I.

INTRODUCTION

D.W., proceeding in pro. per., appeals the family court’s order issuing a domestic

violence restraining order (DVRO) against her at the request of her ex-husband, G.H. We

affirm.

II.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

D.W. and G.H. had M.H.W. in March 2014, and they have had consistent custody

disputes over him since G.H. filed this family law case within months of M.H.W.’s birth.

This appeal concerns only the family court’s restraining order rulings issued in July 2024.

G.H. and D.W. filed respective requests for DVROs against one another. G.H.’s

request stemmed from an incident that occurred at M.H.W.’s school when G.H. was

picking him up. G.H. alleged that D.W.’s boyfriend approached him “aggressively,”

started “cursing at [him]” and got “in [his] face saying all this derogatory language,” and

shoved him twice. As D.W.’s boyfriend did so, D.W. repeatedly yelled from about five

feet away, “‘Put him in his place. Put him in his place.’” G.H. recorded the incident on

his cell phone and provided a copy of the video to the court at the hearing on his request

for a restraining order.

1 Given our conclusion that D.W. failed to provide an adequate record, we provide only a brief overview of the facts and procedural background.

2 Based largely on what the family court could discern from the video recording, the

court found that G.H. was entitled to a DVRO. The court therefore issued a three-year

DVRO against D.W.

III.

DISCUSSION

D.W. asks us to reverse the family court’s DVRO. She contends the family court

erred because she was not part of the incident at M.H.W.’s school and “the video he

provided showed only himself and a third party involved in the incident.”

The appellant bears the burden of providing an adequate record on appeal.

(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.) When an appellant fails to provide an

adequate record, we cannot meaningfully review the trial court’s decisions. (Ibid.) As a

result, an appellant’s “‘[f]ailure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that

the issue be resolved against [the] appellant.’” (Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc.

(2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 187.) In other words, when the appellant fails to provide an

adequate record, we assume everything the trial court did was correct and that it should

be affirmed. (See Jameson v. Desta, supra, at p. 609.)

D.W.’s appeal rests on her argument that the family court erred by relying on the

video G.H. provided in issuing the DVRO. We therefore need to review the video to

properly consider D.W.’s appeal since we necessarily cannot determine whether the

family court properly relied on the video or whether the family court accurately

recounted on the record what the video captured. It appears a copy of the video was not

3 “lodged, filed, or otherwise retained” by the family court, so it is not in our record on

appeal. From what we can discern, D.W. has not tried to get a copy of the video (or a

transcript of the video) into the record on appeal.

As the appellant, D.W. had to provide us with an adequate record. D.W. failed to

do so by omitting a copy of the video from the record. We therefore have no choice but

to affirm the family court’s DVRO. (Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.)

However, “[t]o the extent the court relied on documents not before us, our review

is hampered. . . . But on the record we have, [D.W.] has not shown error.” (Christie v.

Kimball (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1412.)

The family court may “issue a protective order ‘to restrain any person for the

purpose’ of preventing a recurrence of domestic violence and ensuring a period of

separation of the persons involved.” (Rodriguez v. Menjivar (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 816,

820.) The court may issue the protective order on the basis of an affidavit or testimony

that shows “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.” (Fam. Code, § 6300, subd.

(a).) “Abuse is not limited to the actual infliction of physical injury or assault.” (Fam.

Code, § 6203, subd. (b).) Abuse also includes intentionally or recklessly causing or

attempting to cause bodily injury, and placing a person in reasonable apprehension of

imminent serious bodily injury to that person or another. (Fam. Code, § 6203, subd.

(a)(1), (3).)

4 We review the family court’s decision to issue a DVRO for an abuse of discretion.

(Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 115.) We review for substantial

evidence the court’s express and implied factual findings underlying the restraining order.

(In re Marriage of Fregoso & Hernandez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 698, 702.) “We resolve

all factual conflicts and questions of credibility in favor of the prevailing party and

indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the finding of the trial court

if it is supported by substantial evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid

value.” (Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762.)

