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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 Dung Duc Luu, Case No.: 5:25-CV-03145-MEMF-SP

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART

13 PETITIONER’S APPLICATION FOR A Petitioner, TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 14 v. AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION [DKT.

NO. 8]

15 Mark Bowen, et al.,

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17 Respondents. 18

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21 Before the Court is the Application for a Temporary R estraining Order and Preliminary 22 Injunction filed by Petitioner Dung Duc Luu. Dkt. No. 8. For the reasons stated herein, the 23 Application is GRANTED IN PART. 24 // 25 // 26

27

28 1 I. Background

2 A. Factual Background1

3 In 1986, Dung Duc Luu came to the United States at age 14, unaccompanied by parents.

4 Petition at 3. In 1991, Luu was convicted of robbery and burglary, and the court issued a final order

5 of removal on September 16, 2009. Id. At the time, Vietnamese immigrants pre-1995 were not being

6 deported back to Vietnam. Id. at 4-6. The convictions underlying Luu’s order of removal were

7 vacated on December 3, 2025. Id.at 1; Ex. 1, Dkt. No. 14-1.

8 Luu spent three months in ICE detention for his 2009 convictions. Id. at 3. After that, Luu

9 was released on an Order of Supervision, on which he remained for the next nineteen years. Id. at 3-

10 4, 14. Luu has been employed at A+ Printing and Labels in Santa Ana, California since 1998. Id. at

11 4.

12 In compliance with his supervision requirements, Luu has regularly checked in as required at

13 ICE offices since 2009. Id. at 4. On August 29, 2025, Luu reported to his required weekly check-in

14 at the ICE office. Id. Upon his arrival, he was informed that ICE would be taking him into custody

15 effective immediately. Id.

16 Luu’s Notice of Revocation of Release states that:

17 This letter is to inform you that your case has been reviewed, and it has been determined that 18 you will be kept in custody of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at this time. This decision has been made based on a review of your immigration and criminal 19 history, and a change in circumstance which allows ICE to seek to remove you. Based on the

above, and pursuant to 8 CFR 241.4, you are to remain in ICE custody at this time. 20 Ex. 2, Dkt. No. 14-2. ICE did not give him prior notice , cite new circumstances that justified his 21 redete ntion, or provide new information that suggested that hi s removal to Vietnam was now more 22 likely or imminent. Petition at 4, 18. Luu has not been formally ordered removed to any country 23 other than Vietnam. Id. at 18. After about a month in detention, Luu was given a notice of failure to 24 depart, notifying him that he had to surrender certain documents, including a passport, and cooperate 25 with removal efforts. Id. at 14 n.8. He does not have a passport to surrender, and the government 26

27 1 Unless otherwise indicated, the following factual background is derived from the Amended Petition for a 28 Writ of Habeas Corpus. Dkt. No. 7 (“Petition”). This Court is not, at this time, making a final determination 1 identification that he does have, his state driver’s license, is with his property in Adelanto and

2 accessible by immigration officials. Id.

3 On December 3, 2025, Luu had a short interview with an individual who he understood to be

4 a representative from the Vietnamese consulate. Id. Luu alleges that the individual did not suggest

5 that Vietnam would be willing to accept him, much less that travel documents would be provided in

6 the reasonably foreseeable future. Id. at 14-15.

7 B. Procedural History

8 On November 21, 2025, pro se Petitioner Dung Duc Luu filed a petition for a writ of habeas

9 corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 against the Government. See generally Dkt. No. 1. On the same day,

10 Petitioner filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. See generally Dkt. No. 3. On November

11 24, 2025, the Court issued a Minute Order dismissing Petitioner’s Temporary Restraining Order

12 without prejudice for procedural defects. See Dkt. No. 6.

