NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 5 2026

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FELICIANO XEC PUAC, No. 20-70408 Agency No. Petitioner, A209-210-843 v.

MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 3, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: GRABER, CLIFTON, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Feliciano Xec Puac, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review

of a Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) order that dismissed an appeal from an

immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of his application for withholding of removal and

protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

1 20-70408 under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for

substantial evidence. Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th

Cir. 2017) (en banc). Under the deferential substantial evidence standard, the

BIA’s determinations are upheld unless the evidence compels a contrary

conclusion from that adopted by the BIA. Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th

824, 831 (9th Cir. 2022).

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of withholding of removal.

Petitioner did not establish that his proposed particular social groups were

cognizable. “Family ties” and “Guatemalans perceived as wealthy” are too

amorphous, lacking sufficient particularity. See, e.g., Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch,

816 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2016) (“‘[I]mputed wealthy Americans’ is not a

discrete class of persons recognized by society as a particular social group.”).

Even if the proffered groups were cognizable, Petitioner failed to establish a nexus

between the harm suffered and membership in those groups, as nothing in the

record demonstrates that the alleged violence suffered or feared was or would be

on account of such membership.

Petitioner’s CAT claim pointed to the prospect of his being tortured by

private parties, with government consent or acquiescence, if he is removed to

Guatemala. As the agency noted, when Petitioner’s mother was raped, law

2 20-70408 enforcement apprehended the suspect. Although Petitioner testified that the

suspect was later released, “a general ineffectiveness on the government’s part to

investigate and prevent crime will not suffice to show acquiescence.” Andrade-

Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2016). Further, the country reports

and news articles that Petitioner submitted to show the likelihood of torture,

amount to generalized country conditions evidence, which, without more, does not

satisfy the required showing of a particularized threat of torture. See Dhital v.

Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Accordingly,

substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of CAT protection.

The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.

PETITION DENIED.

3 20-70408