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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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13 HECTOR AMBRIZ, an individual, Case No.: 2:25-cv-06814-MEMF-MARx

14 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF HECTOR 15 v. AMBRIZ’S MOTION TO REMAND [DKT.

NO. 8]

16 CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, a

Delaware limited liability company; CAROL 17 STEEN, an individual, and DOES 1 through 50, 18 inclusive, Defendants. 19 20 21 22

23 Before the Court is the Motion to Remand filed by Plaintiff Hector Ambriz. Dkt. No. 8. 24 Defendant Charter Communications, LLC filed an Opposition. Dkt. No. 12. Plaintiff then filed a 25 Response to the Opposition. Dkt. No. 13. For the reasons stated herein, the Court hereby GRANTS 26 Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. 27 // 28 1 I. Background

2 A. Factual Background1

3 Pl aintiff in this action is Hector Ambriz (“Plaintiff”), an individual residing in Los Angeles 4 Count y, California. He was employed by Defendants from approximately August 1, 2022, to 5 Decem ber 13, 2023. Dkt. No. 1-2 ¶ 1. Defendants in this action are Charter Communications, LLC 6 (“Cha rter”) and Carol Steen (“Steen”). Ch arter is a limited liability company, whereas Steen is an 7 individual residing in California and employed by Charter in a managerial role. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. 8 Around August 1, 2022, Charter hired Plaintiff as a Sales Advisor. Id. ¶ 12. During the hiring 9 process, Plaintiff requested workplace accommodations to sit periodically during work hours and a 10 late shift due to morning stiffness and limited morning mobility from his disability caused by a back 11 surgery (L4-5 Laminectomy). Id. ¶ 13. During the six months following hiring, Defendants allowed 12 Plaintiff to sit periodically during work hours and late shifts. Id. ¶ 14. However, around January 13 2023, after being assigned a new supervising store manager, Latasha Smith (“Smith”), who informed 14 Plaintiff that he could no longer sit while working and that surveillance cameras were monitoring 15 him, Plaintiff began receiving notices of misconduct for sitting down and arriving late to work. Id. ¶ 16 15. 17 Around April 26, 2023, Plaintiff submitted three workplace accommodation requests to Charter: 18 (1) permission to sit for short periods during work hours; (2) late shifts; and (3) Mondays and 19 Tuesdays off to be able to take his child, who suffers from autism spectrum disorder, to his required 20 therapy sessions. Id. ¶ 16. 21 The next day, Charter’s Human Resources representative Gayle Greenhow (“Greenhow”) 22 responded via email that she would initiate the accommodation process for the first two requests. Id. 23 ¶ 17. She also informed Plaintiff that he would soon receive a series of emails containing 24 instructions and forms for him and his healthcare provider to complete to move the request forward. 25

26 1 Unless otherwise indicated, the following factual background is derived from Plaintiff’s Complaint. Dkt. 27 No. 1-2. For the purposes of this Motion, the Court treats these factual allegations as true, but at this stage of the litigation, the Court makes no finding on the truth of these allegations and is therefore not—at this stage— 28 finding that they are true. 1 Id. However, for the third request, Greenhow instructed Plaintiff to file a separate claim through

2 Sedgwick, stating that they administer that type of accommodation. Id.

3 On the same date, Plaintiff also reported via email to Greenhow about a meeting he had with

4 District Manager Steen, along with Smith. Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiff alleged that during the meeting, Steen

5 and Smith told Plaintiff he was being defiant for sitting during his shift and showed Plaintiff

6 surveillance photos of him sitting and told him that even with medical documentation, they would