13 On December 4, 2025, Petitioner filed an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus, Dkt.

14 No. 7 (“Petition”), and Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction,

15 Dkt. No. 8 (“Application”). On that same day, a Request for Appointment of Counsel was filed by

16 Petitioner. Dkt. No. 9. On December 7, the Government filed its opposition. Dkt. No. 11 (“Opp.”).

17 On December 8, the Government filed a Declaration of Jorge G. Preciado in support of its

18 Opposition. Dkt. No. 12. On that same day, Petitioner filed his Reply. Dkt. No. 14 (“Reply”). On

19 December 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Declaration of Estalyn Marquis in Support of Application for

20 Preliminary Injunction. Dkt. No. 15.

21 II. Applicable Law

22 A. Preliminary Injunctions 23 The analysis that courts must perform for temporary restraining orders and preliminary 24 injunctions is “substantially identical.” Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 25 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2001). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 sets forth the procedure for issuance of 26 a preliminary injunction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary 27 remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). To 28 1 a likelihood that he will suffer irreparable harm without an injunction; (3) the balance of equities tips

2 in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 20. This Court cannot grant the

3 preliminary injunction “unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”

4 Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997).

5 The Ninth Circuit has held that injunctive relief may issue, even if the moving party cannot

6 show a likelihood of success on the merits, if “‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a balance

7 of hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary injunction,

8 so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the

9 injunction is in the public interest.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th

10 Cir. 2011). Under either formulation of the principles, preliminary injunctive relief should be denied

11 if the probability of success on the merits is low. See Martin v. Int’l Olympic Comm., 740 F.2d 670,

12 675 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[E]ven if the balance of hardships tips decidedly in favor of the moving party,

13 it must be shown as an irreducible minimum that there is a fair chance of success on the merits.”).

14 B. Habeas Petitions in the Immigration Detention Context

15 District Courts are “generally prohibit[ed]” from “entering injunctions that order federal

16 officials to take or to refrain from taking actions to enforce, implement, or otherwise carry out”

17 certain provisions of the INA, found in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1221–1232. Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez, 596

18 U.S. 543, 550 (2022). But “lower courts retain the authority to ‘enjoin or restrain the operation of’

19 the relevant statutory provisions ‘with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual

20 [noncitizen] against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. §

21 1252(f)(1)). This Court, therefore, may grant relief in “individual cases.” Reno v. American-Arab

22 Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1999). 23 In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court established that courts should 24 treat a six-month period of detention as “presumptively reasonable.” Id. at 700-01. It explained: 25 After this 6–month period, once the [noncitizen] provides good reason to believe that there 26 is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. And for 27 detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the “reasonably foreseeable future” conversely would have to shrink. This 28 1 buen trile lieta sheads abfeteern s idxe tmeromnithnse.d T toh atth et hceornet riasr yn,o a s[ingonnifciictiaznetn ]li kmealiyh oboed h eolfd rienm coovnafiln ienm ethnet

2 reasonably foreseeable future.

Id. at 701. In other words, trial courts considering an immigration detainee’s habeas petition seeking 3

release must first ascertain if the detainee has demonstrated good reason to believe that, in the 4

reasonably foreseeable future, there is no significant likelihood of removal. Only then does the 5

burden shift to the Government to rebut that showing. 6

A different framework applies, however, once an immigrant has been “released under an 7

order of supervision.” 8 U.S.C. § 241.13(i)(1). To “revoke an [noncitizen]’s release under this 8

section and return the [noncitizen] to custody,” the Service must “determine[] that there is a 9

significant likelihood that the [noncitizen] may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. 10

§ 241.13(i)(2). “Upon revocation, the [noncitizen] will be notified of the reasons for revocation of 11

his or her release,” and is entitled to an initial interview after the immigrant’s return to custody to 12

allow the immigrant to respond, submit evidence, or otherwise demonstrate that “there is no 13

significant likelihood he or she be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. § 241(i)(3). 14

III. Discussion

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16 A. Luu’s Motion is procedurally proper.

