NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 5 2026

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MANUEL GONZALES, on behalf of No. 25-2951 himself and all others similarly situated, and D.C. No. the general public, 2:24-cv-04632-MEMF-AS Plaintiff - Appellee,

MEMORANDUM*

v.

ROSE HILLS COMPANY, a Delaware corporation; SERVICE CORPORATION INTERNATIONAL, a business entity of unknown form; SCI SHARED SERVICES,

INC.,

Defendants - Appellants,

and

DIGNITY MEMORIAL, a business entity of unknown form, DOES 1-50, inclusive,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 1, 2025**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Pasadena, California

Before: CALLAHAN, OWENS, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

Defendants-Appellants Rose Hills Company, Dignity Memorial, Service

Corporation International, and SCI Shared Services, Inc. (“SCI”), (collectively

“Employers” or “Appellants”) challenge the district court’s denial of their motion

to compel arbitration for failure to establish the existence of an arbitration

agreement. As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here.

We have jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 16 and affirm.

“We review de novo the denial of a motion to compel arbitration, while

underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error.” Berman v. Freedom Fin.

Network, LLC, 30 F.4th 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). Additionally, we

“review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and reverse if the exercise of

discretion is both erroneous and prejudicial.” Elosu v. Middlefork Ranch Inc., 26

F.4th 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal citation omitted).

The district court must determine “whether there is an agreement to arbitrate

between the parties” before it “decid[es] whether to compel arbitration.” Zoller v.

GCA Advisors, LLC, 993 F.3d 1198, 1201 (9th Cir. 2021). In a challenge to the

existence “of an arbitration agreement, the presumption in favor of arbitrability

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

2 25-2951 does not apply.” Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of Reno, 747 F.3d 733, 742 (9th

Cir. 2014). In evaluating a motion to compel arbitration, “district courts rely on

the summary judgment standard of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.” Hansen v. LMB Mortg. Servs., Inc., 1 F.4th 667, 670 (9th Cir. 2021).

“[C]ourts apply state-law principles of contract formation and interpretation”

to determine whether an arbitration agreement was formed. Suski v. Coinbase,

Inc., 55 F.4th 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 2022). The party seeking to compel arbitration

bears the burden of proving the existence of an agreement to arbitrate by a

preponderance of the evidence. See Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 771 F.3d

559, 565 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Sec. Corp., 58 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 875, 885 (Cal. 1996)).

1. Employers argue that the district court abused its discretion by excluding

portions of testimony from two of their employees. We disagree. 1

Employers sought to establish that Plaintiff-Appellee Manuel Gonzales2

signed the agreement through testimony from two employees: Jessica Crawford, an

1 Employers also argue for the first time in their reply brief that even if the district court correctly excluded their evidence, the evidence that the district court admitted sufficiently established the existence of the arbitration agreement. We do not address this argument because arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are forfeited. See Vasquez v. Rackauckas, 734 F.3d 1025, 1054 (9th Cir. 2013). 2 Manuel Gonzales was employed by Rose Hills Company, Service Corporation International, and SCI at times relevant to this case.

3 25-2951 HR Compliance Manager at SCI, and Brian Pellegrin, Assistant VP of Information

Technology at SCI. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding

portions of those employees’ testimonies because the employees lacked personal

knowledge of whether Gonzales signed the purported agreement. See Fed. R.

Evid. 602; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).

The district court rejected Crawford’s testimony because her knowledge of

Employers’ electronic signature practices did not establish knowledge as to

whether Gonzales actually signed the arbitration agreement. Crawford stated that

“all employees of Rose Hills, including [Gonzales], were required to use the

Workday system to review and, when applicable, electronically signed [sic]

documents relating to their employment with Rose Hills.” This statement says

nothing about whether the requirement to electronically sign documents was

applicable to Gonzales and further fails to establish knowledge of Gonzales’ actual

conduct.

The district court also rejected Pellegrin’s testimony for similar reasons.

The court held that Pellegrin inappropriately testified that Gonzales signed the

agreement because “at best, Pellegrin can testify only as to what he observes was

done with [Gonzales’s] login information,” and did not rule out the “possibility

that someone else gained and used [Gonzales’s] login information.” The district

court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Pellegrin lacked personal

4 25-2951 knowledge of whether Gonzales signed the arbitration agreement.

Employers fail to persuade us that the district court abused its discretion by

misapplying the law. See United States v. Nguyen, 465 F.3d 1128, 1130 (9th Cir.

2006) (district court abuses discretion when its evidentiary rulings are based on “an

erroneous view of the law”). The cases Employers point to where a party seeking

to enforce arbitration successfully authenticated the arbitration agreement are

inapposite to the instant case. See Prostek v. Lincare Inc., 662 F. Supp. 3d 1100,

1114 (E.D. Cal. 2023) (concerning a handwritten signature); Jones-Mixon v.

Bloomingdale’s, Inc., 2014 WL 2736020, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2014)

(concerning consent by failure to opt out). Employers’ other cases in which the

party seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement adequately authenticated the

electronic signature on that agreement also do not control. In those cases, the party

seeking to enforce the arbitration agreement provided more relevant evidence than

Employers did here. See Tagliabue v. J.C. Penney Corp., Inc., 2015 WL 8780577,

at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2015) (concluding sufficient authentication when plaintiff

“was required to re-sign the arbitration agreement”); Espejo v. S. Cal. Permanente

Med. Grp., 201 Cal. Rptr. 3d 318, 329 (Ct. App. 2016) (finding adequate

authentication where there was detailed information about “the steps an applicant

would have to take” to make an electronic signature). Even if “reasonable minds

could have reached different conclusions” in this case, Medrano v. City of Los

5 25-2951 Angeles, 973 F.2d 1499, 1507 (9th Cir. 1992), the district court did not abuse its

discretion.

2. We also reject Employers’ challenge to the district court’s conclusion that

Gonzales adequately challenged the existence of the arbitration agreement.

Gonzales stated that he did not recall signing the arbitration agreement and that he

would only sign documents by hand with his written signature. The district court

correctly held that this was sufficient. See Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Grp., Inc., 181

Cal. Rptr. 3d 781, 790 (Ct. App. 2014) (finding adequate challenge to the existence

of an arbitration agreement when opposing party “claimed he did not recall signing

the [arbitration] agreement and would not have signed it had it been presented to

him.”).

3. Finally, the district court was not required to furnish Employers with

additional opportunities to respond and engage in discovery. A “district court is

vested with broad discretion to make discovery and evidentiary rulings conducive

to the conduct of a fair and orderly trial.” Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1515

(9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Employers argue that the

district court should have allowed supplemental briefing and granted discovery

because Employers were surprised by the court’s conclusion that their evidence

was internally contradictory. But the district court identified issues that “concern

matters within [Employers’] own knowledge,” for which Employers had “ample

6 25-2951 time to present sufficient evidence” and for which discovery through deposition of

Gonzales would have been inappropriate. Thus, the district court’s decision to

decline supplemental briefing and discovery did not constitute an abuse of

discretion.

AFFIRMED.

7 25-2951