NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 10 2026

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NARCISO BAHENA-BARRETO, No. 24-4497 Agency No. Petitioner, A216-051-709 v.

MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 6, 2026** Portland, Oregon

Before: BEA, CHRISTEN, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of a decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) that dismissed his appeal from an

immigration judge’s decision, which denied his application for cancellation of

removal and ordered Petitioner removed to Mexico. We have jurisdiction under 8

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). U.S.C. § 1252(a). We review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo. Umana-

Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023). We affirm.

Cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents generally requires, inter

alia, the absence of a conviction under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or

1227(a)(3). See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b); but see 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(5) (allowing

waiver in certain circumstances). Petitioner was the subject of a restraining order

issued under the Oregon Family Abuse Prevention Act. In violation of that

restraining order, he contacted the protected person in person, and he subsequently

had a judgment entered against him for contempt of court pursuant to Oregon

Revised Statutes “O.R.S.” § 33.015.

Under Diaz-Quirazco v. Barr, 931 F.3d 830, 846 (9th Cir. 2019), a contempt

judgment under O.R.S. § 33.015 meets the definition of a conviction pursuant to 8

U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A), notwithstanding the fact that a contempt judgment is not a

criminal conviction under Oregon law; Petitioner therefore has been convicted for

purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) and is thus ineligible for cancellation of

removal under § 1229b(b).

Petitioner urges us to overrule Diaz-Quirazco, which deferred to the BIA

under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.

837 (1984). See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412 (2024)

(overruling Chevron). As a three-judge panel, we are bound by Diaz-Quirazco

2 24-4497 unless Loper Bright “undercut the theory or reasoning underlying [Diaz-Quirazco]

in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable.” Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d

889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). In Loper Bright, the Supreme Court explained

that its decision “do[es] not call into question prior cases that relied on the Chevron

framework” and holds that “[t]he holdings of those cases… are still subject to

statutory stare decisis despite our change in interpretive methodology . . . [absent a]

‘special justification.’” 603 U.S. 369, 412 (2024) (citation modified). No such

special justification is claimed and none exists, see, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State,

Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 585 U.S. 878, 916–29 (2018) (discussing special

justifications for overruling a precedential case); therefore, Diaz-Quirazco remains

binding. See Lopez v. Garland, 116 F.4th 1032, 1045 (9th Cir. 2024).

AFFIRMED.

3 24-4497