1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 DANTEA COOPER, Case No.: 25-cv-1793-TWR (BJW)

CDCR #BT-9633,

11

ORDER (1) SCREENING FIRST

Plaintiff, 12 AMENDED COMPLAINT vs. PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 13 §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b) and

14 (2) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO ARIZU, Correctional Officer,

EFFECT SERVICE PURSUANT TO

15 Defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) & Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 4(c)(3)

17

18 On July 9, 2025, Plaintiff Dantea Cooper, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a 19 civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with a Motion to Proceed In 20 Forma Pauperis (“IFP”). (See ECF Nos. 1–2.) On September 8, 2025, the Court granted 21 Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP and dismissed the Complaint, which appeared to contain 22 claims for retaliation and cruel and unusual punishment, for failure to state a claim pursuant 23 to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b). (See ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff was notified of the 24 deficiencies of the pleading and was granted leave to amend. (See id. at 4–7.) 25 Plaintiff has now filed a First Amended Complaint. (See ECF No. 9 (“FAC”).) 26 Plaintiff indicates he is abandoning the cruel and unusual punishment claim and is 27 proceeding only with his retaliation claim. (Id. at 6–7.) 28 1 I. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) 2 A. Standard of Review 3 Because Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding IFP, his FAC requires a pre-Answer 4 screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b). Under these statutes, the Court 5 must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, 6 malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See 7 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. 8 § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 9 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). 10 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 11 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 12 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 13 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 14 2012) (noting that § 1915A screening “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the 15 context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”) Rule 16 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state 17 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), 18 quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Determining whether 19 a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires 20 the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere 21 possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me 22 accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id. 23 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “creates a private right of action against individuals who, 24 acting under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” 25 Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a 26 source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights 27 elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (internal quotation 28 marks omitted). 1 B. Allegations in the FAC 2 Plaintiff alleges in his FAC that he: 3 Constitutionally invoked his 14th Amendment right by refusing medical when there were no penological interest. Defendant Arizu, because 4 of Plaintiff’s refusal of medical care, proceeded to threaten Plaintiff [to] 5 confiscate his belongings if he continued to refuse. CDCR conducted an investigation found my allegations had merit and I was transferred to another 6 prison. The Court ruled in White v. Napolean (1990) that any retaliation 7 against an inmate for refusing medical care violates the 14th Amendment and is actionable under 1983. 8

9 (FAC at 3.) Plaintiff seeks monetary damages in the amount of $18 in lost wages and 10 $21,000 in punitive damages. (Id. at 5.) 11 C. Analysis 12 “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails 13 five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an 14 inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled 15 the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably 16 advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567–68 (2005) 17 (footnote omitted). Plaintiff must also allege a retaliatory motive, that is, a causal 18 connection between the adverse action and his protected conduct. See Watison v. Carter, 19 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012). The alleged adverse action need not itself be an 20 independent constitutional violation. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 21 1995) (stating that to prevail on a retaliation claim, plaintiff “need not establish an 22 independent constitutional interest” was violated); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531–32 23 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding a transfer to a different prison constitutes adverse action). 24 Plaintiff identifies the adverse action taken against him in retaliation for his refusal 25 to report to medical was his transfer to another prison, and alleges the transfer was due to 26 Defendant Arizu’s threat to confiscate his belongings if he continued to refuse medical 27 care. (See FAC at 3, 10–12.) He states that his transfer was due to safety concerns arising 28 from a finding of overfamiliarity with staff directly caused by Arizu’s threat, as confirmed 1 through the administrative appeal process. (Id. at 3, 15–18.) In sum, Plaintiff plausibly 2 alleges an adverse action was taken against him in being transferred to another prison due 3 to safety concerns arising from an overfamiliarity with staff as a result of Defendant Arizu 4 threatening to confiscate his personal property in retaliation for Plaintiff exercising his 5 constitutional right to refuse medical care. 6 These allegations are sufficient to survive the “low threshold” of the screening 7 required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) with respect to a retaliation claim against 8 defendant Arizu, the only claim against the only Defendant named in the FAC. Watison, 9 668 F.3d at 1112. As a result, Plaintiff is entitled to have the U.S. Marshal effect service 10 of the summons and the First Amended Complaint on his behalf against Defendant Arizu. 11 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and 12 perform all duties in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (“[T]he court may order that 13 service be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal . . . if the plaintiff is 14 authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”) 15 II. Conclusion 16 For the foregoing reasons, the Court: 17 1. DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s First Amended 18 Complaint (ECF No. 9) for Defendant Arizu and forward it to Plaintiff along with a blank 19 U.S. Marshal Form 285. The Clerk will provide Plaintiff with certified copies of the First 20 Amended Complaint and summons for use in serving Defendant. Upon receipt of this “In 21 Forma Pauperis Package,” Plaintiff must complete the USM Form 285 as completely and 22 accurately as possible, include an address where Defendant may be found and/or subject 23 to service pursuant to S.D. Cal. CivLR 4.1(c), and return the forms to the United States 24 Marshal according to the instructions the Clerk provides in the letter accompanying the In 25 Forma Pauperis Package. 26 2. ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of the First Amended Complaint 27 and summons upon Defendant Arizu as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285. Costs 28 1 || of service will be advanced by the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 2 || 4(c)(3). 3 3. ORDERS Defendant, once served, to reply to Plaintiff's First Amended 4 ||Complaint and any subsequent pleading Plaintiff files in this matter in which Defendant is 5 ||named as a party within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rules of 6 || Civil Procedure 12(a) and 15(a)(3). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (stating that while 7 || defendants may occasionally be permitted to “waive the right to reply to any action brought 8 || by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility under section 1983,” 9 || once the Court has conducted its sua sponte screening, defendants are required to respond). 10 4. ORDERS Plaintiff, after service has been completed by the U.S. Marshal, to 11 ||serve upon Defendant, or if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon Defendant’s 12 ||counsel, a copy of every further pleading, motion, or other document submitted for the 13 || Court’s consideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b). Plaintiff must include with every 14 || original document sought to be filed with the Clerk, a certificate stating the manner in 15 || which a true and correct copy of that document has been served on Defendant or their 16 counsel, and the date of that service. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 5.2. Any document received by 17 ||the Court which has not been properly filed with the Clerk, or which fails to include a 18 || Certificate of Service upon a Defendant, or their counsel, may be disregarded. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 || Dated: January 5, 2026 —_—— 21 | 5) (2 re 27 Honorable Todd W. Robinson 53 United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28 5 a oe