1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 C.R.A. by and through his legal guardian Case No. 1:23-cv-00672-KES-BAM

NATYSHJA ALVAREZ, MELCHOR

10 DAVID ALVAREZ, as successors in ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ interest to decedent RAYMOND MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER 11 REGALADO, (Doc. 86) 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. 14 FRESNO COUNTY, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Currently before the Court is Defendants Fresno County and Fresno County Sheriff’s 18 Department’s motion for protective order to stay discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 26(c). (Doc. 86.) Plaintiffs opposed the motion on August 15, 2025. (Doc. 92.) Defendants 20 replied on August 27, 2025. (Doc. 97.) The Court found the motion suitable for decision without 21 oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g) and vacated the hearing set for October 10, 2025. 22 (Doc. 103.) 23 For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion for protective order will be granted. 24 I. Relevant Background1 25 On May 2, 2023, Dianna Regalado filed the original complaint in this action as successor 26 in interest to decedent Raymond Regalado. (Doc. 1.) Dianna Regalado passed away on 27 1 The parties are familiar with the lengthy procedural history in this action, and it will not be 28 recounted except as necessary to resolve the pending motion. 1 December 12, 2023. 2 On November 8, 2024, after multiple motions to amend and/or to substitute the proper 3 successor in interest, the Court granted leave to amend the complaint to substitute C.R.A. and 4 Melchor David Alvarez as plaintiffs and real parties in interest—as successors in interest to 5 decedent and for their own individual claims. (Doc. 59.) Plaintiffs filed their first amended 6 complaint on November 19, 2024. (Doc. 63.) The first amended complaint includes the 7 following claims against Defendants Fresno County and Fresno County Sheriff’s Department: 8 (1) deliberate indifference to serious medical and mental health needs in violation of the 9 Fourteenth Amendment (Survival Action - 42 U.S.C. § 1983); (2) failure to protect from harm in 10 violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Survival Action - 42 U.S.C. § 1983); (3) municipal 11 (Monell) liability for unconstitutional policies, procedures, practices, and custom (42 U.S.C. § 12 1983); (4) deprivation of substantive due process rights in violation of the First and Fourteenth 13 Amendments (42 U.S.C. § 1983); (5) negligent supervision, training, hiring, and retention 14 (Survival Action – California State Law); (6) wrongful death (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.60); and 15 (7) state civil rights violations (Survival Action – Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1). (Id.) 16 On December 10, 2024, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. 17 (Doc. 64.) In their motion, Defendants contend that because neither plaintiff filed a government 18 claim against Defendants as required by the Government Claims Act, Plaintiffs’ state law causes 19 of action should be dismissed. Defendants also contend that because Plaintiffs have failed to 20 plead that they have standing to bring the federal survival causes of action arising under § 1983, 21 those claims also should be dismissed. (Id.) Plaintiffs opposed the motion on September 9, 2025. 22 (Doc. 100.) Defendants replied on October 3, 2025. (Doc. 102.) The motion remains pending 23 before the district judge. 24 On July 28, 2025, Defendants filed the instant motion for protective order to stay 25 discovery in this action pending a final ruling on Defendants’ motion to dismiss the first amended 26 complaint. (Doc. 86.) Defendants contend that the motion to dismiss addresses Plaintiffs’ state 27 and federal claims and may dispose of the entire case. (Doc. 86 at 6-8.) With respect to the state 28 law claims, Defendants explain that the motion to dismiss argues that Plaintiffs’ state law claims 1 are legally insufficient for failure to file the requisite government claim, and Plaintiffs’ failure to 2 have filed a mandatory government claim bars their state law causes of action. (Id. at 6-7.) With 3 respect to the federal claims, Defendants explain that the motion to dismiss challenges the § 1983 4 federal survival causes of action because Plaintiffs have not plead that they have standing to bring 5 a survival action. (Id. at 7.) Defendants therefore assert that discovery should be stayed in this 6 matter to achieve the goal of efficiency for the Court and the parties and because Plaintiffs have 7 not filed a legal sufficient complaint, which is a necessary prerequisite to discovery. (Id. at 7-8.) 8 On August 15, 2025, Plaintiffs opposed the motion for protective order. (Doc. 92.) 