1 O 2 3 4 5 6 7 United States District Court 8 Central District of California 9 10 11 CHRISTIAN ALCALA, Case № 8:25-cv-00078-ODW (DFMx) 12 Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING THE CITY’S

13 v.

MOTION [46] AND GRANTING IN

14 CITY OF GARDEN GROVE et al., PART AND DENYING IN PART 15 Defendants. THE OFFICERS’ MOTION [47] 16 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 Plaintiff Christian Alcala brings this civil rights action against Defendants, the 19 City of Garden Grove (“City”) and Garden Grove Police Department Officers Andrew 20 Archuleta, Jose Amaya, Cody Britton, Joey Garcia, and Michael Kovacs (collectively, 21 “Officers”), alleging violations of Alcala’s rights under the United States Constitution 22 and California law. (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”), Dkt. No. 28.) The City and the 23 Officers respectively move to dismiss Alcala’s First Amended Complaint (“Motions”). 24 (City Mot. Dismiss (“City Mot.”), Dkt. No. 46; Ofcr. Mot. Dismiss (“Ofcr. Mot.”), Dkt. 25 No. 47.) For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the City’s Motion and 26 GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Officers’ Motion.1 27

28 1 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motions, the Court deemed the matters appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 II. BACKGROUND2 2 Alcala is a man of Hispanic heritage who worked during the day and cared for 3 his minor children in the evenings while his wife worked night shifts. (FAC ¶¶ 3, 18.) 4 On the evening of March 8, 2024, Alcala was home with his children when his daughter 5 observed him “making strange noises in his sleep” and looking “unusual.” (Id. ¶ 19.) 6 Concerned for his health, Alcala’s daughter called 911 and asked the operator to send 7 emergency medical assistance for her father. (Id. ¶¶ 19–20.) 8 When the Officers arrived at Alcala’s home, his daughter “reiterated her concern 9 that her father was experiencing a medical emergency” and told the Officers that she 10 and Alcala’s other children were unharmed. (Id. ¶¶ 21, 23.) The Officers then entered 11 Alcala’s bedroom and found him lying in bed face-up and motionless. (Id. ¶ 24.) 12 Seeing Alcala like this, the Officers erroneously determined that he was under 13 the influence of drugs. (Id. ¶¶ 25–26.) Accordingly, they turned Alcala onto his 14 stomach, climbed onto his back, and used “violent control holds” to restrain him. (Id. 15 ¶ 28.) Specifically, Officer Amaya handcuffed and arrested Alcala. (Id. ¶ 30.) 16 Officer Archuleta used a “forced control hold” to restrain Alcala, causing Alcala to cry 17 out in pain. (Id. ¶ 29.) Meanwhile, Officer Britton held down Alcala’s head and 18 shoulders, Officer Garcia “applied his bodyweight to [Alcala’s] upper back and 19 shoulders,” and Officer Kovacs restrained Alcala’s feet and ankles. (Id. ¶¶ 31–33.) At 20 no point during this interaction did the Officers offer Alcala medical assistance. (Id. 21 ¶ 34.) 22 Following his arrest, Alcala was charged with being under the influence of a 23 controlled substance and child endangerment. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 155.) During the pendency 24 of those charges, Alcala was temporarily incarcerated and lost his job. (Id. ¶¶ 36, 40.) 25 Additionally, Child Protective Services (“CPS”) intervened, launching an independent 26 27 2 All factual references derive from Alcala’s First Amended Complaint unless otherwise noted. 28 Alcala’s well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true for purposes of resolving the Motions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 1 investigation into and levying dependency charges against Alcala. (Id. ¶¶ 37, 39.) CPS 2 temporarily removed Alcala’s children from his custody. (Id. ¶ 37.) 3 Based on these allegations, Alcala advances thirteen causes of action against the 4 City and the Officers. Alcala asserts the following seven causes of action under 5 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) unlawful arrest against the Officers (Count 1); (2) excessive force 6 against Officers Archuleta and Amaya (Count 2); (3) denial of medical care against the 7 Officers (Count 3); (4) unlawful interference with familial relations against the Officers 8 (Count 4); (5) unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy under Monell v. New York 9 Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), against the City (Count 5); 10 (6) failure to train under Monell against the City (Count 6); and (7) ratification under 11 Monell against the City (Count 7). (Id. ¶¶ 42–151.) Alcala also asserts the following 12 six state law causes of action against both the City and the Officers: (1) violation of the 13 Ralph Civil Rights Act (“Ralph Act”), Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7 (Count 8); (2) violation of 14 the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (“Bane Act”), Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 (Count 9); 15 (3) assault (Count 10); (4) battery by a peace officer (Count 11); (5) intentional 16 infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) (Count 12); and (6) negligence (Count 13). 17 (Id. ¶¶ 152–224.) 18 The City and the Officers respectively move to dismiss Alcala’s First Amended 19 Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). (City Mot.; Ofcr. 20 Mot.) The Motions are fully briefed. (Opp’n City Mot., Dkt. No. 48; City Reply, Dkt. 21 No. 49; Opp’n Ofcr. Mot., Dkt. No. 50; Ofcr. Reply, Dkt. No. 51.) 22 III. LEGAL STANDARD 23 A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for lack of a cognizable 24 theory or insufficient facts pleaded to support an otherwise cognizable theory. 25 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To survive a 26 motion to dismiss, a complaint need only satisfy the minimal notice pleading 27 requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)—a short and plain statement of the claim. Porter v. Jones, 28 319 F.3d 482, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). The factual allegations in the complaint “must be 1 enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 2 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Stated differently, the complaint must “contain sufficient 3 factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” 4 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). 5 Determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief is a “context-specific 6 task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common 7 sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Generally, a court limits its review to the pleadings and 8 must construe all factual allegations in the complaint “as true and . . . in the light most 9 favorable” to the plaintiff. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 10 2001). However, a court need not blindly accept conclusory allegations, unwarranted 11 deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 12 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 13 IV. DISCUSSION 14 The Officers and the City each move to dismiss Alcala’s First Amended 15 Complaint. 16 A. The Officers’ Motion 17 The Officers argue the Court should dismiss the First Amended Complaint as an 18 impermissible “shotgun pleading” or, alternatively, because Alcala’s allegations are 19 legally insufficient to plausibly state a claim for relief under any of the ten causes of 20 action that Alcala asserts against them. (See Ofcr. Mot. 10–27; see FAC ¶¶ 42–94 21 (Counts 1 through 4), 152–224 (Counts 8 through 13).) 22 1. Shotgun Pleading 23 A “shotgun pleading” can take several forms, including a complaint that asserts 24 “multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the 25 defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the 26 claim is brought against.