1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TYANN CRELLIN, Case No. 1:24-cv-00996 JLT BAM 12 Plaintiff, ORDER ADOPTING THE FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS, DENYING

13 v. PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL, GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO AFFIRM,

14 FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF JUDGMENT Social Security1, IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT 15 Defendant. (Docs. 13, 17, 20) 16 17 18 Tyann Crellin filed unsuccessful applications for disability insurance benefits and 19 supplemental security income with the Social Security Administration. (Doc. 10-11 at 288–304). 20 The agency denied her applications after a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), 21 who issued a written opinion, and after the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request to review 22 the ALJ’s decision. (Id. at 1–5, 19–36, 46–76). Plaintiff then sought review in this Court. 23 (Doc. 1.) 24 Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on the Administrative Record. (Doc. 13.) She 25 makes three arguments. (Id. at 6–7.) First, she argues the ALJ did not give “specific, clear and 26

27 1 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 6, 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court substitutes Frank Bisignano as the 28 defendant in this action. 1 convincing reasons” to reject or discount her allegations that “she was unable to work because of 2 symptoms from herniated spinal discs, sciatic nerve pain, diabetes, bipolar disorder, agoraphobia, 3 anxiety, and depression.” (Id. at 7, 11 (citation omitted).) Second, she argues the ALJ’s 4 conclusions contradicted the medical opinions of a psychologist consultant, Stephen Saxby, 5 Ph.D., and she contends the ALJ did not explain or justify the contradiction. (Id. at 18.) Third, 6 she argues similarly that the ALJ’s conclusions contradicted the opinions of a psychiatric 7 examiner, Meghan Hamill, Psy.D., again without justification. (Id. at 21.) The Commissioner of 8 Social Security, the defendant in this action, opposes Plaintiff’s motion, disagreeing with each of 9 the three points above, and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 17.) Plaintiff filed 10 a reply. (Doc. 18.) 11 The matter was referred to the assigned magistrate judge under this District’s Local Rules. 12 The magistrate judge has prepared findings and recommendations addressing each of Plaintiff’s 13 arguments. (Doc. 20.) First, the magistrate judge determined that the ALJ had provided specific, 14 clear and convincing reasons for discounting plaintiff’s subjective complaints of physical and 15 mental dysfunction. (Id. at 4–11.) The magistrate judge also found that the ALJ’s conclusions 16 were consistent with the findings by Drs. Saxby and Hamill. (Id. at 12–19.) Thus, the magistrate 17 judge recommends denying plaintiff’s appeal, affirming the agency’s determination to deny 18 benefits, and entering judgment in favor of defendant. (Id. at 19–20.) 19 The Court served the Findings and Recommendations on the parties and notified them that 20 any objections were due within fourteen days. (Doc. 20 at 20.) The Findings and 21 Recommendations also warned that a failure to object “may result in the waiver of the ‘right to 22 challenge the [magistrate judge’s] factual findings’ on appeal.” (Id. (quoting Wilkerson v. 23 Wheeler, 772 F.3d 32, 838–38 (9th Cir. 2014)).) Plaintiff filed objections, but they address only 24 her arguments related to Dr. Saxby’s opinions. (Doc. 21.) Defendant responded to the 25 objections. (Doc. 22.) 26 The Court has reviewed the case de novo. With respect to the first and third issues raised 27 in Plaintiff’s motion, the Findings and Recommendations are supported by the record and the 28 proper analysis. The court adopts those portions of the Findings and Recommendations. With 1 respect to Plaintiff’s arguments about the second issue (Dr. Saxby’s opinions), the court adopts 2 the Findings and Recommendations in part, as explained below. 