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8 United States District Court 9 Central District of California

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11 YESSENIA ALVAREZ CABANILLAS, Case № 5:25-cv-03484-ODW (PVCx)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING UNOPPOSED

13 v. EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

14 GEO GROUP, INC. et al., ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW

15 Defendants. CAUSE [2]

16 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 Petitioner Yessenia Alvarez Cabanillas brings this petition for a writ of habeas 19 corpus against Respondents Geo Group, Inc., a Florida corporation, operating the 20 Adelanto Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Processing Center; Moises 21 Becerra, ICE Acting Field Office Director; Kristi Noem, Secretary of the Department 22 of Homeland Security (“DHS”); and Pamela Bondi, U.S. Attorney General. (Pet. ¶¶ 1, 23 11–15, Dkt. No. 1.) Petitioner moves ex parte for an order requiring her release from 24 custody. (Ex Parte Appl. (“TRO”) Dkt. No. 2; Proposed Order ISO TRO (“Proposed 25 Order”) 1, Dkt. No. 2-6.) Petitioner also requests that the Court enjoin Respondents 26 from transferring Petitioner outside of this District pending the Court’s final 27 adjudication of this matter. (Proposed Order at 2.) Respondents do not timely oppose 28 the request. For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS the TRO. 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 Petitioner is a citizen of Peru. (Pet. ¶ 16.) On September 15, 2023, she entered 3 the United States and was apprehended near Nogales, Arizona. (Id.) At that time, she 4 was detained overnight and released the next morning on her own recognizance 5 pursuant to the Attorney General’s discretionary authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 6 (Id. ¶¶ 2, 16.) The conditions of her release required her to check-in with ICE. (Id. 7 ¶ 2.) DHS subsequently served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear and placed her in 8 removal proceedings. (Id. ¶ 17.) Her master calendar hearing is scheduled for June 4, 9 2026, before the immigration court in San Francisco, California. (Id. ¶ 17.) 10 Petitioner complied with the terms of her initial release. (Id. ¶ 18.) However, 11 on October 15, 2025, Petitioner missed a single ICE check-in appointment. (Id.) On 12 December 15, 2025, Petitioner appeared voluntarily before ICE officers, accompanied 13 by her attorney, to explain her failure to check-in. (Id. ¶ 19.) During that meeting, 14 Petitioner told the ICE officer that she missed her October check-in because her 15 daughter in Peru suffered an injury and Petitioner experienced significant distress 16 because of her daughter’s injury. (Id. ¶ 20.) Petitioner’s counsel also explained that 17 Petitioner experienced anxiety and depression in October, for which she was taking 18 medication and that affected her mental clarity during that time. (Id.) 19 Nevertheless, that same day, ICE told Petitioner that she would be detained for 20 missing the October check-in. (Id.) Petitioner’s counsel requested a lesser sanction, 21 such as increased reporting requirements or an ankle monitor, but ICE officers 22 responded that no alternative was available. (Id. ¶ 21.) ICE stated that “the decision 23 has already been made,” and that because “Petitioner waited too long between 24 [the] October and December check-ins, agency policy required detention.” (Id.) 25 Without prior notice or a hearing, and without any determination by a neutral 26 decision-maker that re-detention was warranted, the DHS “abruptly re-arrested 27 Petitioner and deprived her of her liberty.” (Id. ¶ 1.) 28 1 ICE told Petitioner that she would be transferred to Bakersfield, but that she 2 might be subject to further transfer depending on bed availability. (Id. ¶ 22.) ICE 3 then formally arrested Petitioner. (Id. ¶ 24.) On December 19, 2025, Petitioner’s 4 counsel was unable to locate her using the ICE detainee locator system. (Id. ¶ 26.) 5 Later that day, Petitioner’s counsel was informed that Petitioner is being held at 6 Adelanto ICE Processing Center. (Id.) 7 Based on these allegations, on December 22, 2025, Petitioner filed a Petition for 8 Writ of Habeas Corpus on the grounds that her detention violates her Fifth 9 Amendment right to due process and 8 U.S.C § 1226(a). (Id. at 21–22.) That same 10 day, Petitioner filed this Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and 11 Preliminary Injunction. (TRO.) Petitioner requests that the Court order Respondents 12 to release Petitioner from custody. (Proposed Order 1.) Petitioner also requests that 13 the Court enjoin Respondents from relocating Petitioner outside of the Central District 14 of California pending final resolution of this case. (Id. at 2.) Finally, Petitioner 15 requests that the Court issue a preliminary injunction in this case. (Id.) Respondents 16 failed to timely oppose. 17 III. LEGAL STANDARD 18 A temporary restraining order (“TRO”) is an “extraordinary remedy that may 19 only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” 20 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). The standard for issuing a 21 TRO is “substantially identical” to that for a preliminary injunction. Stuhlbarg Int’l 22 Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). Pursuant to 23 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 65, a court may grant preliminary injunctive 24 relief to prevent “immediate and irreparable injury.