NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 20 2026

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MIRIAN CONCEPCION RIVAS-DIAZ; No. 17-70552

MONICA ITZEL RIVAS,

Agency Nos. Petitioners,

A202-121-794; A202-121-795

v.

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted January 20, 2026**

Before: PAEZ, BENNETT, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

Mirian Concepcion Rivas Diaz and her daughter Monica Itzel Rivas petition

for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA’s”) order dismissing their

appeal from the immigration judge’s (“IJ’s”) order denying Rivas Diaz’s

applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Arrey v.

Barr, 916 F.3d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir. 2019). We review de novo questions of law,

mixed questions of law and fact, and constitutional issues. Gutierrez-Alm v.

Garland, 62 F.4th 1186, 1194 (9th Cir. 2023). We deny the petition.

1. The agency did not err in denying Rivas Diaz’s applications for

asylum and withholding of removal. When an applicant seeks asylum or

withholding of removal based on membership in a “particular social group”

(“PSG”), the applicant must demonstrate (1) “the existence of a cognizable

particular social group,” (2) “his membership in that particular social group,” and

(3) “a risk of persecution on account of his membership in the specified particular

social group.” Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1132 n.3 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting

Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 223 (B.I.A. 2014)). The BIA upheld the

IJ’s denial of asylum and withholding on the basis that Rivas Diaz failed to

demonstrate membership in her proposed PSG, “women unable to leave a

relationship based on societal expectations regarding gender and subordination.”

1 Rivas Diaz is the lead petitioner, and Itzel Rivas seeks asylum only as a derivative beneficiary of her mother’s application. Itzel Rivas is not entitled to assert a derivative claim for statutory withholding of removal or CAT relief. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3) (allowing derivative asylum for spouses and children), and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.21, with 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (failing to provide derivative withholding of removal) and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16.

2 17-70552 We review that factual finding for substantial evidence. Hernandez-Montiel v.

INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1091 (9th Cir. 2000) (whether applicant “is a member of a

particular group is a question of fact, to which we apply the substantial evidence

test”), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir.

2005) (en banc).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Rivas Diaz was not a

member of the proposed PSG of “women unable to leave a relationship based on

societal expectations regarding gender and subordination.” Rivas Diaz testified

that she tried to leave Walter two times. The first time, she started packing her

belongings but Walter apologized and convinced her to stay. The second time, she

went to stay with a friend. Walter came to the friend’s house drunk, asked for her,

and told Rivas Diaz to come with him or her friend would suffer the consequences.

Walter also threatened the lives of Rivas Diaz and her daughter and threatened to

beat Rivas Diaz’s brother. Rivas Diaz testified that both her friend and her doctor

encouraged her to report Walter’s abuse to the police. When she did, the police

took a report and told her she needed to leave Walter. Rivas Diaz left El Salvador

seven days later. At the time she left the country, the police had not arrested

Walter. In these circumstances, the record does not compel the conclusion that

Rivas Diaz was unable to leave Walter because of societal expectations regarding

gender and subordination.

3 17-70552 2. The agency also did not err in denying Rivas Diaz’s application for

relief under CAT. To establish entitlement to CAT protection, an applicant must

show, among other things, that she would face torture “inflicted by, or at the

instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official acting in an

official capacity or other person acting in an official capacity” in the proposed

country of removal. Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 834 (9th Cir.

2022) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1)). The BIA upheld the IJ’s finding that

Rivas Diaz failed to demonstrate that, if returned to El Salvador, she would more

likely than not be tortured with government acquiescence. We review the agency’s

determination that a petitioner did not show a likelihood of torture with

government acquiescence for substantial evidence. See Salguero Sosa v. Garland,

55 F.4th 1213, 1222 (9th Cir. 2022).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination. Country

condition reports in the record show that El Salvador’s laws criminalize domestic

violence. Although those laws are not always effectively enforced, the “general

ineffectiveness on the government’s part to investigate and prevent crime [does]

not suffice to show acquiescence.” Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836

(9th Cir. 2016). Further, the agency properly relied on evidence that the police

took a formal report when Rivas Diaz reported Walter’s violence and told Rivas

Diaz to leave him. Although the police did not arrest Walter or take other action

4 17-70552 against him in the seven days between Rivas Diaz’s filing of her report and leaving

the country, that evidence does not compel a contrary conclusion.

PETITION DENIED.

5 17-70552