1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CARLOS MORA SANDOVAL, Case No. CV 25-7218 PVC 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

ORDER

14 GENERAL MOTORS LLC, 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 I. 19 INTRODUCTION 20 21 In March 2025, Carlos Mora Sandoval filed a Complaint in Los Angeles County 22 Superior Court against General Motors LLC, alleging breach of implied and express 23 warranties under (1) the California Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and (2) the 24 federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. (Dkt. No. 1-1). On August 5, 2025, Defendant 25 filed a Notice of Removal, removing the action to federal court. (“Notice,” Dkt. No. 1). 26 27 On August 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand (Dkt. No. 16), supported 28 by the Declaration of Michelle Yang (“Yang Decl.,” Dkt. No. 16-1) and accompanying 1 || exhibits. On September 16, Defendant filed its Opposition. (Dkt. No. 19). On September 2 || 23, Plaintiff filed a Reply in support of his Motion (Dkt. No. 20), supported by the 3 || Declaration of Michelle Yang (“Yang Reply Decl.,” Dkt No. 20-1).! The Court held a 4 || hearing on October 28 (Dkt. No. 24), and on November 12, ordered supplemental briefing 5 || (Dkt. No. 25). Defendant filed its supplemental brief on November 19 (“Def. Supp.,” 6 || Dkt. No. 26), and Plaintiff filed his on November 26 (“PI. Supp.,” Dkt. No. 27). 7 8 The parties have consented pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) to the jurisdiction of the 9 || undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. (Dkt. Nos. 5, 6). For the reasons stated 10 || below, the Motion to Remand is DENIED. 11 12 II. 13 ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT 14 15 Plaintiff purchased a 2021 GMC Yukon XL (“Subject Vehicle”) in April 2021. 16 || (Compl. 4] 6, 9). Plaintiff alleges that the Subject Vehicle was defective and that 17 || Defendant failed to fulfill its warranty obligations. (Ud. 9 12, 14). Plaintiff states five 18 || causes of action arising under the Song-Beverly Act (id. {| 8-33) and the Magnuson- 19 || Moss Warranty Act (MMWA) (id. §[§| 34-44). He seeks actual damages, civil penalties, 20 || consequential and incidental damages, costs and attorneys’ fees, and prejudgment interest. 21 || Ud. at 9). 22 23 24 25 26 27 ' On October 28, 2025, Defendant filed a Supplemental Brief (Dkt. No. 23) without 28 || prior authorization, see Local Rule 7-10, and will not be considered.