17 As a threshold matter, the Government argues that Luu’s motion is procedurally improper.

18 Opp. at 5-7. It cites Local Rule 7-5, which requires a moving paper to include a “complete

19 memorandum . . . and the points and authorities upon which the moving party will rely,” and “[t]he

20 evidence upon which the moving party will rely in support of the motion.” C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-5. It also

21 cites Local Rule 65-1, which requires that a “party seeking a temporary restraining order must

22 submit . . . a declaration setting forth the facts and certification required by F.R.Civ.P. 65(b)(1)(A) 23 and (B).” C.D. Cal. L.R. 65-1. And Local Rule 7-19, which requires an “application for an ex parte 24 order [to] be accompanied by a memorandum containing . . . the reasons for the seeking of an ex 25 parte order, and points and authorities in support thereof.” C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-19. 26 Respondents contend that the TRO Application is not “complete” and does not include 27 “points” in support of relief, legal analysis related to the facts, or a “declaration” of its factual 28 contentions. See Opp. at 5-7 (citing Hung Huu Anh Hoang v. Kristi Noem et al., 5:25-cv-03177 1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2025)). Luu contends that the TRO is filed as an application, not a motion, so

2 Local Rule 7-5 is inapplicable, and the application is not an ex parte application, where Respondents

3 were notified in advance and had time to oppose. See Reply at 9-10. Luu also contends that the

4 Application contains sufficient evidence because of the verified petition and documentary evidence.

5 See id. at 10.

6 “A preliminary injunction [or TRO] is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are

7 less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits.” Univ. of Texas v.

8 Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). “A district court may . . . consider hearsay in deciding

9 whether to issue a preliminary injunction.” Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1083 (9th Cir.

10 2009) (citing Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1363 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc)).

11 Here, although the TRO Application is brief, it does argue the factual and legal basis for the

12 requested relief because it specifically references the claims set forth in Luu’s Petition, and the

13 Petition argues why Luu is likely to succeed on the merits for all his claims. See Application at 2-3;

14 see generally Petition. Luu also subsequently included documentary evidence to support his claims.

15 See Exs. 1, 2, Dkt. Nos. 14-1, 14-2; see Reply at 10. And Luu’s counsel did include a declaration

16 setting forth the factual contentions that cross reference the Petition and explain the notice

17 requirement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 65(b)(1). See Dkt. No. 8-1 ¶¶ 2-4.

18 Therefore, this is a proper TRO Application.

19 The Government next argues that to the extent Luu is relying on the factual allegations in the

20 Petition for its TRO Application, the Petition itself is not properly verified because there is no

21 personal knowledge, which does not create “sworn testimony as to their truth.” See Opp. at 6. The

22 Government cites to an unpublished, nonbinding decision in Hung Huu Anh Hoang v. Kristi Noem et 23 al., 5:25-cv03177, *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2025), where the court held that the “[t]o the extent Hoang 24 relies on the factual allegations of his Petition, those allegations are not verified by Hoang. Rather, 25 Hoang’s attorney, who does not claim to have personal knowledge of the facts in the Petition, has 26 provided the verification.” Id. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Local Rule 83-16.2 states that:

2 If the petition or motion is verified by a person other than the individual in custody, the

3 person verifying the document shall set forth the reason why it has not been verified by the person in custody. The person verifying the document shall allege only facts personally 4 known to that person. If facts are alleged upon information and belief, the source of the information and belief shall be stated. 5 C.D. C al. L.R. 83-16.2. Here, the Court finds that the Petition is properly verified. Luu’s counsel 6 swore “under penalty of perjury … that [based on the information and belief,] the contents of this 7 petitio n are true and correct to the best of [her] knowledge.” See Petition at 24. Luu was a pro se 8 plaint iff, where his initial TRO and Petition were dismissed without prejudice because Luu did not 9 follow the proper procedures. See Dkt. No. 6. Luu then requested counsel under the Criminal Justice 10 Act, w hich the Court granted. See Dkt. No. 9. Luu’s counsel verifying the Petition, Estalyn Marquis, 11 has sp oken with Luu, see Reply at 3, where she got the information for the Petition and thus has 12 person al knowledge. And the assertions in the Petition can be taken as true because Luu’s counsel 13 swore that based on what she has learned from the information, the Petition is true. Therefore, there 14 is “co mpetent sworn testimony” to satisfy the verification requirements under Local Rule 83-16.2 15 Accordingly, the Court does not find procedural defects with the TRO Application that 16 warra nt denial on that basis and will next turn to the merits of the Application. 17

