facts, so we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252, and we deny the petition.

The Immigration Judge concluded, and the BIA affirmed, that Petitioners

did not establish eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or relief under the

CAT.

On appeal to the BIA, the only issue Zavala raised was whether she

established membership in a particular social group. The BIA declined to address

that issue, instead dismissing the appeal based on the Immigration Judge’s other

dispositive determinations, which Zavala did not challenge. Those included the

Immigration Judge’s conclusions that (1) Zavala had not experienced past

persecution; (2) she did not establish a nexus between the alleged persecution and

her membership in a particular social group; (3) she did not show that the Mexican

government would be unwilling or unable to protect her from the harm she fears

from private actors; and (4) she can relocate within Mexico to avoid future harm.

In her petition to this Court, Zavala briefly raises again the question of

whether she demonstrated membership in any particular social group, and an

additional question as to whether she established a nexus between the alleged harm

2 and her purported social groups. Her new argument on appeal implicates questions

of forfeiture and exhaustion. See Shen v. Garland, 109 F.4th 1144, 1157–58 (9th

Cir. 2024) (explaining that administrative exhaustion requires a petitioner to raise

before the BIA the same issues that form the basis of her appeal to this court).

We need not address whether Zavala has established membership in a

particular social group, or whether the nexus issue was forfeited or exhausted,

because Petitioners again fail to challenge other dispositive determinations,

including that the harm Zavala “experienced in the past in relation to both of her

claimed particular social groups is not sufficiently severe to constitute persecution

as a matter of law” and that Zavala “did not establish Mexican officials are

unwilling or unable to protect her from harm perpetrated by private actors.” See

Asarco LLC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 866 F.3d 1108, 1127 (9th Cir. 2017) (issue

abandoned where not raised on appeal to this court). Petitioners’ failure to

challenge these dispositive determinations foreclose their claims for asylum and

withholding of removal. See, e.g., Singh v. Garland, 57 F.4th 643, 652 (9th Cir.

2023) (“The source of the persecution [to support asylum or withholding of

removal] must be the government or forces that the government is unwilling or

unable to control.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly,

we uphold the BIA’s determination that Petitioners have not met their burden with

regard to their asylum or withholding of removal claims.

3 Petitioners did not challenge any of the Immigration Judge’s findings

regarding their claims for CAT relief. Accordingly, we uphold the BIA’s decision

as to their application for protection under the CAT.

PETITION DENIED.2

2 The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues. The motion for stay of removal is otherwise denied. See Dkt. No. 1.

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