1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 BABATUNDE E., No. CV 24-10301-AGR

9 Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

10 v. ORDER 11

12

13 FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social 14 Security,

15 Defendant. 16 17 18 Plaintiff1 filed this action on November 27, 2024. The parties filed briefs on 19 the disputed issues. The court has taken the matter under submission without oral 20 argument.2 21 Having reviewed the entire file, the court affirms the decision of the 22 Commissioner. 23 24 1 Plaintiff’s name has been partially redacted in compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 25 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration 26 and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States.

27 2 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties consented to proceed before the magistrate judge. (Dkt. Nos. 8, 9). 28 1 I. 2 PROCEDURAL HISTORY 3 On November 15, 2021, Plainti ff filed an application for disability insurance 4 benefits and alleged an onset date of April 20, 2021. Administrative Record (“AR”) 5 35. The application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. AR 35, 140-44, 6 146-51. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). 7 AR 152-53. On August 31, 2023, the ALJ conducted a hearing at which Plaintiff 8 and a vocational expert testified. AR 80-120. On January 31, 2024, the ALJ 9 issued a decision denying benefits. AR 32-52. The Appeals Council denied 10 review on September 27, 2024. AR 7-13. This action followed. 11 II. 12 STANDARD OF REVIEW 13 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this court has authority to review the 14 Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. Smith v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 471, 474 15 (2019). The decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial 16 evidence, or if it is based upon the application of improper legal standards. 17 Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). 18 “Substantial evidence” means “‘more than a mere scintilla.’” Biestek v. 19 Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (citation omitted). “It means – and means only – 20 ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 21 support a conclusion.’” Id. (citation omitted). In determining whether substantial 22 evidence exists to support the Commissioner’s decision, the court examines the 23 administrative record as a whole, considering adverse as well as supporting 24 evidence. When the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 25 interpretation, the court must defer to the Commissioner’s decision. Attmore v. 26 Colvin, 827 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2016). 27 28 1 III. 2 DISCUSSION 3 A. Disability 4 A person qualifies as disabled, and thereby eligible for such benefits, “only if 5 his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is 6 not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, 7 education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful 8 work which exists in the national economy.” Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 21- 9 22 (2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 10 B. The ALJ’s Findings 11 The ALJ found that Plaintiff meets the insured status requirement through 12 December 31, 2027. AR 37. Following the five-step sequential analysis 13 applicable to disability determinations, Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 14 1114 (9th Cir. 2006),3 the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the severe impairments of 15 adjustment disorder, bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder, and attention- 16 deficit/hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”). AR 38. Plaintiff’s impairments do not meet 17 or medically equal the severity of a listed impairment. AR 40-41. 18 The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to 19 perform light work except he could stand and/or walk for a total of six hours of an 20 eight-hour workday with normal breaks. He has no limitations with respect to 21 sitting. He could not use ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He could not work around 22 hazards such as unprotected heights or power tools. He could perform simple 23 tasks and make simple work-related judgments, and occasionally interact with 24 supervisors, coworkers, and the public. He could concentrate on work duties for 25 26 3 The five-step sequential analysis examines whether the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity, whether the claimant’s impairment is severe, whether 27 the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment, whether the claimant is able to do his or her past relevant work, and whether the claimant is able to do any 28 1 t wo hours at a time, before needing a break, for a total of eight hours of an eight- 2 h our workday with normal breaks. He could adapt to occasional changes in the 3 w ork environment. AR 41. 4 The ALJ determined that Plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work, 5 but there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that he 6 could perform, such as office helper, small products assembler, and pricer. AR 7 45-46. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not been under a 8 disability since April 20, 2021, the alleged onset date, through January 31, 2024, 9 the date of the ALJ’s decision. AR 28. 