FACTS

Flowers was a student at one of the district’s middle schools for sixth, seventh, and

eighth grade between 1999 and 2002. During this time, he attended a childcare program

before and after school. Defendant West End Young Men’s Christian Association (West

End YMCA) operated the program on Flower’s school campus. West End YMCA

employed defendant Christine Johnson as the program director. The national entity with

which West End YMCA is affiliated is defendant National Council of YMCAS of the

USA dba YMCA of the USA (YMCA USA).

2 Flowers alleges Johnson repeatedly sexually abused him during the 2001-2002

school year on the school campus and at her residence. His complaint, filed in November

2022, alleges seven causes of action: (1) negligence; (2) intentional infliction of

emotional distress; (3) negligent hiring/retention; (4) negligent supervision/failure to

warn; (5) battery; (6) sexual battery; and (7) failure to perform mandatory duties. The

first, third, fourth, and seventh causes of action are asserted against the district. The first

cause of action alleges the district (as well as West End YMCA and YMCA USA)

negligently breached a duty to supervise students, while the fourth cause of action alleges

negligent breach of a duty to supervise Johnson.

The district moved for summary judgment or summary adjudication. The trial

court denied summary judgment, granted summary adjudication as to the third and

seventh causes of action, and denied summary adjudication as to the first and fourth

causes of action.

The district petitioned for writ relief from the partial denial of its motion.

DISCUSSION

We ordered the parties to show cause why we should not grant the district relief on

Flowers’s fourth cause of action. Thus, the trial court’s denial of summary adjudication

as to the first cause of action, based on allegedly negligent supervision of Flowers, is not

at issue here. Also, Flowers clarifies in his return that the “failure to warn” aspect of his

fourth cause of action is limited to West End YMCA and is not asserted against the

3 district. Our only question here, then, is whether there are triable issues as to the

district’s alleged negligent supervision of Johnson.

“Summary adjudication works the same way as summary judgment, ‘except it acts

on specific causes of action or affirmative defenses, rather than on the entire complaint.’”

(Oroville Hospital v. Superior Court (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 382, 398.) “‘A summary

adjudication is properly granted only if a motion therefor completely disposes of a cause

of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.’” (Id. at pp.

398-399; see Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (f)(1).)

“A party challenging denial of summary judgment [or summary adjudication] may

do so by writ petition.” (San Antonio Regional Hospital v. Superior Court (2024) 102

Cal.App.5th 346, 350; see Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (m)(1).) “‘Where the trial

court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment [or summary adjudication] will result in

trial on nonactionable claims, a writ of mandate will issue.’” (CRST, Inc. v. Superior

Court (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1255, 1259-1260.) We review the trial court’s decision de

novo, determining independently whether the undisputed material facts support summary

adjudication. (Id. at p. 1260; Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1348.)

Our Supreme Court articulated the standard applicable to Flowers’s fourth cause

of action in C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861

(C.A.). “[A] school district is liable for the negligence of supervisory employees who

‘knew or should have known of [a school employee’s] dangerous propensities, but

nevertheless hired, retained and failed to properly supervise’ the employee.” (Roe v.

4 Hesperia Unified School District (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 13, 25 (Roe), quoting C.A. at p.

875.) Thus, the school district may be liable for hiring, supervising, or retaining an

employee if the district’s supervisory personnel had actual or constructive knowledge of

the employee’s dangerous propensities. (Roe, at p. 26.) “Constructive knowledge is

knowledge that ‘may be shown by circumstantial evidence “which is nothing more than

one or more inferences which may be said to arise reasonably from a series of proven

facts.”’” (Ibid.)

Applying C.A. to the undisputed facts here, the lack of any evidence that any

district employees had either actual or constructive knowledge of Johnson’s dangerous 1 propensities is fatal to Flowers’s claim. The undisputed facts show no district employee,

let alone a supervisor, witnessed any of the alleged sexual assaults or inappropriate

behavior by Johnson, and Flowers did not report them to anyone during his time at the

middle school. There also is no evidence any district employee observed anything that

reasonably should have triggered suspicion of abuse to justify an inference of

constructive knowledge.

