NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 10 2026

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AURORA ROSARIO, individually and on No. 24-6673 behalf of all others similarly situated and on D.C. No. behalf of the general public, 2:21-cv-07221-JAK-PD Plaintiff - Appellant,

MEMORANDUM*

v.

PIH HEALTH, INC.,

Defendant - Appellee,

v.

FERDINAND RIVERA,

Movant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 4, 2026 Pasadena, California

Before: GRABER, BRESS, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Plaintiff Aurora Rosario appeals the district court’s dismissal of her putative

class action pursuant to the discretionary home state exception to subject matter

jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(d)(3). We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to

decline to exercise jurisdiction, Adams v. W. Marine Prods., Inc., 958 F.3d 1216,

1220 (9th Cir. 2020), we review for clear error the district court’s factual findings,

id. at 1219, and we review de novo the interpretation of CAFA, Brinkley v.

Monterey Fin. Servs., Inc., 873 F.3d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.

Section 1332(d)(3) provides that “[a] district court may . . . decline to

exercise jurisdiction” over a class action that otherwise falls within CAFA’s grant

of subject matter jurisdiction if “greater than one-third but less than two-thirds of

the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate and the primary

defendants are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed.” 28

U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3). Plaintiff argues that the district court erred by relying on

class members’ addresses as evidence of California citizenship and by considering

the proportion of in-state citizens with reference to the proposed settlement class,

rather than the larger classes defined in the complaint.1

1 Plaintiff also argues that the district court erred by dismissing the case without ordering her to brief the issue of CAFA’s discretionary home state exception. We disagree. Plaintiff had ample notice that this exception was at issue, and the district court did not prevent her from briefing the issue.

2 24-6673 On the first issue, we have held that addresses provide some evidence of

domicile, even though they are not a direct proxy. Adams, 958 F.3d at 1221, 1223.

Here, it is particularly appropriate to consider addresses because Defendant PIH

Health is a regional healthcare network; it is reasonable to infer that most people

who seek medical care from a regional entity are domiciled nearby. Addresses also

may suffice as evidence of United States citizenship, if paired with evidence that

the number of in-state addresses likely provides a sufficient cushion above the

statutory threshold to account for noncitizens. See King v. Great Am. Chicken

Corp., 903 F.3d 875, 876, 879–80 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting that addresses may

suffice if they provide a “substantial cushion and [are] bolstered by evidence that

the number of class members who were not domiciled in California or might not

qualify as [United States] citizens are likely covered by the cushion”).

On the second issue, we assume without deciding that the district court

should have used the number of people in the classes defined by the complaint

(about 200,000) rather than the settlement class (about 165,000). The district court

found that “99.58% of the [settlement class] have a last known mailing address in

California.” That finding is not clearly erroneous. Applying the resulting figure

(about 164,000 California addresses) to the total number of class members

identified in the original complaint means that at least two-thirds of the larger pool

of class members had last known addresses in California. As in Adams, “given the

3 24-6673 substantial cushion afforded by the percentage of class members with last known

California addresses, as compared to the percentage of class member citizens

required for a discretionary remand,” 958 F.3d at 1223, there was sufficient

evidence to support the district court’s application of the discretionary home state

exception. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in applying the factors in

28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)(A)–(F).

AFFIRMED.

4 24-6673