1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 JOSE TRUJILLO, Case No. 1:21-cv-01467-KES-SKO 9 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 10 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR v. ATTORNEY’S FEES & COSTS 11 VEJAR’S, INC. dba Vejar’s Mexican Restaurant (Doc. 36) 12 & Cocktail Lounge, et al., 13 Defendants.

14 15 Before the Court is Plaintiff Jose Trujillo (“Plaintiff”)’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs. 16 (Doc. 36). Defendants Vejar’s, Inc., doing business as Vejar’s Mexican Restaurant & Cocktail 17 Lounge and Marketable Urban Investments, LLC (“Defendants”) filed an opposition. (Doc. 38). 18 The parties have consented to conduct the adjudication of this motion before the United States 19 Magistrate Judge under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), with any appeal to the Court of 20 Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. (Docs. 51, 52). For the reasons given below, the Court will grant in 21 part, Plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees and costs. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Plaintiff filed this case on September 30, 2021, alleging that Defendants violated the 24 Americans with Disabilities Act (“the ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.; California’s Unruh Civil 25 Rights Act (“the Unruh Act”), California Civil Code § 51, et seq.; and California Health and Safety 26 Code §§ 19955(a), 19959. (Doc. 1 (“Comp.”)). Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that he is substantially 27 limited in his ability to walk and must use a wheelchair or prosthetic for mobility. (Id. at 2). On or 28 around July 14, 2021, he alleges he visited Vejar’s Mexican Restaurant & Cocktail Lounge (“the 1 facility”) in Tulare, California, to have dinner, but encountered the following barriers: (1) he was 2 unable to find a designated accessible parking lot; (2) a lack of signage directing disabled persons 3 to an accessible entrance, with the back entrance having stairs and the path to the front entrance 4 from the back parking lot being uneven, excessively sloped, with height changes and gaps in the 5 walking surface, and a front entrance that is excessively sloped and lacking in clear level space to 6 maneuver and open the door; (3) a lack of clear space inside the front entrance to turn his wheelchair; 7 (4) a lack of sufficient knee and toe clearances at his table to accommodate his wheelchair; (5) a 8 lack of an accessible restroom; (6) a lack of accessible route to the outdoor bar patio; and (7) an 9 inaccessible transaction counter. (Id. at 3–4). Because of these barriers, he was deterred from 10 visiting the store, but alleges he would return once the barriers are removed. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff 11 sought injunctive and declaratory relief, statutory damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at 9). 12 Plaintiff’s complaint also stated that he would seek to amend his complaint to identify any additional 13 existing barriers to Plaintiff’s access of the facility as it is “Plaintiff's intention to have all barriers 14 which exist at the Facility and relate to his disabilities removed to afford him full and equal access.” 15 (Id.). 16 On December 13, 2021, Plaintiff requested an entry of default, and the Clerk entered a 17 default against Defendants the next day. (See Doc. 7). That entry of default was set aside after a 18 stipulation by the parties on January 10, 2022. (See Doc. 10). Defendants filed their answer on 19 January 24, 2022. (Doc. 12). 20 Prior to the Court entering a scheduling order, Plaintiff provided Defendants a proposed 21 “limited release”—limiting the released claims to those alleged in the Complaint rather than waiving 22 claims as to barriers Plaintiff did not presently know about. (See Doc. 36-2 at 5–6). This was 23 offered as an alternative to conducting an inspection to identify all barriers so that they could all be 24 addressed in the settlement agreement, in order to obtain a “general release.” (Doc. 36-1 at 4). 25 Plaintiff also offered another alternative: Defendants could have the entire Facility inspected 26 themselves by a Certified Access Specialist (“CASp”) so that all barriers could be identified and 27 addressed in the settlement agreement, again resulting in a general release of claims. (Id.) 28 Defendants considered the settlement—in particular the amount of attorney’s fees—unreasonable. 1 (See Docs. 36-1 at 4; 38 at 3). Defendants countered with an initial offer of $3,000—which was 2 later increased to $4,000—in exchange for a general release, dismissal of the action with prejudice, 3 and a covenant not to sue, (Doc. 38), which Plaintiff rejected because he was unwilling to agree to 4 a general release without conducting a site inspection, (Doc. 36-1 at 4). Defendants’ offer also 5 included a proposal that the parties submit the matter of attorney’s fees to the court to resolve on a 6 motion. (Doc. 38 at 4). The parties also disagreed as to whether the property at issue was subject 7 to the standards for existing or new facilities. (Id.). 8 After the Court granted several continuances of the initial scheduling conference to allow 9 the parties to continue settlement discussions, on March 22, 2022, the Court held a scheduling 10 conference on November 29, 2022 and issued a scheduling order the following day. (Doc. 27). 