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 27 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015); Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2011) 28 (affirming dismissal of complaint alleging that “everyone did everything”). Such a 1 pleading thus runs afoul of Rule 8(a)(2)’s and Rule 10(b)’s mandates directing pleaders 2 to clearly, discretely, and succinctly present their claims or defenses. See Weiland, 3 792 F.3d at 1320, 1323. It also fails to give defending parties adequate notice of the 4 claims against them and the grounds for each claim. See id. 5 The Officers assert that Alcala’s First Amended Complaint is a “shotgun 6 pleading” because it frequently groups multiple officers together under the umbrella 7 term “Officer Defendants” without differentiating between each officer’s individual 8 conduct or involvement. (Ofcr. Mot. 10, 12–13.) Alcala counters by listing 9 twenty-eight paragraphs that he asserts “allege[] facts specifying the wrongdoing of 10 each officer, and the legal basis for them.” (Opp’n Ofcr. Mot. 4–5.) 11 The Officers’ argument is not without merit. Certain of Alcala’s claims assert 12 collective references that do not specify which officer is responsible for which 13 misconduct. (See generally FAC ¶¶ 86–94 (alleging the “Officer Defendants and 14 Does 6–8[], inclusive,” acted with “deliberate indifference” when they “intentional[ly] 15 violat[ed] . . . [Alcala’s] civil rights, resulting in the unlawful removal of [Alcala’s] 16 children” (emphasis omitted)), 152–223 (alleging that “the Officer Defendants and 17 Does 6–8” engaged in discriminatory, coercive, outrageous, and negligent conduct 18 (emphasis omitted).) Grouping the Officers together in this manner can make the task 19 of discerning the precise factual basis for each claim against each individual officer 20 challenging. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that 21 allegations must be sufficient “to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to 22 defend itself effectively”); see also Destfino, 630 F.3d at 958 (affirming dismissal of 23 “shotgun pleading” that grouped multiple defendants together and failed to specify 24 which defendants engaged in which conduct). 25 As challenging as this task might be, however, the Court is disinclined to dismiss 26 Alcala’s pleading on this ground. Alcala does allege certain specific involvement and 27 actions by each named officer during his arrest. (See, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 26, 29–33, 45–49, 28 78–83.) Given the content of those factual allegations, dismissing the First Amended 1 Complaint solely on shotgun grounds would be disproportionate. Accordingly, the 2 Court DENIES the Officers’ Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint as a 3 shotgun pleading. 4 2. Federal Causes of Action: § 1983 5 The Officers move to dismiss each of Alcala’s § 1983 claims as insufficiently 6 pleaded. (Ofcr. Mot. 14–22.) Alcala largely resists the Officers’ Motion by referring 7 the Court to certain paragraphs in his pleading and conclusively asserting that his claims 8 are sufficiently alleged. (Opp’n Ofcr. Mot. 5–13.) 9 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that (1) they were “deprived 10 of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,” and (2) “the alleged 11 deprivation was committed under color of state law.” March v. County of San Diego, 12 680 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 13 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999)). Here, it is undisputed that the Officers acted under color 14 of state law. (See FAC ¶¶ 43, 55; see generally Ofcr. Mot.) Therefore, the Court 15 focuses its analysis on whether Alcala plausibly alleges that the Officers deprived him 16 of any particular constitutional guaranty. 17 (i) Unlawful arrest (Count 1) 18 Alcala first claims the Officers violated the Fourth Amendment by unlawfully 19 arresting him without a warrant or probable cause. (FAC ¶¶ 42–53.) 20 The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of citizens to be “secure in their 21 persons[] [and] houses . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. 22 Critically, the Fourth Amendment “does not proscribe all state-initiated . . . seizures; it 23 merely proscribes those which are unreasonable.” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 24 (1991). Reasonableness is thus the touchstone of any Fourth Amendment inquiry. Id. 25 The arrest of a person by physical force with lawful authority is a quintessential 26 seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306, 311 (2021). 27 Where police officers effect a warrantless arrest in the home, that arrest is 28 “presumptively unreasonable.” United States v. Alvarez, 810 F.2d 879, 881 (9th Cir. 1 1987) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586–89 (1980)). A warrantless arrest 2 in the home may be reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes, however, if “both 3 probable cause and exigent circumstances” exist. Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 4 773 (9th Cir. 2009); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 741 (1984) (“[A]bsent probable 5 cause and exigent circumstances, warrantless arrests in the home are prohibited by the 6 Fourth Amendment.”) An officer has probable cause to make an arrest when the facts 7 and circumstances known to them at the time of the arrest would cause “a reasonably 8 prudent person to believe that the suspect ha[d] committed a crime.” Rosenbaum v. 9 Washoe County, 663 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011). “Mere suspicion, common 10 rumor, or even strong reason to suspect are not enough” to establish probable cause. 11 McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Henry v. United States, 12 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959)). “Probable cause is [also] lacking if the circumstances relied 13 on are susceptible to a variety of credible interpretations not necessarily compatible 14 with nefarious activities.” Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1432 (9th Cir. 1994) 15 (citation modified). 16 The Court’s starting point here is uncontroversial: the Officers’ warrantless arrest 17 of Alcala in his home is presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment 18 absent both exigent circumstances and probable cause. Alvarez, 810 F.2d at 881; 19 Hopkins, 573 F.3d at 773. As neither party disputes that the Officers were permitted to 20 enter Alcala’s home to investigate the emergency to which they were originally 21 dispatched,3 the only remaining issue is whether Alcala plausibly alleges the Officers 22 lacked probable cause to arrest him. See Yousefian, 779 F.3d at 1014 (“The absence of 23 probable cause is a necessary element of § 1983 false arrest . . . claims.”). The Court 24 finds that he does. 25

26 3 Courts in this circuit have recognized that law enforcement’s community caretaking function under the emergency exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement may permit police officers 27 to enter a home without a warrant to investigate an emergency. See Hopkins, 573 F.3d at 763; 28 Yousefian v. City of Glendale, No. 2:11-cv-03579-DMG (MANx), 2012 WL 12849427, at *9 n.6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2012), aff’d, 779 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2015). 1 Alcala alleges that his daughter contacted 911 seeking emergency “medical 2 assistance” for Alcala. (FAC ¶¶ 19–20.) The Officers were dispatched to Alcala’s 3 home, where his daughter reiterated her concern that he was experiencing a medical 4 emergency and confirmed that his children were unharmed. (Id. ¶¶ 21, 23.) The 5 Officers then entered Alcala’s bedroom, where they observed Alcala motionless in his 6 bed. (Id. ¶ 24.) Alcala was unarmed and, in his condition, unable to harm anyone. (Id. 7 ¶¶ 21, 24.) Based on these facts, the Officers “formed the belief that [Alcala] was under 8 the influence of drugs” and arrested him. (Ofcr. Mot. 15; FAC ¶ 25.) 9 These facts, taken together as true, plausibly establish that the Officers lacked 10 probable cause to arrest Alcala. The Officers inferred drug use based solely from 11 ambiguous physical symptoms that are at least equally consistent with symptoms 12 denoting a legitimate medical concern. These symptoms are “susceptible to a variety 13 of credible interpretations not necessarily compatible with nefarious activities,” Gasho, 14 39 F.3d at 1432, and thus fall short of satisfying the Fourth Amendment’s objective 15 probable cause standard, see McKenzie, 738 F.2d at 1008. The Officers’ factually 16 unadorned argument that “there was reasonable suspicion or probable cause” to support 17 their belief is conclusory and only underscores the deficiency of their assessment. 