I. BACKGROUND

23 The Court summarized the relevant factual background of this case in its previous Order 24 dismissing Estech’s original complaint. MTD Order at 1–5, ECF No. 50. The relevant facts 25 remain the same. In the FAC, Estech reasserts the claims for direct and indirect infringement the 26 Court previously dismissed. Attached to the FAC are three new exhibits that appear to be claim 27 1 charts1 comparing the claims of the Asserted Patents to the Accused Instrumentalities.2 FAC, Exs. 2 A, B, C, ECF Nos. 52-1, 52-2, 52-3. 3 II. LEGAL STANDARD 4 For the FAC to survive Zoom’s 12(b)(6) motion, it must allege sufficient facts from which 5 the Court can reasonably infer that Zoom is liable for the alleged patent infringement. See 6 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 7 570 (2007)). Courts will accept well-pled allegations in the complaint as true, but unsupported 8 legal conclusions are not afforded the same treatment. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 9 550 U.S. at 555). As such, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by 10 mere conclusory statements” are insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Id. 11 Likewise, in the patent context, a plaintiff does not assert a plausible claim for 12 infringement by merely reciting the elements of patent claims and concluding that the accused 13 product practices those elements. Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Corp. of Am., 4 F.4th 1342, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 14 2021). “A plaintiff is not required to plead infringement on an element-by-element basis,” but the 15 claim must be supported by factual allegations that, when taken as true, give rise to a plausible 16 inference of infringement beyond the speculative level. Id. at 1352 (citing Nalco Co. v. Chem- 17 Mod, LLC, 883 F.3d 1337, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). “The level of detail required in any given case 18 will vary depending upon a number of factors, including the complexity of the technology, the 19 materiality of any given element to practicing the asserted claim(s), and the nature of the allegedly 20 infringing device.” Id. at 1353. 21 III. DISCUSSION 22 In the MTD Order, the Court dismissed Estech’s infringement claims with leave to amend 23 to “include additional factual allegations to support a plausible claim of infringement beyond just 24

25 1 Because Estech’s claim charts forms the basis of its infringement claims, the Court will consider them as incorporated into the FAC by reference. See Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc, 899 26 F.3d 988, 1002 (9th Cir. 2018). 2 “Accused Instrumentalities” has the same meaning as in the FAC—i.e., Zoom’s 27 telecommunications and information handling systems accused of infringing the Asserted Patents. See FAC ¶¶ 21–24. 1 identifying the products and claiming they infringe” and to correct “the conclusory nature of the 2 allegations which merely track the claim language.” MTD Order at 6–9. Zoom argues that Estech 3 has not remedied these deficiencies in the FAC. 4 A. Direct Infringement 5 A party who “makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells” a patented invention “without authority” 6 directly infringes a patent. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). To state a claim for direct infringement, a plaintiff 7 must plead facts that give the alleged infringer fair notice of the claim and the accused 8 misconduct. Disc Disease Sols. Inc. v. VGH Sols., Inc., 888 F.3d 1256, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 9 Zoom contends that the FAC fails to state a claim for direct infringement of any of the Asserted 10 Patents for three reasons: (1) Estech does not explain how any of the cited facts and screenshots in 11 its claim charts meet text of the asserted claims; (2) the claim charts fail to distinguish between 12 any individual Accused Instrumentality or combination of Accused Instrumentalities in asserting 13 infringement; and (3) none of the materials cited in the claim charts supports a plausible inference 14 of infringement. The Court takes each argument in turn. 15 1. Tying Screenshots to Claim Language 16 Zoom acknowledges that the new claim charts accompanying the FAC are replete with 17 screenshots but argues that Estech fails to explain how these screenshots meet the limitations of 18 the asserted claims. Zoom contends that without such explanation, the screenshots do not supply 19 the necessary factual support to state a claim for direct infringement. 