11 On April 7, 2022, Defendants sent a letter to Plaintiff outlining their understanding of 12 settlement discussions. Defendants cited case law for the proposition that a party does not “prevail,” 13 and therefore is not entitled to attorney’s fees, when they “fail[] to secure a judgment on the merits 14 or a court ordered consent decree but ha[ve] nonetheless achieved the desired result because the 15 lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct.” (Doc. 38-3 at 3 (citing 16 Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.V. Dept. of Health & Hum. Res, 532 U.S. 598 (2001)). 17 Defendants articulated their argument that the circumstances of the settlement negotiations in this 18 case and the prevailing party rule cited above amount to special circumstances that would support a 19 denial of Plaintiff’s anticipated motion for attorney’s fees. (Id.) The Defendants also lodged their 20 objection to any attorney’s fees incurred after the date of the letter. (Id.) 21 On April 12, 2022, Plaintiff's expert inspected the subject property. (Doc. 36-2 at 7). On 22 December 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint to add reference to the additional 23 barriers found during the site inspection, (Doc. 28), which Defendants opposed, (Doc. 29). The 24 Court granted the motion on January 19, 2023. (Doc. 31). The next day, Plaintiff filed his First 25 Amended Complaint. (Doc. 32). 26 On February 23, 2023, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal as they had agreed upon a 27 settlement. (Doc. 34). The Court granted the parties’ stipulation to dismiss on March 7, 2023. 28 (Doc. 35). In that order, based on the parties’ request, the Court retained jurisdiction to adjudicate 1 any subsequent motion for attorney’s fees. (See id.). 2 On May 5, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion for attorney’s fees. (Doc. 36). Defendants untimely 3 objected, (Doc. 38), and Plaintiff filed a reply, (Doc. 39). On September 13, 2024, the Court granted 4 Defendants’ ex parte application for an extension of time, finding that Defendants’ seven-day delay 5 was excusable neglect under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1)(B). (Doc. 44). The Court 6 vacated the hearing pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). (Doc. 37). 7 I. LEGAL STANDARDS 8 Under 42 U.S.C. § 12205, a party that prevails on an ADA claim may recover “a reasonable 9 attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses,” at the Court’s discretion. “[F]or a litigant to be a 10 ‘prevailing party’ for the purposes of awarding attorneys’ fees, he must meet two criteria: he must 11 achieve a material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties, and that alteration must be 12 judicially sanctioned.” P.N. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 474 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal 13 quotation marks omitted). 14 The lodestar method guides the determination of a reasonable fee. Antoninetti v. Chipotle 15 Mexican Grill, Inc., 643 F.3d 1165, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010). “The ‘lodestar’ is calculated by 16 multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a 17 reasonable hourly rate.” Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996), opinion 18 amended on denial of reh’g, 108 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1997). 19 The reasonable hourly rate is calculated by reference to the prevailing rate within the 20 community for a similar type of work. Vogel v. Harbor Plaza Ctr., LLC, 893 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th 21 Cir. 2018). “Generally, when determining a reasonable hourly rate, the relevant community is the 22 forum in which the district court sits.” Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th 23 Cir. 2008). 24 Regarding what may be reasonably billed for, “purely clerical or secretarial tasks should not 25 be billed at a paralegal or [lawyer’s] rate, regardless of who performs them.” Missouri v. Jenkins, 26 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10 (1989). Thus, courts have discounted billing entries for “filing, transcript, 27 and document organization time.” Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 921 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones 28 v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1027 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (discounting time for 1 “filing or retrieving electronic court documents or copying”). Moreover, “[c]ounsel for the 2 prevailing party should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are 3 excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). 4 Further, district courts “must strike a balance between granting sufficient fees to attract qualified 5 counsel to civil rights cases and avoiding a windfall to counsel.” Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 6 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, “[t]he number of hours to be compensated is 7 calculated by considering whether, in light of the circumstances, the time could reasonably have 8 been billed to a private client.” Id. 9 “The lodestar amount is presumptively the reasonable fee amount, and thus a multiplier may 10 be used to adjust the lodestar amount upward or downward only in rare and exceptional cases, 11 supported by both specific evidence on the record and detailed findings by the lower courts that the 12 lodestar amount is unreasonably low or unreasonably high.” Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life 13 Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Shayler v. 1310 PCH, LLC, 51 F.4th 1015, 1021– 14 22 (9th Cir. 2022) (approving adequately explained use of a downward multiplier to calculate 15 attorney fees in ADA case). 16 II. ANALYSIS 17 Plaintiff’s motion seeks to recover fees for one attorney, Tanya E. Moore, Esq., and two 18 paralegals, Whitney Law and Isaac Medrano. (Doc. 36-1 at 8). Ms. Moore seeks to recover 44 19 hours, Ms. Law seeks to recover 49.6 hours, and Mr. Medrano seeks to recover 7.5 hours, with a 20 combined total of 101.1 hour claimed for time spent in this case until May 5, 2023. (See Doc. 36-3 21 at 23). Plaintiff also seeks to recover an additional 13.9 hours for the total time spent by Ms. Moore 22 (3 hours) and Ms. Law (10.9) in drafting and filing the reply brief. (Doc. 39-2 at 5). In total, Plaintiff 23 seeks to recover $22,010 in fees for the 115 hours spent by Ms. Moore’s firm in this case. (Id.) 24 Plaintiff also contends that he is entitled to $4,518.74 in costs, which in significant part stem from 25 the $3,600 fee that he incurred to have a Certified Access Specialist (“CASp”) inspect the store and 26 identify all barriers to Plaintiff's access. (Doc. 36-2 at 4–6). 27 As a threshold matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney fees. A 28 prevailing plaintiff under the ADA “should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fees unless special 1 circumstance would render such an award unjust.” Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed’n, 277 F.3d 2 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429). Despite the Defendants’ arguments 3 to the contrary, the Court is not convinced that there are such special circumstances here. 4 The Court’s review of the record and papers submitted by the parties does not find anything 5 special about the course of settlement negotiations warranting a finding of special circumstances 6 and denial of attorney’s fees. Defendants cite no authority in support of this argument and, 7 moreover, the Court disagrees with Defendants framing that they “attempted to resolve this matter 8 by making a settlement offer to plaintiff that fairly subsumes the relief available to plaintiff, at the 9 outset and without protracted litigation.” (Doc. 38 at 5). The record reflects that Defendants’ early 10 offers before the April 12, 2022, inspection included only a general release, while Plaintiff sought 11 a limited releasee unless a site inspection identified all existing barriers. (Compare Doc. 38-3 at 2– 12 3, with Doc. 36-2 at 5–6). Therefore, it is not the case that Defendants’ settlement offer “fairly 13 subsume[d] the relief available to plaintiff.” (Doc. 38 at 5). Because the Court does not find special 14 circumstances warranting a denial of the Plaintiff’s motion, the Court will turn to the reasonableness 15 of Plaintiff’s request. 16 In assessing the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s request, the Court first notes that the 17 Defendants do not argue that Plaintiff’s proposed hourly rates for his attorney, Ms. Moore, or the 18 two paralegals who worked on Plaintiff's case, Whitney Law and Isaac Medrano, are unreasonable. 19 (See generally Doc. 38). Rather, Defendants generally contend the amount of time Ms. Moore’s 20 firm seeks to recover is excessive, unreasonable, and unwarranted. (See id. at 6). Defendants also 21 argue that Plaintiff should not be awarded his expert costs because Plaintiff never produced an expert 22 report. (Id. at 9). The Court agrees with Defendants that a reduction in fees is warranted. 23 The Court acknowledges that while this was a relatively straightforward disability access 24 case, Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable amount in attorney fees. And Plaintiff is entitled to a 25 reasonable amount in attorney fees for the time spent recovering those fees. However, the Court 26 finds the Plaintiff’s request for 115 hours and $4,518.74 to be excessive. For the reasons discussed 27 below, the Court will award Plaintiff $11,005 in attorney fees for the 57.5 hours the Court finds 28 were reasonably expended by Plaintiff's counsel and paralegals in prosecuting Plaintiff's case, 1 including bringing the instant fee motion. The Court will also reduce Plaintiff's request for an award 2 of expert witness costs. 3 A. Hourly Rates 4 Plaintiff proposes $300 per hour as a reasonable hourly rate for Ms. Moore and $115 per 5 hour for each paralegal. (Doc. 56-1 at 6.) Having reviewed the declaration of Ms. Moore (see Doc. 6 56-2 at 2–4), the Court finds that Plaintiff’s proposed rates are consistent with the rates of 7 comparable lawyers and paralegals in the Fresno Division, having previously awarded attorney’s 8 fees to Plaintiff at these rates. See, e.g., Gilbert v. HBA Enterprises, Inc., No. 1:21-CV-01358-JLT- 9 SAB, 2022 WL 2663761, at *17 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 10 2022 WL 3327461 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2022) (concluding that $300 attorney rate and $115 paralegal 11 rate for Ms. Moore’s law firm was reasonable in ADA case). 