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). To obtain 25 relief, a plaintiff must meet the “Winter” factors: (1) the plaintiff “is likely to succeed 26 on the merits”; (2) the plaintiff “is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 27 preliminary relief”; (3) “the balance of equities tips in [the plaintiff’s] favor”; and 28 1 (4) “an injunction is in the public interest.” Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los 2 Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). 3 Courts in the Ninth Circuit evaluate the Winter factors on a sliding scale 4 approach, such that “a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing 5 of another.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). 6 Under the sliding scale approach, a plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction if he 7 has raised “serious questions going to the merits . . . and the balance of hardships tips 8 sharply in [his] favor,” “so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of 9 irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 1135. 10 IV. DISCUSSION 11 The Court first considers whether it has jurisdiction, then turns to the merits of 12 Petitioner’s TRO. 13 A. Jurisdiction 14 The Court must first consider whether it has jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s 15 TRO. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430–31 16 (2007) (“[A] federal court generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first 17 determining that it has jurisdiction.”). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), a court does not 18 have jurisdiction to review “any cause or claim” challenging the execution of 19 “removal orders.” However, a “district court may consider a purely legal question that 20 does not challenge” the execution of a removal order. United States v. Hovsepian, 21 359 F.3d 1144, 1155 (9th Cir. 2004). 22 Here, Petitioner raises a question of law as to whether her detention complies 23 with due process and the requirements proscribed in § 1226(a). (TRO 5–9.) She does 24 not challenge the Attorney General’s discretionary authority to execute removal 25 proceedings. (See generally id.) Moreover, the Court does not review or disturb 26 Petitioner’s underlying order of removal. Instead, the Court confines its analysis to 27 the narrow legal question properly before it: whether Petitioner’s detention under 28 § 1226(a) entitles her to release from custody. As the Court addresses only the legality 1 of Petitioner’s detention—not the merits, validity, or execution of her removal order— 2 the Court has jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s TRO. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1155. 3 Moreover, under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Court has authority to adjudicate a 4 habeas corpus petition alleging that a person is being held in custody “in violation of 5 the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” “[T]he essence of habeas 6 corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that 7 the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. 8 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). Here, Petitioner seeks immediate release from 9 custody, which she contends violates her constitutional rights. (Pet. ¶¶ 33–35.) Thus, 10 Petitioner properly invokes the Court’s habeas jurisdiction. 11 B. Merits of the TRO: Winter Factors 12 Having determined that the Court has jurisdiction over Petitioner’s TRO, the 13 Court now turns to its merits under the Winter factors. 14 1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 15 The first Winter factor “is the most important,” and “is especially important 16 when a plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation and injury.” Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 17 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2023). Petitioner argues that she is likely to succeed on the 18 merits because her continued detention violates her due process rights. (TRO 6–8.) 19 She contends that Respondents failed to identify “any change in circumstances 20 warranting revocation of Petitioner’s release,” such that Petitioner is “a flight risk or 21 danger to the community.” (Id. at 6.) Petitioner argues that her “preemptive detention 22 undermines the procedural safeguards designed to protect released individuals, 23 particularly when they have consistently complied with reporting requirements.” (Id.) 24 The Court agrees that Petitioner’s detention violates her due process rights. The 25 Fifth Amendment protects all persons from being “deprived of life, liberty, or 26 property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. It is settled law that 27 noncitizens within the United States are entitled to due process “whether their 28 presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 1 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); see Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (“It is well 2 established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in the 3 context of [removal] proceedings.”). The government’s release of an individual from 4 detention creates “an implicit promise’ that the individual’s liberty will be revoked 5 only if they fail to abide by the conditions of their release.” Calderon v. Kaiser, 6 No. 25-cv-06695-AMO, 2025 WL 2430609, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2025) (quoting 7 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)). 8 Here, when Petitioner was released from initial detention, she acquired a liberty 9 interest which entitles her to due process. Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1093 10 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025) (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that 11 individuals who have been released from custody, even where such release is 12 conditional, have a liberty interest in their continued liberty.”). Thus, the procedures 13 used against her must adequately protect that interest. See Shaughnessy v. United 14 States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (holding that once an alien “passed 15 through our gates,” they “may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to 16 traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law”). As 17 Respondents detained Petitioner “without notice, without a hearing, and without any 18 determination by a neutral decision-maker that a material change in circumstances 19 rendered her a flight risk or danger to the community,” (TRO 5–6), Petitioner shows a 20 likelihood of success on the merits of her due process claim. 21 2. Likelihood of Irreparable Harm 22 As to the second Winter factor, Petitioner contends that she will suffer 23 irreparable harm in the absence of a TRO because she will continue to be unlawfully 24 detained. (Id. at 8.) “It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights 25 ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 26 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). “[I]n cases 27 involving a constitutional claim, a likelihood of success on the merits usually 28 establishes irreparable harm.” Baird, 81 F.4th at 1048. 1 Here, as discussed above, Petitioner brings a constitutional due process claim 2 which is likely to succeed on the merits. Accordingly, the Court finds that she has 3 established irreparable harm, and thus the second Winter factor also weighs in favor of 4 temporary injunctive relief. 5 3. Balance of Equities and Public Interest 6 The last two Winter factors “merge when the Government is the opposing 7 party.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). “Generally, public interest 8 concerns are implicated when a constitutional right has been violated, because all 9 citizens have a stake in upholding the Constitution.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 10 976, 996 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Preminger v. Principi, 422 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 11 2005)). “[T]he public has a strong interest in upholding procedural protections against 12 unlawful detention,” as well as “in the efficient allocation of the government’s fiscal 13 resources.” Vargas v. Jennings, No. 20-cv-5785-PJH, 2020 WL 5074312, at *4 14 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2020). 15 The balance of hardships tips strongly in Petitioner’s favor as she would suffer 16 great hardship if the Court were to deny her TRO. See Cottrell, 632 F.3d at 1134–35 17 (requiring the balance of hardships to “tip sharply” in the moving party’s favor). 18 Specifically, she would continue to be detained for an indefinite amount of time 19 without due process, despite her willingness to cooperate and follow reporting 20 requirements. (TRO 8.). In contrast, Respondents “cannot reasonably assert” they are 21 “harmed in any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from constitutional 22 violations.” Zepeda v. U.S. Immigr. & Nat. Servs., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983). 23 Thus, the last two Winter factors also weigh in favor of an injunction. 24 Having found that all Winter factors weigh in favor of injunctive relief, the 25 Court GRANTS Petitioner’s TRO. 26 27 28 1 Vv. CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s TRO. (Dkt. 3 || No. 4.) It is hereby ORDERED that: 4 e Respondents shall IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Petitioner; 5 e Respondents are ENJOINED from re-detaining Petitioner absent 6 compliance with constitutional protections, which include, at a minimum, 7 pre-deprivation notice describing the change in circumstances requiring 8 her re-detention and a timely hearing. At any such hearing, Respondents 9 shall bear the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, 10 that Petitioner poses a risk of flight or danger to the community; 11 e Respondents are ENJOINED from relocating Petitioner outside of the 12 Central District of California pending final resolution of this case; and 13 e Respondents shall SHOW CAUSE, in writing only, to be received by the 14 Court no later than December 31, 2025, as to why the Court should not 15 issue a preliminary injunction in this case. Petitioner may file a reply by 16 January 3, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. The Court SETS a hearing on the 17 preliminary injunction for January 6, 2026, at 11:00 a.m., via Zoom. 18 a , 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. Jie g 20 December 24, 2025 é j 3 LL A

1 OTIS D. GHT, II

UNITED STATES, DISTRICT JUDGE

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