G.H.’s testimony at the hearing provided substantial evidence for the family court

to issue a restraining order against D.W. (In re Marriage of Ankola (2020) 53

Cal.App.5th 369, 379 [“‘The testimony of one witness, even that of a party, may

constitute substantial evidence’” supporting the issuance of a DVRO].) G.H. testified

that D.W.’s boyfriend aggressively approached him as he was picking up M.H.W. at

school, verbally accosted him, and shoved him at least twice, all while D.W. encouraged

her boyfriend by repeatedly saying, “‘Put him in his place.’” G.H. feared for his safety

and his family’s safety due to the incident.

From this evidence, the family court could reasonably find that D.W. orchestrated

the altercation by bringing her boyfriend to M.H.W.’s school when she knew G.H. would

be picking him up, instructed her boyfriend to accost G.H., and encouraged him while he

did so. It is immaterial that D.W. did not directly contact G.H. and instead relied on her

boyfriend to harass him. (Cf. Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1405, 1411,

5 1413 [defendant’s letters sent to plaintiff’s daughter were sufficient to show a harassing

course of conduct directed at plaintiff because defendant knew plaintiff would read the

letters].) D.W. claims she was “far away” when the incident occurred and was not

involved with it, but G.H.’s testimony was sufficient for the court to find otherwise. (See

Schild v. Rubin, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 762.) D.W.’s conflicting testimony does not

change that result, nor does it justify reversing the family court’s DVRO. (See Leung v.

Verdugo Hills Hospital (2012) 55 Cal.4th 291, 308 [appellate court conducting substantial

evidence review resolves conflicting evidence in favor of affirming the trial court].)

D.W. nonetheless contends the family court erred in three other respects. None

has merit.

First, she argues the restraining order should not have issued under Family Code

section 6211 because she was “not a perpetrator of abuse against anyone.” But “abuse”

for purposes of a DVRO is not limited to physical abuse; it can include “molesting” and

“harassing.” (Fam. Code, § 6320, subd. (a).) And, again, the fact that she allegedly did

not directly harass or attack G.H. is immaterial. A DVRO may be issued to prevent a

former spouse from “either directly or indirectly” contacting or “disturbing the peace of

another party.” (Ibid.) And “[t]his conduct may be committed directly . . . through the

use of a third party.” (Id., subd. (c).)

Second, D.W. argues the family court did not allow her the opportunity to cross-

examine G.H., in violation of Evidence Code section 776. D.W. does not cite anything in

the record to support this argument, so it is forfeited. (Dietz v. Meisenheimer & Herron

6 (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 771, 800.) In any event, we have reviewed the transcript of the

DVRO request hearing and there is no indication that D.W. asked for but was denied the

opportunity to examine G.H.

Third, G.H. argues the family court violated California Rules of Court, rule 2 2.1040 by allowing G.H. to present the video of the altercation without sending it to her

before the hearing and failing to provide a transcript of the video at any point. We

conclude D.W. forfeited the argument.

When the hearing began, D.W. told the court she had not received a copy of the

video, so the family court put the hearing “on second call . . . in order for the parties to

exchange all evidence.” D.W. never objected that she did not receive a transcript of the

video. Because the video was only 45 seconds long, the break took only a few minutes,

and the hearing promptly resumed afterward without any further objection from D.W. By

failing to object that she did not timely receive a copy of the video or a transcript of it

before the hearing, D.W. forfeited any objection that G.H. and/or the family court

violated California Rules of Court, rule 2.1040. (See Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203

Cal.App.4th 717, 725.)

2 Rule 2.1040(b)(1) provides in relevant part that “before a party may present or offer into evidence any electronic sound or sound-and-video recording not covered under (a) [pertaining to depositions or other prior testimony], the party must provide to the court and to opposing parties a transcript of the electronic recording and provide opposing parties with a duplicate of the electronic recording.”

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IV.

DISPOSITION

The family court’s custody orders of August 3, 2023, are affirmed. G.H. may

recover his costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON

J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ

P. J.

RAPHAEL

J.

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