1 We need not decide whether Johnson’s status as a West End YMCA employee, rather than one of the district, is an independent reason why the district is entitled to summary adjudication on Flowers’s fourth cause of action. C.A. held that a school district may be liable for such things as negligent hiring, retention, or supervision of an employee. (C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 865, 879.) It did not consider whether the district has a duty to supervise someone like Johnson, who was not a district employee, but employed by a third party to operate a program for district students on district property. Either way, the lack of any evidence the district had actual or constructive knowledge of Johnson’s behavior would lead to the same result.

5 The facts of Roe provide a useful contrast. In Roe, this court found the complaint

stated a claim against the defendant school district for negligent supervision of a school

janitor who had sexually abused students. (Roe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 31.) The

plaintiffs had not alleged the defendant district had actual knowledge of the abuse. (Id. at

p. 28.) But they had alleged that “two principals, one of whom was also a school district

director, and an assistant principal witnessed plaintiffs sitting on [the janitor’s] lap and

[the janitor] escorting plaintiffs across campus to empty rooms,” in violation of school

policy about being alone with students in rooms with closed doors and having physical

contact with students. (Id. at p. 30.) We found these alleged facts sufficient to state a

claim for negligent supervision of the janitor by demonstrating constructive knowledge of

abuse by district supervisory personnel. (Id. at p. 31.) Here, in contrast, there is no

evidence any district employee saw Johnson do anything abusive or inappropriate, or

giving rise to suspicion of abuse or inappropriate behavior. Thus, the district is entitled

to summary adjudication on Flowers’s cause of action for negligent supervision of

Johnson.

Flowers’s arguments for a contrary conclusion muddle together the standard for a

claim the district negligently supervised students with the standard for a claim based on

negligently supervising an employee (or, in this case, a non-employee operating a

program for district students on a district campus). With respect to a claim that the

district negligently failed to supervise students, “plaintiffs must allege facts

demonstrating that school personnel failed to exercise ‘“‘ordinary prudence.’”’” (Roe,

6 supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 29, quoting C.A., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 869.) “‘“Either a

total lack of supervision [citation] or ineffective supervision [citation] may constitute a

lack of ordinary care on the part of those responsible for student supervision.”’” (Roe, at

p. 29, quoting C.A., at p. 869.) That standard applies only to Flowers’s first cause of

action, based on allegedly negligent supervision of students, which we excluded from this

proceeding in our order to show cause. It is not the standard applicable to the cause of

action at issue.

Because there is no triable issue of material fact as to whether the district had

actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged abuse by Johnson, the district is entitled

to summary adjudication on Flower’s fourth cause of action.

7

DISPOSITION

The petition for writ of mandate is granted. Let a writ of mandate issue directing

the superior court to (1) vacate its order on the district’s motion for summary judgment or

summary adjudication, and (2) enter a new order granting the district summary

adjudication as to Flowers’s third, fourth, and seventh causes of action, and denying the

district’s motion in all other respects.

The district is awarded its costs per Rules of Court, rule 8.493(a)(1)(A).

RAPHAEL

J.

We concur:

McKINSTER Acting P. J.

MENETREZ

J.

8 Filed 12/3/25

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

RANCHO CUCAMONGA CENTRAL

SCHOOL DISTRICT,

E084855

Petitioner, (Super.Ct.No. CIVSB2225076) v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN

BERNARDINO COUNTY,

Respondent;

KRISTOPHER FLOWERS et al.,

Real Parties in Interest.

Requests having been made to this court pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1120(a) for publication of a nonpublished opinion heretofore filed in the above- entitled matter on November 26, 2025, and it appearing that the opinion meets the standard for publication as specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c),

IT IS ORDERED that said opinion be certified for publication pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(b). The opinion filed in this matter on November 7, 2025, is certified for publication.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

RAPHAEL

J. We concur:

McKINSTER Acting P. J.

MENETREZ

J.

1