1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JAMES SVED, Case No. 1:25-cv-01914 JLT SAB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

13 v. (Doc. 7) 14 ARAMARK SERVICES, INC., and 15 DOES 1-20, inclusive, 16 Defendants. 17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 Plaintiff filed this action pro se on December 11, 2025, in Mariposa County Superior 20 Court, alleging, among other things, that he was terminated in retaliation for complaining about 21 unsafe conditions in workplace housing maintained by Defendants and for requesting medical 22 and/or housing-related accommodations for his spouse, who was injured in or near their 23 workplace housing. (See generally Doc. 1-2.) On December 17, 2025, Defendants removed the 24 case to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. 1.) On December 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed 25 a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO), seeking (1) “an immediate stay [of] 26 enforcement of the December 30, 2025 move-out deadline imposed on Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s 27 spouse”; (2) that Defendants be required to pay for temporary housing accommodations for 28 Plaintiff’s spouse through late January 2026 and temporary “corporate or extended-stay” housing 1 for up to 60 days in a location with reasonable access to medical care; and (3) that Defendants 2 reimburse Plaintiff for housing-related expenses incurred as a result of Defendants’ “failure to 3 timely provide ADA-appropriate housing following the injury.” (Doc. 7 at 2.) 4 For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that, on the present record, Plaintiffs have 5 not established irreparable injury sufficient to justify emergency injunctive relief. The Court 6 therefore DENIES the TRO request1 without prejudice. 7 II. STANDARD OF DECISION 8 The standard for issuing a TRO is the same as the standard for issuing a preliminary 9 injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n. 7 (9th Cir. 10 2001) (explaining that the analysis for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions is 11 “substantially identical”). When seeking a TRO or PI, plaintiffs must establish: (1) they are 12 “likely to succeed on the merits” of their claims, (2) they are “likely to suffer irreparable harm in 13 the absence of a preliminary injunction,” (3) “the balance of equities tips in [their] favor,” and (4) 14 “an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 15 (2008). The moving party has the burden to “make a showing on all four prongs” of the Winter 16 test to obtain a preliminary injunction. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 17 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus, the moving party has “the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. 18 Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997); Hecox v. Little, 104 F.4th 1061, 1073 (9th Cir. 2023). The 19 Court may weigh the request for a preliminary injunction with a sliding-scale approach. Alliance, 20 at 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, a stronger showing on the balance of hardships may support 21 the issuance of a preliminary injunction where there are “serious questions on the merits . . . so 22 long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the 23 injunction is in the public interest.” Id. “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy 24 never awarded as of right.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24. Preliminary injunctions are intended “merely 25 to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held, and to 26 balance the equities as the litigation moves forward.” Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U.S. 192, 201 (2025) 27 1 “A district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing before denying a motion seeking a preliminary 28 injunction or TRO.” Manago v. McMahon, No. 5:21-CV-01370 MCS (KES), 2022 WL 2235479, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 1 (citations omitted). 2 Both the traditional and the “sliding scale” standards require plaintiffs seeking a 3 temporary restraining order to establish that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the 4 absence of the requested injunction. Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d 1134–35; Winter, 5 555 U.S. at 20–22 (rejecting an approach that permitted mere “possibility” of irreparable harm if 6 there is a strong likelihood of success on the merits). “Irreparable harm is traditionally defined as 7 harm for which there is no adequate legal remedy, such as an award of damages.” Ariz. Dream 8 Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Rent–A–Ctr., Inc. v. Canyon 9 Television & Appliance Rental, Inc., 944 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1991)). “[M]onetary injury is not 10 normally considered irreparable.” hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 31 F.4th 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 11 2022) (quoting Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 12 1202 (9th Cir. 1980)). Irreparable harm is harm that is immediate, rather than remote or 13 speculative. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983) (The requirement of 14 irreparable injury “cannot be met where there is no showing of any real or immediate threat that 15 the plaintiff will be wronged . . . .”); see also Caribbean Marine Services Co., Inc. v. Baldrige, 16 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that a “speculative” injury does not constitute 17 irreparable harm); Nat’l Football League, 634 F.2d at 1201 (holding that plaintiffs bear the 18 “burden of demonstrating immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive 19 relief”). 20 III. DISCUSSION 21 The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s request for a stay of the move out order. The 22 Complaint alleges that Plaintiff’s wife was injured on November 14, 2025, purportedly because of 23 unsafe conditions in Defendants’ workplace housing. (Doc. 1-2 at 6.) Plaintiff was terminated 24 from his position with Defendant on November 25, 2025. (Id. at 7.) Thereafter, Defendants 25 directed Plaintiff and his spouse to vacate workplace housing. (Id.) They were initially asked to 26 vacate by December 12, but that date has been extended to December 30, 2025. (Id.) However, 27 the records attached to the complaint indicate that December 30 is not an absolute deadline. A 28 letter addressed to Plaintiff from an Aramark Human Resources Director states: 1 As outlined in our communication on 11/26/2025, our standard policy allows Individuals 72 hours to vacate housing following 2 termination. However, as a courtesy, we extended this period to 35 days, with a move-out date set for December 30th. This extension is 3 contingent upon you and your family making continuous efforts to vacate the employee housing over the next month. If further time Is 4 required beyond 12/30, we are willing to review your situation at that time. 5 6 || (Doc. 1-2 at 80.) Because Defendants have left open the possibility of voluntarily extending the 7 || move out date, any asserted injury related to the move out deadline is speculative at this time. 8 As to the other forms of relief requested, they all pertain to housing expenses Plaintiff has g | incurred or may incur in the future. These are not properly the subject of injunctive relief, which 10 | is available only for harms that cannot be redressed “at law,” such as by way of an award of 11 | monetary damages should Plaintiff prevail on the merits. Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1048 12 | (9th Cir. 1998) (“Injunctive relief is proper only if monetary damages or other legal remedies will 13 || not compensate the plaintiffs for their injuries.”). Plaintiff has not suggested there is any reason 14 || why advanced payment of these expenses by Defendants is necessary to avoid irreparable injury, 15 | and the record suggests otherwise given that an insurance claim regarding the injury has been 16 || opened (see Doc. 1-2 at 81). For these reasons, the Court ORDERS: 17 1. The request for a TRO (Doc. 7) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 18

IT IS SO ORDERED.

19 . 0 Dated: _ December 19, 2025 :

TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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