B. Applying the Winter factors, Luu is entitled to a temporary restraining order. 18 As discussed above, the standard for granting a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 19 injunc tion are substantively identical. Given the urgency of this matter, this Court has only 20 considered whether Luu is entitled to a temporary rest raining order. Having determined below that 21 he is e ntitled to a temporary restraining order, the Court will i ssue an order to show cause as to why 22 a preliminary injunction should issue, which should permit further development of the record and 23 additional briefing. 24 The Petition advances four grounds upon which a temporary restraining order should be 25 granted: First, Luu argues that there is no significant likelihood of his removal to Vietnam in the 26 reasonably foreseeable future. Petition at 11-14. Second, he argues that Respondents have violated 27 due process and INA regulations by re-detaining him without notice and an opportunity to be heard. 28 1 Id. at 15-18. Third, he argues that his removal to any third country would violate due process

2 because ICE has given him neither notice of the proposed third country nor an opportunity to request

3 deferral or withholding of removal. Id. at 18-19. Fourth, he argues that removal to third countries

4 where Luu might face imprisonment violates the constitutional prohibition on “punitive” removal

5 practices. Id. at 20-21.

6 The final two grounds—challenging third country removal as a due process violation and an

7 impermissibly punitive removal measure—concern the question of whether Luu’s removal to any

8 third country would be proper. See Petition at 19, 21. It is well settled that “speculative injury does

9 not constitute irreparable injury sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary injunction.” Caribbean

10 Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Opposition at 5 n.1. Luu’s

11 Reply does not address Respondents’ speculative argument, and only contends that Luu is likely to

12 succeed on his third claim because Luu “has identified recent instances of Vietnamese nationals

13 being removed to third countries as well as written policies that allow individuals to be deported to

14 third countries with insufficient due process.” See Reply at 8. But on the current record, the

15 possibility of removal to a third country is speculative, and therefore Luu cannot show the requisite

16 likelihood of irreparable harm (the second Winter factor). Thus, Luu is not entitled to a temporary

17 restraining order on either of these two grounds. The Court will proceed to consider the other two

18 grounds advanced.

19 Those remaining two grounds are as follows: (1) Luu’s continued detention is unlawful

20 because there is no significant likelihood of his removal to Vietnam in the reasonably foreseeable

21 future, and (2) Luu’s continued detention is unlawful because Respondents redetained him without

22 notice or an opportunity to be heard. The Court addresses these grounds below. 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 1 i. Ttoh beo ftihrs gt rWouinntdesr. factor, likelihood of success on the merits, is met with respect

2 1. Luu has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his 3 claim that his detention is unlawful because there is no significant likelihood of his removal to Vietnam in the reasonably foreseeable 4 future.

5 The parties dispute how to apply the Zadvydas framework to Luu’s continued detention: Luu

6 argues that the Court should consider his prior period of detention and find that he is therefore

7 beyond Zadvydas’s presumptive six-month period. See Petition at 12 (citing Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft,

8 257 F.3d 1095, 1102 n.5 (9th Cir. 2001)). Respondents, on the other hand, argues that the Zadvydas

9 clock restarted on Luu’s latest detention. Opposition at 8-9. The parties do not cite to any binding

10 authority, and this Court is not aware of any, that addresses how to apply the Zadvydas framework to

11 a redetention.