12 B. Hours Reasonably Expended 13 Next, the Court proceeds to the second part of the lodestar analysis—the hours claimed to 14 have been reasonably expended in this case. 15 Plaintiff contends that the 115 hours billed by Ms. Moore’s law firm is a reasonable amount 16 of time given the delays in finalizing a settlement. Defendants urge the Court to substantially reduce 17 the total number of hours sought by Plaintiff to 22.10 hours. (Doc. 38 at 9–10). Based on the 18 reasonable hourly rates, Defendants’ proposed lodestar would amount to an award of $4,391.50. 19 According to Defendants, Ms. Moore reasonably spent 10 hours and Ms. Law and Mr. Medrano 20 spent a combined 12.10 hours. (Id.). The reduced amount is based on Defendants’ argument that 21 the Court should disallow any fees and costs Plaintiff incurred after Defendants’ April 7, 2022 letter 22 objecting to attorney’s fees. (Id.). 23 After review of the parties’ briefs and relevant billing records, the Court disagrees with 24 Defendants that attorney’s fees after Defendant’s April 7, 2022, letter are inappropriate as there was 25 not even a tentative agreement between the parties to resolve the merits of this case. In particular, 26 as discussed above, Defendants’ offer of settlement included a general release, while Plaintiff was 27 requesting a limited release if the case was to be resolved prior to a site inspection. (Compare Doc. 28 38-3 at 2–3, with Doc. 36-2 at 5–6). Based on the Court’s review of the record, the date the parties 1 reached a settlement was on February 7, 2023. (See Doc. 36-2 at 7). 2 For the reasons discussed below, the Court will apply a 50% downward multiplier to the 3 lodestar amount proposed by Plaintiff. The Court finds that a 50% decrease in the lodestar amount 4 is reasonable due to numerous examples where Plaintiff’s counsel billed an excessive amount of 5 time for tasks that should have been performed more efficiently. The Court also finds that some of 6 the litigation efforts were unnecessary or redundant. 7 1. Investigation of Claims & Preparation / Filing of Complaint 8 Ms. Moore spent 3.1 hours reviewing research regarding the parties, performing a conflict 9 check, reviewing pre-filing investigation findings, and communications with her client between July 10 22, 2021, and October 2, 2021. (Doc. 36-3 at 2). Ms. Law spent .7 hours reviewing documents and 11 communications from client, conducting additional information as to defendants, reviewing notes 12 and photos from investigation, and drafting complaint on September 23, 2021.1 (Id.) 13 Here, the total number of hours spent in pre-litigation planning is approximately twice the 14 amount of time recovered by Ms. Moore’s firm for identical tasks in other cases. See Gilbert v. 15 Mohamad, No. 1:22-cv-00554-JLT-EPG, at *10 (E.D. Cal. May 2, 2023), report and 16 recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3724796 (E.D. Cal. May 30, 2023) (finding a total of 1.8 hours 17 spent reviewing client communications, researching the identities of defendants, and reviewing 18 notes and photos from the investigation to be reasonable). The time spent by Ms. Moore’s firm 19 during the initial stage of this case warrants a significant downward reduction. See Pierce v. County 20 of Orange, 905 F.Supp.2d 1017, 1028 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting Lucas v. White, 63 F.Supp.2d 1046 21 (N.D. Cal. 1999)) (“[T]ime reasonably spent on pre-complaint investigation, legal research and 22 informal discovery relevant to developing the theory of the case is properly recoverable[.]) 23 (emphasis added). 24 1 The Court notes that Ms. Law’s single entry of time as to “Category 1: Investigation of claims and preparation/filing 25 of Complaint,” (see Doc. 36-3 at 2), was entered using “block billing”—a time-keeping method by which billing statements lump together multiple tasks, rather than itemizing time expended on each separate task.” Welch v. 26 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 945 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007). With block billing, the Court cannot determine how much time was spent on particular tasks or evaluate whether the time spent on such tasks was reasonable. See id. at 27 948. More specifically here, the Court cannot separate out time spent on investigating Plaintiff’s claims and time spent preparing the complaint. The Ninth Circuit has approved fee reductions for block billing. Welch, 480 F.3d at 948 (citing 28 Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 (holding that an application for attorney’s fees must be supported by billing records that enable 1 Further, Ms. Moore spent 1 hour instructing Ms. Law regarding the drafting of the complaint, 2 reviewing the draft complaint, and corresponding with the client regarding the complaint. (ECF No. 3 29-3, p. 3). Given Ms. Moore’s experience with filing ADA complaints and because the complaint 4 in this case was very similar to others filed in past cases, see Trujillo v. Lakhani, No. 1:17-CV- 5 00056-LJO-SAB (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2017) (Doc. 1), a significant downward reduction is also 6 warranted, see Trujillo v. Lakhani, No. 1:17-CV-00056-LJO-SAB, 2017 WL 1831942, at *7 (E.D. 7 Cal. May 8, 2017) (“The time billed is excessive and duplicative and .5 hours would be a reasonable 8 amount of time for Ms. Moore to spend on preparing, researching, reviewing, and drafting the 9 complaint in this action.”). 