner argues that prudential 21 exhaustion would be futile in light of the BIA’s decision, Yajure Hurtado. (See Pet. ¶¶ 13– 22 15). The Court agrees with Petitioner and other courts that have addressed this issue. See 23 Esquivel-Ipina v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-2672 JLS (BLM), 2025 WL 2998361, at *3–4 (S.D. 24 Cal. Oct. 24, 2025) (finding exhaustion would be futile in light of Yajure Hurtado); 25 Vasquez v. Feeley, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2676082, at *10 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025) 26 (same). 27 28 1 C. Merits—Detention Statutes 2 Petitioner argues that his mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) is unlawful and 3 that he instead falls under § 1226(a)’s discretionary detention framework. (Pet. ¶ 29). 4 Respondents maintain that Petitioner is properly detained under § 1225(b)(2). (Return 1). 5 The Court agrees with Petitioner. 6 Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “an alien who is an applicant for admission, if 7 the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly 8 and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, . . . shall be detained for a proceeding under [§ 9 1229a].” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). An “applicant for admission” is an 10 “alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United 11 States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival . . .).” Id. § 1225(a)(1). Respondents 12 do not contend that Petitioner affirmatively applied for admission. Rather, Respondents 13 argue that an applicant for admission is automatically understood to be “seeking 14 admission” within the meaning of § 1225(b)(2)(A). (See Return 11–12). However, 15 Respondents’ understanding of “seeking admission” would “seemingly render that phrase 16 mere surplusage, such that the language could be deleted while retaining the same statutory 17 meaning.” Castellanos Lopez v. Warden, 25-cv-2527-RSH-SBC, 2025 WL 3005346, at 18 *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025). Thus, “seeking admission requires an affirmative act such as 19 entering the United States or applying for status, and it does not apply to individuals who, 20 like [Petitioner], have been residing in the United States and did not apply for admission 21 or a change of status.” Esquivel-Ipina v. Larose, No. 25-CV-2672 JLS (BLM), 2025 WL 22 2998361, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2025); Vasquez Garcia, 2025 WL 2549431, at *6. 23 Further, Respondents’ interpretation would render the Laken Riley Act, Pub. L. No. 24 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025), superfluous. Section 1226(c) carves out exceptions to § 1226(a), 25 requiring certain people be detained. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Specifically, § 1226(c)(1)(E) 26 (enacted by the Laken Riley Act) requires mandatory detention for people who are 27 inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A), (6)(C), or (7) and charged with certain crimes not 28 relevant here. Id. § 1226(c)(1)(E). As a practical matter, if § 1225(b)(2) already 1 encompassed all inadmissible noncitizens, there would be no need to pass an amendment 2 that required detention for those who are inadmissible under the same statutes and are being 3 charged with specific crimes. Vasquez Garcia, 2025 WL 2549431, at *6. “A plain reading 4 of this exception implies that the default discretionary bond procedures in Section 1226(a) 5 apply to a noncitizen who . . . is present without being admitted or paroled but has not been 6 implicated in any crimes as set forth in Section 1226(c).” Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F. 7 Supp. 3d 1239, 1256 (W.D. Wash. 2025). 8 The Court’s holding maintains a “general distinction” between §§ 1225(b) and 9 1226(a) as explained by the Supreme Court: § 1225(b) applies to “aliens seeking admission 10 into the country” and § 1226 applies to “aliens already in the country.” Castellanos Lopez, 11 2025 WL 3005346, at *3 (citing Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294–95 (2018)). 12 Thus, the Court finds that Petitioner is being unlawfully detained under § 1225(b)(2).1 13 D. Relief 14 Because § 1226(a) establishes a discretionary detention framework, there remains 15 the possibility that Petitioner will be detained even after a bonding hearing. As such, the 16 Court DENIES Petitioner’s request to be immediately released from custody under 17 reasonable conditions of supervision. Instead, the harm suffered—that Petitioner is not 18 receiving a bond hearing under the proper statute—is remedied by ordering Respondents 19 to conduct a bond hearing under § 1226(a) and enjoining Respondents from denying bond 20 on the basis that Petitioner is detained under § 1225(b)(2). See Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d 21 at 1263. Thus, the Court ORDERS Respondents to provide Petitioner with an 22 individualized bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a).2 23

24 25 1 In light of this determination, the Court declines to address Petitioner’s arguments concerning the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 26 2 Petitioner also seeks an order prohibiting Respondents from “transferring Petitioner out of the 27 jurisdiction of this court during the pendency of these proceedings and while . . . Petitioner remains in Respondents’ custody.” (Pet., Prayer for Relief, ¶ 3). Respondents do not address this requested relief in 28 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the Petition. However, the Court 3 || DENIES Petitioner’s request to be immediately released from custody under reasonable 4 || conditions of supervision. The Court ENJOINS Respondents from transferring Petitioner 5 of the Southern District of California during the pendency of these proceedings and 6 ||while Petitioner remains in Respondent’s custody. Further, this Court ORDERS 7 Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under § 1226(a) within fourteen 8 || days of the entry of this Order. Respondents shall not deny Petitioner’s bond on the basis 9 || that § 1225(b)(2) requires mandatory detention. The parties are ORDERED to file a Joint 10 ||Status Report within 21 days of this Order’s filing, confirming Petitioner received a bond 11 hearing under § 1226(a). 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 ||Dated: November 26, 2025 14 in ym. Lh) Hon. Dana M. Sabraw 15 United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28