1 III. 2 DISCUSSION 3 4 Plaintiff moves to remand the action to state court, arguing that Defendant’s 5 removal was untimely and not substantively proper. (Mot. at 2). 6 7 A. Legal Standards 8 9 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having subject matter jurisdiction 10 over matters authorized only by the Constitution and statute. Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. 11 Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 26 (2025). There is a presumption that a district court lacks 12 jurisdiction, and “the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting 13 jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); 14 accord Corral v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 878 F.3d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 2017). 15 16 A defendant may remove a state civil action to the federal district and division 17 where the action is pending if the district court would have had original jurisdiction over 18 the matter. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “The basic statutory grants of federal-court subject- 19 matter jurisdiction are contained in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332.” Arbaugh v. Y&H 20 Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006). “A plaintiff properly invokes § 1331 jurisdiction when 21 she pleads a colorable claim ‘arising under’ the Constitution or laws of the United States. 22 She invokes § 1332 jurisdiction when she presents a claim between parties of diverse 23 citizenship that exceeds the required jurisdictional amount, currently $75,000.” Id. 24 Removal is narrowly construed, and there is a “strong presumption against removal.” 25 Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The 26 defendant “always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper,” Casola v. 27 Dexcom, Inc., 98 F.4th 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted), and any ambiguities or 28 1 doubt as to an action’s removability are resolved in favor of remand, Moore-Thomas v. 2 Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009). 3 4 If the action stated by the initial pleading is removable, a defendant must file the 5 notice of removal within 30 days after receipt of a copy of the initial pleading. 28 U.S.C. 6 § 1446(b). This “first pathway” applies where “the basis for removal is clear from the 7 complaint.” Dietrich v. Boeing Co., 14 F.4th 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2021). If “it is unclear 8 from the complaint whether the case is removable,” the pleading is “indeterminate,” and 9 the case is not removable at that stage. Harris v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 10 689, 693–94 (9th Cir. 2005); accord Reyes v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 781 F.3d 1185, 11 1189 (9th Cir. 2015). If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice 12 of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant of a copy of an 13 amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained 14 that the case is one which is or has become removable. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). When 15 removability is not apparent from the face of the complaint or ascertainable from a 16 subsequent paper, a defendant may remove a matter based on diversity jurisdiction outside 17 of these two 30-day timelines, but within a year of commencement of the action. 28 18 U.S.C. § 1446(c); see Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P., 720 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th 19 Cir. 2013) (observing § 1446(c) requires that “a notice of removal must be filed, in any 20 event, within one year of the commencement of the action”). 21 22 B. Analysis 23 24 1. Timeliness of Removal 25 26 Plaintiff contends that removal was untimely because the Complaint asserts that he 27 was a California resident and “Defendant had sufficient information to plausibly allege 28 satisfaction of the jurisdictional threshold.” (Mot. at 2). But diversity jurisdiction is 1 based on Plaintiff’s citizenship, not his residence. See Kanter v. Warner–Lambert Co., 2 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (parties’ actual citizenship, not residency, determines 3 diversity); accord Rainero v. Archon Corp., 844 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2016). And the 4 Complaint does not allege the actual price paid or payable by Plaintiff for the Subject 5 Vehicle or any information from which Defendant could estimate statutory offsets such as 6 the mileage of the vehicle when presented for repair. Thus, the amount in controversy on 7 Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly Act claims is indeterminate from the face of the Complaint, and 8 the 30-day clock under the first pathway of removal does not apply. 9 10 Plaintiff contends, however, that “[g]iven its sophisticated knowledge of the motor 11 vehicle industry, Defendant GM has, at a minimum, a rudimentary understanding or 12 ability to ascertain an approximation of the Subject Vehicle’s market value as the 13 manufacturer and distributor of the Subject Vehicle; especially given that the make, 14 model, year, and VIN, were included within the factual bases alleged within the 15 Complaint.” (Mot. at 6). To the contrary, the “notice of removability under § 1446(b) is 16 determined through examination of the four corners of the applicable pleadings, not 17 through subjective knowledge or a duty to make further inquiry.” Harris, 425 F.3d at 18 694; accord Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA LLC, 707 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2013) 19 (“declin[ing] to hold that materials outside the complaint start the thirty-day clock”). 20 21 In his Reply, Plaintiff argues for the first time that as part of the parties’ 22 prelitigation settlement discussions, “Plaintiff produced to Defendant a copy of the 23 Subject Vehicles Sales Agreement and repair orders.” (Reply at 1) (emphasis omitted). 24 But arguments raised for the first time in a reply are waived. See, e.g., Hoel v. Experian 25 Info. Sols. Inc., No. 8:24-CV-00347-JLS-KES, 2024 WL 3628115, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26 1, 2024). In any event, the Ninth Circuit has rejected the “suggestion that a pre-complaint 27 document containing a jurisdictional clue can operate in tandem with an indeterminate 28 initial pleading to trigger some kind of hybrid of the first and second removal periods.” 1 Carvalho v. Equifax Information Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 886 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e 2 conclude that any document received prior to receipt of the initial pleading cannot trigger 3 the second thirty-day removal period.”). 4 5 Plaintiff additionally argues that because his complaint contains a federal cause of 6 action under the MMWA, federal question jurisdiction was clear from the complaint. 7 (Mot. at 4–5). The MMWA includes an amount in controversy threshold of $50,000. See 8 Kelly v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 377 F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 15 U.S.C. 9 § 2310(d)). Accordingly, federal jurisdiction for an MMWA claim “does not exist unless 10 the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000.” Id. (citation omitted); see Shoner v. Carrier 11 Corp., 30 F.4th 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Although the MMWA is a federal statute, 12 federal courts do not have jurisdiction over an MMWA claim if the amount in controversy 13 is less than $50,000.”). Here, the Complaint does not clearly assert the basis for damages 14 on the MMWA claim, and as discussed above, the Complaint is indeterminate as to any 15 values necessary to calculate an amount in controversy. Accordingly, inclusion of the 16 MMWA claim in the Complaint did not start a 30-day clock for removal. 17 18 2. Amount in Controversy2 19 20 Plaintiff vaguely contends that Defendant “failed to establish removal is 21 substantively proper.” (Mot. at i; see id. at 7–8). But “a defendant’s notice of removal 22 2 The parties do not dispute that there is complete diversity. Based on its own 23 investigation, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff is a California citizen. (Opp’n at 17; see 24 Notice at 3). A limited liability company (LLC) such as Defendant is a citizen of each state in which its owners or members are citizens. Johnson v. Columbia Props. 25 Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006). A corporation is a citizen in the state in which it is incorporated and the state “where it has its principal place of business.” 28 26 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). Here, Defendant is an LLC whose sole member is General Motors 27 Holdings LLC. (Notice at 3). The sole member of General Motors Holding LLC is General Motors Company. (Id.). General Motors Company is incorporated in Delaware 28 1 need include only a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the 2 jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 3 81, 89 (2014). Under the Song-Beverly Act, a plaintiff may receive actual damages in the 4 amount of “the actual price paid or payable by the buyer,” offset by the “amount directly 5 attributable to use by the buyer prior to the time the buyer first delivered the vehicle to the 6 manufacturer or distributor.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(B)–(C). Actual damages are 7 further offset by negative equity; noncash credits provided by the manufacturer; and the 8 actual price of “optional equipment, service contracts, or [guaranteed asset protection] 9 financing purchased by the plaintiff.” Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 871.27(b)–(d). A 10 plaintiff may also be entitled to civil penalties if the defendant’s violations were willful. 11 Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(c). A civil penalty award may not exceed twice the amount of 12 actual damages. Id. 13 14 The Notice plausibly alleges that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 15 After its preliminary investigation, Defendant estimated the Subject Vehicle’s purchase 16 price was $136,620.12. (Notice at 5). Defendant also estimated $16,872.86 in statutory 17 deductions, yielding an estimate of actual damages of $119,747.26. (Id.). The Complaint 18 also seeks civil penalties in the amount of twice Plaintiff’s actual damages. (Compl. at 6). 19 The Song-Beverly Act also allows recovery of attorneys’ fees, which Defendant estimates 20 at $5,000 to date. (Notice at 5–6). In sum, Defendant’s investigation revealed a plausible 21 basis for concluding that the amount in controversy exceeded the $75,000 threshold for 22 diversity jurisdiction. 23 24 For the first time in his Reply, Plaintiff contends that Defendant failed to 25 demonstrate that the amount in controversy exceeds the $75,000 threshold. (Reply at 4– 26 6). If the plaintiff contests the defendant’s jurisdictional allegation, “both sides submit