10 2. Preparation for & Attendance at the Scheduling Conference 11 Ms. Moore recorded 3.4 hours and Ms. Law recorded 2.9 hours for tasks related to the 12 Court’s telephonic scheduling conference, including conferring with opposing counsel pursuant to 13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f), preparing stipulations to continue the scheduling conference, preparing joint 14 scheduling reports, preparing for the conference, and attending the conference. (Doc. 36-3 at 4–5). 15 The Court finds the amount of time spent preparing for the scheduling conference to be 16 unreasonable, especially given the number of times Ms. Moore has appeared for scheduling 17 conferences in similar ADA cases. 18 Ms. Moore has 24 years of litigation experience and over 12 years of ADA experience, (see 19 id. at 2–3), and could have adequately prepared for the scheduling conferences in an hour. See, e.g., 20 Block v. Christian, No. 1:16-CV-00650-LJO-SKO, 2017 WL 5248402, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 21 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 6350773 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2017) (reducing 22 hours spent on preparing for a scheduling conference before this Court by experienced litigator with 23 12 years of ADA experience). Moreover, the joint scheduling reports filed by the parties contains 24 largely boilerplate language that Ms. Moore has used in scheduling reports filed in other cases. 25 (Compare, e.g., Doc. 25, with Trujillo v. Velez, 1:21-cv-001469-SAB (E.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2021) 26 (Doc. 11). The amount of time spent on these tasks should therefore be substantially reduced. 27 // 28 // 1 3. Site Inspection 2 Ms. Moore billed 11.2 hours of time related to the April 12, 2022, CASp site inspection 3 performed by Plaintiff’s consultant, including preparation (.3 hours), instructions for and review of 4 paralegal draftings (.3 hours), communications with client (.3 hours), review of a court order (.1 5 hours), meet and confer efforts with opposing counsel (.6 hours), correspondence with opposing 6 counsel (1.4 hours), travel time (6 hours), and attending the inspection (2 hours). (Doc. 56-3 at 15– 7 16.) Additionally, Mr. Medrano and Ms. Law billed 2.1 hours related to the inspection, including 8 correspondence with opposing counsel (1 hour), correspondence with expert (.5 hours), and drafting 9 demands (.5 hours). The Court finds that a significant downward departure is warranted. 10 First, Ms. Moore did not explain the benefit or substantive merit of her attendance at the 11 inspection in this case. Thus, a substantial decrease in the hours claimed is appropriate. See, e.g., 12 Gilbert v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. 1:21-CV-01640-EPG, 2023 WL 7736500, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 13 Nov. 14, 2023) (“Plaintiff does not explain the benefit or substantive merit of Ms. Moore’s 14 attendance at a routine inspection under these circumstances. Thus, a significant decrease in the 15 hours claimed is appropriate.”). Second, the Court finds that the other 5.1 hours billed related to the 16 site inspection are also excessive and warrant a downward departure. See, e.g., Block v. Christian, 17 No. 116CV00650LJOSKO, 2017 WL 5248402, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2017), report and 18 recommendation adopted, No. 116CV00650LJOSKO, 2017 WL 6350773 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2017) 19 (“Ms. Moore spent 2.3 hours on preparation for and correspondence about the inspection, alone, 20 when such routine work should have taken a fraction of that time for an attorney as experienced in 21 these types of cases as Ms. Moore.”). 22 4. Amendment of Complaint 23 Next, the Court finds that the number of hours Ms. Moore billed in this case as to the 24 amendment of the complaint is not reasonable given the nature of this case and Ms. Moore's 25 experience in these types of actions. Ms. Moore states that between November 28 and 29, 2022, 26 she and Ms. Law spent 2.3 hours preparing, reviewing, and revising the first amended complaint 27 and stipulation. (Doc. 36-3 at 8). Based upon the Court’s familiarity with the actions filed by Ms. 28 Moore’s firm in this court, the Court is aware that this is basically a form complaint and the only 1 substantive changes in the amended complaint were the addition of identified barriers to paragraph 2 11. (Compare Doc. 1, with Doc. 32). The Court finds 2.3 hours between Ms. Moore and Ms. Law 3 excessive and warranting of a downward departure. See Gutierrez v. Leng, No. 1:14-CV-01027- 4 WBS, 2015 WL 1498813, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2015) (“The Court finds that .5 hours of both 5 Ms. Moore’s and Ms. Law’s time is sufficient to draft the first amended.”), report and 6 recommendation adopted, No. 114CV01027WBSSKO, 2015 WL 13667745 (E.D. Cal. May 8, 7 2015). 