12 The Court finds that to apply the Zadvydas framework in the way Respondents propose under

13 these facts would be contrary to the reasoning of Zadvydas and produce anomalous results. The

14 question in Zadvydas concerned the constitutionality of indefinite or prolonged detention. 533 U.S.

15 at 689 (“In our view, the statute, read in light of the Constitution's demands, limits a [non-citizen’s]

16 post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that [non-citizen’s]

17 removal from the United States. It does not permit indefinite detention.”). The Supreme Court’s

18 concern that indefinite or prolonged detention would be unconstitutional applies equally to a single

19 prolonged detention as it does to a detention that is broken up into shorter periods. To apply

20 Zadvydas in the manner Respondents propose would suggest that Respondents could detain an

21 individual for six months, release them, redetain them just outside the gates of the detention facility,

22 and redetain them for another six months, and do this repeatedly without ever having to comply with 23 its burden under Zadvydas. Another district court in this Circuit’s approach is instructive here: It 24 considered and rejected the Government’s argument that “because [the petitioner’s] detention was 25 not consecutive, the clock has restarted.” Nguyen v. Scott, No. 2:25-CV-01398, 2025 WL 2419288, 26 at *13 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 2025) (collecting similar cases). Rather, it appears that Section 241.13 27 actually codifies how Zadvydas should apply: 28 1 Tsuhbisje cste tcoti ao nfi neaslt aobrdliesrh oesf rsepmeocivaall raenvdi eawre dperotaciendeudr uens dfeorr t hthe ocsues t[ondoyn rceivtiizeewn sp]r owchedou areres

2 provided at § 241.4 after the expiration of the removal period, where the [noncitizen] has provided good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal to the 3 country to which he or she was ordered removed . . . in the reasonably foreseeable future. 4 8 U.S .C. § 241.13(a) (emphasis added).2 This therefore indicates that the subsection Luu relies 5 upon— 241.13(i)(2)—only applies where the noncitizen has made the showing of “good reason to 6 believ e.” And this mirrors Zadvydas: “[a]fter [the] 6-month period, once the [non-citizen] provides 7 good r eason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably 8 forese eable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” 9 533 U .S. at 701.3 10 Here, Luu has provided good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of 11 remov al in the reasonably foreseeable future, noting the current arrangement with Vietnam, the 12 paucit y of removals to Vietnam, and the absence of any indication that the Government is seeking to 13 meet t he conditions of the current arrangement with Vietnam. See Petition at 14-15. The burden 14 would therefore shift to the Government. 15 Respondents argue there is a significant likelihood of removal because travel documents 16 were r equested from the Vietnamese Embassy on September 18, 2025, and Luu was then 17 interv iewed on December 1, 2025, by consular officials for the purpose of obtaining his travel 18 docum ents. See Opp. at 9 (citing Preciado Decl. ¶¶ 20-22, Dkt. No. 12). Respondents also argue that 19

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22 2 Where it does not change the meaning, this Court will endeavor to use the term “noncitizen” in place of alien, consistent with the practice of the United States Supreme Court. See Avilez v. Garland, 69 F.4th 525, 23 527 (9th Cir. 2023) (“[U]se of the term noncitizen has become a common practice of the Supreme Court . . . . [In addition,] [t]he word alien can suggest ‘strange,’ ‘different,’ ‘repugnant,’ ‘hostile,’ and ‘opposed,’ Alien, 24 Webster's Third New International Dictionary 53 (2002), while the word noncitizen, which is synonymous, see Alien and Noncitizen, American Heritage Dictionary of English Language 44, 1198 (5th ed. 2011), avoids 25 such connotations. Thus, noncitizen seems the better choice.”). 26 3 The Government contends that although “Petitioner does not yet have a specific date of anticipated 27 removal,” it does “not make his detention indefinite. See Opposition at 12 (citing Diouf v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 1222, 1233 (9th Cir. 2008)). But unlike the plaintiff in Diouf, who was refusing to cooperate with removal 28 after ICE “successfully completed the arrangements for Diouf's removal,” Luu is not refusing to cooperate 1 three individuals were removed to Vietnam in the past year, Opp. at 10, and that there is no bar to

2 removal to Vietnam, Opp. at 10-11, 11 n.2.

