NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 8 2025

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ARLENE D. JUNIOR, No. 24-5320 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:22-cv-07270-WHO v.

MEMORANDUM*

SONOMA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California William Horsley Orrick, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 22, 2025 San Francisco, California

Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, FORREST, Circuit Judge, and COLLINS, District Judge.**

This is an employment discrimination action. Plaintiff-Appellant Arlene D.

Junior (“Junior”) appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of

her former employer, Defendant-Appellee Sonoma County Superior Court

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Raner C. Collins, United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation. (“Superior Court”). Junior alleges that she was terminated as a result of race

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and California’s Fair

Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). Junior also alleges that she was

terminated in retaliation for expressing concerns about racial bias at the Superior

Court in violation of FEHA and in retaliation for expressing concerns about

misconduct by a Superior Court judge in violation of California Labor Code

§ 1102.5. The Court assumes familiarity with the facts of this case.

“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo and,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, determine

whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court

correctly applied the relevant substantive law.” Teradata Corp. v. SAP SE, 124 F.4th

555, 572 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Honey Bum, LLC v. Fashion Nova, Inc., 63 F.4th

813, 819 (9th Cir. 2023)). We affirm.

1. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the Superior

Court on Junior’s claims of discrimination under Title VII and FEHA. The

applicable legal framework for considering Junior’s discrimination claims is the

three-step framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411

U.S. 792 (1973).1 Under that framework, (1) the plaintiff must first “demonstrate[]

1 “California courts apply the Title VII framework to claims brought under FEHA.” Metoyer v. Chassman, 504 F.3d 919, 941 (9th Cir. 2007). Both parties

2 24-5320 [her] prima facie case”; (2) then “the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action”; and (3)

“[i]f the defendant meets this burden, . . . the plaintiff must then raise a triable issue

of material fact as to whether the defendant’s proffered reasons are mere pretext for

unlawful discrimination.” Reynaga v. Roseburg Forest Prods., 847 F.3d 678, 691

(9th Cir. 2017) (simplified). Although we conclude that Junior met her burden to

establish a prima facie case of discrimination, we agree with the district court that

Junior did not meet her burden to “show that the articulated reason is pretextual.”

See id.

At step one of the McDonnell Douglas framework, Junior produced sufficient

evidence to meet her “minimal burden” to show that circumstances surrounding the

adverse employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination. See Chuang

v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, Bd. of Trs., 225 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000); Reynaga,

847 F.3d at 691. Junior produced evidence that a fellow employee expressed

concerns that the investigator may have asked racially biased questions. Because

“‘very little . . . evidence is necessary’” to establish a prima facie case, Schnidrig v.

Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F.3d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Lowe v. City of

Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1009 (9th Cir. 1985)), this circumstantial evidence is

agree that the failure to prevent discrimination claim rises or falls with the substantive discrimination claims.

3 24-5320 sufficient to support an inference of discrimination at the prima facie stage.

At step two of the McDonnell Douglas framework, neither party disputes that

the Superior Court provided a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its decision

to terminate Junior. See Opara v. Yellen, 57 F.4th 709, 723 (9th Cir. 2023). Judge

Averill provided four reasons in her termination letter: the findings of three

independent investigations and an additional concern that Junior had been dishonest

with Judge Averill about courthouse operations. The first investigation found that

Junior “regularly engaged in behavior reasonably viewed as upsetting, abrasive,

intimidating and insulting,” which Judge Averill determined was a violation of the

code of conduct for a Court CEO. The second investigation found that Junior

“engaged in a pattern of unfair treatment towards [] Smith that was more likely than

not directly related to” Smith’s first complaint about Junior. The third investigation

found that Junior misrepresented to Judge Averill the reasons why an employee

resigned. Finally, Judge Averill believed that Junior “made misrepresentations to

[her] regarding who was responsible for receiving media requests.”

At step three of the McDonnell Douglas framework, Junior failed to raise a

genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Superior Court’s proffered reasons

for termination were pretextual. A plaintiff can prove pretext either “(1) directly, by

showing that unlawful discrimination more likely than not motivated the employer;

(2) indirectly, by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of

4 24-5320 credence because it is internally inconsistent or otherwise not believable; or via a

combination of these two kinds of evidence.” Opara, 57 F.4th at 723 (citing

Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1127) (citation modified).