18 (Ofcr. Mot. 15.) 19 The Court therefore finds that Alcala plausibly alleges an unlawful arrest claim 20 under § 1983. As Alcala’s allegations implicate all of the named Officers in the arrest, 21 (see FAC ¶¶ 29–33), the Court DENIES the Officers’ Motion as to Alcala’s first cause 22 of action. 23 (ii) Excessive force (Count 2) 24 Alcala next claims Officers Archuleta and Amaya violated the 25 Fourth Amendment by using “excessive and unreasonable force” to restrain, handcuff, 26 and arrest Alcala. (FAC ¶¶ 54–73.) The Officers acknowledge that “some force was 27 used” but argue that Alcala’s allegations are insufficient to establish that such force was 28 excessive. (Ofcr. Mot. 16–17 (emphasis omitted).) 1 Excessive force claims are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s 2 reasonableness standard, which requires courts to balance the extent of the challenged 3 intrusion against law enforcement’s legitimate interests under the circumstances. 4 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395–97 (1986). In balancing these competing 5 privacy and law enforcement interests, courts consider (1) the severity of the crime at 6 issue, (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat, and (3) whether the suspect 7 actively resisted arrest or attempted to evade arrest by flight. Id. at 396. In so doing, 8 however, courts must be mindful of “the perspective of a reasonable officer on the 9 scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. 10 Alcala plausibly states a claim for excessive force against Officers Archuleta and 11 Amaya. First, the severity of Alcala’s perceived crime was minimal. The alleged basis 12 for Alcala’s arrest was the relatively minor misdemeanor offense of being under the 13 influence of a controlled substance. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11550; (FAC 14 ¶ 155). Second, Alcala posed no threat to the Officers. As alleged, Alcala was 15 motionless, bedridden, unarmed, and unable to harm anyone. (FAC ¶¶ 21, 24.) Third, 16 Alcala did not resist or attempt to evade arrest. His only action was to cry out in pain 17 when Officer Archuleta used a forced control hold on him. (FAC ¶¶ 24, 29.) 18 On balance, these factors suggest that Officers Archuleta and Amaya’s interest 19 in using force against Alcala was minimal. See Liston v. County of Riverside, 120 F.3d 20 965, 976 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the force used in an arrest “must be balanced 21 against the need for th[e] force[,] . . . which is at the heart of the Graham factors”). Yet, 22 despite the absence of aggravating circumstances, Officer Archuleta used a “forced 23 control hold” on Alcala while Officer Amaya “forcibly restrained . . . and handcuffed” 24 Alcala. (FAC ¶¶ 29–30.) Their use of painful force on a non-resisting, non-threatening, 25 and motionless individual like Alcala plausibly constitutes excessive force. See, e.g., 26 Tuuamalemalo v. Greene, 946 F.3d 471, 477 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding use of chokehold 27 on non-resisting, restrained person violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on the 28 1 use of excessive force). Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Officers’ Motion as to 2 Alcala’s second cause of action. 3 (iii) Denial of medical care (Count 3) 4 Alcala next claims the Officers collectively and with deliberate indifference 5 denied him necessary medical care in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (FAC 6 ¶¶ 74–85.) The Officers move to dismiss, arguing that no objectively serious medical 7 need was apparent, and their response was reasonable under the circumstances. (Ofcr. 8 Mot. 17–20.) 9 Claims for the denial or deficient provision of medical care during or immediately 10 following an arrest are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. Mejia v. City of San 11 Bernardino, No. 5:11-cv-00452-VAP (DTBx), 2012 WL 1079341, at *5 n.12 12 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2012) (citing Tatum v. City & County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 13 1090, 1098–99 (9th Cir. 2006)); (see also Opp’n Ofcr. Mot. 8–9 (clarifying that 14 Alcala’s denial-of-medical-care claim arises under the Fourth Amendment, not the 15 Fourteenth Amendment). The Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement officers to 16 provide objectively reasonable post-arrest care to an apprehended suspect. Tatum, 17 441 F.3d at 1099. Although the Ninth Circuit has not defined the contours of 18 “objectively reasonable post-arrest care,” district courts have examined such factors as 19 the promptness of the care, the seriousness of the medical need, and whether law 20 enforcement officers had knowledge or notice of the medical need. Purnell v. City of 21 Sunnyvale Police Dep’t, No. 5:18-cv-02113-EJD, 2019 WL 587287, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 22 Feb. 13, 2019); Espinoza v. Cal. Highway Patrol, No. 1:16-cv-00193-DAD-JLT, 23 2016 WL 4943960, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2016). 24 Alcala fails to plausibly state a denial-of-medical-care claim. First, Alcala does 25 not adequately allege facts supporting the inference that, at the time of his arrest, he was 26 experiencing a serious injury that required prompt medical treatment. He alleges that 27 he experienced “a medical emergency” and “extreme mental and physical pain and 28 suffering, and great bodily harm,” that he later attributes to diverticulosis. (FAC ¶¶ 24, 1 76, 83.) But these allegations are conclusory and devoid of any supportive detail 2 describing the nature, extent, and severity of his alleged injury. See Purnell, 2019 WL 3 587287, at *3 (dismissing denial-of-medical-care claim where plaintiff failed to 4 describe “the nature, extent[,] and severity” of injuries or allege that a reasonable officer 5 would have known they “posed a serious risk” and required immediate care). 6 Second, Alcala does not plead sufficient facts to permit the Court to infer that the 7 Officers knew at the time of arrest that Alcala was in the throes of a medical emergency 8 posing a serious risk to his health or requiring immediate medical attention. Alcala 9 alleges he was motionless and in bed when the Officers found him. (FAC ¶ 24.) His 10 only explicit outward reaction was a cry of pain when Officer Archuleta restrained him. 11 (Id. ¶ 29.) As Alcala alleges, not even he knew what ailed him, much less whether that 12 ailment posed a serious risk to his health. (Id. ¶ 20.) The First Amended Complaint 13 contains no allegations that Alcala or his daughter told the Officers he required 14 emergency medical treatment. It also does not contain any allegation that Alcala 15 suffered any visible symptom—such as bleeding, vomiting, convulsions, impaired 16 breathing, or altered consciousness—that would have put a reasonable police officer on 17 alert that Alcala was experiencing a true medical emergency. Without such allegations, 18 the Court cannot infer the Officers knew that Alcala required immediate medical 19 assistance. 20 For the reasons discussed above, Alcala ultimately fails to state a cognizable 21 denial-of-medical-care claim. The deficiencies above, though potentially curable 22 through amendment, prevent the Court from finding that Alcala has stated a cognizable 23 claim at this stage. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Officers’ Motion and 24 DISMISSES Alcala’s third cause of action WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 25 (iv) Interference with familial relations (Count 4) 26 Alcala next claims the Officers unlawfully interfered with his 27 Fourteenth Amendment right to maintain a familial relationship with his children by 28 1 directly and proximately causing CPS to remove Alcala’s children from his custody. 2 (FAC ¶¶ 86–94.) 3 The Fourteenth Amendment confers on parents a “substantive due process right 4 to family integrity or to familial association.” Rosenbaum, 663 F.3d at 1079. To state 5 a claim for interference with familial relations, a plaintiff must allege that state actors 6 engaged in conduct that “shocks the conscience.” Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 7 1137 (9th Cir. 2008). Where it is practical for the state actor to “actual[ly] deliberate,” 8 their conduct is conscience-shocking when they act with deliberate indifference. 9 Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010). A state actor acts with 10 deliberate indifference when they “recognize[] the unreasonable risk and actually 11 intend[] to expose the plaintiff to such risks without regard to the consequences to the 12 plaintiff.” Herrera v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 18 F.4th 1156, 1158 (9th Cir. 2021) 13 (alterations in original). 14 A plaintiff must also plausibly establish that the state actor actually and 15 proximately caused their constitutional injury. See Chaudhry v. Aragón, 68 F.4th 1161, 16 1169–70 (9th Cir. 2023). Proximate cause demands a “sufficient connection to the 17 result” that is not “so attenuated that the consequence is more aptly described as mere 18 fortuity.” Id. at 1169 n.12. A plaintiff may establish proximate cause by showing the 19 state actor “set[] in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably 20 should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” Id. at 1169. 21 Intervening acts, however, may sever the causal chain and thus vitiate proximate cause. 22 Caldwell v. City & County of San Francisco, 889 F.3d 1105, 1115 (9th Cir. 2018). In 23 cases involving prosecutorial discretion, for example, courts presume the prosecutor 24 who files charges “exercise[s] independent judgment,” thereby immunizing the 25 investigating officers from liability. Id. This presumption can be overcome only if a 26 plaintiff shows the “officers either presented false evidence to or withheld crucial 27 information from the prosecutor.” Id. at 1116. 28 1 Alcala fails to state a claim for unlawful interference with familial relations for 2 two independent reasons. First, Alcala does not adequately allege the Officers 3 proximately caused CPS to remove Alcala’s children from his custody. California law 4 requires child welfare agencies like CPS to exercise independent, professional judgment 5 and apply carefully delineated child welfare criteria to custody and removal 6 determinations. See, e.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 300, 306(a), 16501(f), 16501.1; 7 Cal. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., Manual of Policies and Procedures: Social Service Standards, 8 div. 31-125 (2023). The Ninth Circuit and district courts likewise recognize that child 9 services workers exercise independent judgment in determining whether and when to 10 bring and pursue custody or dependency proceedings and that such judgment is 11 analogous to the function of a criminal prosecutor. See, e.g., Meyers v. Contra Costa 12 Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[S]ocial workers are 13 entitled to absolute immunity in performing quasi-prosecutorial functions connected 14 with the initiation and pursuit of child dependency proceedings.”); Alberici v. County 15 of Los Angeles, No. 2:12-cv-10511-JFW (VBKx), 2013 WL 5573045, at *13 (C.D. Cal. 16 Oct. 9, 2013) (“[A]ctions by a child services worker in exercising independent judgment 17 in determining when to bring custody or dependency proceedings is analogous to the 18 function of a criminal prosecutor.”). Here, Alcala’s well-pleaded allegations 19 demonstrate that CPS exercised its independent and professional judgment in deciding 20 to investigate Alcala, levy dependency charges against him, and temporarily remove his 21 children from his custody. (FAC ¶¶ 37–39.) CPS’s independent decision-making thus 22 presumptively severed the causal chain connecting the Officers’ arrest of Alcala to 23 CPS’s custody removal determination. See Caldwell, 889 F.3d at 1115–16. 24 To the extent Alcala alleges that CPS’s removal decision was a “foreseeable 25 outcome” and that that the Officers “knew or should have known” their actions would 26 trigger CPS involvement, (see FAC ¶ 36), those allegations are inadequate to overcome 27 the presumption of independent judgment and bridge the causation gap, see Caldwell, 28 889 F.3d at 1116. In sum, Alcala fails to explain how CPS’s custody removal decision 1 was a foreseeable consequence of his arrest rather than a contingent outcome dependent 2 on CPS’s exercise of its independent, professional judgment. Thus, Alcala fails to show 3 that the Officers’ alleged constitutional violation proximately caused CPS to remove 4 Alcala’s children from his custody. 5 Second, Alcala does not adequately allege conscience-shocking conduct. Alcala 6 asserts that the Officers’ actions “were [not] in furtherance [of] or related to any 7 legitimate penal or law enforcement interest and are therefore consciously shocking 8 [sic] as they exhibit a deliberate and intentional indifference to [Alcala’s] rights.” (FAC 9 ¶ 88.) But such factually unenhanced and conclusory statements are insufficient to state 10 a claim under § 1983. Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 11 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a § 1983 12 claim). None of Alcala’s allegations support the inference that the Officers actually 13 knew of and consciously disregarded the risk to Alcala’s familial rights. See Herrera, 14 18 F.4th at 1158–59 (“[A] state actor needs to know that something is going to happen 15 but ignore the risk and expose the plaintiff to it.” (citation modified)). Even accepting 16 Alcala’s allegations that the Officers’ actions were mistaken or wrongful, “negligently 17 inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.” 18 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998). 19 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Officers’ Motion and DISMISSES 20 Alcala’s fourth cause of action WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 21 3. State Law Causes of Action 22 The Officers move to dismiss Alcala’s state law claims for violation of the Ralph 23 Act, violation of the Bane Act, assault, battery by a peace officer, IIED, and negligence 24 as insufficiently pleaded and conclusory. (Ofcr. Mot. 22–27). 25 (i) Ralph Act (Count 8) 26 Alcala claims the Officers violated the Ralph Act because the Officers based their 27 assumption that Alcala was under the influence of drugs on his Hispanic heritage. (FAC 28 1 ¶¶ 152–62.) Alcala further suggests that the City is vicariously liable for the Officers’ 2 conduct. (Id. ¶¶ 154–55.) 3 The Ralph Act protects the right of all persons within California’s jurisdiction to 4 be free from violence or intimidation “because of” a protected characteristic, including 5 race. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51, 51.7(b)(1). To state a claim under the Ralph Act, a plaintiff 6 must show: (1) the defendant committed or threatened violent acts against him or his 7 property, (2) a motivating reason for the defendant’s conduct was the plaintiff’s 8 protected characteristic, (3) the plaintiff was harmed, and (4) the defendant’s conduct 9 was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff harm. See Austin B. v. Escondido Union 10 Sch. Dist., 149 Cal. App. 4th 860, 880–81 (2007). 11 Alcala fails to plausibly state a Ralph Act claim. Relying solely on the Officers’ 12 alleged misassumption that Alcala was under the influence of drugs, Alcala presumes 13 the Officers’ decision to arrest and use force on Alcala was “racially motivated by their 14 perception of [Alcala] as a male of Hispanic heritage.” (FAC ¶ 156.) But the fact that 15 the Officers allegedly made an unsupported assumption of drug use, standing alone, 16 does not plausibly suggest race or ethnicity was a motivating factor in the Officers’ 17 arrest of or use of force on Alcala. 