3 However, Petitioner has gone over two and a half months without a travel document, after

4 the request was made, and Respondents have stated that the “estimated time for production of a

5 travel document varies and currently remains pending.” See Preciado Decl. ¶ 21 (emphasis added).

6 And in Luu’s “short interview [on December 1, 2025,] with an individual who he understood to be a

7 representative from the Vietnamese consulate,” the individual “did not suggest that Vietnam would

8 be willing to accept [him], much less that travel documents would be provided in the reasonably

9 foreseeable future.” Petition at 14-15. There is “no travel document in sight.” Id. at 1; see also

10 Marquis Decl. ¶ 2, Dkt. No. 15 (noting that the representative from the Vietnamese consulate “did

11 not indicate that [Luu] would be receiving travel documents” after his approximately five-minute

12 meeting). There is thus no current estimate as to when a travel document will be issued, even though

13 the 2020 Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. and Vietnam provides that within thirty

14 days of a request for travel documents, the travel document should be issued, or the individual

15 should be notified that it is insufficient. See 2020 Memorandum of Understanding between the

16 Department of Homeland Security of the United States of America and the Ministry of Public

17 Security of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam §§ 8(3), (4) (November 21, 2020),

18 https://www.asianlawcaucus.org/news-resources/guides-reports/trinh-reports.

19 Furthermore, Respondents’ reliance on three instances of an individual being removed to

20 Vietnam is not persuasive to show that Luu himself faces a “significant likelihood of removal in the

21 reasonably foreseeable future.” See Opposition at 10. In sum, there is no “good reason to believe that

22 there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” Zadvydas, 533 23 U.S. at 701; see also Reply at 2-3.4 24 25

26 4 Even if the Government can establish that Luu is removable under the 2020 MOU, Vietnam has total 27 discretion whether to accept particular non-citizens so the 2020 MOU is insufficient on its own to show a significant likelihood of removal. See Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d 144, 151 (D. Mass. 2025); Hoac v. 28 Becerra, No. 25-CV-01740, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025); Vu v. Noem, No. 25-CV- 1 Accordingly, the Court finds that Luu is likely to succeed in showing that the Government

2 has not rebutted his showing, so Luu has demonstrated the likelihood of success on the merits of the

3 question of whether his detention is unlawful under Zadvydas.

4 2. Luu has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his

5 claim that his detention is unlawful because the Government did not provide him with notice and an opportunity to be heard. 6 This Court next turns to Luu’s second ground. Luu argues that “[b]ecause Respondents 7 violat ed [his] due process rights and their own regulations, this claim provides a separate and 8 indepe ndent basis for his release.” Petition at 15. For the reasons below, this Court finds he is likely 9 to suc ceed on the merits of this claim. 10 “‘The Fifth Amendment entitles [noncitizens] to due process of law’ in the context of 11 remov al proceedings.” Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 12 U.S. 2 92, 306 (1993)). Accordingly, immigration detainees pending removal are “entitled to notice 13 and op portunity to be heard ‘appropriate to the nature of the case.’” Id. (quoting Mullane v. Central 14 Hanov er Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). Importantly, the Respondents do not 15 meani ngfully dispute that Luu has the right to notice and the opportunity to be heard on his 16 redete ntion, consistent with the applicable regulations. 17 Respondents argue that Luu was provided the proper procedures as he was “issued a Notice 18 of Rev ocation of Release upon his detention” on August 29, 2025. Opp. at 12 (citing Preciado Decl. 19 ¶ 10). But the Notice of Revocation contains generic language, where Luu’s Notice cites to 8 C.F.R. 20 § 241.4 for the basis of removal and states that “[t]his decision has been made based on a review of 21 your i mmigration and criminal history, and a change in circum stances which allows ICE to seek to 22 remove you.” See Ex. 2, Dkt. No. 14-2. There is no reference to any violation of the Order of 23 Supervised Release, what the change in circumstance is, or any other specific reason as to why Luu 24 was redetained. See id. This vague, generic statement does not satisfy due process and the 25 requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). See Trump, 604 U.S. at 673 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 26 314); 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3) (noting that upon revocation, the noncitizen “will be notified of the 27 reasons for revocation”); see also Bui v. Warden of the Otay Mesa Det. Facility, No. 25-cv-2111, 28 1 3030590, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025). Therefore, the Court finds that Luu was not given proper