8 Additionally, Ms. Law spent 6.3 hours on preparing the motion to amend and related reply 9 and Ms. Moore spent 2 hours for her review of the opposition to the motion to amend and preparation 10 of reply. The Court finds this excessive, as the motion to amend was routine and nearly identical to 11 motions to amend filed by Ms. Moore in other similar cases, (compare Doc. 28, with Moore v. Singh, 12 No. 1:15-cv-00450-SKO (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2025) (Doc. 18); and Trujillo v. SSSC, Inc., 21-cv- 13 01691-ADA-BAM (E.D. Cal. December 21, 2022) (Doc. 76)), and not legally complex. Therefore, 14 this too warrants a downward departure. See, e.g., Kalani v. Nat’l Seating & Mobility, Inc., No. 15 2:13-CV-00061 JAM-CK, 2014 WL 3956669, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2014) (“the Court finds the 16 hours expended on the motion to amend to be excessive. . . . [t]his motion was straightforward and 17 did not involve complex legal issues.”); cf. Acosta v. Perez, No. 119CV01224AWIEPG, 2021 WL 18 3910543, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2021) (“Other judges in this District have reduced Ms. Moore’s 19 time spent in preparing motions for default judgment where the motion filed is nearly identical to 20 motions for default filed by Ms. Moore in other actions.”), report and recommendation adopted, 21 No. 119CV01224AWIEPG, 2021 WL 4461536 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2021). 22 5. Motion for Attorney’s Fees 23 Ms. Moore billed 5.1 hours for her time spent drafting and editing the instant motion and 24 associated reply. (Docs 36-3 at 23; 39-2 at 5). Ms. Law billed 33.2 hours on the same matters. 25 (Docs 36-3 at 23; 39-2 at 5). The Court finds that 38.3 hours is quite excessive for the drafting of a 26 routine motion for attorney’s fees and associated reply. See Block v. Christian, No. 27 116CV00650LJOSKO, 2017 WL 5248402, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2017) (finding that 33.8 hours 28 was excessive for the drafting of a motion for attorney’s fees, especially in light of the attorney’s 1 expertise in ADA matters, and finding that “5 hours [was] a reasonable amount of time for counsel 2 to have spent drafting, editing, and finalizing the [motion for attorney’s fees] and accompanying 3 declaration), report and recommendation adopted, No. 116CV00650LJOSKO, 2017 WL 6350773 4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2017). Because the Court finds that the amount of time billed for the instant 5 motion and associated reply is excessive, the associated billing also warrants a downward departure. 6 // 7 // 8 // 9 // 10 // 11 // 12 // 13 // 14 // 15 // 16 // 17 // 18 // 19 // 20 // 21 // 22 // 23 // 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // 1 6. Communications with Plaintiff 2 Between July 24, 2021 and March 29, 2023, Ms. Moore, Ms. Law, and Mr. Medrano 3 collectively spent 6.55 hours communicating with or reviewing communications with Plaintiff. Date Biller Memo Time 4 7/24/2021 Tanya Moore Letter to the client 0.5 5 7/24/2021 Tanya Moore Reviewed communication from the client. 0.1 6 8/29/2021 Tanya Moore Attention to client correspondence 0.25 communications with the 7 8/29/2021 Tanya Moore client re fact gathering 0.2 8 Reviewed correspondence from the client of 9/27 re: 10/2/2021 Tanya Moore complaint 0.3 9 4/7/2022 Tanya Moore tc with the client 0.35 11/28/2022 Tanya Moore Communications with the client in preparation of the FAC 0.5 10 2/2/2022 Tanya Moore Communications with the client re [preparation of the SAR] 0.25 11 2/14/2022 Tanya Moore Phone call with client re settlement 0.5 Communications with the client and Mr. Aguilar re 12 2/14/2022 Tanya Moore settlement 0.6 Communications with the client re consultant's 13 recommendations re injunctive and correspondence with the 14 6/27/2022 Tanya Moore client re same 0.6 8/11/2022 Tanya Moore TC w/ client re settlement agreement revisions 0.5 15 1/20/2023 Tanya Moore TC w/Trujillo re revisions to the SAR 0.6 16 Correspondence with Mr. Aguilar, client re final revisions in 1/31/2023 Tanya Moore version 6 of the settlement agreement 0.5 17 Preparation of correspondence to client with disbursement of 3/29/2023 Tanya Moore damages payment 0.1 18 Sum of Ms. Moore's Time 5.85 19 Receive email from defense counsel with counter offer for 3/3/2023 Whitney Law fees and costs; forward to client; memo to file 0.2 20 Sum of Ms. Law's Time 0.2 21 12/1/2022 Isaac Medrano Called client re deposition and depo prep 0.2 Correspondence to client with draft settlement agreement for 22 2/4/2022 Isaac Medrano review 0.1 Correspondences to client and defense counsel with final 23 1/31/2023 Isaac Medrano settlement agreement to sign 0.2 24 Sum of Mr. Medrano's Time 0.5

TOTAL TIME 6.55

25 26 These calculations do not include the 6.9 hours of billed time entries that were in part based on 27 communication with Plaintiff but were block billed such that the Court cannot discern how much 28 time was actually spent communicating with or reviewing communication from Plaintiff. 1 Date Biller MAtetemnoti on to final draft of the complaint and instructions to Time 2 9/27/2021 Tanya Moore paralegal re same. Communications with the client re same. 0.6 Preparation for depositions of the client and PMKs, 3 instructions to IM and WL re depo notice preparation, topics, etc. Emails with IM re same, phone conference with WL re 4 11/30/2022 Tanya Moore topics. 0.5 5 Reviewed counter offer and email from Viviano. TC with 3/8/2022 Tanya Moore client re same. 0.5 6 Discussed counter offer with the client, instructions to WL re 9/8/2022 Tanya Moore preparation of a response to Aguilar with counter demand. 