27 with a principal place of business in Michigan. (Id.). Thus, there is complete diversity of 28 citizenship between the parties. 1 proof and the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the amount-in- 2 controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Dart Cherokee Basin, 574 U.S. at 88. 3 “Under this system, a defendant cannot establish removal jurisdiction by mere speculation 4 and conjecture, with unreasonable assumptions.” Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 5 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015). “But assumptions made part of the defendant’s chain of 6 reasoning need not be proven; they instead must only have some reasonable ground 7 underlying them.” Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriot, 936 F.3d 920, 927 (9th Cir. 2019) 8 (citation omitted). While Plaintiff arguably waived this argument, as discussed above, the 9 Court allowed supplemental briefing to develop this issue. 10 11 Here, Defendant has provided the purchase agreement, repair history, and loan 12 payment history for the Subject Vehicle.3 (Def. Supp. at 10 & Exs. A–C). Based on this 13 information, Defendant applied a mileage offset, other deductible offsets, and estimated 14 the remaining unpaid financing, which indicated actual damages reasonably estimated as 15 $78,776.09. (Id. at 10). Plaintiff alleged willful violation of the Song-Beverly Act in his 16 Complaint and seeks civil penalties twice actual damages. (Compl. at 6 & ¶¶ 17, 24, 28). 17 This raises the reasonable amount in controversy to $236,328.27 without even considering 18 attorneys’ fees. 19 20 Plaintiff contends that mere allegations of willfulness are insufficient to place civil 21 penalties in controversy. (Pl. Supp. at 3–7). The Court is mindful that some district 22 courts require defendants to proffer evidence that a plaintiff will receive the maximum 23 amount of civil penalties. See, e.g., Gomez v. Nissan North America, Inc., No. 2:24-cv- 24 09020-SVW, 2025 WL 26368, at *5–6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2025) (declining to consider 25 civil penalties because plaintiff's allegations of willfulness were conclusory). 26 Nevertheless, “[m]any courts have included the maximum civil penalty available under

27 3 Plaintiff inexplicably argues that Defendant failed to provide the purchase agreement, 28 repair chronology, offset data, and pre-suit exchanges. (Pl. Supp. at 1). 1 the Song-Beverly Act as part of the amount in controversy, at least when the plaintiff 2 alleges that the defendant acted willfully and requests the full penalty in the complaint.” 3 Amavizca v. Nissan North America, Inc., No. ED CV 22-02256 JAK (KK), 2023 WL 4 3020489, at *6–8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2023) (collecting cases). 5 6 Here, Plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to a civil penalty of two times Plaintiff’s 7 actual damages due to Defendant’s willful conduct (Compl. at 6; see id. ¶¶ 17, 24, 28), 8 and Defendant provides evidence that the Subject Vehicle was presented for repair at least 9 five times (Def. Supp. at 15 & Ex. B). Although Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s civil 10 penalty assumption is unsupported, Plaintiff does not address his own allegations 11 regarding willful conduct or Defendant’s evidence regarding the number of times the 12 vehicle was presented for repair. The Court finds that it is appropriate here to include the 13 maximum amount of civil penalties in the calculation of the amount in controversy. The 14 inclusion of civil penalties results in an amount in controversy that exceeds $75,000, 15 without consideration of attorneys’ fees and costs. 16 17 In sum, the Court finds that Defendant has met its burden to show by a 18 preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 for 19 purposes of diversity jurisdiction. 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 IV. 2 CONCLUSION 3 4 For the foregoing reasons, Sandoval’s Motion to Remand is DENIED. The Court 5 || will issue a separate order setting a scheduling conference. 6 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. °

9 || DATE: January 6, 2026 fuk 10 PEDRO V.CASTILLO ———s—s—‘“_sS i UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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