NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 31 2025

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KARINA ELIZABETH CORRALEJO, No. 25-2250 D.C. No. Plaintiff-Appellant, 2:22-cv-00673-DMC v.

MEMORANDUM*

FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Dennis M. Cota, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 18, 2025 San Francisco, California

Before: BOGGS**, BRESS, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.

Karina Corralejo appeals the district court’s order affirming the denial of her

application for Supplemental Security Income and Disability Insurance Benefits.

She contends that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred at multiple stages of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals, sitting by designation. the five-step analysis used to assess whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.920. Because none of these arguments has merit, we affirm.

1. Social Security regulations create a five-step sequential evaluation

process to determine whether an individual is disabled and entitled to benefits. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The Social Security Act provides that “[t]he findings

of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial

evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence, while

requiring more than a mere scintilla, asks only whether a reasonable mind could

accept the evidence as adequate to support the conclusion. Biestek v. Berryhill, 587

U.S. 97, 103 (2019). Review is thus highly deferential. Indeed, if “evidence is

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s decision must be

affirmed.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 494 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

2. Neither party contests the ALJ’s step-one determination, so we begin at

step two: is the individual’s condition medically severe? While the ALJ did find

that Corralejo had the severe impairment of diabetes mellitus, Corralejo argues that

the ALJ’s determination that she had no other severe impairments was arbitrary and

unsupported by substantial evidence. That argument fails; we do not reverse for

step-two errors unless they also affect the ALJ’s analysis of the claimant’s residual

functional capacity (“RFC”) for work in relation to steps four and five and could

2 25-2250 affect the ultimate determination. Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007);

Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, any

alleged step-two error with respect to other conditions was immaterial because the

ALJ correctly considered only diabetes in his RFC analysis.

In formulating an RFC, the ALJ is only required to consider functional

limitations that the claimant establishes. See, e.g., Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676,

684 (9th Cir. 2005). Corralejo testified at her hearing that she stopped working due

to diabetes and pregnancy, and that nothing besides diabetes would keep her from

working again. She also did not assert during the administrative process that

anything other than variable blood sugar and a bone island in her left knee limited

her functioning, claiming that the latter left her unable to walk more than half a block

without pain. With respect to the knee pain, however, “a claimant who alleges

disability based on subjective symptoms must produce objective medical evidence

of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the

pain or other symptoms alleged.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir.

1996) (internal quotations omitted). Corralejo has produced no objective evidence

of this underlying bone island. Thus, the ALJ only needed to consider diabetes in

his RFC analysis, which he did.

3. At step three, the ALJ must ask whether the claimant’s severe and non-

severe medical conditions, by themselves or in combination, meet or equal the

3 25-2250 severity of a listing of medical criteria that is set forth in The Listing of Impairments,

20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (‘the Appendix’). See Tackett v. Apfel,

180 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999). Here, the ALJ found that they did not, and we

find no error in that determination. Corralejo has nowhere explained how her

diabetes, by itself or in combination with other impairments, meets or medically

equals any body-system listing.

Corralejo nevertheless argues that the ALJ’s step-three discussion was mere

boilerplate, and she cites Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 507 (9th Cir. 2001), for the

proposition that boilerplate is insufficient to support a step-three finding. But there

is no step-three error where a claimant “offer[s] no theory . . . as to how [her

conditions] combine[] to equal a listed impairment.” Id. at 514. Corralejo has not

identified any specific listing the ALJ should have considered. While she contends

for the first time in her reply brief that the ALJ had an independent duty to find an

applicable listing, that argument is waived. Greenwood v. F.A.A., 28 F.3d 971, 977

(9th Cir. 1994) (“We review only issues which are argued specifically and distinctly

in a party’s opening brief.”).

4. The ALJ then proceeded to determine Corralejo’s RFC for steps four

and five of the analysis. He found that Corralejo had the RFC to perform medium-

exertion work as defined by 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(c), “except that she is limited to

frequent bilateral fingering” and could not climb any surfaces or be exposed to even

4 25-2250 moderate hazards such as unprotected heights. Substantial evidence supported the

ALJ’s RFC assessment. The ALJ drew heavily from the RFC conclusions in Dr.

Schwartz’s consultative examination. Corralejo does not question its reliability in

her opening brief and thus forfeits any such argument. Greenwood, 28 F.3d at 977.

To the extent that there is evidence that might undercut the ALJ’s RFC finding, it

consists almost entirely of the claimant’s own testimony and is inconsistent with the

medical records, which show normal physical-examination results. Corralejo has

forfeited any argument that the ALJ improperly discounted her subjective statements

by failing to raise the point below or in her opening brief.

5. On appeal, Corralejo does not challenge the ALJ’s step-four

determination that she had no past relevant work, so we continue to step five.

Corralejo’s objection to the ALJ’s analysis at this step is that it “relied on a legally

insufficient RFC.” Hence, she raises no independent step-five argument.

AFFIRMED.

5 25-2250