7 not accommodate him. Id. They also told Plaintiff in an “intimidating manner,” “[Y]ou knew what 8 your job required. If you knew you had a problem, why did you apply?” and repeatedly asked 9 Plaintiff, “What are you going to do?” Id. Plaintiff told Greenhow in the email that he was being 10 targeted and singled out, but Greenhow never sent him a response. Id. 11 In the following month, Plaintiff continued his attempt to move forward with his workplace 12 accommodations, including submitting required forms and documentation, such as doctor’s notes. 13 Id. ¶¶ 19-27. In mid-May 2023, Greenhow went on leave and instructed Plaintiff to continue the 14 process with Cecilia Munoz, Human Resources manager, and other representatives, including 15 Rachell Sablan. Id. ¶¶ 22-25. Eventually, Greenhow returned as the primary contact for Plaintiff’s 16 accommodations request. Id. ¶ 28. 17 From June 15 to December 13, 2023, Plaintiff took medical leave for a two-disc replacement 18 back surgery. Id. ¶ 29. Defendants informed Plaintiff that he was not eligible for leave and 19 threatened him with disciplinary action for taking it. Id. During the midst of his leave, Defendant 20 also denied Plaintiff’s two accommodation requests for periodic sitting and late shifts made in April 21 2023, claiming he had failed to provide a required medical form. Id. ¶ 30. After the denial, Plaintiff 22 resubmitted his requests with medical documents and followed up with Charter’s ADA team. Id. ¶ 23 31. 24 On December 13, 2023, Plaintiff submitted his letter of resignation. Id. ¶ 33. 25 B. Procedural History 26 On June 25, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Los Angeles County Superior Court asserting 27 causes of action against Charter for: (1) Disability Discrimination in Violation of California Fair 28 1 Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); (2) Associational Disability Discrimination in Violation

2 of FEHA; (3) Failure to Accommodate in Violation of FEHA; (4) Failure to Engage in the

3 Interactive Process in Violation of FEHA; (5) Hostile Work Environment Harassment in Violation

4 of FEHA; (6) Retaliation in Violation of FEHA; (7) Failure to Prevent Discrimination and

5 Retaliation in Violation of FEHA; and (8) Constructive Discharge in Violation of Public Policy. See

6 Dkt. No. 1-2. In the Complaint, Plaintiff only asserted the fifth cause of action against Steen. Id.

7 On July 24, 2025, Charter filed an Answer to the Complaint in Los Angeles County Superior 8 Court and served a copy on Plaintiff’s counsel of record. Dkt. No.1-4. 9 On July 25, 2025, Charter filed a Notice of Removal based on diversity jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 1. 10 At the time of filing, to Charter’s knowledge, no proceedings had been heard at the state court, and 11 no other parties have been named or served with Summons and Complaint. Id. ¶ 8. Further, to 12 Charter’s knowledge, Steen had not been served with the Summons and Complaint for the action. Id. 13 As of the close of briefing on this Motion, Steen had still not been served. Dkt. No. 12 at 6. 14 On August 25, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Remand on the basis that complete 15 diversity does not exist. Dkt. No. 8. Plaintiff further seeks attorney’s fees resulting from Charter’s 16 removal. Id. On September 8, 2025, Charter filed an Opposition to the Motion to Remand. Dkt. No. 17 12. On September 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Reply to Charter’s Opposition. Dkt. No. 13. 18 II. Applicable Law 19 In general, “any civil action brought in a state court of which the district courts of the United 20 States have original jurisdiction may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district 21 court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal courts have jurisdiction over “diversity” cases, between 22 “citizens of different States.” Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 26 (2025). 23 Diversity jurisdiction requires that (1) all plaintiffs be of different citizenship from all defendants, 24 and (2) the amount in controversy exceed $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 25 1332(a). Subsequently, “[a] civil action otherwise removable solely based on the jurisdiction under 26 28 U.S.C. §1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined 27 and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 28 1441(b)(2). In sum, diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity, meaning each plaintiff must 1 have a different citizenship from each defendant. Grancare, LLC v. Thrower ex rel. Mills, 889 F.3d

2 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added). For diversity purposes, an individual is a citizen of the

3 state in which he or she is domiciled. United States v. Aldridge, 56 F.3d 73 (9th Cir. 1995). A

4 person’s domicile is the place he or she resides with the intention to remain, or to which he or she

5 intends to return. Kanter v. Warner Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). At the same

6 time, a limited liability company’s citizenship depends on the citizenship of “all the members.”