2 notice prior to the revocation. See Petition at 18.

3 Furthermore, Respondents focus on the fact that the decision to revoke supervised released

4 and re-detain Luu is discretionary. Opp. at 12-13 (citing Rodriguez v. Hayes, 578 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir.

5 2009)). Be that as it may, this does not mean that Luu does not have the right to notice and the

6 opportunity to be heard on this discretionary decision. And perhaps more importantly, the

7 Government fails to justify why it should be permitted to exercise its discretion under the regulation

8 in a way to contravenes the requirement of the same regulation to provide notice and an opportunity

9 to be heard. In light of J.G.G., it appears that the applicable regulations, namely 8 U.S.C. §

10 241.13(i)(3) and 8 U.S.C. § 241.4(l)(1) are the means by which ICE has determined it will meet the

11 due process rights of putative detainees. The Government provides no reason the Court should find

12 otherwise, and the Court declines to take the extraordinary position that these individuals are not

13 entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard in the absence of clear direction—in binding law, in

14 the relevant statutes, or in the applicable regulations—to that effect. The Court therefore finds that

15 Luu is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that detention is only permitted upon notice and

16 an opportunity to be heard. Because the Government never provided Luu with notice that his Order

17 of Supervision was revoked prior to re-detention, never conducted an informal interview or afforded

18 Luu an opportunity to be heard, and never sufficiently demonstrated the changed circumstances that

19 render his removal significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, Luu is thus likely to

20 succeed on the merits of hid due process claim. See Petition at 18; Reply at 6-7.

21 The Court’s conclusion is consistent with that of other district courts. Particularly instructive

22 is the Court’s approach in McSweeney v. Warden of the Otay Mesa Det. Facil., No. 25-CV-02488, 23 2025 WL 2998376 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2025). There, the Court found that a detention which did not 24 properly notify the petitioner of the reasons for revocation of release, or grant him an interview to 25 allow him to respond to the reasons for revocation, violated the petitioner’s due process rights. Id. at 26 *5–7. In McSweeney, it appears that the petitioner had received more notice than Luu has in this 27 case; there, the petitioner was sent a notice of the reasons for revocation of his release. Id. at *6. 28 Still, because there was no interview opportunity following that notice, the Court found that the 1 procedural deficiencies rose to the level of procedural due process violations. Id. In its words,

2 “Petitioner could not have meaningfully responded to the proffered reasons for revocation when he

3 had not yet even been informed of those reasons.” Id.

4 Today, the Court must determine whether Luu is likely to eventually prevail on the merits.

5 For the reasons described above, and because the Government never provided Luu with notice that

6 his Order of Supervision was revoked prior to re-detention, never conducted an informal interview

7 or afforded Luu an opportunity to be heard, or never sufficiently demonstrated the changed

8 circumstances that render his removal significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, the

9 Court finds that he is. See Petition at 18. In sum, the first Winter factor is met here under both of

10 Luu’s first two requests for habeas relief.5

11 ii. The second Winter factor, a demonstrated likelihood of irreparable harm

absent an injunction, is met. 12

13 To establish the second Winter requirement, Luu must demonstrate a likelihood that he will

14 suffer irreparable harm without a temporary restraining order. The Court finds that he has done so.