0.4 7 tc WL, tc client, obtained authority from the client, 10/18/2022 Tanya Moore instructions to WL re convey 0.5 8 tc with Mr. Aguilar, he wants to take Mr. Trujillo’s 9 deposition instead of settling the case. TC to Mr. Trujillo re same, instructions to WL re proceeding with the scheduling 10 11/10/2022 Tanya Moore conference. 0.4 Reviewed email from the opposing counsel re further 11 revisions to the SAR, acceptance of certain terms, 12 communications with the client re same, phone call with Mr. Aguilar to discuss further revisions and the stipulation that 13 he requested to keep the settlement agreement confidential. Instructions to WL re preparation of the stipulation and 14 further correspondence with the client and Mr. Aguilar to 1/31/2023 Tanya Moore finalize. 0.6 15 Reviewed communications from the client, instructions to 16 2/1/2023 Tanya Moore IM re sending the final SAR to Mr. Aguilar. 0.1 Sum of Ms. Moore's Time 3.6 17 Review docs and communications from client; review info from initial investigation and conduct additional research to 18 identify defendants and location for service; review notes 19 and photos from investigation; draft substantive portions of 9/23/2021 Whitney Law complaint 0.7 20 Prepare First Amended Complaint including substantive paragraph 11, incorporating findings from Plaintiff's site 21 inspection and identifying all barriers to his access and how 11/28/2022 Whitney Law they affect him; email to client re: same 1.7 22 Confer w/TM re documents we are waiting for from 23 5/24/2022 Whitney Law consultant; email to consultant re same 0.2 Receive and review email from Aguilar with redlines to 24 8/11/2022 Whitney Law settlement agreement; email to client re same 0.2 25 Confer w/TM re revisions to settlement agreement to provide for fee motion; revise agreement and send to Aguilar for 26 1/20/2023 Whitney Law approval; email to client re same 0.5 Sum of Ms. Law's Time 3.3 27

TOTAL 6.9

28 1 Other courts have significantly reduced the amount of time claimed by Ms. Moore’s firm for 2 communications with Plaintiff, given Ms. Moore’s history of representing Plaintiff in similar 3 actions. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Gsarwar Inc., Case No. 2:21-cv-02023-MCE-JDP, 2022 WL 4245325, 4 at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 15, 2022), report and recommendation adopted 2022 WL 7101283 (reducing 5 the time sought in default judgment from 2.4 hours to .50 hours). And courts routinely reduce the 6 amount of time claimed by a party for that parties’ use of block billing. See, e.g., Gauchat-Hargis 7 v. Forest River, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-02737-KJM, 2013 WL 4828594, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2013); 8 see also Grouse River Outfitters, Ltd. V. Oracle Corp., 848 F. App’x 238, 245 (9th Cir. 2021) (We 9 have recognized that attorneys’ fees awards can be reduced where a party block bills “because block 10 billing makes it more difficult to determine how much time was spent on particular activities.” 11 (quoting Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2007))). 12 Here, the Court finds that some of the time spent by Ms. Moore, Ms. Law, and Mr. Medrano 13 to communicate with Plaintiff was necessary due to Ms. Moore’s obligations as counsel. However, 14 some of the communication was substantively unnecessary and impermissibly block billed and, 15 therefore, warrant a downward departure. 16 7. CCDA Report 17 On September 30, 2021 and March 1, 2023, Ms. Moore recorded .4 hours for “Attention to 18 New Complaint CCDA report drafted by JM and approved for submission” and 1.0 hour preparing 19 a “mandatory CCDA report.” (Doc. 36-3 at 22.) Mr. Medrano also billed .5 hours for “review[ing] 20 proof of service and busted addressed for service via CCDA portal” (.1 hours) “draft[ing] CCDA 21 case resolution report” (.1 hours), and “review[ing] fully signed settlement agreement and 22 prepar[ing] CCDA case resolution report for attorney fees motion” (.3 hours). (Id.) Finally, Ms. 23 Law billed .2 hours for “[i]nstruction to IM re preparation of CCDA reporting and stipulation for 24 dismissal.” (Id.) As this Court has previously found, these tasks are “clerical in nature.” See Gilbert 25 v. Gsarwar Inc., No. 2:21-CV-02032-MCE-JDP, 2022 WL 4245325, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 26 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 7101283 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2022) 27 (deducting 0.3 hours spent by a paralegal to prepare and submit a report “on CCDA portal.”). 28 Because these tasks were clerical and not subject to compensation, see Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 1 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10 (1989) (purely clerical tasks will not be compensated), here too the Court 2 observes a need for a downward departure. 3 * * * 4 Based on these representative examples, the Court will apply a 50% downward multiplier to 5 the number of hours claimed by Ms. Moore’s firm. Accordingly, the Court finds the lodestar figures 6 are as follows: 7 Hourly 8 Person Hours2 Rate Total Tanya E. 9 Moore 23.65 $300.00 $7,095.00 Whitney Law 30.25 $115.00 $3,478.75 10 Isaac Medrano 3.75 $115.00 $431.25 11 Total Fees $11,005.00 12 Thus, the Court finds the total amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees to be $11,005.00. 