7 Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195-96 (1990). 8 III. Discussion 9 Charter contends that its removal was permissible. See Dkt. No. 12. Charter urges the Court to 10 follow other courts, including California district courts, and decide that the plain language of 28 11 U.S.C. §1441(b)(2) permits removal where a forum defendant has not been served at the time of 12 removal. Id. Alternatively, it contends that the “inclusion of Steen in this action is a transparent 13 effort to defeat federal jurisdiction” and that she is a “fraudulently joined sham defendant.” Dkt. No. 14 12 at 5, 6. 15 Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends Charter’s reliance on “snap removal” cannot cure the 16 absence of the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and Charter cannot meet the “heavy burden” to 17 prove Steen was fraudulently joined. See Dkt. No. 13. Plaintiff also seeks an award of attorney’s fees 18 incurred because of Charter’s removal. Dkt. No. 13 at 7. 19 The parties do not dispute that Charter is a citizen of Connecticut, Delaware, Missouri, New 20 York, and New Jersey. Dkt. No.1 ¶¶ 16-17. They also do not dispute that Plaintiff and Steen are both 21 citizens of California. Dkt. No.1-2. ¶¶ 1, 3. Here, the Court will first address whether Steen is a 22 fraudulently joined sham defendant and, consequently, determine whether Charter’s removal was 23 proper. 24 A. Defendant Carol Steen Is Not a Fraudulently Joined Sham Defendant 25 There are two ways to establish fraudulent joinder: “(1) actual fraud in the pleading of 26 jurisdictional facts, or (2) inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the non- 27 diverse party in state court.” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 2009). 28 1 Fraudulent joinder is established the second way if a defendant shows that an “individual[ ] joined in

2 the action cannot be liable on any theory.” Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th

3 Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). But “if there is a possibility that a state court would find that the

4 complaint states a cause of action against any of the resident defendants, the federal court must find

5 that the joinder was proper and remand the case to the state court.” Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1046

6 (emphasis added). A defendant invoking federal court diversity jurisdiction based on fraudulent

7 joinder bears a “heavy burden” since there is a “general presumption against [finding] fraudulent 8 joinder.” Id. Additionally, the standard for a California FEHA harassment cause of action is that “a 9 single incident of harassing conduct is sufficient to create a triable issue regarding the existence of a 10 hostile work environment if the harassing conduct has unreasonably interfered with Plaintiff’s work 11 performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.” Cal. Gov’t Code 12 § 12923(b). 13 Charter contends that Plaintiff alleged only a single incident of purported harassment, which it 14 contends falls far short of sufficiently pleading the FEHA harassment cause of action. Dkt. No. 12 at 15 11. But because, as discussed below, there is “a possibility that a state court would find that the 16 complaint states a cause of action” against Charter, see Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1046, the Court finds 17 Charter has not met its burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff does not have a possible harassment 18 cause of action against Steen. 19 Under California law, “[a] single incident of harassing conduct is sufficient to create a triable 20 issue regarding the existence of a hostile work environment if the harassing conduct has 21 unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s work performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or 22 offensive working environment.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12923(b). Accordingly, given Ambriz’s 23 allegations, there is a possibility that a state court could find that he has stated a cause of action for 24 hostile work environment harassment in violation of FEHA against Steen. He alleged that Steen, a 25 district manager, along with Smith, the store manager, told Ambriz during a meeting that he was 26 being defiant for sitting during his shift and showed Plaintiff surveillance photos of him sitting. Id. 27 He further alleged that they told him that they would not accommodate his disability even with 28 medical documentation. And finally, he alleges that they addressed him in an intimidating manner, 1 saying “[Y]ou knew what your job required. If you knew you had a problem, why did you apply?”

2 and repeatedly asking, “What are you going to do?” Id.

3 There is a possibility that a state court could find that these statements and this conduct, made by

4 individuals in a managerial role and in an intimidating manner unreasonably interfered with

5 Plaintiff’s work performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment

6 as prohibited by FEHA. There is also a possibility a state court could find that these statements and

