1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ESTATE OF MICHAEL OLIVO, by and Case No.: 24cv0896-W-MMP through successor in interest, Patricia 12 Olivo; PATRICIA OLIVO, individually, ORDER GRANTING 13 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR Plaintiffs,

RECONSIDERATION [DOC. 33]

14 v. 15 California Department of Corrections and 16 Rehabilitation, et al., 17 Defendants. 18 19 Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration (Recon Mtn. [Doc. 33]) 20 regarding the Court’s July 9, 2025 order (Order [Doc. 29]) that granted Defendants’ 21 motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ state law claims without leave to amend. Defendants filed an 22 opposition, and Plaintiffs filed a reply. (Opposition [Doc. 37]; Reply [Doc. 38].) For the 23 reasons stated below, Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED. 24 25 I. Background 26 On May 21, 2024, Plaintiffs initiated this action by filing a complaint against the 27 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and several other 28 individually named defendants. (Complaint [Doc. 1] at 1.) On August 19, 2024, Plaintiffs 1 filed a first amended complaint, which alleges several causes of action including: (1) 2 Failure to Provide Mental Health Treatment, Eighth Amendment violation (42 U.S.C. § 3 1983); (2) Failure to Protect from Harm, Eight Amendment violation (42 U.S.C. § 1983); 4 (3) Deprivation of the Right to Familial Relationship with Decedent (42 U.S.C. § 1983); 5 (4) Supervisory Liability Causing Constitutional Violations (Failure to Properly Train, 6 Supervise and Discipline, 42 U.S.C. § 1983); (5) Wrongful death; (6) Negligence; (7) 7 Failure to Provide Medical Care; and (8) Declaratory Relief (28 U.S.C. § 2201). (First 8 Amended Complaint (“FAC”) [Doc. 4] at 1.) 9 On February 18, 2025, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ FAC. (Mtn. to 10 Dismiss [Doc. 25].) This Court granted dismissal of Plaintiffs’ first four causes of action 11 with leave to amend and dismissed causes of action five through seven without leave to 12 amend. (Id.) Now, pursuant to Rules 54(b), 59(e), and/or 60(b) of the Federal Rules of 13 Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the prior order dismissing causes of 14 action five through seven without leave to amend. (Recon Mtn.) 15 16 II. Legal Standard 17 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides that “any order . . . that adjudicates 18 fewer than all the claims . . . may be revised at any time before entry of a judgment 19 adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 20 Rule 54 does not provide courts guidance on a standard or factors to consider when 21 reviewing prior orders. For this reason, district courts look to the standard for motions for 22 reconsideration under Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b). See Lyons v. Baughman, No. CIV. S- 23 01-412 LKK/KJM P, 2007 WL 1378022, at *3 n. 3 (E.D. Cal. May 10, 2007) (Rule 59(e) 24 and Rule 60(b) standards provide guidance to Rule 54(b) motions); Pac. Coast Fed. of 25 Fishermen's Ass'n v. Locke, No. C 10-4790 CRB, 2011 WL 289927, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26 27, 2011) (applying Rule 59(e) standard to Rule 54(b) motion); Calloway v. Cal. Dep't of 27 Corrections and Rehabilitation, No. C 07-2335 RMW(PR), 2010 WL 1221883, at *1 28 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2010) (same). 1 A motion is treated as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e) if it is 2 filed within twenty-eight days of entry of judgment or the ruling, otherwise, it is treated 3 as a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from a judgment or order. Am. Ironworks & Erectors, 4 Inc. v. N. Am. Construction Corp., 248 F.3d 892, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, Plaintiffs’ 5 motion (Recon Mtn.) was filed within twenty-eight days of this Court’s order (Order). 6 Accordingly, the Court considers Plaintiffs’ motion under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules 7 of Civil Procedure, which governs motions to alter or amend a judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 59(e). 9 “Although Rule 59(e) permits a district court to reconsider and amend a previous 10 order, the rule offers an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of 11 finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 12 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 13 “Indeed, ‘a motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual 14 circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, 15 committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.’” Id. 16 (quoting 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999)). Further, 17 a motion for reconsideration “may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for 18 the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Id. It 19 does not give parties a “second bite at the apple.” See id. Finally, “after thoughts” or 20 “shifting of ground” do not constitute an appropriate basis for reconsideration. Ausmus v. 21 Lexington Ins. Co., 2009 WL 2058549, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 15, 2009) (citations and 22 internal quotation marks omitted). 23 Here, Plaintiffs do not claim any new facts or circumstances exist but instead base 24 their motion for reconsideration on clear error. (See Recon Mtn.) Plaintiffs’ arguments are 25 considered below. 26 / / / / 27 / / / / 28 1 III. Discussion 2 The Court’s August 6, 2025 order concluded that Plaintiffs failed to substantially 3 comply with the California Government Claims Act because they did not “identify any of 4 the individuals in the FAC and only named Danny Samuel, the warden of a different 5 prison, who is also not included in the FAC.” (Order at 6.) Plaintiffs concede that 6 Warden Danny Samuel was erroneously named as the Warden of Richard J. Donovan 7 Correctional Facility. (Reconsideration Mtn. at 5.) They, however, argue that their claim 8 “clearly identified the subject matter, the injuries, and the actors involved.” (Id. at 4.) 