13 8. Costs 14 Under the ADA, a court, in its discretion, can allow a prevailing party to recover reasonable 15 attorneys’ fees, including litigation expenses and costs. 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Litigation expenses 16 “include items such as expert witness fees, travel expenses, etc.” Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 17 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 28 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. A., Section-by-Section Analysis, § 35.175). 18 Plaintiff seeks $4,518.74 in costs. (Doc. 36-1 at 14.) Defendants object to the cost of 19 Plaintiff’s CASp inspection, in large part because Plaintiff did not provide Defendants with the 20 report. (See Doc. 38 at 9.) Plaintiff counters that the “written memo” was “prepared for the purposes 21 of litigation” and that he “has no obligation [to share it].” (Doc. 39). 22 At least one court has found it relevant in determining whether an award of costs associated 23 with a that a plaintiff did not produce a report to defendant, despite the fact that the site inspection 24 consultant’s invoice referenced “report preparation.” See Gilbert v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. 25 1:21-CV-01640-EPG, 2023 WL 7736500, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2023). Here, as in Gilbert, the 26 2 The hours in this column represent a 50% downward multiplier to the 47.3 hours billed by Ms. Moore, (see Docs. 36- 27 1 at 15; 39 at 7), 60.5 hours billed by Ms. Law, (see Docs. 36-1 at 15; 39 at 7), and 7.5 hours billed by Mr. Medrano. These hours include the hours billed as reflected in the motion for attorney’s fees, (see Doc. 36-1 at 15; see also Doc. 28 36-3 at 2–23), plus the additional hours billed for the preparation of the reply brief, (see Doc. 39 at 7; see also Doc. 39- 1 consultant’s invoice references “report preparation” and Plaintiff did not provide any documentation 2 of the expert’s written findings. The distinction in this case is that Ms. Moore represents she had 3 no obligation to turn the written findings over as it was “prepared for the purposes of litigation.” 4 (Doc. 39 at 4). The Court declines to resolve the matter of whether Plaintiff had an obligation to 5 turn the report over, as Plaintiff represented that he would share the report if Defendant’s paid for 6 it. (Id.) Because Plaintiff now seeks costs from Defendants, which the Court will grant in part, the 7 Court will order Plaintiff to provide the consultants written findings to Defendants. 8 Continuing its analysis as to whether Plaintiff’s costs are reasonable, the Court observes that 9 the invoice submitted in support of Plaintiff's expert witness fees is not itemized, (see Doc. 36-3 at 10 32), and does not permit the Court to determine whether the expenditures are reasonable. See 11 Hopson v. Singh, No. 2:16-cv-3014-TLN-EFB, 2019 WL 4298040, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 12 2019) (denying request for $2,162.50 in expert witness site inspection fees and declarations because 13 invoice did not specify how much time the expert spent completing each inspection); see also 14 Johnson v. Yates, No. 2:14-cv-1189-TLN-EFB, 2017 WL 3438737, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2017) 15 (finding that “billing $200 for an ambiguous ‘investigation’ without providing supporting 16 documents” was unreasonable). Moreover, the Court observes that the amount charged for the 17 CASp site inspection, $3,600, appears to be excessive. (See Doc. 36-3 at 32). Indeed, one court 18 recently accepted the prevailing market rate for such an inspection as $1,000–$1,500. See 19 Hernandez v. MRVS Enterprises Inc., No. 3:21-CV-06441-JSC, 2023 WL 8720138, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 20 Dec. 18, 2023) (reducing $2,800 CASp inspection cost request to $1,500). Ms. Moore has 21 previously sought costs of $1,295 for a CASp inspection. See Acosta v. Perez, No. 19-CV-01224 22 AWI EPG, 2021 WL 3910543, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2021), report and recommendation 23 adopted, 2021 WL 4461536 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2021). 24 Because the invoice is not itemized and the amount sought is excessive considering the 25 prevailing market rate, the Court will therefore award $1,500 as reasonable amount for the CASp 26 site inspection. See Hernandez, 2023 WL 8720138, at *8. 27 As to the other costs—$194.93 for a pre-filing investigation, a $402 filing fee, $236.80 to 28 effectuate service of process, and $85.01 for online legal and public records searches—the Court 1 finds those costs reasonable. 2 III. CONCLUSION 3 Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for attorney fees and expert 4 witness costs, (Doc. 36) is granted in part as follows: 5 1. Plaintiff is AWARDED $11,005.00 in attorney fees; 6 2. Plaintiff is AWARDED $2,418.74 in costs; 7 3. Plaintiff is ORDERED to provide Defendants with a copy of the CASp report by no 8 later than seven (7) days after the filing of this order. 9

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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11 Dated: October 17, 2025 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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