7 this conduct created a workplace that was “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and 8 insult.” See Beyda v. City of Los Angeles, 65 Cal. App. 4th 511, 516-17 (1998) (citing Harris v. 9 Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). This conclusion is particularly possible given 10 Ambriz’s additional allegations: that his report of the meeting was ignored; his previous 11 accommodations were terminated; he was reprimanded by Smith; he had received notices for 12 misconduct; and he encountered difficulties when reapplying for accommodations. See Dkt. No. 1-2. 13 On the basis of these allegations in the complaint, the Court finds it possible that a state court 14 could find Plaintiff has stated a cause of action for harassment under FEHA against Steen and thus 15 declines to find Steen was fraudulently joined. 16 The Court will now move to determine whether Charter’s removal was proper since Steen has 17 been determined not to be a fraudulently joined sham defendant in this action. 18 B. Snap Removal Is Improper When Lacking Complete Diversity 19 Charter has attempted what is known as “snap removal,” filing its notice of removal before 20 service of the summons and complaint. Casola v. Dexcom, Inc., 98 F.4th 947, 950 (9th Cir. 2024). 21 Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) forum defendant rule precludes removal based on diversity 22 jurisdiction only “if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen 23 of the State in which such action is brought.” Id. “Snap removal” is considered permissible by some 24 courts, which interpret the phrase “properly joined and served” to allow a defendant to remove the 25 case to federal court if they do so before any forum defendant has been served, even though the 26 forum defendant rule would otherwise preclude removal. See Texas Brine Co., L.L.C. v. Am. Arb. 27 Ass’n, Inc., 955 F.3d 482, 485 (5th Cir. 2020). However, it is important to note that the forum 28 1 defendant rule is procedural, not a jurisdictional one. Lively v. Wild Oats Markets, Inc., 456 F.3d

2 933, 936 (9th Cir. 2006). And that the diversity requirement in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) requires

3 complete diversity; absent complete diversity, the district court lacks original jurisdiction over all of

4 the claims in the action. Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373-74 (1978).

5 Further, as the parties have reminded the Court, the Ninth Circuit has not decided to rule on “the

6 permissibility of snap removals[,]” Casola 98 F.4th at 950 n. 1, and there remains a “split among

7 courts on how to handle [them],” See Kornfeind v. Kia Am., No. 8:23-cv-01796, 2023 WL 8456111, 8 at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2023) (noting the lack of controlling authority). 9 Charter contends that snap removal in this case is permissible, relying on “the clear, 10 unambiguous, and plain language of §1441.” See Dkt. No. 12. Charter further urges the Court to 11 follow other California district courts’ decisions that held that the plain language of §1441(b)(2) 12 permits removal where a forum defendant has not been served at the time of removal. Id. 13 Specifically, Charter cites cases from this district, urging the Court to also interpret the 14 “properly joined and served” language to allow removal of a case before service upon a forum 15 defendant. Dechow v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 358 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1052 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (“Plaintiffs are 16 citizens of Virginia (Dechow), Pennsylvania (Evans), New York (Klein), and Louisiana (Scott). 17 Defendant Gilead is a citizen of California and Delaware.”); Harrison v. Sonesta Int’l Hotels Corp., 18 No. 2:23-cv-04867-SB-RAO (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2023) (noting diversity of citizenship existed); 19 Zalvin v. Carrel, No. 8:24-cv-00482-FWS-JDE, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2024) (noting diversity of 20 citizenship existed between the parties as Plaintiff was a citizen of Florida); Kornfeind, 2023 WL 21 84566111, at *2 (noting complete diversity of citizenship between the parties to the case); Lawton v. 22 Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., No. 8:23-cv-01797-JVS (KES), (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2023) (noting 23 complete diversity of citizenship existed between all parties); Country Casualty Ins. Co. v. Hyundai 24 Motor Am., No. 8:24-cv-02428-SB-JDE, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9385, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 25 2025) (“Plaintiffs do not dispute that diversity is complete.”). 26 However, as Plaintiff pointed out and explained to the Court, the above cases that Charter had 27 cited all have one similarity: They all involved situations where the parties were already diverse. 28 Dkt. No. 13 at 3. 1 The Court is a “court of limited jurisdiction.” Corral v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 878 F.3d

2 770, 773 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Civil actions may be removed from state

3 court if the federal court has original jurisdiction. See Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S.

