DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that the trial court ignored evidence of excusable neglect, failed to consider the substance of his motion,

3 and relied on procedural defects and delays in denying his motion to set aside. He asserts that the court should have accounted for “the challenges non-lawyers face” in exercising discretion, and the public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits supports reversal. As we explain below, plaintiff has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to vacate or set aside the judgment.

I. Plaintiff Has Forfeited His Appellate Arguments

As a threshold matter, we conclude that plaintiff has forfeited any challenge to the order denying his motion to vacate or set aside due to his failure to provide an adequate record on appeal and failure to cite the record in his briefs. “ ‘ “It is the duty of an appellant to provide an adequate record to the court establishing error. Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against appellant.” ’ ” (Mack v. All Counties Trustee Services, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 935, 940; Estrada v. Ramirez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 618, 620, fn. 1 [same].) Here, plaintiff appeals the denial of his motion to vacate or set aside the judgment but did not include that motion in the clerk’s transcript. This error is fatal to his appeal because we cannot adequately review the trial court’s decision without knowing his arguments in the motion. Further, plaintiff failed to cite the record anywhere in his briefs as required by the Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C). Allegations that are not supported by references to the record are deemed forfeited. The court is not required to make an independent search of the record and may disregard any claims when no reference is furnished. (Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 735, 745; Nwosu v. Uba (2004)

4 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246; Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856.)

II. Plaintiff’s Evidence Shows No Mistake,

Inadvertence, Surprise, or Excusable Neglect Even if we were to address the merits of the court’s order denying plaintiff’s motion, we find no abuse of discretion. Section 473, subdivision (b) states: “The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or the party’s legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against the party through the party’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. . . . [T]he court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any (1) resulting default entered by the clerk against the attorney’s client, and which will result in entry of a default judgment, or (2) resulting default judgment or dismissal entered against the attorney’s client, unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” The party moving under section 473, subdivision (b) bears the burden of demonstrating entitlement to relief by providing a satisfactory explanation—excusable mistake, surprise, or neglect—for the judgment they seek to set aside. (Huh v. Wang (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1420, 1423 (Huh); Kendall v. Barker (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 619, 623–624.) In that regard, it is “simply not enough to assert a general state of misapprehension or ignorance.” (Hopkins & Carley v. Gens (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1410 (Hopkins).) Rather, the moving party must “specify

5 the actual cause of his failure . . . and explain why that failure should be excused.” (Ibid.) We review the trial court’s ruling on the section 473, subdivision (b) motion for abuse of discretion. (Huh, at p. 1419.) Here, plaintiff’s new attorney submitted a declaration in support of plaintiff’s motion but did not attest to his own mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, likely because counsel was not involved in this case until after the judgment was entered. Counsel’s declaration thus did not entitle plaintiff to relief under section 473. Plaintiff’s own declaration likewise provides no satisfactory explanation for his failure to respond to the motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff states that from May 2023 through September 2024, he attempted to litigate in propria persona and “diligently sought new representation” by contacting one attorney who he named and other unnamed lawyers through several websites. He attested that, “due to the fact that my vocation requires me to drive to locations that are outside of Los Angeles County and often out of the state of California while I supported my family and attempted to self-medicate the trauma I suffered, I was unable to find representation as I had little time to meet in person with potential law offices and lawyers so that they would genuinely understand my case.” Plaintiff provides no other information about why he failed to respond to the motion for summary judgment. It is well established that “[t]he ‘naïveté’ of lay litigants in ‘rely[ing] on themselves to protect their substantial legal interests’ does not afford a ground for relief from adverse results. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 979.)” (Hopkins, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1414.) “The law does not entitle a

6 party to proceed experimentally without counsel and then turn back the clock if the experiment yields an adverse result. One who voluntarily represents himself ‘is not, for that reason, entitled to any more (or less) consideration than a lawyer. Thus, any alleged ignorance of legal matters or failure to properly represent himself can hardly constitute ‘mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect’ as those terms are used in section 473.’ (Goodson v. The Bogerts, Inc. (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 32, 40.) Rather, ‘when a litigant accepts the risks of proceeding without counsel, he or she is stuck with the outcome, and has no greater opportunity to cast off an unfavorable judgment than he or she would if represented by counsel.’ (Burnete v. La Casa Dana Apartments (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1267.)” (Id. at p. 1413.) The declarations that supported plaintiff’s motion to vacate or set aside failed to provide any qualifying basis for relief. Plaintiff’s assertions regarding his work schedule, personal difficulties, and challenges in securing new counsel fall short of the required showing. Case law makes clear that self- representation and the difficulties attendant to it do not constitute grounds for relief under section 473, subdivision (b), and litigants who elect to proceed without counsel are bound by the consequences of that choice. On this record, the trial court acted well within its discretion in concluding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate excusable neglect or any other statutory basis to set aside the judgment.

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DISPOSITION

The court’s order is affirmed. Defendant Byung Woo Kang is awarded his costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL

REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

EGERTON, J.

HANASONO, J.

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