1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 WENTAO XU, an individual, No. 2:25-cv-02807-JAM-SCR 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER DENYING

MOTION TO REMAND

12 GENERAL MOTORS LLC, a Delaware limited liability 13 company, and DOES 1-10, inclusive, 14 Defendants. 15 16 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to 17 Remand., ECF No. 6 (“Mot”). Defendant filed an opposition ECF 18 No. 10 (“Opp’n”); Plaintiff filed a Reply, ECF No. 11 (“Reply”). 19 For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is denied.1 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 On August 26, 2025, Plaintiff initiated a lawsuit in 22 Sacramento County Superior Court, arising out of his 2024 23 purchase of a Hummer EV vehicle(the “Subject Vehicle”), which he 24 claims is defective. See generally Mot. at 1-2; Opp’n at 2. On 25 September 29, 2025, Defendant removed the matter to this Court, 26 based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, and 1446, alleging the parties 27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 28 oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g); see also ECF No. 12. 1 were diverse and the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. ECF 2 1. Specifically, Defendant alleged the Plaintiff is a California 3 citizen and the Defendant is a Michigan and Delaware citizen. 4 Id. Defendant also averred that despite Plaintiff’s 5 intentionally ambiguous pleading, the amount in controversy 6 plausibly exceeds $75,000. Id. 7 II. OPINION 8 A. Legal Standard 9 Federal district courts have subject matter jurisdiction 10 over civil actions between parties with diverse citizenship 11 where “the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of or value of 12 $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs.” 28 U.S.C. 13 § 1332(a). Such an action may be removed to federal court under 14 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). It is well-established that “[r]emoval 15 statutes are strictly construed, and any doubt about the right 16 of removal requires resolution in favor of remand. This rule of 17 narrow construction both recognizes the limited jurisdiction of 18 federal courts and protect[s] the jurisdiction of state courts.” 19 Casola v. Dexcom, Inc., 98 F.4th 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2024) 20 (citing and quoting Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 21 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) and Harris v. Bankers Life & 22 Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 698 (9th Cir. 2005)) (internal citations 23 and quotations removed). 24 “The presumption against removal means that the defendant 25 always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” 26 Casola, 98 F.3d at 954 (quoting Moore-Thomas, 553 F.3d at 1244) 27 (quotations removed). Indeed, when removal is challenged based 28 on whether the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, “‘the 1 removing defendant bears the burden of establishing, by a 2 preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy 3 exceeds’ the jurisdictional threshold,” unless it is clear from 4 the face of the state court complaint. Urbino v. Orkin Services 5 of California, Inc., 726 F.3d 1118, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2013) 6 (quoting Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 7 (9th Cir. 1996)). The Ninth Circuit defines the “amount in 8 controversy as the amount at stake in the underlying litigation, 9 [that is,] any result of the litigation, excluding interests and 10 costs, that entails a payment by the defendant. This amount 11 includes, inter alia, damages (compensatory, punitive, or 12 otherwise) and the cost of complying with an injunction, as well 13 as attorneys’ fees awarded under fee shifting statutes.” 14 Gonzales v. CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC, 840 F.3d 644, 648-49 15 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing and quoting Theis Research, Inc. v. 16 Brown & Bain, 400 F.3d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 2005) and Guglielmino 17 v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 2007) 18 (internal quotations, citations, and brackets removed)). 19 In assessing whether the defendant has met its burden, a 20 court “may consider allegations in the complaint and in the 21 notice of removal, as well as summary-judgment-type evidence 22 relevant to the amount in controversy.” Chavez v. JPMorgan 23 Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 416 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Kroske v. 24 U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2005)). 25 B. Analysis 26 Plaintiff contests jurisdiction by claiming Defendant did 27 not meet its burden of establishing the amount in controversy 28 exceeds $75,000. See generally Mot. As noted by Defendant, 1 Plaintiff appears to suggest that removal here was too early but 2 Plaintiff did not present any argument in support of this 3 contention. Nor does Plaintiff dispute complete diversity. 4 Opp’n at 1-3. 5 It is not apparent from the face of the Complaint that the 6 amount in controversy exceeds $75,000; accordingly, Defendant 7 bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance that the 8 amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See Urbino, 726 F.3d 9 1118. The Court finds that Defendant has presented more than 10 enough evidence for the Court’s consideration in determining the 11 amount in controversy here and has clearly satisfied its burden. 12 See ECF Nos. 10–10-3. 13 Plaintiff seeks three categories of damages for his claims 14 under the Song-Beverly Act: (1) actual damages; (2) civil 15 penalties; and (3) attorneys’ fees. Defendant has provided 16 exhibits and declarations which demonstrate that the $75,000 17 diversity threshold has been met and easily exceeded. This 18 evidence includes the Retail Installation Contract for the 19 Subject Vehicle which was purchased for $122,530.13. The 20 evidence further demonstrates that after offsets, Plaintiff’s 21 actual damages at issue here are $116,022.60. Opp’n at 6-7. As 22 for Defendant’s calculations regarding the amount of civil 23 penalties and attorneys’ fees at stake, the evidence supports 24 Defendant’s argument that these two categories bring the amount 25 in controversy well in excess of $75,000. Opp’n at 7-11. 26 Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s estimation of Plaintiff’s 27 actual damages is “fatally speculative and not supported by 28 facts or evidence.” Rep at 2. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff ee EI EEE OE OI EIEIO OE

1 has not provided any alternative proposal for the Court to 2 consider regarding any of the categories at stake. Plaintiff 3 refused to plead the amount he seeks and he does not state in 4 his Motion that he is seeking less than $75,000. Defendant has 5 responded to Plaintiff’s amount in controversy challenge with 6 evidence and argument clearly demonstrating that the amount in 7 controversy exceeds the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold. 8 Til. ORDER 9 Plaintiff’s Reply Brief exceeds the Court’s page limitation 10 by five pages. ECF No. 2-2, Plaintiff shall pay a monetary 11 sanction of $250 to the Clerk of the Court within five days of 12 the date of this Order. 13 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion to 14 Remand is DENIED. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 Dated: December 29, 2025 17

HN A. MENDEZ.

1s Fee UNITED pe acl JUDGE 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28