3 A few more details about Plaintiff’s application and the ALJ’s decision are a necessary to 4 explain the Court’s decision. As the magistrate judge accurately summarized in the Findings and 5 Recommendations, the ALJ decided Plaintiff was not disabled by following the Social Security 6 Administration’s five-step evaluation process. (Doc. 20 at 2.) The ALJ found Plaintiff had not 7 been engaged in “substantial gainful employment” since January 1, 2020 (step one), and Plaintiff 8 had several severe impairments (step two). (Id. at 2.) But because these impairments did not 9 meet or equal the impairments listed in certain regulations (step three), the ALJ went on to decide 10 what “residual functional capacity” of “RFC” Plaintiff had, i.e., the most she could still do despite 11 her limitations, based on the evidence in the record (step four), and to decide what work Plaintiff 12 could perform with this residual functional capacity, if any (step five). (Id. at 2–3.) 13 Dr. Saxby’s opinions came into play at the fourth step in this process: in deciding what 14 residual functional capacity Plaintiff had. (See AR 28–34.2) Dr. Saxby found Plaintiff had a mild 15 impairment on her ability to understand, remember, or apply information. (AR 165.) He found 16 she had moderate impairments on her abilities to interact with others; to concentrate, persist, or 17 maintain a pace; and to adapt or manage herself. Id. She had no significant limit on her “ability 18 to carry out very short and simple instructions.” (AR 171). This meant that in Dr. Saxby’s 19 opinion, Plaintiff could “understand, remember and carry out simple instructions.” (AR 166, 20 174.) Plaintiff could also, by his assessment, “sustain attention and concentration for short simple 21 tasks,” as well as “respond to supervisors, co-workers, and work situations,” and “adapt to 22 changes in a routine work setting.” (Id.) The ALJ found these opinions were “mostly 23 persuasive,” but not entirely so, “given her reports of issues with people,” which showed she had 24 “limitations on social functioning” as well. (AR 33.) 25 Dr. Saxby was just one of many professionals who had offered their opinions in Plaintiff’s 26 2 Citations in this format refer to the Administrative Record, filed in this action at Docs. 10-11 27 and 10-12. For consistency with the parties’ briefing and the Findings and Recommendations, the Court refers to the page numbers at the bottom right of each page of the Administrative Record, 28 not those applied by the CM/ECF system. 1 case by the time the ALJ made her decision. (See AR 32–34.) Some of these opinions were 2 different from Dr. Saxby’s opinions. For example, Dr. Hamill, the psychiatric examiner noted 3 above, examined Plaintiff and wrote that she had only “mild” impairments on her abilities “to 4 perform detailed and complex tasks” and “to understand and accept instructions from 5 supervisors.” (AR 981.) And like Dr. Saxby’s opinions, the ALJ found Dr. Hamill’s opinions 6 were “mostly persuasive.” (AR 33–34.) 7 The ALJ did not to adopt any single one of these multiple opinions or assessments. Nor 8 did she give any one of them “controlling” weight. (AR 32.) She instead “assessed specific 9 restrictions on a function-by-function basis best supported by the evidence as a whole.” (Id.) 10 This assessment led the ALJ to conclude Plaintiff could (1) “understand, remember, and carry out 11 simple instructions,” (2) “sustain attention and concentration to complete simple tasks,” 12 (3) “adapt to changes in a routine work setting,” (4) “interact with co-workers and supervisors 13 occasionally,” and (5) “cannot work with the general public.” (Id.) This was Plaintiff’s residual 14 functional capacity, the yardstick the ALJ would use to decide whether there was work Plaintiff 15 could perform in the national economy and thus whether Plaintiff was “disabled” for purposes of 16 her claims. (See AR 34–35.) 17 The parties’ current dispute focuses on the second of these limitations, i.e., the ALJ’s 18 finding that Plaintiff could “sustain attention and concentration to complete simple tasks.” This 19 finding differed from Dr. Saxby’s opinion in one small but crucial respect. As noted, in Dr. 20 Saxby’s opinion, Plaintiff could “sustain attention and concentration for short simple tasks,” 21 rather than merely “simple tasks.” (AR 166, 174 (emphasis added).) Plaintiff argues the 22 omission of the word “short” brings the ALJ’s decision into conflict with Dr. Saxby’s opinions. 23 (See, e.g., Doc. 21 at 2.) Defendant disagrees. (See, e.g., Doc. 22 at 1–2.) The Magistrate Judge 24 found the ALJ’s determination was “consistent with” Dr. Saxby’s opinion. (Doc. 20 at 13.) The 25 Magistrate Judge also found the ALJ’s determination was based on more than judge Dr. Saxby’s 26 assessment, so it could not be expected to “exactly match” that assessment alone. (Id. at 14 27 (quoting Mills v. Comm’s of Soc. Sec., No. 2:13-cv-0899 KJN, 2014 WL 4195012, at *4 n.8 (E.D. 28 Cal. Aug. 22, 2014)).) 