NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 30 2025

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-1684 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:05-cr-00578-JFW-37 v.

MEMORANDUM*

JOSE LUIS MEJIA, AKA Cheech, AKA Seal KK,

Defendant - Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-1685 Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:05-cr-00578-JFW-31 v.

ERNESTO OROZCO MENDEZ, AKA

Seal EE, AKA Gordo,

Defendant - Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-1687 Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:05-cr-00578-JFW-22 v.

GILBERTO CARRASCO, AKA Beto,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. AKA Seal V,

Defendant - Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-1688 Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:05-cr-00578-JFW-7 v.

MANUEL YEPIZ, AKA Martin Sanchez, AKA Seal G, AKA Pony,

Defendant - Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-1690 Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:05-cr-00578-JFW-35 v.

FRANCISCO ZAMBRANO, AKA Seal II, AKA Noc,

Defendant - Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-1691 Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:05-cr-00578-JFW-1 v.

RAFAEL YEPIZ, AKA Seal A, AKA Sneaky, AKA Ralph,

Defendant - Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-1709

2 24-1684 Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:05-cr-00578-JFW-21 v.

JESUS CONTRERAS, AKA Seal U, AKA Yuck,

Defendant - Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-1784 Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:05-cr-00578-JFW-44 v.

MARIANO MEZA, AKA Durango,

Defendant - Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-1915 Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:05-cr-00578-JFW-36 v.

SERGIO MEJIA, AKA Seal JJ, AKA Jaws,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 11, 2025 Pasadena, California

Before: M. SMITH, CHRISTEN, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

Following remand from our court, Defendants Jose Luis Mejia, Ernesto

3 24-1684 Orozco Mendez, Gilberto Carrasco, Manuel Yepiz, Francisco Zambrano, Rafael

Yepiz, Jesus Contreras, Mariano Meza, and Sergio Mejia appeal the district court’s

order denying their motion for an evidentiary hearing and relief pursuant to Brady

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Because the parties are familiar with the facts,

we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review de novo the district court’s “denial of a motion for a new trial arising

from the government’s” Brady obligation. United States v. Bruce, 984 F.3d 884,

890 (9th Cir. 2021).1 We review questions of law de novo and factual findings for

clear error. United States v. Cloud, 102 F.4th 968, 975–76 (9th Cir. 2024). We

review the district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion.

United States v. Olsen, 704 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2013). We affirm.

1. To obtain a new trial because of a Brady violation, a defendant must

show: “(1) the evidence at issue was favorable to him, either because it was

exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the State, either

willfully or inadvertently; and (3) that he was prejudiced.” Bruce, 984 F.3d at

894–95. Defendants argue the government failed to disclose that its witness Victor

Bugarin: (i) received monetary benefits, including $5,000 in relocation costs for an

1 Bruce recognized “some tension in our case law” with respect to the standard of review applicable to motions for a new trial based on Brady. Bruce, 984 F.3d at 890 n.1. As in Bruce, we need not address that tension because “[t]he outcome here does not depend on the standard of review.” Id.

4 24-1684 unrelated case, approximately $620 in expense reimbursements, and roughly $500

in payments for information; (ii) was promised consideration in his brother’s

sentencing in exchange for information about street gangs; (iii) had a history of

drug use; and (iv) was criticized by law enforcement for his lack of candor. We

conclude that the government improperly suppressed impeachment evidence, but

that there was no prejudice to Defendants.

We begin with the first two Brady elements. Although the undisclosed

evidence at issue here is facially impeaching, the government contends that some

of it either was not “suppressed” because it was in the possession of state or local

law enforcement, not the federal government, or was not “favorable” because it

lacked sufficient impeachment value. We reject these arguments.

First, because the government plainly knew of Bugarin’s prior cooperation

with state and local authorities—a fact to which Bugarin testified—it could have

learned about the relevant payments from the California Bureau of Narcotics

Enforcement and the Santa Barbara Police Department. See United States v. Price,

566 F.3d 900, 909–10 (9th Cir. 2009).

Second, “it ‘is not the role of the prosecutor to decide that facially

exculpatory evidence need not be turned over because the prosecutor thinks the

information is false’ or has diminished probative value.” Cloud, 102 F.4th at 977

(citation omitted). Even if Bugarin ultimately was “unhappy with the

5 24-1684 consideration” his brother received, that he was willing to trade information for

favorable consideration at his brother’s sentencing clearly had impeachment value

because it shows that Bugarin was willing to work for the government in exchange

for benefits that he anticipated would be of value to him. See id. Similarly, even if

the government believed that the statement regarding Bugarin’s prior drug use was

false and would have been neutralized by the testimony of the law enforcement

officer who wrote the statement, or that the statement concerning Bugarin’s

credibility was equivocal and undercut by contrary statements in the same

document, this evidence had some impeachment value. The government was

therefore required to turn it over. Id.