18 The Officers went to Alcala’s home after his daughter contacted 911 and 19 explained her concerns about Alcala’s symptoms to the 911 operator. (Id. ¶ 24.) The 20 Officers were dispatched to Alcala’s home, where they observed Alcala lying in bed 21 motionless. (Id. ¶¶ 21, 24.) However, neither these nor any of Alcala’s other allegations 22 plausibly support his conclusory inference that the Officers’ engaged in their challenged 23 conduct “because of [Alcala’s] Hispanic heritage.” (Id. ¶ 100.) On the contrary, 24 considering these allegations, the Officers’ allegedly mistaken assumption of drug use 25 could equally be attributed to Alcala’s daughter’s description of his symptoms to the 26 911 operator, the Officers’ personal observations of Alcala’s motionless and bedridden 27 state, or other non-race and non-ethnic factors. The Court need not blindly accept 28 Alcala’s conclusory and speculative allegations to the contrary, which are insufficient 1 to withstand a motion to dismiss. Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988; see Rodriguez v. Orange 2 County, No. 3:23-cv-00823-TJW (DDLx), 2023 WL 6472000, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 3 2023) (dismissing Ralph Act claim based on conclusory race allegations); Garcia v. 4 Diaz, No 5:20-cv-02564-FLA (MAAx), 2021 WL 4775638, at *12 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 5 2021) (“Conclusory allegations that Defendants’ conduct was due to Plaintiff’s race are 6 insufficient to state a Ralph Act claim.”). 7 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Officers’ and the City’s Motions and 8 DISMISSES Alcala’s eighth cause of action WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 9 (ii) Bane Act (Count 9) 10 Alcala next claims the Officers violated the Bane Act by interfering with Alcala’s 11 Fourth Amendment rights through “threats, intimidation, or coercion.” (FAC ¶¶ 163– 12 75.) He further alleges the City is vicariously liable for the Officers’ conduct. (Id. 13 ¶ 172.) The Officers argue that Alcala fails to state a claim because he does not 14 adequately allege the Officers acted with specific intent to violate his constitutional 15 rights. (Ofcr. Mot. 24.) 16 To state a Bane Act claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant interfered 17 with their constitutional rights “by threat, intimidation, or coercion.” Cal. Civ. Code 18 § 52.1(b). Unlike a § 1983 claim, a Bane Act claim requires a plaintiff to prove the 19 defendant acted with specific intent to interfere with the plaintiff’s rights. Reese v. 20 County of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1044 (9th Cir. 2018). Specific intent may be 21 shown through evidence that the defendant acted in “reckless disregard” of the 22 plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Id. at 1045. 23 Alcala fails to state a Bane Act claim. Alcala identifies his alleged unlawful 24 arrest and the Officers’ alleged use of excessive force as the constitutional bases for his 25 claim. (FAC ¶ 165.) These actions could constitute coercion. However, Alcala’s 26 pleading lacks factual allegations plausibly suggesting the Officers acted with specific 27 intent to deprive Alcala of his Fourth Amendment rights, as opposed to simply acting 28 unreasonably under the circumstances. Alcala’s allegations that the Officers 1 “intentionally and deliberately denied each of [Alcala’s] rights . . . by threats, 2 intimidation, or coercion” are conclusory and do not adequately fill that pleading gap. 3 (Id. ¶ 164); Leff v. City of Garden Grove, No. 8:19-cv-010340-AG (ADSx), 2019 WL 4 6357970, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2019) (dismissing Bane Act claim because intent 5 allegations were conclusory); Allen v. City of Sacramento, 234 Cal. App. 4th 41, 69 6 (2015) (explaining that “coercion [is] inherent in any arrest” and that “a wrongful arrest 7 or detention, without more, does not satisfy both elements of [the Bane Act]”). As 8 Alcala fails to adequately plead a Bane Act violation as to the Officers, vicarious 9 liability cannot attach to the City. Segura v. City of San Bernardino, No. 5:22-cv- 10 00277-JGB (SPx), 2024 WL 4579144, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2024). 11 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Officers’ Motion and DISMISSES 12 Alcala’s ninth cause of action WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 13 (iii) Assault and battery (Counts 10 and 11) 14 Alcala next claims the Officers assaulted and battered him, and that the City is 15 vicariously liable for the Officers’ tortious conduct. (FAC ¶¶ 176–200.) 16 Under California law, a plaintiff asserting assault and battery claims against 17 peace officers acting in their official capacities must prove the officers used 18 “unreasonable force.” Avina v. United States, 681 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) 19 (quoting Munoz v. City of Union City, 120 Cal. App. 4th 1077, 1102 (2004)). “Claims 20 that police officers used excessive force in the course of an arrest . . . or other seizure 21 of a free citizen are analyzed under the reasonableness standard of the Fourth 22 Amendment . . . .” Id. (quoting Munoz, 120 Cal. App. 4th at 1102). Here, as Alcala 23 plausibly states an excessive force claim against Officers Archuleta and Amaya under 24 § 1983, the Court finds that Alcala’s parallel state law claims against these Officers are 25 also plausible. 26 As to Officers Britton, Garcia, and Kovacs, Alcala abandons his assault and 27 battery claims and concedes dismissal of those claims “without prejudice.” (Opp’n 28 Ofcr. Mot. 15 n.2.) However, when a plaintiff abandons or fails to oppose an argument 1 addressing a particular claim in a motion to dismiss, courts routinely treat that 2 abandonment or failure as the plaintiff’s assent to dismissal with prejudice. Griffin v. 3 Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1030, 1054–55 (C.D. Cal. 2015) 4 (collecting cases); see Moore v. Apple, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1205 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 5 (“[W]here a plaintiff simply fails to address a particular claim in its opposition to a 6 motion to dismiss that claim, courts generally dismiss it with prejudice.” (internal 7 quotation marks omitted)). Alcala is uniquely positioned to allege facts that could 8 support an assault or battery claim against Officers Britton, Garcia, and Kovacs. His 9 express abandonment and failure to allege such facts demonstrate that there is nothing 10 left to plead. By voluntarily abandoning and conceding dismissal of his claims, Alcala 11 effectively agrees the Court may treat his abandonment as final and dismiss the 12 abandoned claims with prejudice. 13 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the 14 Officers’ Motion as to Alcala’s tenth and eleventh causes of action. Specifically, the 15 Court DISMISSES Alcala’s tenth and eleventh causes of action as to Officers Britton, 16 Garcia, and Kovacs WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND and WITH PREJUDICE. 17 The Court DENIES dismissal of these causes of action as to Officers Archuleta and 18 Amaya directly and as to the City vicariously. 19 (iv) IIED (Count 12) 20 Alcala next claims the Officers are liable for IIED because they unlawfully 21 arrested Alcala using unreasonable force and “with reckless disregard for the effect that 22 these actions and omissions would have []on Alcala, including emotional distress.” 23 (FAC ¶¶ 201–12.) Alcala further asserts that the City is vicariously liable for the 24 Officers’ tortious conduct. (Id. ¶ 211.) 25 To state an IIED claim, a plaintiff must plead: “(1) extreme and outrageous 26 conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the 27 probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme 28 emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by 1 the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 855 2 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 209 (1982)). 3 The extreme and outrageous conduct required to sustain an IIED claim must be so 4 “extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” 5 Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035, 1050 (2009). Such conduct must cause “emotional 6 distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in 7 civilized society should be expected to endure it.” Id. at 1051 (alteration in original). 8 “And the defendant’s [outrageous] conduct must be intended to inflict [such severe 9 emotional distress] or engaged in with the realization that [such] injury will result.” Id. 10 (citation modified). 