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8 United States District Court 9 Central District of California

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11 BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL Case № 2:19-cv-07722-ODW (JEMx)

PROTECTION,

12 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO Plaintiff, 13 INTERVENE AND REOPEN [98] v. 14

CERTIFIED FORENSIC LOAN

15 AUDITORS, LLC et al.,

16 Defendants. 17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 On June 24, 2025, nearly five years after the Court entered Final Judgment in 20 this case, nonparties Mark Burke and his mother, Joanna Burke (the “Burkes”), 21 proceeding pro se, move to reopen the case and intervene as a matter of right under 22 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 24(a). (Mot. Intervene & Reopen (“Motion” 23 or “Mot”) 1, Dkt. No. 98; see Final J. ¶¶ 10–30, Dkt. No. 93.) For the reasons 24 discussed below, the Court DENIES the Burkes’ Motion.1 25 26 27

28 1 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 II. BACKGROUND2 2 On September 6, 2019, Plaintiff Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection 3 (the “Bureau”) filed this civil enforcement action against Defendants Certified 4 Forensic Loan Auditors, LLC (California); Certified Forensic Loan Auditors, LLC 5 (Texas); Andrew Lehman; and Michael Carrigan, alleging violations of the Consumer 6 Financial Protection Act (“CFPA”) and other applicable regulations in connection 7 with offering, advertising, marketing, and selling purported financial-advisory and 8 mortgage assistance relief services. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) 9 On July 20, 2020, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the Court entered a Final 10 Judgment resolving all claims in this case against Defendants. (See generally Final J., 11 Dkt. No. 93.) The Final Judgment required Defendants to pay restitution damages, 12 civil penalties, and other monetary relief to provide redress to affected consumers. 13 (Id. ¶¶ 10–30.) Subsequently, from November 2020 to October 2024, the Bureau 14 administered a comprehensive redress distribution program. (Decl. Rumana Ahmad 15 ISO Opp’n (“Ahmad Decl.”) ¶¶ 2–6, Dkt. No. 101-1.) In February 2024, the Bureau 16 stopped accepting new claims relating to this case, and in October 2024, the Bureau 17 concluded the distribution of funds. (Id. ¶ 6.) 18 On June 24, 2025, nearly five years after the Court entered Final Judgment in 19 this case, and over a year after the Bureau closed its redress distribution program, the 20 Burkes filed the instant Motion. (Mot.) The Burkes ask the Court to reopen the case 21 and allow them to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a). (Id. at 1, 11) 22 III. LEGAL STANDARD 23 Intervention is a procedure by which a nonparty can gain party status without 24 the consent of the original parties. United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New 25 York, 556 U.S. 928, 933 (2009) (“[I]ntervention is the requisite method for a nonparty 26 27 2 The Court restates only the factual background that is relevant to the disposition of this Motion. 28 All factual references following the Court’s entry of Final Judgment in this case derive from the parties’ papers filed in connection with this Motion. 1 to become a party to a lawsuit.”). Rule 24 contemplates two types of intervention: 2 intervention as a matter of right and permissive intervention. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24. 3 Intervention as a matter of right under Rule 24(a) requires an applicant to show 4 that (1) the application is timely; (2) the applicant has a “significant protectable 5 interest relating to the property or transaction” at issue; (3) “the disposition of the 6 action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede” the applicant’s ability to protect 7 that interest; and (4) the applicant’s interest is inadequately represented by the existing 8 parties. United States v. Alisal Water Corp., 370 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 2004). The 9 applicant bears the burden of establishing these four elements. Id. “Failure to satisfy 10 any one of the requirements is fatal to the application, and [the court] need not reach 11 the remaining elements if one of the elements is not satisfied.” Perry v. Proposition 8 12 Off. Proponents, 587 F.3d 947, 950 (9th Cir. 2009). 13 IV. DISCUSSION 14 Timeliness is a “threshold requirement” for intervention under Rule 24(a). 15 Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 409–12 (9th Cir. 1998). The Court finds that the 16 Burkes fail to meet this requirement. 17 To determine whether a motion to intervene is timely, the Ninth Circuit 18 considers three factors: (1) the “stage of the proceedings” at which an applicant seeks 19 to intervene; (2) the prejudice to the existing parties; and (3) the reason for and length 20 for the delay. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1308 21 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Orange County v. Air Cal., 799 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 22 1986)). Prejudice is the “most important” consideration in deciding whether a motion 23 for intervention is timely. United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 588 (9th Cir. 1990). 24 All three factors strongly weigh against timeliness. First, the Burkes seek 25 intervention nearly five years after the Court entered Final Judgment in this case. (J. 26 (entered July 20, 2020); see Mot. (filed June 24, 2025).) “Allowing intervention after 27 final judgment is highly disfavored because it results in severe prejudice to the other 28 parties to the action.” Roman Cath. Bishop of Monterrey v. Cota, No. 2:15-cv-08065- 1 JFW (RAOx), 2016 WL 320741, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2016), aff’d sub nom., 2 Roman Cath. Bishop of Monterey v. Cota, 711 F. App’x 428 (9th Cir. 2018). Indeed, 3 this matter was fully resolved on July 20, 2020, when the Court entered the Final 4 Judgment. (See Final J.) Following the entry of judgment, the Bureau “oversaw a 5 redress distribution process to [a]ffected [c]onsumers, which closed in 6 February 2024.” (Opp’n 1–2, Dkt. No. 101; see Ahmad Decl. ¶ 6.) 