15 Here, Luu has “established a likelihood of irreparable harm by virtue of the fact that [he is]

16 likely to be unconstitutionally detained for an indeterminate period of time.” Hernandez v. Sessions,

17 872 F.3d 976, 994 (9th Cir. 2017). Luu argues that the Government has not complied with the legal

18 process that is due to him as a detained noncitizen. And “it is well established that the deprivation of

19 constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d

20 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). Moreover, Luu’s

21 ongoing detention of indeterminate length—which may lead to a deportation sometime in the future

22 to an undetermined country—inherently risks him irreparable harm, as it is not clear when he will be 23 24 5 Luu contends that he “plans to immediately move to re-open his immigration proceedings and to move to 25 vacate the removal order.” Petition at 2. Respondents argue that the Court cannot enjoin the Government from 26 removing Luu while Luu challenges a removal order by filing a motion to reopen. See Opp. at 14 (citing Rauda v. Jennings, 55 F.4th 773, 775 (9th Cir. 2022)). However, Luu’s challenge is not to the “Attorney 27 General's exercise of his discretion to execute [Luu’s] removal order, which [the Court has] no jurisdiction to review,” see Rauda, 55 F.4th at 778, but rather Luu is seeking to enjoin his removal only until the due process 28 and statutory procedural requirements are followed, see Petition at 22-23; Reply at 5 n.2. Thus, the Court has 1 processed, released, or removed. Respondents do not contest these arguments in their Opposition.

2 See generally Opp. Respondents only contend that Luu has not shown an irreparable harm if he was

3 transferred out of this District. See Opp. at 5 n.1. Luu has not addressed this argument and has thus

4 conceded it. See Reply at 8. However, because the Court has already found that Luu has a sufficient

5 likelihood of success on the merits of both of his challenges to his current detention—one of which

6 has a basis in Luu’s constitutional rights—the Court finds the second Winter factor is met.

7 iii. The third and fourth Winter factors, balancing the equities and considering the

public interest, are met. 8

9 When, as here, the nonmoving party is a governmental entity, the last two Winter factors

10 “merge.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). This Court then considers the third and fourth

11 factors—whether the “balance of equities” is in Luu’s favor and whether an injunction is in the

12 public interest—jointly. All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135.

13 The balance of equities does appear to tilt strongly in Luu’s favor. It is true, as Respondents

14 note, that the Government has a strong interest in the enforcement of federal immigration law. See

15 Opp. at 15. But the Government “cannot reasonably assert that it is harmed in any legally cognizable

16 sense” by being compelled to follow the law. Zepeda v. I.N.S., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983).

17 And, for related reasons, an injunction is in the public interest. “Public interest concerns are

18 implicated when a constitutional right has been violated, because all citizens have a stake in

19 upholding the Constitution.” Preminger v. Principi, 422 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 2005). In sum, the

20 third and fourth Winter factors are met here.

21 IV. Conclusion

22 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS that Luu’s Application for a 23 Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. No. 8) is GRANTED IN PART. 24 Luu’s request for a temporary restraining order is GRANTED. This Court will rule on the request for 25 a preliminary injunction following the Order to Show Cause hearing described below. 26 1. Respondents are ORDERED to release Petitioner from custody as soon as reasonably 27 practicable, and not redetain him without compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 241.4(l)(1) and 8 28 U.S.C. § 241.13(i); 1 2. Respondents shall show cause, in writing, as to why a preliminary injunction should not 2 issue in this case no later than fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order. Petitioner may 3 file a response no later than seven (7) days after Respondents’ filing; and 4 3. The parties shall meet and confer and file a joint status report regarding the Respondents’ 5 compliance with this Order by December 24, 2025. The joint status report shall also 6 address whether the habeas petition is moot. 7 8 || ITIS SO ORDERED.

10 Dated: December 11, 2025. 1] MAAME EWUSI-MENSAH FRIMPONG 12 United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28