11 Alcala fails to plausibly establish the first two elements of his IIED claim. Alcala 12 alleges that the Officers acted “outrageous[ly]” by unlawfully arresting Alcala and 13 using force on him “without any lawful justification.” (FAC ¶¶ 105, 202.) An unlawful 14 arrest by law enforcement and their use of excessive force may constitute outrageous 15 conduct. See Gonzalez v. City of Tustin, No. 8:23-cv-01274-FWS (ADSx), 2023 WL 16 9689159, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2023) (“The conduct underlying an excessive force 17 claim can qualify as ‘outrageous conduct’ for purposes of an [IIED] claim.”). However, 18 Alcala fails to allege how the Officers’ alleged unreasonable conduct was “so extreme 19 and outrageous as to exceed all bounds that are usually toler[ated] in a civilized 20 community.” Gerritsen v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. 2:22-cv-06052-RGK 21 (KSx), 2023 WL 4291441, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2023); see Rivera v. City of Santa 22 Ana, No. 8:09-cv-01233-DOC (RNBx), 2011 WL 717369, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 23 2011) (holding that a “[p]laintiff may not succeed in his [IIED] claim merely by proving 24 that [d]efendants’ conduct was ‘unreasonable’”). This pleading shortcoming is fatal to 25 his IIED claim. Gerritsen, 2023 WL 4291441, at *7 (dismissing plaintiff’s IIED claim 26 because the allegations of extreme and outrageous conduct were conclusory). 27 Similarly fatal are Alcala’s broad-stroke assertions that he suffered “great bodily 28 harm and emotional distress,” and that he “continues to suffer from emotional distress, 1 pain, suffering, paranoia, and depression.” (FAC ¶¶ 203, 207.) Without any attendant 2 factual allegations to support such symptoms or conditions, Alcala’s assertions are 3 inadequate to plausibly establish that he suffered or is suffering the sort of severe 4 emotional distress required to state a claim for IIED. See Schultz v. Stericycle, Inc., 5 No. CV F 13-01244-LJO MJS, 2013 WL 4776517, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2013) 6 (finding plaintiff’s “sweeping references to ‘pain and suffering, extreme and severe 7 mental anguish, and emotional distress,’ with no facts to support such symptoms or 8 conditions,” failed to meet the “severe emotional distress” prong). 9 Further, as Alcala fails to plausibly state an IIED claim against the Officers, 10 vicarious liability against the City cannot attach. Black v. City of Blythe, 562 F. Supp. 11 3d 820, 832 (C.D. Cal. 2022). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Officers’ Motion 12 and DISMISSES Alcala’s twelfth cause of action WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 13 (v) Negligence (Count 13) 14 Alcala next claims the Officers breached their duty of care by unlawfully 15 arresting Alcala and using excessive force in furtherance of the arrest. (FAC ¶¶ 215, 16 217–18.) Alcala also asserts that the City is vicariously liable for the Officers’ breach 17 and directly liable for negligent hiring, supervision, training, and failure to implement 18 protective standards that would have prevented harm to Alcala. (Id. ¶¶ 216, 220–22.) 19 To the extent Alcala advances direct-liability negligence claims against the City, 20 those claims must be dismissed because they are not cognizable under California law 21 absent statutory authorization. See Johnson v. Shasta County, 83 F. Supp. 3d 918, 936 22 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (“With respect to hiring and supervision practices, . . . there is no 23 statutory basis under California law for declaring a[] [governmental] entity directly 24 liable for negligence.”); Black, 562 F. Supp. 3d at 833 n.3 (same); see also Munoz, 25 120 Cal. App. 4th at 1112–13 (holding municipality could not be directly liable based 26 on negligent training and supervision or failure to promulgate clearer procedures). 27 Moreover, “California law does not recognize a general duty of care on the part 28 of supervisors with respect to negligent hiring, retention, or training.” Estate of Osuna 1 v. County of Stanislaus, 392 F. Supp. 3d 1162, 1182 (E.D. Cal. 2019). Although 2 California courts “recognize[] the existence of a ‘special relationship’ between arresting 3 officers and arrestees,” the issue here is “whether the supervisors responsible for hiring, 4 training, disciplining, and so forth had such a special relationship [with the arrestees].” 5 Id. at 1183. Alcala fails to plead any such special relationship between himself and the 6 City’s employees who hire, train, or discipline police officers. Therefore, he fails to 7 state a negligence claim against the City on this basis. 8 Finally, as to the Officers, Alcala bases his negligence claim on the Officers’ 9 “seizure [of Alcala] through uses of unreasonable and excessive force” in violation of 10 the Fourth Amendment. (FAC ¶ 215.) The reasonableness inquiry in the Fourth 11 Amendment context is the same analysis used in determining reasonableness under 12 California negligence law. Hernandez v. City of Pomona, 46 Cal. 4th 501, 513–14 13 (2009). As Alcala plausibly states Fourth Amendment claims for unlawful arrest 14 against Officers Britton, Garcia, Kovacs, Archuleta, and Amaya, and excessive force 15 against Officers Archuleta and Amaya, the Court finds that Alcala’s parallel negligence 16 claim on the same grounds is also plausibly stated. See, e.g., Conta v. City of 17 Huntington Beach, No. 8:21-cv-01897-JLS (KESx), 2022 WL 18278391, at *5 18 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2022) (“[A] negligence claim may proceed against officers for using 19 excessive force in effecting an arrest.”). Alcala’s vicarious liability claim against the 20 City on these same grounds is also plausible. Id. 21 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the 22 Officers’ Motion as to Alcala’s negligence cause of action as follows. The Court 23 DISMISSES this cause of action as to Officers Britton, Garcia, and Kovacs for 24 excessive force WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND and WITH PREJUDICE. The 25 Court further DISMISSES this cause of action against the City to the extent it is 26 predicated on a direct-liability theory WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND and WITH 27 PREJUDICE. Alcala’s negligence claim survives only against the named Officers for 28 1 unlawful arrest, Officers Archuleta and Amaya for excessive force, and the City for 2 vicarious liability based on the alleged unlawful arrest and use of excessive force. 3 B. The City’s Motion 4 The City moves to dismiss Alcala’s Ralph Act claim and three Monell claims on 5 the ground that Alcala’s allegations are legally insufficient to impose liability on the 6 City. (City Mot. 11–18.) The City also requests that the Court take judicial notice of a 7 provision from the Garden Grove Police Department’s policy manual. (Id. at 15 n.1.) 8 As the Court dismisses Alcala’s Ralph Act claim above, it need not reach the City’s 9 additional arguments to dismiss that claim. The Court therefore focuses its analysis 10 below on the City’s request for judicial notice and its arguments supporting dismissal 11 of Alcala’s Monell claims. 12 1. Request for Judicial Notice 13 The City requests the Court to take judicial notice of a provision excerpted from 14 the Garden Grove Police Department’s policy manual to establish the adequacy of the 15 City’s police training and recruitment program at the time of Alcala’s arrest. (City 16 Mot. 15 n.1; see id. Ex. A, Dkt. No. 46-1.) The policy, however, bears a copyright date 17 of March 20, 2024, which is later than the March 8, 2024 date when the incidents at 18 issue in this case occurred. (See id. Ex. A, at 1; FAC ¶¶ 36, 131.) The City provides 19 the Court no basis to find that the proffered version of the policy was the version in 20 effect at the time of the events in question. As such, the relevance of this policy 21 provision is elusive. See Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 22 450 F.3d 1022, 1025 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that courts may decline to take judicial 23 notice of irrelevant documents); see also Price v. Clifton, No. 2:22-cv-00091-JLS 24 (GJSx), 2024 WL 4720888, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2024) (declining to judicially 25 notice police department manual bearing copyright date later than the date the events at 26 issue took place), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4828700 (C.D. Cal. 27 Nov. 19, 2024). Accordingly, the Court DENIES the City’s request for judicial notice. 