7 On June 24, 2025, the Burkes filed this Motion, nearly five years after the entry 8 of Final Judgment and a year after the Bureau closed the redress distribution program. 9 (Opp’n 1–2; Ahmad Decl. ¶ 6.) Intervention at this stage is untimely as there is no 10 ongoing proceeding in which to intervene. See Air Cal., 799 F.2d at 538 (finding 11 motion to intervene untimely when filed after a court-approved settlement following 12 five years of litigation). 13 Second, allowing intervention here would significantly prejudice the parties and 14 undermine the finality of judgment. See Oregon, 913 F.2d at 588 (finding prejudice 15 where intervention would challenge a complex and balanced plan achieved after four 16 years of negotiation); Wilson, 131 F.3d at 1304 (finding prejudice where the applicant 17 waited twenty-seven months before moving to intervene). The Bureau indicates that it 18 completed its obligations under the Final Judgment and closed the redress distribution 19 program. (See Final J.; Opp’n 1–2; see also Ahmad Decl. ¶ 6–7.) Specifically, the 20 Bureau “stopped accepting new claims relating to this case in February 2024 and 21 concluded distribution of funds in October 2024.” (Ahmad Decl. ¶ 6.) Moreover, 22 “[t]he dedicated phone line and email address were deactivated on December 31, 23 2024,” and [t]he dedicated matter website was deactivated on January 8, 2025.” (Id.) 24 The Bureau “did not identify anyone by the name of Joanna Burke or Mark Burke” as 25 an affected consumer using the data provided by the Defendants. (Id. ¶ 7 (indicating 26 that the Bureau has “no record of either individual submitting a claim form, a request 27 for a claim form, or a request for information about the claims process in connection 28 with this case”).) Allowing the Burkes to intervene would require the Court to reopen 1 a case that has been fully resolved for years, disrupt the Bureau’s completed 2 administration of monetary redress, and undermine the certainty and finality of 3 judgment promised to the affected consumers and the regulated entities. See Cota, 4 2016 WL 320741, at *4 (holding that delayed intervention “would not only be 5 attempting to undermine the final judgment” but “would also unfairly disturb the 6 myriad of subsequent agreements negotiated and entered into in good faith” by the 7 original parties to this action). 8 Finally, the Burkes offer no compelling justification for their years-long delay. 9 See Alisal, 370 F.3d at 923 (holding that an intervenor must provide a reason for its 10 delay in seeking intervention). The Burkes merely contend that this Motion “follows 11 Lehman’s attempt to domesticate a void judgment of nearly $2 million and 12 [Lehman’s] threat’s to foreclose on the Burkes residence, further emphasizing the 13 urgency of their intervention.” (Id. at 13.) In support of their argument that the 14 Motion is timely, the Burkes also state that “[t]his case involves a 5-year period tied to 15 the suspended judgment and deferred penalties.” (Id.) They also make a vague 16 reference to certain “recent developments” that follow “political changes after 17 the 2024 election and the [Bureau’s] ‘deactivation.’” (Id.) 18 It is unclear, however, how any of these assertions, alone or in the aggregate, 19 support the finding that the Burkes’ Motion is timely. The Burkes do not explain how 20 Lehman’s judgment against Mark Burke, whether void or not, is related to this civil 21 enforcement action. (See id.) The Burkes also fail to explain to what “suspended 22 judgment and deferred penalties” they are referring. (Id.) While the Final Judgment 23 here contains an order-distribution and record-keeping provision that is effective for 24 five years after the entry of the Final Judgment, (Final J. ¶ 36), the Burkes fail to 25 explain how this provision justifies their delay in seeking to intervene in this case. 26 The Burkes also fail to explain how the alleged “recent developments” or “[p]olitical 27 changes” following the 2024 election support their position that the Motion is timely. 28 (See Mot. 13.) 1 By their own admission, the Burkes have been litigating issues relating to 2 || Lehman for years. (/d. at 9-11.) None of their contentions help the Court understand 3 || why they did not move to intervene during the pendency of the proceedings, at the time of the Final Judgment, or even during the Bureau’s administration of the redress 5 || distribution program. The significant lapse of time, coupled with the Burkes’ failure 6 || to justify their delay in seeking intervention, defeats their Motion. See Wilson, 131 F.3d at 1304 (holding that untimeliness defeats a motion for intervention). 8 The Court finds the Burkes’ Motion untimely. Accordingly, the Court need not 9 || reach the other requirements for intervention. See Perry, 587 F.3d at 950 (“Failure to 10 || satisfy any one of the requirements is fatal to the application, and [the court] need not 11 || reach the remaining elements if one of the elements is not satisfied.”). Accordingly, 12 | the Burkes’ request for intervention is DENIED. 13 Vv. CONCLUSION 14 For the reasons discussed above, the Burkes failed to satisfy the requirements 15 | for intervention. Accordingly, the Court DENIES their Motion to Intervene and 16 || Reopen. (Dkt. No. 98.) 17 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 20 December 11, 2025 21 ‘SA: oA

3 OTIS D. HT, II 04 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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