9 Plaintiffs first contend that the motion misleads the court, is frivolous, and merits sanctions under 10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 because “it is based on a false claim that defendant County’s 11 motion to dismiss is dispositive of all Plaintiff’s [sic] claims.” (Id. at 1.) Plaintiffs next contend 12 that Defendants’ motion to dismiss is not dispositive of all of Plaintiffs’ claims “as Plaintiffs have 13 demonstrated standing to pursue these claims under California state survival statute for federal 14 law claims.” (Id. at 2.) Lastly, Plaintiffs contend that they would be heavily prejudiced by a stay 15 in discovery pending resolution on a non-dispositive motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs indicate that 16 the case has been stayed for two years without Plaintiffs being able to conduct any discovery, and 17 given the Court’s docket, there is a likelihood the motion to dismiss will be pending for a long 18 time. Plaintiffs contend that a stay is prejudicial and inefficient. (Id. at 15.) 19 On August 27, 2025, Defendants filed their reply to Plaintiffs’ opposition. (Doc. 97.) 20 II. Legal Standard 21 A district court “has wide discretion in controlling discovery.” Little v. City of Seattle, 22 863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1988). A motion to stay discovery pending resolution of a potentially 23 dispositive motion may be granted for good cause. See Body Xchange Sports Club, LLC v. Zurich 24 Am. Ins. Co., No. 1:20-cv-01518-NONE-JLT, 2021 WL 2457482, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 16, 2021) 25 (“Though the Ninth Circuit has not provided a clear standard for evaluating a motion to stay 26 discovery pending resolution of a potentially dispositive motion, it has affirmed that district 27 courts may grant such a motion for good cause.”) (citations omitted). Similarly, Federal Rule of 28 Civil Procedure 26 states that “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or 1 person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,” including 2 forbidding discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). The party seeking a protective order has the 3 burden “to ‘show good cause’ by demonstrating harm or prejudice that will result from the 4 discovery.” Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004). 5 “[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does [sic] not provide for automatic or blanket 6 stays of discovery when a potentially dispositive motion is pending.” Mlejnecky v. Olympus 7 Imaging Am. Inc., No. 2:10-cv-02630 JAM KJN, 2011 WL 489743, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 8 “Indeed, district courts look unfavorably upon such blanket stays of discovery, because delaying 9 or prolonging discovery can create unnecessary litigation expenses and case management 10 problems.” Salazar v. Honest Tea, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-02318-KJM-EFB, 2015 WL 6537813, at *1 11 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “In evaluating a motion to stay, a 12 court inevitably must balance the harm produced by a delay in discovery against the possibility 13 that the motion will be granted and entirely eliminate the need for such discovery.” Id. (internal 14 citations and quotation marks omitted); see also ColfaxNet, LLC v. City of Colfax, No. 2:19-cv- 15 02167-WBS-CKD, 2020 WL 4818895, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2020), reconsideration denied 16 sub nom. ColfaxNet, LLC v. Colfax, No. 2:19-cv-2167 WBS-CKD, 2020 WL 5518397 (E.D. Cal. 17 Sept. 14, 2020). 18 A two-part test is used to determine whether to grant a stay of discovery pending the 19 resolution of a potentially dispositive motion. See ColfaxNet, 2020 WL 4818895, at *4. First, the 20 pending motion “must be potentially dispositive of the entire case, or at least dispositive on the 21 issue at which discovery is directed.” Id. (citation omitted). Second, the court must determine 22 “whether the pending dispositive motion can be decided absent discovery.” Id. 23 III. Discussion 24 A. Potentially Dispositive Motion 25 In determining whether to issue a stay, California district courts evaluate the dispositive 26 nature of the underlying motion in various manners. United States v. Dynamic Med. Sys. LLC, 27 No. 1:17-cv-01757-JLT-SAB, 2023 WL 1995522, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2023). “Some courts, 28 in taking a ‘peek’ at the merits of the potentially dispositive motion, have conducted fairly in- 1 depth analyses of the underlying motion, sometimes requiring the defendant to establish a strong 2 likelihood of success on the merits in order to receive a stay of discovery.” Id. (citing cases); see 3 also Roe v. Rodriguez, No. 1:22-cv-01574-JLT-SAB, 2023 WL 2752537, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4 31, 2023) (same). Here, however, because it is the district judge who is responsible for resolving 5 Defendants’ underlying motion to dismiss, this Court’s review of the pending motion is limited. 