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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 11 NORMAN GEORGE LAMBERT, Case No. 2:23-cv-1814-JDP (SS) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of 15 Social Security, 16 Defendant. 17 18 Plaintiff’s counsel seeks an award of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b).1 ECF No. 19 16. Plaintiff entered into a contingent fee agreement providing that he would pay counsel twenty- 20 five percent of any award of past-due benefits. ECF No. 16-3 at 1. After this court remanded for 21 further proceedings, plaintiff was found disabled and awarded $116,664 in past-due benefits. 22 ECF No. 16-1 at 3. Plaintiff’s counsel requests $19,950 in attorney fees, which is less than the 23 statutory maximum, and which equates to an effective hourly rate of $820.98.2 ECF No. 16 at 4. 24 25

1 Although the motion for fees was filed under plaintiff’s name, plaintiff’s counsel is the 26 real party in interest. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 798 n.6 (2002). 27 2 Plaintiff states that the attorney who represented him at the administrative level is anticipated to receive $9,200 in attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(a). Accordingly, $9,200 is 28 calculated in the 25% of fees awarded to plaintiff’s attorneys. 1 An attorney is entitled to reasonable fees for successfully representing social security 2 claimants in district court. 3 Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who was represented before the court by an 4 attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent 5 of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment. 6 7 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). Rather than being paid by the government, fees under section 406(b) 8 are paid by the claimant from the awarded past-due benefits. Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 9 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 802). The twenty-five percent 10 statutory maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement; the court must ensure that the requested 11 fee is reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808-09 (“We hold that § 406(b) does not displace 12 contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs courts to review 13 for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements.”). In assessing whether a fee is reasonable, 14 the court should consider “the character of the representation and the results the representative 15 achieved.” Id. at 808. A “court may properly reduce the fee for substandard performance, delay, 16 or benefits that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151. 17 The court finds that the requested fees are reasonable. Counsel’s billing records reflect a 18 total of 24.3 hours of attorney time on this case. ECF No. 16-4 at 1. Counsel’s request for 19 $19,950, which is equivalent to the statutory maximum, would constitute an hourly rate of 20 approximately $820.98 for attorney services. Counsel did not engage in dilatory conduct or 21 perform in a substandard manner. Indeed, counsel’s representation resulted in this matter being 22 remanded for further proceedings, which resulted in a favorable decision and an award of 23 benefits. See ECF Nos. 12 & 16-1. Given counsel’s experience, the result obtained in this case, 24 and the risk of loss in representing plaintiff, the court finds the hourly rate reasonable. See, e.g., 25 De Vivo v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 4262007 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2018) (awarding fees at an effective 26 hourly rate of $1,116.26); White v. Berryhill, No. cv 04-00331-AS, 2017 WL 11634804, at *3 27 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2017) (awarding fees at an effective hourly rate of $1,612); Monica H. v. 28 1 Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 3:16-cv-2111-JR (D. Or. Jan. 25, 2021) (awarding fees at an 2 | effective hourly rate of $2,000); Kelly Kay M. v. O'Malley, No. 22-cv-1969-DDL, 2024 WL 3 | 4536462, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2024) (awarding fees at an effective hourly rate of $1,923.07). 4 Counsel concedes that the $5,900 award should be offset by the fees previously awarded 5 || under the under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). ECF No. 16; see ECF No. 12. He 6 | also indicates that he will reimburse plaintiff the amount previously awarded under the EAJA. 7 | See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002) (holding that where attorney’s fees are 8 | awarded under both EAJA and § 406(b), the attorney must refund the smaller of the two awards 9 | to the plaintiff). 10 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 11 1. The motion for attorney fees, ECF No. 16, is GRANTED. 12 2. Plaintiffs counsel is awarded $19,950 in fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). 13 3. Upon receipt of the $19,950 award, counsel shall refund to plaintiff the sum of $5,900 14 || previously awarded under the EAJA. 15 16 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: _ October 14, 2025 Q———— 18 JEREMY D. PETERSON 19 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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