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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

SHAWN MICHAEL H.,

11 Case No. 5:25-cv-01866-KES

12 Plaintiff, 13 v. MEMOR ANDUM OPINION

AND ORDER

14 FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security, 15

16 Defendant.

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18 I.

19 INTRODUCTION

20 On July 23, 2025, Plaintiff Shawn Michael H. (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint 21 for review of denial of social security disability benefits. (Dkt. 1.) On October 15, 22 2025, Plaintiff filed a Plaintiff’s Brief under Rule 6 of the Supplemental Rules for 23 Social Security Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (“PB” at Dkt. 11.) After a stay 24 caused by the lapse of appropriations to fund the federal government (Dkt. 10, 14), 25 on December 8, 2025, Defendant Frank Bisignano, the Commissioner of Social 26 Security (“Commissioner”), filed a responding Commissioner’s Brief under Rule 7. 27 (“CB” at Dkt. 15.) Plaintiff filed a Reply Brief. (“PRB” at Dkt. 16.) For the reasons 28 1 stated below, the Commissioner’s decision denying benefits is REVERSED and 2 REMANDED for further administrative proceedings. 3 II. 4 BACKGROUND 5 Plaintiff worked as a trash truck driver from 1996 to 2018. Administrative 6 Record (“AR”) 330-31. He stopped working on December 6, 2018, due to an 7 industrial injury to his right ankle, after which he pursued a workers’ compensation 8 claim. AR 209, 609, 629, 780. His workers’ compensation case settled in 2019. 9 AR 601. 10 In July 2020, Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits 11 (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging disability as of December 12 6, 2018. AR 209-15. Plaintiff filed a second DIB application on May 2, 2022, 13 alleging the same disability onset date. AR 200. 14 On August 8, 2024, Plaintiff testified at a hearing before an Administrative 15 Law Judge (“ALJ”), as did a vocational expert (“VE”). AR 33-57. On August 28, 16 2024, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. AR 14-32. The ALJ found that 17 Plaintiff suffered from the severe medically determinable impairments (“MDIs”) of 18 “obesity; degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine; osteoarthritis of the knees; 19 and right Achilles tear.” AR 19. Despite these MDIs, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 20 had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform work with the following 21 exertional demands: 22 [Plaintiff] can lift and carry fifty pounds occasionally and twenty 23 pounds frequently; [he] can stand and/or walk four hours in an eight- hour workday and sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday; [he] can 24 frequently climb ramps and stairs; [he] can occasionally climb 25 ladders, ropes and scaffolds; [he] can frequently balance, kneel, stoop, crouch and crawl and [he] must avoid concentrated exposure to 26 hazards. 27 AR 22. 28 1 Based on these RFC findings, the VE’s testimony, and other evidence, the 2 ALJ found that Plaintiff could no longer do his past relevant work as a trash truck 3 driver. AR 25-26. He could, however, work as a (1) storage facility rental clerk 4 (Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) 295.367-026); (2) ticket seller (DOT 5 211.467-030); and (3) router (DOT 222.587-038) (the “Alternative Jobs”). AR 27. 6 The DOT classifies all the Alternative Jobs as light work. Generally, light work 7 “requires standing or walking for six hours in an eight-hour day,” not four, the limit 8 in Plaintiff’s RFC. Jenkins v. Astrue, 628 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1149 (C.D. Cal. 2009) 9 (emphasis added); see Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at 10 *6, 1983 SSR LEXIS 30, at *14 (“[T]he full range of light work requires standing 11 or walking, off and on, for a total of approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday.”). 12 The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. AR 27. 13 III. 14 ISSUES PRESENTED 15 (1) Whether the ALJ erred by failing to find that Plaintiff had a “severe 16 shoulder or lumbar impairment.” (PB at 6-9.) 17 (2) Whether the ALJ erred by failing to give clear and convincing reasons, 18 supported by substantial evidence, for discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. 19 (PB at 9-14.) 20 (3) Whether the ALJ erred by failing to account in the RFC findings for 21 “mild” mental limitations assessed by consultative psychologist LaQeishia Hagans, 22 Ed.D. (PB at 14-17.) 23 (4) Whether the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff can do the Alternative Jobs is 24 supported by substantial evidence, since the VE did not explain testimony about 25 walking and standing requirements that deviated from the DOT. (PB at 17-19.) 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 IV. 2 DISCUSSION 3 Because error in the ALJ’s vocational findings raised by Issue Four provides 4 a sufficient basis to remand for further administrative proceedings, the Court 5 declines to address Plaintiff’s other issues. On remand, the ALJ may wish to 6 consider Plaintiff’s other claims of error. 7 A. ISSUE FOUR: Support for the ALJ’s Vocational Findings. 