1

JS-6

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 D EDWARD HERNANDEZ, Case No. 2:25-cv-07271-FLA (AGR) 3 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING

V. COMPLAINT WITHOUT LEAVE

14 TO AMEND 15 | COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; CITY

OF LOS ANGELES; JUDGE COHEN-

16 | LAURIE; and SUPERIOR COURT OF 17 | CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS

ANGELES,

18 Defendants. 19 20 21 Plaintiff, an inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a civil 22 | rights complaint (the “Complaint”, Dkt. 1) against the County of Los Angeles, the 23 | City of Los Angeles, the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles 24 | (“Superior Court’), and Superior Court Judge Cohen-Laurie. 25 The court screens the Complaint to determine whether it fails to state a claim 26 | on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A. For the 27 | reasons set forth below, the court dismisses the Complaint without leave to amend. 28 | ///

1 LEGAL STANDARDS 2 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 3 ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 4 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 5 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 6 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility 7 standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer 8 possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts 9 that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line 10 between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (citations and 11 internal quotation marks omitted). 12 The “tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a 13 complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements 14 of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.; 15 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “In sum, … the non- 16 conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be 17 plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret 18 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). 19 The court generally limits its review to the operative pleading. See Lee v. 20 City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). However, materials that are 21 the subject of judicial notice and materials “submitted as part of the complaint” are 22 not “outside” the complaint and may be considered. Id.; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. 23 Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir. 1990). 24 A pro se complaint is “to be liberally construed.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 25 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). Before dismissing a pro se civil rights complaint, 26 the plaintiff is given “notice of the deficiencies in his or her complaint” and 27 provided “an opportunity to amend the complaint to overcome deficiencies unless it 28 is clear [the deficiencies] cannot be cured by amendment.” Eldridge v. Block, 832 1 F.2d 1132, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 2 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 3 ALLEGATIONS OF COMPLAINT 4 Plaintiff alleges he is currently a pretrial detainee in an unidentified state 5 court criminal action. Dkt. 1 (“Compl.”) at 7.1 Plaintiff further alleges that in an 6 earlier, different state court criminal case, styled People v. Hernandez, Case No. 7 3PB01415, in which he admitted to a felony violation of his post-release 8 community supervision pursuant to an agreement with the prosecutor, Superior 9 Court Judge Cohen-Laurie violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights on June 21, 10 2023, by failing to calculate correctly both pre-conviction custody credits, under 11 Cal. Penal Code § 2900.5, and conduct credits, under Cal. Penal Code § 4019. 12 These errors allegedly resulted in Plaintiff’s over-detention.2 Compl. at 3, 5, 8, 9. 13 Plaintiff alleges that, on July 12, 2023, he filed a motion for resentencing in Case 14 No. 3PB01415. Plaintiff claims that, on July 31, 2023, Judge Cohen-Laurie granted 15 his motion for resentencing and issued a release order, which led to his release from 16 custody. Compl. at 11–14. Plaintiff contends he would have been released 44 days 17 earlier with the proper credits. Id. at 22. 18 The Complaint alleges four federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 19 (“§ 1983”) (Claims One, Four, Five, and Six) and two state law claims for violation 20 of mandatory duties and negligence (Claims Two and Three). Id. at 16–19, 22. 21 The Complaint seeks damages and punitive damages, jointly and severally against 22 Judge Cohen-Laurie and the Superior Court, as well as such other relief as the court 23 deems just and proper. Id. at 28–29. 24