20 Zoom equates Estech’s approach to that in Chapterhouse, LLC v. Shopify, Inc., No. 2:18- 21 CV-00300, 2018 WL 6981828 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2018). In Chapterhouse, the court dismissed a 22 claim for direct infringement that did little more than recite the elements of the asserted claims, 23 conclude that the accused products practice those elements, and provide screenshots of the 24 defendant’s website with no further allegations. Id. at *2. The court acknowledged that 25 “screenshots may be useful in laying out a plausible allegation of patent infringement,” but found 26 the complaint deficient because the plaintiff had failed to explain “how the screenshots meet the 27 text of the exemplary claim in order to lay out sufficient factual allegations which might permit the 1 Court to find that the Iqbal/Twombly standard is met.” Id. 2 Here, too, Estech uses screenshots of Zoom and third-party documents to support its claim 3 for direct infringement. The FAC’s claim charts include screenshots for each claim limitation, but 4 Estech does not explain how the content of the screenshots matches up with the language of the 5 claim limitations. Take claim limitation 13[e] of the ’298 Patent, for example. Limitation 13[e] 6 requires, in part, “means for displaying on the first IP telephone a list of telephone destinations 7 stored in the second IP server.” FAC, Ex. A at 65. After stating that this limitation is met, Estech 8 attaches screenshots of Zoom support pages titled “Company directory search,” “How to use the 9 Contacts menu,” “Encryption,” and “Searching Corporate Directory (LDAP) Contact.” Id. at 66– 10 68. Yet, Estech does not explicitly state why it has included these screenshots or what in the 11 screenshots correspond with the claim language. Nor is it readily apparent why a document 12 concerning “Encryption” is at all relevant to Limitation 13[e]. 13 But that is where the similarities to Chapterhouse end. Unlike the complaint in that case, 14 Estech also includes narrative explanations of how parts of Zoom’s system correspond to claim 15 language. Returning to the example of Limitation 13[e] in the ’298 Patent, Estech alleges that 16 “[t]he ‘telephone destinations’ are the contacts (names with numbers or extensions) stored in 17 Zoom’s system. The phone, over the WAN, can request these entries (often via a search query). 18 In response, Zoom’s server can send back a list of matching contacts, which the phone then 19 displays to the user on its screen.” Id. at 68. This description compares the language of 20 Limitation 13[e] to corresponding parts of Zoom’s system, supporting an inference that Zoom 21 practices the asserted claim. To be sure, these allegations remain untethered to Estech’s 22 screenshots. But screenshots aside, Estech articulates a cohesive theory of infringement that 23 matches up the language of the asserted claims with corresponding parts of the Accused 24 Instrumentalities. 25 Indeed, in later cases the Chapterhouse court has warned against over-reliance on 26 Chapterhouse and limited the case’s holding to its facts. See, e.g., Liberty Peak Ventures, LLC v. 27 Regions Fin. Corp., No. 2:21-CV-00417, 2022 WL 798030, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2022); 1 Fractus, S.A. v. TCL Corp., No. 2:20-cv-097, 2021 WL 2483155, at *2–3 (E.D. Tex. June 2, 2 2021). Chapterhouse presented a particularly egregious example of a complaint devoid of any 3 factual allegations apart from screenshots, and subsequent cases have made clear that failure to 4 explain screenshots is not by itself fatal to a complaint. Fractus is especially instructive on this 5 point. There, the court found that the plaintiff had adequately pled a direct infringement claim 6 where the complaint “[did] not list each element and sub-element of the asserted claims and map 7 them on to the accused products—i.e., it [did] not include a claim chart—[but did] describe the 8 accused products in a manner that corresponds the asserted claims.” Fractus, 2021 WL 2483155 9 at *3 (noting that the plaintiff “includes both images of the accused structures and descriptive 10 paragraphs”). Estech’s FAC arguably goes beyond the complaint found to be sufficient in Fractus 11 because it includes claim charts breaking down the asserted claims into their respective elements. 