1 It might seem at first blush that the difference between “short, simple tasks” and “simple 2 tasks” is not particularly meaningful, given the likelihood that most simple tasks are also short. 3 But as the Ninth Circuit has explained, the difference might prove to be decisive in a case like this 4 one. See Leach v. Kijakazi, 70 F.4th 1251, 1256–57 (9th Cir. 2023). In Leach, the ALJ had 5 determined that the plaintiff claimant could “perform simple, routine tasks” and could “follow 6 short, simple instructions.” Id. at 1254. As is “often” the case, ALJ then called on a vocational 7 expert to testify about what jobs, if any, a hypothetical person with specific limitations could 8 perform. Id. But rather than asking the vocational expert about jobs involving “short, simple 9 instructions,” the ALJ asked what jobs a person could do if limited to merely “simple job 10 instructions.” Id. at 1256. A question that does not reflect all of a person’s limitations “has no 11 evidentiary value,” id. at 1255 (citation omitted), so the ALJ erred by relying on the vocational 12 expert’s answer, id. at 1256. But more crucially for purposes of this case, the error was not 13 harmless. See id. at 1256–57. In response to the ALJ’s question, the vocational expert had 14 identified jobs that required workers “to carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral 15 instructions” rather than “simple one- or two-step instructions.” Id. at 1256 (quoting Dict. of 16 Occupational Titles App. C, § III (4th ed. 1991)). Because “detailed” instructions might very 17 well be longer than “one- or two-step instructions,” those jobs might not actually be jobs the 18 plaintiff claimant could have performed, so the ALJ might have rejected her claim in error, and 19 further proceedings were necessary. See id. at 1256–57, 1258. 20 Plaintiff relies heavily on Leach. (See, e.g., Doc. 21 at 3.) The Circuit’s opinion is indeed 21 instructive. It illustrates why “short and simple” might be a meaningfully stricter limitation than 22 “simple.” In this case, as in Leach, the ALJ asked a vocational expert to identify jobs, and again, 23 as in Leach, the vocational expert identified three jobs that each require “detailed but uninvolved 24 written or oral instructions,” i.e., a small products assembler, a route clerk and a marking clerk. 25 (See AR 35 (citing Dict. Occupational Titles §§ 739.687-030, 222.687-022, 209.587-034 (4th ed. 26 1991)).) It is quite plausible that someone limited to only “short and simple” tasks and 27 instructions might not be capable of performing these jobs. The first, for example, small products 28 assembler, is expected to cut, fit and fasten together products like shoes and loudspeakers using 1 machines like “arbor presses, punch presses, taps, spot-welding or riveters.” Dict. Occupational 2 Titles § 739.687-030 (4th ed. 1991). The assembly of a shoe or a loudspeaker with a punch press 3 or a spot welder may very well involve merely simple tasks and instructions, but not short tasks 4 and instructions. 5 But as the magistrate judge pointed out, unlike Leach, this case is not about a mismatch 6 between Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity and the vocational expert’s opinions. (See Doc. 7 20 at 14–15.) Rather, it is about the differences, if any, between one doctor’s opinions and the 8 ALJ’s conclusions about Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity. (See id.) The Court cannot 9 distinguish Leach for that reason alone, as the Magistrate Judge recommends, (id.), and as 10 Defendant urges, (Doc. 22 at 3.) The Circuit’s opinion in Leach illustrates the practical 11 implications of omitting the word “simple” from the description of Plaintiff’s residual functional 12 capacity. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the Circuit’s opinion in Leach shows the distinction 13 between “short, simple tasks” and “simple tasks” is a “concrete” one that could—if erroneous— 14 lead to mistaken conclusions about a claimant’s capacity to work in a particular job, given the 15 ALJ’s reliance on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and the vocational expert’s testimony. 16 (Doc. 21 at 3.) If the ALJ did not explain her finding that plaintiff could “sustain attention and 17 concentration to complete simple tasks,” or if the ALJ’s explanation is not supported by 18 substantial evidence, the omission cannot stand. See Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792 (9th 19 Cir. 2022). 