25 1 Because the Complaint is not consecutively paginated, the court cites page numbers assigned by CM/ECF in the header of the Complaint. 26 2 According to Plaintiff, the sentence in Case No. 3PB01415 was supposed to run 27 concurrently with the sentence in a different criminal case, Case No. 3WC00708. 28 Compl. at 8. 1 DISCUSSION 2 A. Judicial Immunity 3 The Complaint names Superior Court Judge Cohen-Laurie as a defendant in 4 his official and individual capacities. However, “state judges are absolutely 5 immune from liability for their judicial acts.” Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334 6 (1983); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1978). Judicial immunity 7 applies to claims under § 1983 and state law claims. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 8 11 (1991) (per curiam) (§ 1983); Huffman v. Lindgren, 81 F.4th 1016, 1019, 1022 9 (9th Cir. 2023) (related state law claims). 10 Judicial immunity is not lost even if a complaint alleges that the judge’s 11 actions were erroneous, malicious, or in bad faith. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 12 (“judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice”); Stump, 13 435 U.S. at 356 (“judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he 14 took was in error, done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority”). 15 Allegations of conspiracy do not overcome judicial immunity. Acres Bonusing, 16 Inc. v. Marston, 17 F.4th 901, 916 (9th Cir. 2021); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 17 1072, 1077–78 (9th Cir. 1986). 18 Judicial immunity “is overcome in only two sets of circumstances. First, a 19 judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in 20 the judge’s judicial capacity. [Citations omitted.] Second, a judge is not immune 21 for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all 22 jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12. 23 The Complaint does not allege any facts that overcome judicial immunity. 24 Examining the second circumstance first, the Complaint alleges Judge Cohen- 25 Laurie’s actions occurred in the context of a criminal case pending before him. 26 Thus, the Complaint does not and cannot allege actions in the complete absence of 27 all jurisdiction. 28 / / / 1 As to the first circumstance, whether an act is taken in a judicial capacity 2 “‘relate[s] to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally 3 performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt 4 with the judge in his judicial capacity.’” Id. at 12 (citation omitted). The Ninth 5 Circuit has enumerated the following factors: “whether ‘(1) the precise act is a 6 normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the judge’s chambers; (3) the 7 controversy centered around a case then pending before the judge; and (4) the 8 events at issue arose directly and immediately out of a confrontation with the judge 9 in his or her official capacity.’” Lund v. Cowan, 5 F.4th 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2021) 10 (citation omitted). 11 The factual allegations against Judge Cohen-Laurie in the Complaint 12 challenge only actions taken in his judicial capacity – sentencing and calculation of 13 custody/conduct credits in the criminal case pending before him. Judge Cohen- 14 Laurie is entitled to judicial immunity even assuming his sentencing or credit 15 decisions were erroneous. Sadoski v. Mosely, 435 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2006) 16 (holding judge who incorrectly extended term of incarceration beyond that 17 authorized by law was entitled to judicial immunity). 18 Clearly, the Complaint challenges Judge Cohen-Laurie’s sentencing decision 19 and credit calculations in the criminal case before him. Because amendment would 20 be futile, the claims against Judge Cohen-Laurie in his official and individual 21 capacities are dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend. Huffman, 81 22 F.4th at 1022 (affirming dismissal without leave to amend based on judicial 23 immunity); Lund, 5 F.4th at 973 (same). 24 B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 25 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) a violation of 26 rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, (2) proximately 27 caused (3) by conduct of a ‘person’ (4) acting under color of state law.” Crumpton 28 v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). Although Plaintiff purports to bring 1 some claims under the United States Constitution, a party “has no cause of action 2 directly under the United States Constitution” and must bring such claims under 3 § 1983. Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992). 4 “[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 5 ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 6 (1989). A suit against a state officer in his or her official capacity is “another way 7 of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Hafer v. 8 Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (citations omitted). “Suits against state officials in 9 their official capacity therefore should be treated as suits against the State.” Id. 10 The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal jurisdiction over claims against a 11 State unless the State has consented to suit or Congress has abrogated its immunity. 12 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99–100 (1984). The 13 State of California has not consented to be sued under § 1983 in federal court, and 14 the Supreme Court has held that § 1983 was not intended to abrogate a State’s 15 Eleventh Amendment immunity. Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025–26 16 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985) 17 and Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 n. 17 (1985)). 18 The Superior Court of California is a state entity entitled to Eleventh 19 Amendment immunity. Simmons v. Sacramento Cty. Super. Ct., 318 F.3d 1156, 20 1161 (9th Cir. 2003); Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995) 21 (“system of courts in California is a statewide system, established by the State 22 Constitution and the statutes enacted by the Legislature pursuant thereto”); Greater 23 L.A. Council on Deafness v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The 24 official name of the court is the Superior Court of the State of California; its 25 geographical location within any particular county cannot change the fact that the 26 court derives its power from the State and is ultimately regulated by the State. 27 Judges are appointed by California’s governor, and their salaries are established and 28 paid by the State. We conclude that a suit against the Superior Court is a suit 1 | against the State, barred by the eleventh amendment.”). “[S]tate court judges 2 | cannot be sued in federal court in their judicial capacity under the Eleventh 3 | Amendment.” Munoz v. Super. Ct., 91 F.4th 977, 981 (9th Cir. 2024). The claims against the Superior Court and Judge Cohen-Laurie in his judicial 5 | capacity cannot be cured by amendment. Therefore, leave to amend would be 6 | futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th 7 | Cir. 2011) (dismissal without leave to amend is proper where amendment would be 8 | futile); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1129 (“district courts are only required to grant leave to 9 | amend if a complaint can possibly be saved”). 10 C. Remaining Defendants 11 The Complaint names as defendants the County of Los Angeles (“County”) 12 | and City of Los Angeles (“City”). The Complaint does not contain any allegations 13 } against the County and City, other than the allegations against the Superior Court 14 | and Judge Cohen-Laurie, apparently in the mistaken belief that the Superior Court 15 is a county or city entity. As discussed, the Superior Court is a state entity and 16 | there is no basis for liability on the part of the County or City for acts of the 17 | Superior Court or the sentencing decisions of Judge Cohen-Laurie. Plaintiffs 18 | claims, therefore, cannot be cured by amendment. Cervantes, 656 F.3d at 1041; 19 | Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1129. 20 CONCLUSION 21 For the reasons set forth above, the Complaint, Dkt. 1, is DISMISSED in its 22 | entirety without leave to amend. The Clerk of court shall close the action 23 | administratively forthwith. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 26 | Dated: December 8, 2025 7 FERN tT, APNLLE-ROCHA United States District Judge 28