4 28, 33 (2002) (“Under the plain terms of § 1441(a), in order properly to remove an action pursuant to

5 that provision, . . . original subject-matter jurisdiction must lie in the federal courts.” (cleaned

6 up)). More importantly, where this Court does not have jurisdiction, it must remand, regardless of

7 the procedural propriety of the removal. 8 Charter’s removal here is based solely on diversity jurisdiction, which requires complete 9 diversity. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996) (stating that the diversity jurisdiction 10 statute “applies only to cases in which the citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from the citizenship 11 of each defendant.”). This means that federal diversity jurisdiction exists only when each plaintiff 12 and each defendant is a citizen of a different state. Here, the Court has already determined that 13 Steen’s joinder is not fraudulent, and she is a defendant in this action; therefore, complete diversity 14 is lacking. That is to say, even the concept of snap removal under § 1441—which purportedly 15 permits a defendant to remove the case before the plaintiff has served the forum defendant—does 16 not permit a defendant to bypass the complete diversity requirement for diversity jurisdiction, which 17 requires “that each plaintiff must be of a different citizenship from each defendant.” Grancare, 889 18 F.3d at 548. 19 In sum, the § 1441(b)(2) forum defendant rule is a procedural rule and not a jurisdictional one. 20 Lively, 456 F.3d at 936. It may permit a defendant to remove, but it cannot and does not change the 21 jurisdictional requirements federal courts must have to exercise diversity subject-matter jurisdiction, 22 nor preclude the consideration of the citizenship of non-served forum defendants for purposes of 23 establishing diversity jurisdiction and the right to remove. The undisputed fact in this action is that 24 the parties are not completely diverse, as the parties consist of Plaintiff, a California citizen; Steen, a 25 California citizen; and Charter, citizens of Connecticut, Delaware, Missouri, New York, and New 26 Jersey. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 16-17; Dkt. No. 1-2 ¶¶ 1, 3. Since Plaintiff and Steen are both California 27 citizens for diversity purposes, and for this alone, this Court’s diversity jurisdiction is defeated. 28 1 Finally, the Court is aware of both Charter’s assertion that Plaintiff has failed to serve Steen on

2 time, and Plaintiff’s assertion that 25 (living) women in California have used the name “Carol

3 Steen.” Dkt. No. 8 at 11; Dkt. No. 12 at 13. But ultimately, since Plaintiff and Steen are both citizens

4 of California, the delay of service to Steen by Plaintiff does not change the fact that this Court lacks

5 complete diversity for federal diversity jurisdiction exists here.

6 Therefore, the Court finds Charter’s removal improper, and this case must be remanded to the

7 state court. 8 C. Plaintiff is Not Entitled to Attorneys’ Fees 9 The Court will next address whether Plaintiff should be granted attorneys’ fees due to 10 Defendant’s removal. An order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual 11 expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Absent 12 unusual circumstances, attorneys’ fees should not be awarded under § 1447(c) when the removing 13 party has an objectively reasonable basis for removal. Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 14 132 (2005). Courts in the Ninth Circuit apply “an objectively reasonable standard by looking to the 15 clarity of the law at the time of removal.” Lussier v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 518 F.3d 1062, 1066 16 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Martin, 546 U.S. at 141). Removal is not objectively unreasonable “solely 17 because the removing party’s arguments lack merit, or else attorneys’ fees would always be awarded 18 whenever remand is granted.” Id. at 1065. 19 The Court finds that Charter’s assertion that Steen was a fraudulent defendant was an objectively 20 reasonable one, as Charter made its arguments in good faith, and “is entitled to present the facts 21 showing the joinder to be fraudulent.” Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th 22 Cir. 2001) (quoting McCabe v. General Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987)). 23 Furthermore, the Court also finds that Charter’s basis for removal was not without merit, having 24 presented its arguments in favor of snap removal based on its own statutory interpretation. Again, as 25 noted by the parties, courts across the country have interpreted and consequently applied snap 26 removal differently, and in light of this unsettled doctrinal landscape, the Court declines to find that 27 Charter’s attempt at removal was not objectively reasonable. 28 1 Therefore, the Court will not award attorneys’ fees to Plaintiff. 2 IV. Conclusion 3 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows: 4 1. The Motion (Dkt. No. 8) is GRANTED IN PART. 5 2. Plaintiff's Request for Attorneys’ Fees is DENIED. 6 3. The case is REMANDED to the Los Angeles County Superior Court. 7 8 IT IS SO ORDERED.

10 Dated: November 26, 2025.

MAAME EWUSI-MENSAH FRIMPONG

United States District Judge

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