12 The relevant pleading standard does not require Estech to prove that its theory of 13 infringement at the pleading stage with detailed explanations of how screenshots demonstrate 14 infringement. Nalco, 883 F.3d at 1350 (citation omitted). Rather, to survive dismissal, a plaintiff 15 must plausihbly describe how the accused products correspond to the language of the asserted 16 claims such that the defendant is on notice of what activity is accused of infringement. See 17 Lifetime, 869 F.3d at 1379. Estech has done so here. Accordingly, the lack of explanation as to 18 how the screenshots meet the language of the asserted claims does not doom the FAC at this stage. 19 2. Supporting Plausible Inference of Infringement 20 Next, Zoom argues that the other factual allegations in the FAC do not support a plausible 21 inference that Zoom infringes the Asserted Patents for several other reasons. Zoom points to 22 examples of key claim limitations for which it contends the FAC’s allegations are insufficient. 23 a. ’298 Patent 24 Zoom’s motion focuses first on Limitation 13[b] of the ’298 Patent. Limitation 13[b] 25 requires “second and third telephone extensions coupled to a second IP server within a second 26 LAN.” FAC, Ex. A at 36. Estech identifies five candidates for the “second and third telephone 27 extensions” in Zoom’s system: dial-in telephone numbers for Zoom Meetings, “Call Me” callback 1 numbers, voicemail access extensions, automated attendant extensions, and interactive voice 2 response extensions. Id. at 47–49. Estech alleges3 that these extensions are held in Zoom’s call 3 controller (the “second IP server”) residing within Zoom’s cloud network (the “second LAN”). 4 Opp. at 10. Zoom argues that the documents Estech cites in its claim chart fail to demonstrate that 5 any of the proffered examples of “second and third telephone extensions” in Zoom’s system are 6 “coupled” to Zoom’s cloud network, as required by Limitation 13[b]. 7 The Court disagrees. As explained above, Estech does not need to prove its allegations to 8 survive a motion to dismiss; it need only show that infringement is plausible. Nalco, 883 F.3d at 9 1350. Estech’s claim chart provides a narrative description explaining that Zoom’s VoIP phones 10 register to Zoom’s cloud, and each user’s telephone extension is held within a call controller 11 within Zoom’s cloud network. FAC, Ex. A at 36. This explanation plausibly satisfies the 12 “coupling” aspect of Limitation 13[b]. 13 However, Estech’s infringement theory faces another, bigger issue: it is implausible when 14 applied to the ’298 Patent’s other claim limitations. Limitation 13[g], for instance, requires 15 “means for displaying on the first IP telephone a list of LANs coupled to the WAN, including the 16 second and third LANs.” FAC, Ex. A at 74–75. Under Estech’s theory, limitation 13[g] requires 17 that the first IP telephone display Zoom’s cloud network (the “second LAN”) and another “third 18 LAN.” The problem with this is that Estech alleges, “Zoom’s cloud operates as a central PBX hub 19 for all users.” Opp. at 10 (emphasis added). If this were the case, displaying Zoom’s cloud 20 network (the “second LAN”) would display every user in every LAN, so it would be redundant 21 and unecessary for Zoom’s system to display other LANs or for there to be any distinction 22 between second and third LANs. Estech’s allegations and arguments do not cure this apparent 23 contradiction, which renders its direct infringement claim implausible. See ALD Soc., LLC v. 24

25 3 In its reply brief, Zoom notes that Estech asserts infringement theories in its opposition brief that 26 are not alleged in the FAC. There do seem to be some discrepancies between what Estech argues in its brief and the factual allegations in the FAC, but they do not change the result. So, for 27 purposes of this analysis, the Court considers the version of Estech’s infringement theory as set forth in Estech’s opposition brief. 1 Verkada, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 3d 972, 978 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (finding that an infringement theory 2 based on an implausible construction failed to state a claim for patent infringement). Accordingly, 3 Estech has not plausibly alleged infringement of the ’298 Patent. 