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facts, we do not recount them at length here. We affirm.

Plaintiff failed to establish that his claims are prudentially ripe. “The

ripeness doctrine is ‘drawn from both Article III limitations on judicial power and

from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.’” Nat’l Park Hosp.

Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003) (quoting Reno v. Cath. Soc.

Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993)).

As a threshold matter, we first address Plaintiff’s request that we abrogate

the doctrine of prudential ripeness. We cannot. We acknowledge that “[t]he

Supreme Court has stated that the prudential ripeness doctrine is ‘in some tension’

with ‘the principle that a federal court’s obligation to hear and decide cases within

its jurisdiction is virtually unflagging.’” Planned Parenthood Great Nw., Hawaii,

Alaska, Indiana, Kentucky v. Labrador, 122 F.4th 825, 840 (9th Cir. 2024)

(quoting Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 167 (2014)) (cleaned

up). However, “the Supreme Court’s observation in Driehaus does not relieve us

of our obligation, as a panel, to follow our prudential ripeness precedents.”

Stockton v. Brown, 152 F.4th 1124, 1148–49 (9th…