6 Dynamic Med. Sys, 2023 WL 1995522 at *4 (“[W]ith respect to the instant matter, it is the 7 District Judge, and not this Court, who is responsible for resolving Defendants’ underlying 8 motions to dismiss. Accordingly, this Court’s ‘peek’ at the merits, while consistent with the 9 general practice of courts in this District, is limited.”); see also Britt v. Lennar Corp., No. 1:23- 10 cv-1475-KES-BAM, 2024 WL 2117258, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2024). The Court is not 11 required to decide who will prevail in the pending motion to dismiss.2 Est. of Jackson v. City of 12 Modesto, No. 1:21-cv-00415-AWI-EPG, 2021 WL 5989754, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2021). 13 Rather, the Court conducts “a preliminary review of the pending dispositive motion.” Id. 14 Defendants contend that the motion to dismiss addresses Plaintiffs’ state and federal 15 claims, and the motion may dispose of the entire case. (Doc. 86 at 6-8.) Plaintiffs counter that 16 the motion to dismiss is non-dispositive, arguing the merits of the underlying motion to dismiss 17 and asserting that even if the Court found a deficiency in their claims, Plaintiffs would be allowed 18 to amend the complaint. (Doc. 92 at 5.) Plaintiffs indicate that, at best, they would be foreclosed 19 from pursuing the state law claims. (Id.) 20 Defendants’ motion to dismiss seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ state law claims for (1) 21 negligent supervision, training, hiring and retention under state law; (2) wrongful death under 22 California Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60; and (3) state civil rights violations under 23 California Civil Code section 52.1. (See Doc. 64 at 10.) Defendants’ motion to dismiss also seeks 24 dismissal of Plaintiffs’ § 1983 federal survival causes of action, which Defendants identify as 25 causes of action for “deliberate indifference to serious medical and mental health needs, failure to 26 2 The Court therefore will not address the parties’ arguments concerning the substantive merits of 27 the underlying motion to dismiss. The Court also will not address Plaintiffs’ related assertions regarding the frivolousness of Defendants’ arguments in support of their motion to dismiss and 28 Plaintiffs’ call for Rule 11 sanctions. 1 protect from harm under the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 1983, or municipal liability 2 under Section 1983.” (See id. at 15.) The motion also challenges Plaintiffs’ federal cause of 3 action for deprivation of substantive due process rights. (Id. at 16.) 4 Without determining the merits of the pending motion to dismiss, and based on a 5 preliminary review, the Court finds that the underlying motion to dismiss, if successful, would be 6 fully dispositive of Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants. The motion seeks dismissal of all 7 claims asserted against Defendants. Thus, this consideration supports granting the requested stay 8 of discovery. 9 B. Necessity of Discovery to Resolve Pending Motion to Dismiss 10 As to the second part of the test, it does not appear that any discovery is necessary to 11 resolve the pending motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss is fully briefed and set for hearing 12 before the district court. (Docs. 64, 89, 100, 102.) Moreover, Plaintiffs’ opposition to the motion 13 to dismiss makes no assertion that any discovery is necessary to withstand the motion. Indeed, in 14 their opposition, Plaintiffs aver that Defendants’ motion to dismiss is a “facial challenge to the 15 Complaint.” (Doc. 100 at 6.) Given that no discovery appears to be required for the district 16 court to rule on the motion to dismiss, the second part of the two-part test supports granting the 17 requested stay of discovery. 18 C. Good Cause 19 Additionally, the Court finds good cause for a temporary stay of discovery. The Court has 20 not issued a scheduling order in this case and no discovery deadlines have been set. If 21 Defendants’ motion to dismiss does not resolve the case, then Plaintiffs will not be prejudiced by 22 a delay in discovery. However, proceeding with discovery before the pleadings in this action are 23 settled may result in unnecessary motion practice, litigation costs, and a waste of judicial 24 resources. See Britt, 2024 WL 2117258, at *3. 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 IV. Conclusion and Order 2 For the reasons stated, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 3 1. Defendants’ motion for a protective order, (Doc. 86), is GRANTED; 4 2. Discovery in this action is STAYED pending a ruling on Defendants’ motion to 5 dismiss Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint. 6

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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8 Dated: October 14, 2025 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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