28 1 2. Monell Claims 2 As a general matter, municipal liability is not available in § 1983 actions under a 3 respondeat superior theory. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Liability attaches to a 4 municipality only when the “execution of a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts 5 the [constitutional] injury.” Id. at 694. A plaintiff may establish municipal liability 6 only if they plausibly show: (1) a city employee committed a constitutional violation 7 “pursuant to a formal governmental policy” or a “longstanding practice or custom”; 8 (2) the city employee who committed the violation was an official with “final 9 policy-making authority”; or (3) an official with final policy-making authority “ratified 10 a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Gillette v. 11 Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346–47 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation modified); see City of 12 Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989) (recognizing that a municipality’s failure 13 to train its employees can be actionable as an improper “policy”). “[T]o withstand a 14 motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a Monell claim must consist of more than 15 mere formulaic recitations of the existence of unlawful policies, conducts, or habits.” 16 Doe #1 M.L. v. San Bernardino Sheriff Dep’t, 753 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1029–30 (C.D. Cal. 17 2024). 18 Alcala claims the City is liable to him under Monell because the City (1) has 19 “unconstitutional policies, practices, and customs,” (2) failed to adequately train its law 20 enforcement officers amounting to deliberate indifference, and (3) ratified the Officers’ 21 conduct by its inaction. (FAC ¶¶ 107, 121, 132, 145.) 22 (i) Unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy (Count 5) 23 Alcala first claims the City is liable to him under Monell because the Officers 24 acted pursuant to an “expressly adopted policy and practice and custom” of 25 “employ[ing] excessive and unreasonable force” and “ignoring [the] medical care and 26 needs of people seeking their aid.” (FAC ¶¶ 101, 103.) 27 For a municipality to be liable for an improper express policy or custom under 28 Monell, a plaintiff must show that the municipality has an express “policy statement, 1 ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s 2 officers.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; see Waggy v. Spokane County, 594 F.3d 707, 713– 3 14 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that a plaintiff must allege and prove an express policy exists 4 to challenge an express municipal policy or custom). Although an official policy need 5 not have “received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking 6 channels,” a municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 unless an action taken under 7 that express policy caused a constitutional tort. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. 8 Alcala fails to show that an improper express policy exists. He asserts that the 9 City has policies of using excessive force, ignoring medical needs, and discriminating 10 based on race. (See FAC ¶¶ 100–01, 103). But nowhere in his pleading does Alcala 11 identify any express policy promulgated and adopted by the City or its officers. Instead, 12 Alcala merely compiles a “speculative list of various customs, policies, and practices,” 13 without any attendant “allegations of underlying facts.” Moore v. City of Orange, 14 No. 8:17-cv-01024-JVS (JCGx), 2017 WL 10518114, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2017) 15 (quoting A.E. ex rel. Hernandez v. City of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012)). 16 Without allegations showing that such policies exist, explaining how they are 17 constitutionally deficient, and how they amount to the City’s deliberate indifference to 18 its inhabitants’ rights, Alcala fails to state a claim based on an improper express policy. 19 See Waggy, 594 F.3d at 713–14; Herd v. County of San Bernardino, 311 F. Supp. 3d 20 1157, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 2018). 21 Absent a formal governmental policy, a plaintiff must show a longstanding 22 practice or custom that is “so permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom or 23 usage’ with the force of law.” City of St. Louis v. Prapotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988). 24 Alcala fails to do so. 25 An improper custom or practice claim “may not be predicated on isolated or 26 sporadic incidents” but must instead “be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, 27 frequency[,] and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of 28 carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). Proof of one 1 or even two incidents of unconstitutional conduct is not sufficient to meet this standard. 2 Saved Mag. v. Spokane Police Dep’t, 19 F.4th 1193, 1201 (9th Cir. 2021) (single 3 incident of constitutional violation not sufficient to establish improper custom); Meehan 4 v. County of Los Angeles, 856 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1988) (two incidents of 5 unconstitutional assault not sufficient to establish improper custom). Here, Alcala 6 alleges a single instance of unconstitutional conduct that occurred on March 8, 2024. 7 (See FAC ¶¶ 19, 36.) Other than this lone incident, Alcala identifies no other similar 8 instances of unlawful conduct by Garden Grove police officers. Alcala’s allegations 9 thus amount to only an “isolated or sporadic incident[]” that cannot form the basis of a 10 Monell claim based on an improper custom or practice. Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918. 11 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the City’s Motion and DISMISSES Alcala’s 12 fifth cause of action WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 13 (ii) Failure to train (Count 6) 14 Alcala next claims the City is liable under Monell for “fail[ing] to properly and 15 adequately train” its police officers. (FAC ¶ 118.) 16 A municipality’s failure to train can serve as the basis for § 1983 liability in 17 “limited circumstances,” such as where its failure amounts to deliberate indifference. 18 City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 387. Absent circumstances where a failure to train is 19 expressed in actual written or oral policy, see Bd. of Cnty. Cmm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 20 397, 407 (1997), a plaintiff ordinarily must demonstrate “[a] pattern of similar 21 constitutional violations by untrained employees,” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 22 62 (2011). A single constitutional violation by an allegedly untrained employee is thus 23 ordinarily insufficient to demonstrate deliberate indifference in a training program. 24 However, a single violation may suffice if the need for training is “so obvious” and “so 25 likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights” that “the failure to provide proper 26 training may fairly be said to represent a policy for which the city is responsible.” City 27 of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390. This theory of single-incident liability applies in only “a 28 narrow range of circumstances” where a constitutional violation is a “highly predictable 1 consequence of the failure to train.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 63 (quoting Bd. of Cnty. 2 Comm’rs, 520 U.S. at 409). 3 Alcala’s failure-to-train claim does not rest on a “pattern of similar constitutional 4 violations by untrained employees” but instead on a theory of single-incident liability. 