Turning to prejudice, “[t]he touchstone of the prejudice analysis is whether

admission of the suppressed evidence would have created a reasonable probability

of a different result.” Price, 566 F.3d at 911 (citation modified). “The mere

possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense,

or might have affected the outcome of the trial,” is not sufficient. Barker v.

Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1099 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Defendants fail

to meet this threshold.

The undisclosed evidence was cumulative of the substantial impeachment

introduced at trial. See United States v. Wilkes, 662 F.3d 524, 536 (9th Cir. 2011)

(“Evidence is cumulative . . . if the grounds for impeachment are no secret to the

6 24-1684 jury.” (citation modified)). Bugarin’s credibility was attacked at trial by evidence

that he: (i) received immunity for his testimony; (ii) received $5,000 in relocation

expenses in connection with this case; (iii) cooperated with state and federal

authorities and had received a more lenient sentence in exchange for his

cooperation; and (iv) had been a drug dealer for years and sought to help the

Mexican Mafia murder a leader of the Vineland Boys (VBS) gang. The

undisclosed evidence is unlikely to have changed the jury’s verdict because its

modest probative value would have been eclipsed by the considerable

impeachment evidence that was introduced at trial, which was of a similar nature

to the undisclosed evidence. See Heishman v. Ayers, 621 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir.

2010) (noting that undisclosed evidence may not be prejudicial if it is “similar to

and cumulative of . . . extremely thorough impeachment” evidence that was

introduced at trial).

The testimony Bugarin provided was also “cumulative to the testimony of a

number of the government’s other witnesses.” United States v. Croft, 124 F.3d

1109, 1124 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Wilkes, 662 F.3d at 536. Bugarin testified that

he coordinated activities between the Mexican Mafia and VBS, collected taxes

from VBS on the Mexican Mafia’s behalf, and was aware of the power struggles

within VBS’s leadership. This evidence was not “central” to the government’s

case, Horton v. Mayle, 408 F.3d 570, 578–79 (9th Cir. 2005), and it primarily

7 24-1684 served to establish that VBS was an enterprise under the Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act—an issue amply discussed by other witnesses.

The district judge, who both presided over the trial and decided the order presently

on appeal, remarked during the 2006 trial: “[Q]uite frankly, I don’t think

[Bugarin’s] testimony is . . . that remarkable.” On this record, we conclude that the

undisclosed evidence is unlikely to have changed the jury’s verdict.2

2. The decision whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion for a

new trial is “within the sound discretion of the trial court.” United States v. Del

Muro, 87 F.3d 1078, 1080 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).3 Defendants

argue that an evidentiary hearing might have revealed additional benefits Bugarin

received, but such speculation does not warrant an evidentiary hearing. See

2 Separately, we conclude that the district court followed our remand instruction by “engag[ing] in the necessary factfinding to ascertain whether [Bugarin] received benefits that were undisclosed to defendants at the time of trial” and determining “whether Brady was violated as to each convicted count.” United States v. Yepiz, 718 F. App’x 456, 467 (9th Cir. 2017). We also conclude that Defendants’ allegations of bad faith fall well short of showing that the government made a “deliberate and strategic decision” to “conceal[]” evidence from the jury. Silva v. Brown, 416 F.3d 980, 990 (9th Cir. 2005). 3 We recognize that in proceedings brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, “the district court ‘shall’ grant an evidentiary hearing ‘unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.’” United States v. Rodriguez, 49 F.4th 1205, 1213 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation modified) (quoting § 2255(b)). That presumption does not apply here because Defendants did not file a § 2255 motion and instead elected to pursue their Brady claim on direct appeal. Yepiz, 718 F. App’x at 466.

8 24-1684 Morgan v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 1084, 1091 (9th Cir. 2007). Defendants also

contend that an evidentiary hearing was warranted to resolve whether the statement

about Bugarin’s drug use was a clerical error. But the district court reasonably

concluded that the marginal impeachment value of that statement would have been

significantly nullified by evidence the government could have introduced to rebut

it. Moreover, even assuming that an evidentiary hearing could have produced

evidence showing that Bugarin had used drugs at some point in the past, the

cumulative value of this additional impeachment evidence falls well short of

satisfying Brady’s materiality threshold. In light of the written record generated by

the government’s exhaustive investigation, the district court did not abuse its

discretion by declining to hold an evidentiary hearing.

AFFIRMED.

9 24-1684