8 1. Relevant Law. 9 The DOT is the Commissioner’s “primary source of reliable job information” 10 and creates a rebuttable presumption as to a job classification. Johnson v. Shalala, 11 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 n.6, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 12 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1990)). ALJs may rely on VE testimony “which contradicts 13 the DOT, but only insofar as the record contains persuasive evidence to support the 14 deviation.” Id. at 1435; Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 15 1997). Although evidence provided by a VE “generally should be consistent” with 16 the DOT, “[n]either the DOT nor the VE … evidence automatically ‘trumps’ when 17 there is a conflict.” SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *2, 2000 SSR LEXIS 8, at 18 *4-5. Thus, the ALJ must first determine whether a conflict exists, and if it does, 19 the ALJ must then determine whether the VE’s explanation for the conflict is 20 reasonable and whether a basis exists for relying on the expert rather than the DOT. 21 Id. Only after determining whether the VE has deviated from the DOT, and 22 whether any deviation is reasonable, can an ALJ properly rely on the VE’s 23 testimony as substantial evidence to support a disability determination. Massachi v. 24 Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152-54 (9th Cir. 2007). 25 “For a difference between an expert’s testimony and the [DOT’s] listings to 26 be fairly characterized as a conflict, it must be obvious or apparent.” Gutierrez v. 27 Colvin, 844 F.3d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 2016). If there is an apparent conflict, an ALJ 28 may rely on VE testimony but only to the extent that the record contains persuasive 1 evidence supporting the deviation. Johnson, 60 F.3d at 1435. 2 2. Relevant Administrative Proceedings. 3 When the ALJ questioned the VE at the hearing, the ALJ’s first hypothetical 4 question did not contain any limitations on standing or walking. AR 54-55. The 5 ALJ then added a limitation that the hypothetical worker be “limited to walking 6 and/or standing four hours in an eight-hour workday.” AR 55. The VE testified 7 that such a worker could perform the Alterative Jobs, identifying all of them as 8 “light” work. AR 56. 9 The ALJ asked the VE if his testimony was consistent with the DOT. AR 56. 10 The VE answered, “It has aside of a few things here, climbing ladders and stairs, 11 [as well as] the off-task time[] would be based upon my knowledge, experience[,] 12 and training. I’m trying to see if there’s anything else that I’m missing. I think 13 that’s it, Your Honor.” AR 56-57. No one asked the VE any further questions. 14 AR 57. 15 3. Analysis. 16 The first inquiry is whether the VE’s testimony raised an apparent conflict 17 with the DOT. It did. The ALJ asked the VE about a hypothetical worker limited 18 to walking or standing for four hours per day, whereas the VE testified that Plaintiff 19 could do the Alternative Jobs, all of which, as light work, require walking or 20 standing for up to six hours per day. AR 27, 56; Melissa B. v. Kijakazi, No. 5:20- 21 cv-01684-MAA, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12792, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2022) 22 (discussing the well-established nature of the definition of light work). 23 Next, the apparent conflict was not resolved with persuasive evidence to 24 support the deviation. When the ALJ asked the VE if his testimony deviated from 25 the DOT, the VE failed to acknowledge a deviation about walking or standing 26 requirements. AR 56-57. As a result, the ALJ did not inquire about the deviation, 27 and the VE failed to provide any explanation. AR 57. “Absent anything in the 28 record to explain this apparent discrepancy, we must reverse and remand so the 1 ALJ can ask the VE to reconcile these jobs with [Plaintiff's walking and standing] 2 limitations.” Lamear v. Berryhill, 865 F.3d 1201, 1206 (9th Cir. 2017); see also 3 Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1004 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Because 4 the ALJ did not recognize the apparent conflict …, the VE did not address whether 5 the conflict could be resolved. As a result, we cannot determine whether substantial 6 evidence supports the ALJ’s step-five finding.”) (citation modified). Thus, reversal 7 is warranted. See Melissa B., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12792, at *9 (remanding case 8 for identical scenario). 9 The Commissioner contends that the VE’s testimony provides sufficient 10 evidentiary support for the ALJ’s vocational findings. (CB at 17.) The Commissioner 11 argues that the VE sufficiently identified and explained the conflict between his 12 testimony and the DOT by testifying that “a few things” he said deviated from the 13 DOT, but those were based on his experience. (CB at 17-18.) But the VE identified 14 only testimony about climbing and time spent off-task as testimony that deviated 15 from the DOT. AR 56-57. The VE did not say that his testimony about the walking 16 and standing requirements of the Alternative Jobs was based on his experience. 17 The Commissioner also contends that not all light jobs require six hours of 18 walking or standing. (CB at 18.) While this is true, per the DOT, all light work can 19 require up to six hours of walking or standing. This requires the VE to explain any 20 testimony that someone who cannot walk and/or stand for six hours can nevertheless 21 do particular light jobs. 22 / / / 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 V. 2 CONCLUSION 3 Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that judgment shall be entered 4 | REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits and 5 | REMANDING this case for further administrative proceedings. 6 DATED: January 8, 2026 bones 6. Scott 2 8 KAREN E. SCOTT 9 United States Magistrate Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28