1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 OKECHUKWU DESMOND AMADI, Case No.: 25-cv-3497-RSH-BJW

12 Petitioner,

ORDER:

13 v. (1) GRANTING MOTION TO 14 JEREMY CASEY, Warden, et al.,

APPOINT COUNSEL;

15 Respondents. (2) GRANTING MOTION TO 16

FILE SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF,

17 (3) DENYING MOTION FOR 18

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

19 ORDER; AND

20 (4) DIRECTING FURTHER 21 BRIEFING

22 [ECF Nos. 2, 4, 10, 11] 23

24 On December 8, 2025, petitioner Okechukwu Desmond Amadi filed pro se a petition 25 for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition”). ECF No. 1. 26 Petitioner, a citizen of Nigeria, is detained at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility in 27 Calexico, California. 28 1 On December 10, 2025, the Court set a briefing schedule. ECF No. 3. On December 2 15, 2025, Petitioner moved to file a supplemental brief, submitting the brief along with his 3 motion. ECF No. 10. On December 23, 2025, Respondents filed a return. ECF No. 13. 4 Petitioner has also filed an application for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”), 5 and a motion for appointment of counsel. ECF Nos. 2, 4, 11. 6 I. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 7 Petitioner moves for appointed counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B), which 8 allows courts to provide counsel for financially eligible persons seeking habeas relief under 9 § 2241 when the interests of justice so require. When deciding this issue, “the district court 10 must evaluate the likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability of the petitioner 11 to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” 12 Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983). Here, the Court determines that 13 Petitioner states at least a colorable claim for relief as set forth below, and concludes that 14 given the complexity of the issues involved, the case would benefit from appointment of 15 counsel. Petitioner represents that he has spoken several times with an attorney from 16 Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., who has expressed willingness to represent 17 Petitioner if appointed. ECF No. 11 at 1-2. 18 Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion for appoint of counsel [ECF Nos. 4, 11] is 19 GRANTED. the Court APPOINTS Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., to represent 20 Petitioner in connection with his petition. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to provide a 21 copy of this order to Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc. 22 II. SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 23 The Court grants Petitioner’s unopposed motion to file a supplemental brief. ECF 24 No. 10. 25 III. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 26 Petitioner’s application for a TRO is summary in nature, consisting of a list of 27 requested relief. ECF No. 2. The Court denies the application without prejudice. The Court 28 expects to move toward an expeditious resolution of Petitioner’s case on the merits 1 following adequate briefing. 2 IV. FURTHER BRIEFING 3 Among the issues raised in the Petition is the following. 4 Respondents assert that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 5 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). ECF No. 13 at 3, 6.1 That statute provides in relevant part, “in the 6 case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer 7 determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be 8 admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” 8 9 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Respondents contend that Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” 10 because, since he last arrived in the United States September 28, 2017, he was paroled into 11 the United States for purposes of criminal prosecution, and was then prosecuted and served 12 time in federal criminal custody, but never admitted. ECF No. 13 at 7. Respondents cite 8 13 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v), which states: “An alien lawfully admitted for permanent 14 residence in the United States shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the United 15 States for purposes of the immigration laws unless the alien … has committed an offense 16 identified in section 1182(a)(2) of this title, unless since such offense the alien has been 17 granted relief under section 1182(h) or 1229b(a) of this title.” Respondents state, 18 “Petitioner was paroled into the United States for charges of money laundering and then 19 was convicted of money laundering and conspiracy to commit money laundering.” ECF 20 No. 13 at 7. Respondents do not further address how the charges or conviction establish 21 that Petitioner, despite being a lawful permanent resident, was an “applicant for admission” 22 as of September 28, 2017. 23 Petitioner’s brief relies extensively on the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Lau v. 24 25 26 1 Respondents also assert that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 27 a separate provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B). ECF No. 13 at 7. Respondents do not specify which of the mandatory detention regimes within that subparagraph apply to 28 1 || Bondi, 130 F.4th 42 (2d Cir. 2025), which stated, “we see no statutory basis to conclude 2 DHS is allowed to use a subsequent conviction to provide an after-the-fact justification 3 ||for its prior decision to parole an LPR upon reentry.” /d. at 49. The Second Circuit’s 4 || opinion thereby disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Vasquez Romero v. Garland, 5 F.3d 656, 664 (9th Cir. 2021). In Vasquez Romero, the Ninth Circuit held that “to meet 6 burden of proving that a returning LPR is seeking an admission to the United States 7 |;under § 1101(a)(13)(C), the government may rely on a conviction obtained after the LPR 8 paroled into the United States but before the LPR is placed in removal proceedings.” 999 9 ||F.3d at 668. As the Second Circuit noted, however, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion was 10 || explicitly premised on deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the statute pursuant to the 11 || Chevron doctrine—deference that is no longer due. 12 Respondents’ brief does not address Lau or Vasquez Romero, neither of which was 13 habeas case. Respondents’ brief also does not address Petitioner’s argument that his 14 ||money laundering conviction does not amount to a “crime involving moral turpitude,” 8 15 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)()(D), for purposes of determining whether a LPR should be deemed 16 be seeking admission. Respondents may be relying on a different provision to establish 17 Petitioner should be deemed an applicant for admission, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)() 18 || (pertaining to money laundering), but they do not say so. 19 The Court would benefit from briefing on the foregoing issue from both Parties, in 20 || addition to other arguments the Parties see fit to raise. 21 Accordingly, the Court directs further briefing from both Parties as follows: 22 Petitioner’s supplemental brief shall be filed no later than January 15, 2026. 23 Respondents’ supplemental brief shall be filed no later than January 26, 2026. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 || Dated: December 24, 2025 ‘ 26 Jokut ¢ Howe 17 Hon. Robert S. Huie United States District Judge 28