9 Under Government Code § 910, a claimant must provide the claimant’s name and 10 address, the date, place, and circumstances of the occurrence; a general description of the 11 injury, damage, or loss; the names of the responsible employees, if known; and the 12 amount of the claim. Cal. Gov’t Code § 910. Although the California Government Claims 13 Act generally requires the identification of the public employees who caused the alleged 14 injury, a claimant may demonstrate “plead[] and prove[]” that their identities were 15 unknown or unknowable at the time the claim was submitted. Cal. Gov’t Code § 950.4. 16 Here, Plaintiffs’ claim identified the unknown officials that caused the injuries as 17 “Warden Danny Samuel, and other Unknown State of California and California 18 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitations custody personnel and medical/mental 19 health personnel.” (Defts’ Judicial Notice Request [Doc. No. 25-1 at 24, 46].) Plaintiffs’ 20 claim further alleges that “Warden Danny Samuel, and other policy-making officers for 21 the State of California and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 22 were and are aware of a pattern of misconduct and injury caused by California 23 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation officers and the custodial and 24 medical/mental health personnel at the jails, but failed to discipline culpable law 25 enforcement officers and custody/medical staff at the jails and failed to institute new 26 procedures and policy within the State of California and the California Department of 27 Corrections and Rehabilitation.” (Id. at 25-1 at 40.) Although Plaintiffs’ claim 28 1 erroneously named the wrong warden, they stated that the individually named Defendants 2 were unknown and generally referred to policy-making officers at the CDCR. 3 The California Supreme Court has explained that “a defect in the form of 4 compliance is not fatal so long as there is substantial compliance with the essentials of 5 the requirement.” Hall v. Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d 198, 202 (1941). In Dillard v. County 6 of Kern, the court found substantial compliance in the claim presented to the public entity 7 when the claimants omitted the identities of the individuals who caused the damage but 8 provided clear “details as to the nature of the claim,” “[t]he time and place of the 9 collision,” and “[t]he extent and amount of the injury or damage.” Dillard v. Cty. of Kern, 10 23 Cal. 2d 271, 278 (1943). 11 Furthermore, California courts have recognized that “a claim that substantially fails 12 to comply . . . may still be considered . . . if it puts the public entity on notice both that 13 the claimant is attempting to file a valid claim and that litigation will result if the matter 14 is not resolved.” Del Real v. City of Riverside, 95 Cal. App. 4th 761, 769 (2002). As the 15 California Supreme Court has explained, the Act’s purpose is “to give the entity the 16 opportunity to investigate and settle the claim before suit [i]s brought.” State of 17 California v. Superior Ct., 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1244, 90 P.3d 116, 121 (2004). The 18 California Supreme Court explained further: 19 The statute does not require that the officers or employees be named or that their duties or official capacity be described. If the purpose of the statute is 20 to enable the county to make an investigation and determine the claim on the 21 merits, there is substantial compliance when it is advised that . . . its agents and servants caused the injury without further describing them. The 22 employer . . . is more apt to know the names and capacities of its employees. 23 Dillard, 23 Cal. 2d at 278. 24 Upon further review, the fact that the employees’ identities were unknown at the 25 time of the claim is not detrimental to Plaintiffs’ claims. Although Plaintiff erroneously 26 identified the warden and failed to identify the individual defendants in its claim, this 27 error does not negate substantial compliance. Plaintiffs identified the correct prison, the 28 1 ||name of the decedent, his inmate number, the date, the location of the incident (inside the 2 || decedent’s prison cell), and the theory of liability (.e. failure to provide meaningful 3 ||medical attention). (See Defts’ Judicial Notice Request.) 4 Additionally, even if the claim were found not to substantially comply, the 5 || statute’s underlying purpose has nevertheless been satisfied. The purpose of the statute 6 || “is to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately 7 || investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation.” 8 || City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 447, 455 (1974). Here, the information 9 || provided in Plaintiffs’ claim, including the date, prison, name of decedent, inmate 10 number, the theory of liability, and location of the incident, was sufficient to conduct an 11 |/investigation. Accordingly, the statute’s purpose is fulfilled. 12 13 IV. Conclusion 14 For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. 15 || The Court’s August 6, 2025 order is therefore MODIFIED to the extent that it dismissed 16 claims five through seven without leave to amend. Upon reconsideration, the Court 17 || DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss the above claims. Plaintiffs’ claims five through 18 |} seven are reinstated. In all other respects, the August 6, 2025 order remains unchanged. 19 || Plaintiffs shall file a second amended complaint consistent with this ruling no later than 20 || December 18, 2025. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 ||Dated: December 4, 2025 \

Hn. 7 omas J. Whelan 25 Unted States District Judge 26 27 28