10 C. Subjective Symptom Allegations 11 Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred by failing to articulate legally sufficient 12 reasons for discounting his subjective symptom complaints. 13 “‘An ALJ engages in a two-step analysis to determine whether a claimant’s 14 testimony regarding subjective pain or symptoms is credible. First, the ALJ must 15 determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an 16 underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or 17 other symptoms alleged.’” Smith v. Kijakazi, 14 F.4th 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2021) 18 (citation omitted). “At this step, the medical evidence need not corroborate the 19 severity of the alleged symptoms; the medical evidence need only establish that 20 the impairment could reasonably be expected to cause some degree of the 21 alleged symptoms.” Id. 22 “Then, provided ‘there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the 23 claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, 24 clear and convincing reasons for doing so.’” Id. at 1112 (citation omitted). The 25 Ninth Circuit requires that the ALJ “‘specify which testimony she finds not credible, 26 and then provide clear and convincing reasons, supported by evidence in the 27 record, to support that credibility determination.’” Id. (citation omitted). “[A]n ALJ 28 cannot be required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else disability 1 b enefits would be available for the asking.’” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 2 A dmin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1106 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 3 Plaintiff claims that he is unable to work due to depression, anxiety, and 4 ADHD. AR 38, 95. He reported difficulty concentrating, completing tasks, and 5 managing daily responsibilities, stating that he is constantly behind and easily 6 distracted. AR 95, 97-98, 293. Plaintiff also testified to severe social anxiety, 7 panic attacks, nervousness around others, trouble making eye contact, and 8 feelings of isolation and loneliness. AR 95-100. He described significant fatigue, 9 difficulty getting out of bed, and memory problems that interfere with planning and 10 finishing tasks. AR 95-96. Plaintiff stated that despite weekly therapy and an 11 increasing medication regimen, his symptoms have worsened over time. AR 100- 12 1. He further reported side effects from medications, including hand shaking, 13 lightheadedness, and instability. AR 100-01. Plaintiff testified that his mental 14 impairments affect daily activities such as cooking, cleaning, doing laundry, 15 driving, and managing appointments. AR 95-99, 100, 293. He noted chronic pain, 16 weakness, neuropathy, and mobility limitations, including neck and shoulder 17 tension, foot pain, numbness in his fingers, and difficulty standing and walking. 18 AR 95, 100, 109. He could not stand for more than thirty minutes at a time, and 19 he could not exercise due to pain, stiffness and tenseness. AR 109-10, 298. 20 In her decision, the ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff’s “medically 21 determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of the 22 alleged symptoms,” but concluded that Plaintiff’s statements “concerning the 23 intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely 24 consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” AR 42-43. 25 The ALJ relied primarily on two reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective 26 symptom testimony: (1) his statements were not fully supported by the objective 27 medical evidence; and (2) his reported activities of daily living suggested a higher 28 level of functioning than he alleged. AR 43-45. As discussed below, these 1 j ustifications constitute clear and convincing reasons, supported by substantial 2 e vidence, for rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective symptom complaints. 3 First, the ALJ found that Plaintif f’s subjective symptom allegations were 4 unsupported by the objective medical evidence. AR 43-45. Although lack of 5 objective medical evidence supporting the degree of limitation “cannot form the 6 sole basis for discounting pain testimony,” it is a factor that an ALJ may consider 7 in assessing credibility. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005); see 8 also SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *5 (Oct. 25, 2017). Plaintiff alleged 9 significant physical symptoms, including chronic pain, neuropathy, weakness, and 10 balance and mobility issues. However, physical and neurological examinations 11 were largely normal, with intact gait, coordination, and stability. AR 1337-38. A 12 brain MRI showed only mild white-matter changes, and Plaintiff’s neurologist 13 described the findings as asymptomatic. AR 107, 1333, 1338. Imaging of 14 Plaintiff’s lumbar and cervical spine revealed no degenerative disease or other 15 impairment that would reasonably produce the significant pain and functional 16 limitations he described. See AR 1189-94. Similarly, with respect to Plaintiff’s 17 mental impairments, mental status examinations consistently showed normal 18 appearance and motor activity, intact memory, good attention, normal thought 19 content and process, normal speech and behavior, and good insight and 20 judgment. AR 