5 Connick, 563 U.S. at 62; (see, e.g., FAC ¶ 2 (specifying that this action arises from “a 6 confrontation that occurred on or about March 8, 2024,” with the Officers).) However, 7 Alcala fails to establish that the facts of this case implicate the narrow range of 8 circumstances where that theory would apply. 9 Although effecting arrests, using reasonable force, and distinguishing medical 10 emergencies from intoxication may be “usual and recurring situations” for police 11 officers, (FAC ¶ 121), Alcala does not plead facts showing that the training the City 12 provided its officers in these areas was so patently deficient or non-existent that a 13 constitutional violation was a “highly predictable consequence” of that training deficit. 14 Connick, 563 U.S. at 64 (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 520 U.S. at 409). Nor does 15 Alcala allege what training practices the City employed at the time the Officers 16 allegedly violated Alcala’s rights, how that training was constitutionally infirm, whether 17 any policymaker was aware of the infirmity, or how the infirmity specifically caused 18 Alcala harm. See Waggy, 594 F.3d at 714 (affirming dismissal of failure-to-train claim 19 where plaintiff failed to allege facts indicating what training practices the county 20 employed and what constitutionally mandated training was lacking); Bagley v. City of 21 Sunnyvale, No. 16-cv-02250-LHK, 2017 WL 344998, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2017) 22 (dismissing failure-to-train claim where plaintiff failed to allege “what training the 23 Sunnyvale police officers received” or whether “any Sunnyvale policymaker was aware 24 that the training was deficient”). Alcala’s allegations that the City “failed to properly 25 and adequately train” officers, (FAC ¶ 118), in using reasonable force and “properly 26 identifying medical emergencies,” (id. ¶ 120), are boilerplate, conclusory, and cannot 27 suffice, see Dougherty v. City of City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900–01 (9th Cir. 2011). 28 1 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the City’s Motion and DISMISSES Alcala’s 2 sixth cause of action WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 3 (iii) Ratification (Count 7) 4 Alcala next claims the City is liable under a Monell ratification theory because it 5 failed to discipline the Officers for their alleged misconduct. (FAC ¶¶ 129–51.) 6 “Where a plaintiff alleges that a municipality’s conduct runs afoul of [§ 1983] for 7 the city’s failure to discipline its employees, the claim is understood as one for 8 ratification.” Rabinovitz v. City of Los Angeles, 287 F. Supp. 3d 933, 967 (C.D. Cal. 9 2018). To show ratification, a plaintiff must prove that “authorized policymakers 10 approve[d] a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it.” Prapotnik, 485 U.S. at 127. 11 The authorized policymaker must have “knowledge of the alleged constitutional 12 violation,” Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999), and must “ma[k]e a 13 deliberate choice to endorse” the subordinate’s actions, Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1348. “The 14 mere failure to discipline” an employee for misconduct therefore “does not amount to 15 ratification of their allegedly unconstitutional actions.” Sheehan v. City & County of 16 San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1231 (9th Cir. 2013), rev’d in part on other grounds, 17 575 U.S. 600 (2015). 18 Alcala fails to state a ratification claim under Monell. The only facts Alcala 19 proffers are his “information and belief” allegations that “a final policymaker” “knew 20 of[] and specifically approved” the Officers’ alleged unconstitutional actions “[b]y 21 doing nothing substantive in response to the incident.” (FAC ¶¶ 132, 144; see also id. 22 ¶ 145 (“By their inactions to this incident, the authorized policymakers within the City 23 have shown affirmative agreement with each of the actions of the Officer Defendants.” 24 (emphasis omitted).) Alcala further surmises that “the final policymakers,” including 25 “the then-Chief of the [Garden Grove Police Department],” failed to “discipline[], 26 reprimand[], retrain[], . . . suspend[], or otherwise penalize[]” the Officers. (Id. ¶¶ 102, 27 141–42.) These allegations are inadequate because they fail to demonstrate that any 28 policymaker was actually aware of the Officers’ alleged unconstitutional conduct. 1 Caldwell v. City of San Francisco, No. 12-cv-01892-DMR, 2020 WL 7643124, at *18 2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2020) (granting summary judgment on ratification theory where 3 plaintiff failed to show the police chief or any other policymaker was aware of the 4 allegedly unconstitutional conduct). Alcala’s allegations are also deficient because they 5 overlook that the City’s simple acquiescence or “mere failure to discipline . . . does not 6 amount to ratification.” Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1231 (“Ratification . . . generally requires 7 more than acquiescence.”); Rabinovitz, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 968 (finding plaintiff’s 8 evidence that officer “ha[d] never been disciplined” was “woefully inadequate to prove 9 ratification”). 10 As Alcala’s ratification theory rests on nothing more than the City’s alleged 11 inaction and failure to discipline the Officers, he fails to state a cognizable ratification 12 claim under Monell. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the City’s Motion and 13 DISMISSES Alcala’s seventh cause of action WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 14 V. CONCLUSION 15 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS IN PART and 16 DENIES IN PART the Officers’ Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. No. 47.) Specifically, the 17 Court DISMISSES Alcala’s third, fourth, eighth, ninth, and twelfth causes of action 18 WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. The Court further DISMISSES Alcala’s tenth and 19 eleventh causes of action as to Officers Britton, Garcia, and Kovacs WITHOUT 20 LEAVE TO AMEND and WITH PREJUDICE. And the Court DISMISSES 21 Alcala’s thirteenth cause of action as to Officers Britton, Garcia, and Kovacs, to the 22 extent it is based on Alcala’s excessive force allegations, WITHOUT LEAVE TO 23 AMEND and WITH PREJUDICE. 24 The Court further GRANTS the City’s Motion to Dismiss, (Dkt. No. 46), and 25 DISMISSES Alcala’s fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and twelfth causes of action 26 against the City WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. The Court further DISMISSES 27 Alcala’s thirteenth cause of action against the City for direct municipal liability 28 WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND and WITH PREJUDICE. 1 The following causes of action survive the City’s and Officers’ Motions: (1) Count 1 for unlawful arrest against the Officers; (2) Count 2 for excessive force 3 || against Officers Archuleta and Amaya; (3) Counts 10 and 11 for assault and battery 4|| against Officers Archuleta and Amaya directly, and the City vicariously; and (4) Count 13 for negligence against the Officers for the alleged unlawful arrest, 6 || Officers Archuleta and Amaya for the alleged use of excessive force, and the City for 7 || vicarious liability based on the alleged unlawful arrest and use of excessive force. 8 If Alcala chooses to amend his complaint to cure the above-discussed 9 || deficiencies, he shall file a Second Amended Complaint by no later than fourteen (14) 10 || days from the date of this Order, in which case the City and the Officers shall answer 11 || or otherwise respond to the Second Amended Complaint within fourteen (14) days of 12 | Alcala’s filing. If Alcala does not timely amend, then the causes of action the Court 13 || dismisses with leave to amend shall be deemed dismissed with prejudice as of the lapse 14] of Alcala’s filing deadline. In that event, the City and the Officers shall answer the 15 || surviving claims in the First Amended Complaint within fourteen (14) days of the lapse 16 || of Alcala’s filing deadline. 17 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 20 December 5, 2025 ~

73 OTIS DSWRIGHT, II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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