20 Plaintiff argues the ALJ did not explain her decision. (See, e.g., Doc. 21 at 2.) The Court 21 disagrees. Before the ALJ catalogued the various medical assessments in the record before her, 22 she summarized relevant clinical findings—including the results of an MRI, an 23 electroencephalogram, mental status examinations, and psychological consultations—and 24 Plaintiff’s symptoms, her responses to medication, and her ability to complete “simple routine 25 tasks” in her daily life. (See AR 31–32.) The ALJ then summarized each doctor’s opinions and 26 explained what persuasive value she gave them and why. (AR 33–34.) The most persuasive of 27 these opinions were, in the ALJ’s view, the two discussed above, by Drs. Saxby and Hamill, 28 which she described as “mostly persuasive.” (Id.) But as noted above, their opinions were not 1 perfect matches for one another. While Dr. Saxby had written that Plaintiff could “sustain 2 attention and concentration for short simple tasks” and that Plaintiff was “[m]oderately limited” 3 in her “ability to carry out detailed instructions,” Dr. Hamill had written that Plaintiff had “no 4 impairment in her ability to perform simple and repetitive tasks and mild impairment in her 5 ability to perform detailed and complex tasks.” (AR 33; see also AR 166, 174, 981.) The ALJ 6 wrote that she would “not adopt a single assessment” from those offered by various experts, 7 including Drs. Saxby and Hamill, but would instead assess “specific restrictions on a function-by- 8 function basis best supported by the evidence as a whole.” (AR 32.) The ALJ thus explained her 9 ultimate decision not to adopt Dr. Saxby’s opinion verbatim—nor Dr. Hamill’s, for that matter— 10 but instead to find that Plaintiff could “sustain attention and concentration to complete simple 11 tasks.” (Id.) 12 The ALJ’s explanation is also supported by substantial evidence. As the magistrate judge 13 explained in detail, the ALJ’s conclusions about Plaintiffs’ mental limitations had support in her 14 medical records. (See Doc. 20 at 6–11.) The ALJ also relied reasonably on Dr. Hamill’s 15 opinions, which she reached after examining Plaintiff in person, and which she explained in a 16 detailed, written report. (AR 33–34, 977.) Dr. Hamill summarized Plaintiff’s responses to 17 questions and her demeanor and explained a variety of conclusions about her memory, 18 intelligence, ability to perform mental calculations, concentration, abstract thinking, judgment, 19 and insight. (AR 979–80.) For example, Dr. Hamill found Plaintiff’s “short-term, long-term and 20 working memory appeared intact,” her intelligence appeared to be “in the average range,” she 21 could perform common arithmetic, she did not “display any significant deficits with 22 concentration,” and she summarized Plaintiff’s intelligent interpretations of two common 23 proverbs. (See AR 33–34, 979–80.) Finally, Dr. Saxby found only “moderate” limitations on 24 Plaintiff’s ability to “carry out detailed instructions” and “to maintain attention and concentration 25 for extended periods.” (AR 171.) This was substantial evidence—i.e., more than a “scintilla,” 26 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971)—to support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff 27 could sustain attention and concentration to complete simple tasks, even if they were not short. 28 See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A]n ALJ’s assessment of 1 | aclaimant adequately captures restrictions related to concentration, persistence, or pace where the 2 || assessment is consistent with restrictions identified in the medical testimony.”’). 3 Thus, the Court ORDERS: 4 1. The Findings and Recommendations (Doc. 20) are ADOPTED IN PART as 5 specified above. 6 2. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and appeal from the agency’s decision 7 (Doc. 13) are DENIED. 8 3. Defendant’s request to affirm the administrative decision (Doc. 17) is 9 GRANTED. 10 4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate any pending motions; enter 11 judgment in favor of Defendant Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social 12 Security, and against Plaintiff Tyann Crellin; and to close this case. 13 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 Dated: _ January 8, 2026 Charis [Tourn

TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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