facts, procedural history, and arguments underlying this appeal, we do not detail

them here. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We deny the petition.

We “review only the BIA’s opinion, except to the extent that it expressly

adopted portions of the IJ’s decision.” Villegas Sanchez v. Garland, 990 F.3d

1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Velasquez-Gaspar v. Barr, 976 F.3d 1062,

1064 (9th Cir. 2020)). We review the BIA’s denial of relief for substantial

evidence, meaning we “must uphold the agency determination unless the evidence

compels a contrary conclusion.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028

(9th Cir. 2019).

1. We conclude the BIA did not err in finding that Avilio, who is male, was

not a member of the particular social group “women in El Salvador” and therefore

could not establish a nexus to a protected ground. The agency’s denial of asylum

and withholding claims was supported by substantial evidence.

2. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision to deny asylum to both applicants for

failure to show past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution in El

Salvador on account of a protected ground. Because the IJ found that Leslie is a

member of the particular social group, we understand this finding to refer to

persecution and nexus. The BIA separately affirmed the IJ’s determination that

2 24-6224 Leslie did not establish a nexus to a protected ground, citing the IJ’s conclusions at

pages 14–15. There, the IJ found that while Leslie was a member of the particular

social group “women in El Salvador,” “she has not been persecuted, and there’s no

indication here that she’s been targeted for anything,” and concluded “there’s

simply no persecution, no nexus to indicate that she would suffer any harm from

anyone.”

The BIA did not err in concluding that Leslie had not established any nexus

between the protected social group and the drive-by shooting of her uncle, the

shooting of the employee at the family’s brick factory, or the body found near her

grandmother’s home.1 But the record compels the contrary conclusion regarding

nexus to the incidents of sexual harassment Leslie described. Those incidents were

by their “very nature gender-based” and they occurred in the context of high levels

of violence in El Salvador against women because they are women. However, the

BIA correctly decided that the incidents Leslie described did not constitute

1 The BIA stated in the penultimate paragraph of its decision that the failure to show nexus was dispositive of Petitioners’ asylum and withholding claims, but earlier in its decision it had already determined that: (1) Avilio’s asylum and withholding claims failed because he was not a member of the protected group; and (2) both Petitioners had failed to show past or future persecution. In context, the BIA’s statement that it did not reach Petitioners’ “other claims” refers to the arguments in Petitioners’ brief to the BIA that the IJ erred by failing to apply a lower standard for persecution in light of Leslie’s age and that they could not avoid future persecution by relocating. We read the BIA order denying Leslie’s asylum and withholding claims to rely on both its persecution and nexus findings.

3 24-6224 persecution within the meaning of the INA. See Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at

1028 (persecution is an “extreme concept”); Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052,

1061–63 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding that persecution requires showing “ongoing

pattern of serious maltreatment” specific to petitioners, not solely “generalized

violence” in a country). Therefore, the BIA’s denial of Leslie’s asylum and

withholding claims was supported by substantial evidence.

3. Petitioners must exhaust their challenges to an IJ’s conclusions before the

BIA in order to preserve the issues for appeal. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d

674, 678 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Shen v. Garland, 109

F.4th 1144, 1157 (9th Cir. 2024) (explaining that this court may not reach merits of

legal claim not presented on appeal to BIA). In their appeal to the BIA, Avilio and

Leslie did not refer to the CAT standard, argue that it was met, or contest the IJ’s

finding that they had not established a likelihood of torture. The BIA did not err in

concluding that Petitioners waived their opportunity to appeal the denial of CAT

protection. Because Petitioners failed to exhaust their challenge to the denial of

their CAT applications on the basis of government acquiescence in torture, we

deny their petition.

We therefore DENY the petition for relief.

4 24-6224