60-62, 1080-87, 1110-29, 1261, 1322-29. On this record, the ALJ 21 permissibly concluded that the objective medical evidence did not corroborate the 22 severity of Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms. 23 Second, the ALJ reasonably determined that Plaintiff’s symptom allegations 24 were inconsistent with his activities of daily living. AR 43-45. An ALJ may 25 properly reject a claimant’s symptom testimony when he “engaged in daily 26 activities inconsistent with the alleged symptoms.” See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 27 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008). Although Plaintiff testified at the August 2023 28 hearing that he experienced disabling cognitive limitations affecting concentration, 1 t ask completion, and planning, as well as chronic pain and difficulty standing, the 2 r ecord reflects a substantially higher level of activity during the relevant period. 3 N otably, Plaintiff was able to attend a graduate program at Pepperdine University 4 to obtain a master’s degree in psychology and achieved a GPA of 3.95. AR 1072, 5 1249. As part of that program, Plaintiff completed a practicum requiring 6 approximately twenty hours per week. AR 1074, 1294, 1325. He reported in 7 February and March 2023 that he was simultaneously attending classes, 8 completing his practicum, and driving for Uber. AR 1294, 1306. In April 2023, he 9 stated that he was finishing classes as late as 10:00 p.m. AR 1075. In August 10 2023, he discussed working with and supporting clients as part of his practicum. 11 AR 1263-64. In addition, Plaintiff stated that he assisted his brother with wedding 12 planning and spent several hours per week coordinating by phone. AR 1254. He 13 reported taking evening walks averaging approximately four miles and going 14 hiking. AR 1074, 1140. Taken together, these activities reasonably support the 15 ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s symptom allegations were inconsistent with the 16 record. 17 Accordingly, remand is not warranted on this claim. 18 D. Residual Functional Capacity 19 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s RFC assessment is not supported by 20 substantial evidence. 21 The RFC assessment measures the claimant’s capacity to engage in basic 22 work activities. Bowen v. New York, 476 U.S. 467, 471 (1986); Burch v. Barnhart, 23 400 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2005). The RFC is a determination of “the most [the 24 claimant] can still do despite [the claimant’s] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 25 404.1545(a)(1). Although the RFC assessment is ultimately the ALJ’s 26 responsibility, it must be supported by substantial evidence. Rounds v. Comm’r of 27 Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015); Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 28 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008). The ALJ must “set out in the record his 1 r easoning and the evidentiary support for his interpretation of the medical 2 e vidence.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999). 3 In formulating the mental RFC, the ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s treating 4 psychologist’s opinion, which found marked mental limitations affecting 5 concentration and task completion. The ALJ instead relied primarily on the 6 opinions of the consultative examiner and Plaintiff’s activities. AR 44-45. 7 Although the consultative examiner’s opinion was based on a single examination 8 without review of Plaintiff’s longitudinal medical records, AR 545, Plaintiff’s 9 statements provided supporting longitudinal evidence. ALJs “are, at some level, 10 capable of independently reviewing and forming conclusions about medical 11 evidence.” Farlow v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 485, 488 (9th Cir. 2022), The ALJ’s 12 specific functional limitations are supported by substantial evidence. For example, 13 the ALJ concluded Plaintiff could concentrate on work duties for two hours at a 14 time. See AR 41-45. As discussed above, Plaintiff’s mental status examinations 15 consistently showed normal appearance and motor activity, intact memory, good 16 attention, normal thought content and process, normal speech and behavior, and 17 good insight and judgment. AR 60-62, 1080-87, 1110-29, 1261, 1322-29. Plaintiff 18 was able to attend a graduate program at Pepperdine University to obtain a 19 master’s degree in psychology and achieved a GPA of 3.95. AR 1072, 1249. 20 Plaintiff completed a practicum requiring approximately 20 hours per week. AR 21 1074, 1294, 1325. In February and March 2023, Plaintiff reported that he was 22 attending classes, completing his practicum, and driving for Uber. AR 1294, 1306. 23 In April 2023, he stated that he was finishing classes as late as 10:00 p.m. AR 24 1075. In August 2023, he discussed working with and supporting clients as part of 25 his practicum. AR 1263-64. The ALJ could reasonably infer from this evidence 26 that Plaintiff could concentrate on work duties for at least two hours at a time. 27 Plaintiff has not shown error. 28 1 IV. 2 ORDER 3 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed 4 that judgment be entered for Defendant. 5

DATED: December 31, 2025 8 ALICIA G. ROSENBERG 9 United States Magistrate Judge 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28