Junior argues that Judge Averill’s stated bases for termination are pretextual

by challenging the accuracy of the investigation reports. However, “[w]hen

assessing the validity of an employer’s stated reason for its actions, the key is not

whether the reason is ‘objectively false’ or ‘baseless’ but whether the employer

‘honestly believed its reasons for its actions.’” Kama v. Mayorkas, 107 F.4th 1054,

1059 (9th Cir. 2024) (citing Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1063

(9th Cir. 2002)). Junior does not provide any evidence that demonstrates that Judge

Averill’s reliance on those reports was “unworthy of credence.” See Chuang, 225

F.3d at 1127. Nor does Junior provide evidence that suggests that Judge Averill did

not “honestly believe” the reports to be fair, adequate, and unbiased. See Villiarimo,

281 F.3d at 1063.

Junior argues that the investigations were so inadequate that they alone can

establish pretext. However, the cases that Junior relies upon are inapposite. See

Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc., 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296, 324–27 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)

(investigation itself could be evidence of pretext where the investigation was led by

a supervisor with an “axe to grind” against plaintiff and where the investigation

failed to interview witnesses for potentially exculpatory information); see also

5 24-5320 Mendoza v. W. Med. Ctr. Santa Ana, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 720, 728 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014)

(investigation was inadequate where plaintiff’s expert pointed to “numerous

shortcomings,” including lack of investigation plan, lack of written statements, and

an unqualified investigator). Junior does not dispute that the investigations in this

case were conducted by independent, qualified investigators who reviewed all

relevant documents, considered explicit racial bias, and interviewed multiple

witnesses, including witnesses favorable to Junior.2

The only shortcoming that Junior’s expert identifies is an investigator’s

alleged failure to sufficiently consider implicit bias. But because “‘abundant and

uncontroverted independent evidence’ suggests that ‘no discrimination . . .

occurred,” the investigator’s failure to consider implicit bias, without more, creates

at most “‘a weak issue of fact’” insufficient to survive summary judgment. See

Opara, 57 F.4th at 724 (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. Inc., 530 U.S.

133, 148 (2000)).3 Accordingly, we conclude that Junior failed to present sufficient

evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Judge Averill did not

2 Four of the six employees interviewed for the first investigation “corroborated Smith’s complaint that Junior yelled or screamed at employees.” Hema Gopal, one of the two employees who did not initially corroborate Smith’s complaint, later revealed that she had not been honest during the investigative interview because she “did not know how Junior would receive complete honesty.” 3 This Court has not addressed whether implicit bias may be probative or used as evidence of intentional discrimination. See Yu v. Idaho State Univ., 15 F.4th 1236, 1244–45 (9th Cir. 2021).

6 24-5320 “honestly believe” the reasons for her actions and was instead engaged in racial

discrimination, see Kama, 107 F.4th at 1059, or that Judge Averill’s reasons for

terminating Junior were “unworthy of credence,” see Chuang, 225 F.3d at 1127.

2. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the Superior

Court on Junior’s FEHA retaliation claim, which is also subject to the McDonnell

Douglas framework. See Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 116 P.3d 1123, 1130 (Cal.

2005). Even if Junior established a prima facie case of retaliation under FEHA, she

failed to raise a factual issue as to pretext for the same reasons discussed above.

3. Finally, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the

Superior Court on Junior’s California Labor Code § 1102.5 claim. The Superior

Court does not dispute, for purposes of this appeal, that Junior’s reports regarding

Judge LaForge’s misconduct constitute a protected activity and that Junior’s

termination was an adverse employment action. But Junior failed to create a factual

dispute as to whether her protected activity was a “contributing factor” to her

termination. See Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc., 503 P.3d 659, 667

(Cal. 2022). There is no evidence that either Judge Averill or Judge LaForge knew

about Junior’s concerns—the record shows only that Junior expressed her concerns

to Judge DeMeo, but Judge DeMeo was not involved in the termination decision.

Even if Junior had raised a factual issue as to whether her protected activity

was a “contributing factor” to her termination, the Superior Court produced

7 24-5320 sufficient evidence to show that it would have made the same decision for legitimate,

independent reasons. See Lawson, 503 P.3d at 667–68. Judge Averill called a

meeting of the Executive Committee to recommend Junior’s termination based on

the results of the investigations and to seek their input. Judge Averill made this

decision and recommendation based on the results of the three independent

investigations described above. And all judges present at the Executive Committee

meeting voted to approve Judge Averill’s decision to terminate Junior. Accordingly,

the district court correctly granted summary judgment to the Superior Court on

Junior’s California Labor Code § 1102.5 claim.

AFFIRMED.

8 24-5320