4 b. ’684 Patent 5 As for the ’684 Patent, Zoom contends that the FAC lacks factual allegations sufficient to 6 infer that Zoom practices key limitations of Claim 42. More specifically, Zoom argues that Estech 7 has not plausibly alleged that Zoom practices a “throttling step” that “further comprises the step of 8 adjusting a level of throttling of the data in response to the mode level included in the throttling 9 signal” (in Claim 41, from which asserted Claim 42 depends) and further “setting the mode level 10 to a most aggressive mode” (Limitation 42[a]). FAC, Ex. B at 50–55. In the FAC, Estech cites a 11 Zoom article titled “Implementing Quality of Service (QoS) for Zoom Phone” and alleges that 12 Zoom’s QoS protocol implements the “throttling” step via standard session initiation protocol 13 (“SIP”) features for overload control. E.g., id. at 52–53. According to Estech, Zoom’s article 14 demonstrates that Zoom’s implementation of QoS prioritizes Zoom Phone traffic over other 15 network traffic, which is effectively a throttling step. Estech further avers that Zoom uses SIP 16 Overload Control features to set levels or “modes” of throttling up to a “most aggressive” level. 17 Id. 18 These allegations come close to sufficiently stating a claim for direct infringement of the 19 ‘684 Patent but still fall short. Estech’s argument that Zoom’s QoS protocol is equivalent to a 20 “throttling” step is well taken. However, even if the SIP Overload Control features enable the 21 setting of “modes” of throttling up to a “most aggressive” mode, Estech does not allege that Zoom 22 integrates those features of SIP in the Accused Instrumentalities. Nor does Estech allege facts to 23 support its apparent assumption that Zoom must implement SIP Overload Control simply because 24 such features are industry standard. Indeed, while the allegations show that it is possible Zoom 25 could practice the claim requirements, they do not rise to the level of demonstrating it is plausible 26 Zoom does so. This falls short of the relevant pleading standard set forth in Twombly/Iqbal. See 27 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a 1 defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to 2 relief.” (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)). 3 c. ’699 Patent 4 Zoom likewise argues that Estech’s claim chart is insufficient to support an inference that 5 Zoom performs Limitation 1[h] of the ’699 Patent. Limitation 1[h] requires “streaming voice data 6 containing the voice mail box to the telecommunications device over the audio path.” FAC, Ex. C 7 at 34. In alleging that Zoom practices this limitation, Estech relies on a single Zoom support page 8 titled “Zoom Phone Certified Hardware” that concerns encryption of voice call media on SIP 9 devices. Id. This document, according to Estech, shows that Zoom’s system streams encrypted 10 voice data from a voice mail box to telecommunication devices like phones. But as Zoom 11 correctly points out, the page only concerns streaming real-time phone calls, not asynchronous 12 voicemails. It does not logically follow that because Zoom streams voice calls that it does the 13 same for voicemails. 14 Estech counters that release notes for third-party AudioCode hardware phones cited 15 elsewhere in the ’699 Patent claim chart demonstrate that Limitation 1[h] is met. Opp. at 19–20 16 (citing FAC, Ex. C at 35–36). Estech claims this document shows that in Zoom’s system, 17 “voicemail is stored on a server and the phone retrieves it over a SIP/RTP session.” FAC, Ex. C at 18 35. As an initial matter, it is unclear whether Zoom can be held liable for direct infringement 19 based on AudioCode’s hardware phones. But assuming that it can, the Court reads Estech’s cited 20 document differently. While it does discuss voicemail capabilities, the document does not 21 reference any feature that allows for live streaming of voicemails from a server to a phone. 22 Instead, the cited portion of the release notes state that “SIP device users can listen electronically 23 stored voice messages that callers leave for them.” ECF No. 69-2 at 55. This statement says 24 nothing of users’ ability to stream voicemails in real time from a separate server and could just as 25 well mean that users can download voicemails to their phones for later asynchronous listening. 26 Estech does not allege other facts that support its conclusion that Zoom practices Limitation 1[h]. 27 As such, Zoom has not plausibly alleged infringement of the ’699 Patent. 3. Distinguishing Amongst Accused Instrumentalities 1 Finally, Zoom contends that the FAC fails to state a claim for infringement because it does 2 not distinguish between the various Accused Instrumentalities. Estech accuses numerous products 3 or services by name, as well as other unnamed “products and services that incorporate the same or 4 similar technology, that employ VoIP to perform various functions.” FAC ¶ 21. These products 5 and services cover a wide range of functionalities, ranging from hardware phones to software and 6 network services. According to Zoom, this mixing and matching of different Accused 7 Instrumentalities is insufficient to make a plausible claim of infringement, particularly because the 8 Accused Instrumentalities have a diverse range of different features and functionalities. 9 The Court agrees. District court authority regarding how specifically a plaintiff must 10 identify the products or services alleged to infringe their patents somewhat varies, with some 11 courts requiring more specificity and others less. See Pat. Harbor, LLC v. DreamWorks 12 Animation SKG, Inc., No. 6:11-CV-229, 2012 WL 10978964, at *3 & nn. 3, 4 (E.D. Tex. July 27, 13 2012) (collecting cases and noting that “[s]ome courts require plaintiffs to identify specific 14 products or services while others require the identification of a general category of products”); 15 Bender v. LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc., No. C 09-02114 JF (PVT), 2010 WL 889541, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. 16 Mar. 11, 2010) (similar). However, courts consistently require at least enough specificity to put 17 the defendant on notice as to what it must defend. Pat. Harbor, 2012 WL 10978964 at *3 (“The 18 required detail level of the description is dictated by the facts and circumstances surrounding the 19 action such that the complaint, taken as a whole, puts the defendant on notice of what it is 20 supposed to defend.”); Bender, 2010 WL 889541 at *5 (finding persuasive “those decisions 21 requiring enough specificity to give the defendant notice of what products or aspects of products 22 allegedly infringe”). 23 Here, Estech purports to err on the side of more specificity by identifying Zoom products 24 and services by name. Yet by identifying a large swath of different Zoom products and services 25 and not distinguishing between them, Estech fails to give Zoom sufficient notice of the conduct of 26 which it is being accused. Estech asserts, without explanation, that different products meet 27 1 different claim elements in the same asserted claim, which is implausible given the varying and 2 wide-ranging features and functionalities of the Accused Instrumentalities. See TeleSign Corp. v. 3 Twilio, No. 16-2106-PSG (SSx), 2016 WL 4703873, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2016); Geovector 4 Corp. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 16-CV-02463-WHO, 2017 WL 76950, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 5 2017). Moreover, Estech does not squarely address this argument in its opposition, giving the 6 Court no reason to reach a different outcome. Failure to distinguish between the Accused 7 Instrumentalities is thus another basis for dismissing Estech’s direct infringement claim. 8 * * * 9 In sum, Estech fails to plausibly allege that the Accused Instrumentalities infringe. The 10 Court thus GRANTS Zoom’s motion to dismiss the claim for direct infringement. The Court is 11 somewhat skeptical that Estech will be able to cure the pleading deficiencies the Court identifies 12 in this Order, but nonetheless GRANTS leave to amend out of an abundance of caution. 13 B. Indirect and Willful Infringement 14 Having failed to allege any plausible claim for direct infringement of the Asserted Patents, 15 Estech’s indirect and willful infringement claims also fail. See e.Digital Corp. v. iBaby Labs, Inc., 16 No. 15-CV-05790, 2016 WL 4427209, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2016) (dismissing indirect 17 infringement claim where complaint failed to state direct infringement claim); see also Yangtze 18 Memory Techs. Co., Ltd. v. Micron Tech., Inc., No. 23-CV-05792, 2024 WL 3422598, at *3 (N.D. 19 Cal. July 16, 2024) (dismissing willful infringement claim where complaint failed to state a claim 20 for direct infringement). The Court therefore GRANTS Zoom’s motion as to Estech’s claim for 21 indirect infringement of the Asserted Patents. 22 IV. CONCLUSION 23 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Zoom’s motion. The Court further grants 24 Estech leave to amend, and any amended complaint must be filed within 21 days of this Order. 25 26 27 1 IT IS SO ORDERED. 2 Dated: December 26, 2025 3 4

EDWARD J. DAVILA

5 United States District Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 a 12

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS